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ABSTRACT 
 
NON-BEING & MEMORY: 
 
A CRITIQUE OF PURE DIFFERENCE IN DERRIDA AND DELEUZE 
 
 
 
By 
Frank Scalambrino 
August 2011 
 
Dissertation supervised by Daniel J. Selcer 
 The psychology philosophy split has restricted viable readings of today‟s 
psychological research.  My project (within the philosophy of psychology) is to provide 
these readings.  Specifically, in this dissertation I analyze the data and the interpretations 
of a large number of contemporary memory research articles.  I use these articles to 
support my claim that Immanuel Kant misunderstood what in the Critique of Pure 
Reason he labeled “affinity.”  Further, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze inherit this 
Kantian misunderstanding by way of G.W.F. Hegel‟s attempt to eliminate it.  Put another 
way, the component in question is that which grounds the post-structuralist justification 
for “pure difference,” and the wider context of this discussion is Plato‟s problem of non-
being.  That is, Kant‟s reading of affinity and Derrida‟s and Deleuze‟s respective 
 v 
readings of pure difference all function as failed attempts to solve the problem of non-
being.   
Taking Plato‟s Parmenides and Sophist as points of departure, I show how each of 
the above-mentioned thinkers, including Aristotle, fails to meet Plato‟s criteria for, i.e. 
solve, the problem of non-being.  I then use contemporary memory research for the sake 
of enunciating my own solution to Plato‟s problem.  The critical structure of my 
discourse is directed at Derrida and Deleuze, then, as a critique of their readings of pure 
difference, and this is to accentuate the difference between my response to the problem 
and theirs.       
Kant‟s misunderstanding of memory committed him to an ontological filled-
duration illusion.  On the one hand, my reading of contemporary memory research 
depicts being as bound by memory.  On the other hand, memory‟s binding is governed by 
play, i.e. memory as being‟s play-ground.  And, gaps can be noticed by regarding shifting 
engagements of procedural memory or memory‟s cycling, though these gaps are often 
covered over by priming and habitual scripts.  Hence, just as these gaps justify calling 
ontological filled-duration illusory, these gaps also constitute my solution to the problem 
of non-being.  I paraphrase the fruit of solving the problem: Your being is not persisting; 
it is pulsing.  Perhaps the largest impact of my solution is to be found in ethics. 
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PREFACE 
 
I had already been trained in formal logic when, for the first time, I watched a 
man die.  I was majoring in psychology at Kenyon College and working in the emergency 
department of a trauma center in Canton, Ohio.  Witnessing such experiences I became 
persuaded of the idea that there is a difference between thoughts about death and the 
experience of death.  Perhaps this is why I became so enthusiastic when I first learned of 
the philosophical problem of non-being. 
So, what is the problem of non-being?  In order to understand this problem, start 
with the question itself: What is non-being?  This question has perplexed philosophers 
because all answers seem self-refuting.  In other words, since when you answer this 
question, an answer is being given, the answer cannot refer to non-being.  Put simply, this 
would be like telling a fish that has never been out of water that “dry” is the opposite or 
negation of the water the fish currently experiences.  The words are all understandable; 
yet, the fish neither knows dryness, nor has the fish become different through an 
awareness of dryness. 
The problem of non-being is especially unique, then, because this self-refutation 
goes all the way down to the term “non-being” itself.  In fact, for this reason some 
philosophers hold that the problem of non-being cannot be a problem at all.  Likewise, 
they say the question “what is non-being?” is not a real question.  On the one hand, non-
being does not refer to anything.  On the other hand, you cannot decide upon an answer 
to the question without taking non-being to be something and attempting to negate that 
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thing.  Hence, this is the very problem of non-being.  That is, what is non-being, and how 
can this question be answered given the topic about which it supposedly asks? 
When philosophers attempt to solve the problem, rather than merely dismiss it, 
they usually do so by distinguishing between being and becoming, and then consider non-
being to refer to the difference between the two.  As I will show in this dissertation, 
Immanuel Kant came closest to date to solving the problem by positing a third non-entity, 
i.e. the thing-in-itself, as different from the object which is experienced and the various 
experiential stages of its becoming.  So, Plato pointed to the path and Kant cleared the 
way to the formulation of a solution.  However, Kant fell short of solving the problem, 
and philosophers in his wake have, to date, not corrected his shortcomings.   
There is a significant list of philosophers who have attempted to solve the 
problem of non-being.  Moreover, given the unique perplexity of the problem, I engage a 
number of these thinkers in order to provide a proof for my solution.  After all, the 
thinkers with whom I disagree about non-being are eminent philosophers, e.g. Aristotle, 
G.W.F. Hegel, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze.  Hence, I thought it prudent to do 
more than just claim these thinkers are wrong in regard to non-being.   
Also, when facing such seemingly impenetrable perplexity, philosophers often 
inquire regarding the value of the problem, of the question, or of its solution.  In other 
words, what is at stake regarding non-being?  As I will show in this dissertation, Plato 
considered this question important because you cannot understand being until you 
understand non-being.  So, what is at stake with the problem of non-being is being.  This 
is a powerful claim, i.e. if you cannot solve the problem of non-being, then you do not 
understand what being is.  I affirm both the perplexity of the problem and its value.  In 
 xxi 
fact, I find the solution‟s paradigm shift to be particularly interesting, i.e. when you 
understand the solution to the problem, you understand being, and thereby your being, 
differently.
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“The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition  
is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”1 
~Alfred North Whitehead 
 
“[P]hilosophy without the history of philosophy is, if not blind, at least dumb…”2 
~Wilfrid Sellars 
 
“What then will you do about philosophy?   
Where will you turn, while these difficulties remain unresolved?”
3
 
~Plato, (Parm 135c) 
Chapter One: Part I – Introduction: The Problem of Non-Being 
Dissertation Overview 
The topic of this dissertation is the problem of non-being.  I address this topic in 
order to criticize the contemporary readings of “pure difference” put forth by Jacques 
Derrida and Gilles Deleuze as their solutions to the problem of non-being.  The method 
with which I address the topic, and thereby provide a critique of pure difference, may be 
divided into two treatments.  The first treatment is negative; negative because I show that 
– based on the criteria for solving the problem of non-being – neither Derrida‟s nor 
Deleuze‟s reading of pure difference solves the problem.  The second treatment is 
positive; positive because I solve the problem of non-being. 
 §1 Part I Overview – The first part of the dissertation contains (1) an explication 
of the problem of non-being, (2) a reading of pure difference according to Derrida and a 
reading according to Deleuze, and (3) the negative first treatment showing that neither 
version of pure difference solves the problem of non-being.  Now, the explication of the 
problem necessarily invokes a number of philosophers.  Yet, as the explication is for the 
                                               
1 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, (New York: Free Press, 1985), 39. 
2 Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes, (California: Ridgeview 
Publishing, 1992), 1. 
3 Plato, Parmenides, Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan, tr., Plato Complete Works, (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1997), 369. 
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sake of the single problem of non-being, these thinkers may be merely regarded as so 
many attempts to articulate solutions.   
The series of thinkers to be encountered then includes: Plato, Aristotle, Immanuel 
Kant, and G.W.F. Hegel.  The manner in which these thinkers treat the problem of non-
being provides the context for reading pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze.  As I will 
show, specifically Plato provides the first formal statement of the problem, and he 
himself offers a rendition of (what may technically be referred to as “pure”) difference to 
solve the problem.  However, Kant is the thinker of all these mentioned who came closest 
to date to solving the problem of non-being.  Moreover, I take both Derrida and Deleuze 
to be post-Kantian thinkers.  Hence, I invoke Aristotle and Hegel in regard to non-being 
to help the reader grasp the manner in which Derrida and Deleuze appropriate Plato’s 
difference in their post-Kantian attempts to solve the problem.    
 None of the three thinkers upon whom I focus in the dissertation, i.e. Kant, 
Derrida, and Deleuze, solve the problem of non-being.  Yet, I chose these three thinkers 
because, on the one hand, Kant cannot be avoided as his structure of experience 
constitutes the greatest advance on the problem.  And, on the other hand, with the benefit 
of post-Hegelian hindsight, Derrida and Deleuze stand as the most sophisticated 
opponents to anyone who would contend to solve the problem of non-being.  This is the 
case because in order to argue against Hegel‟s dialectic Derrida and Deleuze opt for a 
return to Kant‟s structure of experience.  With Kant‟s structure of experience as their 
point of departure, Derrida and Deleuze are then able to employ the ideas of Plato and 
Aristotle in regard to non-being, i.e. difference and potentiality, toward overcoming 
Hegel‟s dialectic.   
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Whereas the Hegelian dialectic was supposed to eliminate the need to posit Kant‟s 
idea of the “thing-in-itself,” it was Kant‟s structure of experience which necessitated him 
– as I will show – to posit the thing-in-itself in the attempt to solve the problem of non-
being.  So, in returning to Kant to overcome Hegel, Derrida and Deleuze replace the idea 
of the thing-in-itself with the idea of pure difference.  And, whatever else one may say 
about Hegel‟s dialectic, Hegel‟s dialectic constitutes his attempt to solve the problem of 
non-being.  Hence, pure difference – as I will show – functions for Derrida and Deleuze 
as an attempt to solve the problem of non-being.   
It is not mere coincidence that after more than 2,000 years, the most sophisticated 
attempts to solve the problem of non-being repeat – albeit differently – the idea a 
character in Plato‟s dialog the Sophist put forth as an answer, i.e. pure difference.  This is 
yet more support for the claim that Derrida and Deleuze stand as the most sophisticated 
opponents to anyone who would contend to solve the problem of non-being.  That is, 
looking back over 2,000 years of philosophy, Derrida and Deleuze were able to 
incorporate the most viable ideas regarding non-being toward returning to what has 
always seemed the most viable solution.  It is, in my opinion, remarkable that Plato could 
articulate a problem which would stand unbreached for over 2,000 years; and, he 
seemingly was able to anticipate the limit of what could be offered as a solution as well. 
§2 Part II Overview – The second part of the dissertation, then, contains my 
solution to the problem of non-being.  My solution adheres to the same criteria 
enumerated in Plato‟s formal statement of the problem and adhered to by his successors 
such as, for example, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Derrida, and Deleuze.  As I noted above, 
then, in returning to an idea of difference in the attempt to solve the problem of non-
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being, Derrida and Deleuze take Kant‟s structure of experience as their point of 
departure.  Now, the aspect of Kant‟s innovative structure of experience which I contend 
kept him from solving the problem derives from a – perhaps excusable for the 18th 
century – misunderstanding by Kant of psychology.  Namely, of what Kant refers to as 
the three original sources or powers of the mind, Kant did not recognize these sources as 
rooted in memory.  Hence, standing on Kant‟s shoulders, I solve the problem of non-
being by revealing Kant‟s sensation and imagination as rooted in and functions of 
sensory memory and working memory respectively. 
There is a longstanding prejudice amongst philosophers regarding memory.  Put 
generally, philosophers tend to think of sensation as devoid of memory, and to think of 
imagination as more powerful than memory.  Furthermore, despite their criticisms of 
phenomenology both Derrida and Deleuze adhere to this psychological prejudice.  
Though contemporary psychologists researching memory do not share this prejudice, 
neither do they attempt to solve philosophical problems.  Therefore, on the one hand, I 
support my change to Kant‟s structure of experience by citing contemporary memory 
research.  On the other hand, whereas the post-Kantian readings of Derrida and Deleuze 
fail to solve the problem of non-being, my post-Kantian reading informed by both 
contemporary memory research and the work of Derrida and Deleuze solves the problem 
of non-being.   
This, then, is the positive aspect of my critique.  Rather than provide just a 
different idea, such as pure difference or the thing-in-itself, my solution to the problem 
provides a different relation, and a different perspective, by solving the problem.  Yet, it 
is, of course, possible, as I will show in the conclusion of the dissertation, to construct an 
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idea from the results of my solution (Deleuze should be happy).  What is more, I believe 
this idea I have constructed is original in regard to the literature.  You can be the judge 
after you read the dissertation.  Lastly, though the manner in which this solution to the 
problem of non-being might fit in with some portion or with Plato‟s dialogs as a whole is 
not a concern which I will pursue in this text, I conclude the dissertation with a brief 
discussion of the new vista of being which my solution to the problem of non-being 
provides.  I also provide a brief discussion of the value of such a vista.        
The Relations amongst Becoming, Being, and Non-Being  
“Socrates: „Is any one of the manys what someone says it is, then, any more than it is not what he says it 
is?‟ Glaucon: „No, they are like ambiguities [enigmas and puzzles]…‟  
Socrates: „Then do you know how to deal with them? [my emphasis] … Surely, they can‟t be more than 
what is or not be more than what is not, for apparently nothing is darker than what is not or clearer than 
what is.‟  
Glaucon: „Very true.‟  
Socrates: „We‟ve now discovered, it seems [my emphasis], that the many conventions of the majority of 
people about beauty and the others are rolling around as intermediates between what is not and what purely 
is.‟”4  
~Plato (Rep 1997, 479b-e) 
 
§3 The Context of the Problem – The purpose of this section of the Introduction is 
to establish the context for introducing the problem of non-being.
5
  I take Plato (c. 428-c. 
348 B.C.) to have achieved the most precise Ancient statement of the problem of non-
being.  The dialogs widely considered to take the problem of non-being as a central 
theme are the Parmenides and the Sophist.  And, I take Plato‟s statement of the problem 
in the Sophist as the first formal statement of the problem.  What is more, Plato‟s Sophist 
includes the anticipation of various attempts to solve the problem indicating why each of 
the attempts fails as a solution.  Though the value of initially returning to Plato, then, is 
                                               
4 Cf. Plato, Republic, G.M.A. Grube, tr., C.D.C. Reeve, rev., Plato Complete Works, John M. Cooper, ed., 
(Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 1106. 
5 As I will explain below, I am reserving upper case letter terms, i.e. Being and Non-Being, for the Ideas of 
being and non-being, so as to make my text more reader friendly. 
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more than merely organizational, it should be acknowledged that Plato was able to 
organize the problem of non-being by indicating two impasses such that any attempt to 
solve the problem must overcome.  Despite the care Plato took in outlining the intricacy 
involved, what one may consider to be Plato‟s solution – as I will show in the next 
section – is unsatisfactory.  However, his statement of the problem still holds such that it 
may be used as a touchstone to gauge any progress toward a solution. 
§4 Platonic Background to the Problem – Before stating the problem of non-
being found in the Sophist, a brief discussion of Plato‟s Book V of the Republic provides 
a wider context for understanding the problem of non-being.  There Plato suggests a 
distinction is to be made between Being, Becoming, and Non-Being.
6
 (Rep 1997, 479c-e)  
And, according to Plato, an explanation of this distinction is not something to be easily 
given.  Plato associates the difficulty with enigmas or puzzles (αἰλίγκαηη).   
Recall that in the beginning of Book V (Rep 449a) Socrates is encouraged into a 
“digression” which, among other things, passes through the “divided line” (Rep 509d-
511e) of Book VI and culminates with the “Cave Allegory” (Rep 514a-520a) of Book 
VII.  This digression is supposed to discuss the differences between citizens and the 
training as propaedeutic which separates the philosopher from the others.  Noburu 
Notomi‟s The Unity of Plato’s Sophist links the digression of the Republic just mentioned 
with the digression of the Sophist, and in this way, though Notomi does not pursue the 
connection, the problem of non-being is further supposed to be linked to the training and 
discovery of the philosopher.
7
  Recall also, Plato takes pains to note in the Cave allegory 
                                               
6 Cf. Plato, Republic, G.M.A. Grube, tr., C.D.C. Reeve, rev., Plato Complete Works, John M. Cooper, ed., 
(Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 1106.  Hereafter cited as Rep 1997. 
7
 Noburu Notomi, The Unity of Plato’s Sophist, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), xx, 30-
37, & 40-41.  I discovered Notomi‟s discussion after recognizing the connection. 
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that to the prisoners in the cave the philosopher‟s discourse may sound ridiculous (Rep 
517a).  Yet, if the philosopher is capable of solving the enigmas and making the journey, 
then this discourse leads from “the realm of becoming” inside the cave to the “realm of 
being” outside the cave [ἀπὸ ηνῦ γηγλνκέλνπ ἐπὶ ηὸ ὄλ] (Rep 521d).  Further, then, as 
prefatory, the standard Plato passage to quote if discussing Becoming is Timaeus §28.  
There Plato states,  
As I see it, then, we must begin by making the following 
distinction: What is that which always is and has no 
becoming, and what is that which becomes but never is?  
The former is grasped by the understanding, which 
involves a reasoned account.  It is unchanging.  The latter is 
grasped by opinion, which involves unreasoning sense 
perception [Plato‟s emphases].8 (27d5-28a3) 
I quote this passage here for its relevance, though I will discuss it momentarily.  
  §5 The twofold task in working out the question of non-being – At this point it is 
worth pausing to briefly reflect on the term “Becoming.”  As you can see from the Greek 
above, gignomenou is related to the verb gignesthai [γίγλεζζαη] and the noun genesis 
[γέλεζηο].9  So, the Greek translated here as “becoming” points to notions of “origin” and 
“source” and a “beginning” such as a “manner of birth,” “production,” “generation,” or 
“coming into being.”10  Moreover, Francis Macdonald Cornford (1874-1943) in his book 
Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist precisely links becoming, 
and the distinction between being and becoming, from the Republic with the distinction 
                                               
8 Plato, Timaeus, Donald J. Zeyl, tr., Plato Complete Works, John M. Cooper, ed., (Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997), 1234. 
9 Cf. Plato, Sophist, William S. Cobb, tr. (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 1990), 119n.  Hereafter cited as 
Soph 1990.  I use the year to acknowledge the translator; abbreviated references for Plato, Aristotle, and 
Kant without a year refer to no specific translation. 
10 Cf. Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem, “Glossary,” Plato’s Sophist or the Professor of 
Wisdom: Translation with Introduction and Glossary, (Newburyport: Focus Publishing, 1996), 89.  Cf. 
Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 343.   
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as it is further discussed in the Sophist.
11
  What is more, in his article “Plato on Not-
Being,” Gwilym Ellis Lane Owen (1922-1982) among the Republic and Theaetetus lists 
the Parmenides, the Euthydemus, and the Cratylus as dialogs which 
use such locutions as „what is not‟ without ever asking 
whether these are capable of coherent use.  The Sophist by 
contrast proceeds on the view that if and only if we can 
understand the proper use of „what is not‟ … shall we 
understand philosophically the situations those expressions 
are commonly invoked to explain.
12
 
Owen‟s insight not only indicates the value of solving the problem of non-being, it points 
back to the very nature of enigmatic discourses – beyond even the Republic – and the 
puzzles regarding Being, Becoming, and Non-Being. 
Suddenly it does not seem so obvious that discerning the distinction between 
becoming and being – as was supposed in the Republic – makes one a philosopher.  
Rather, the task of discerning being itself is now caught up in the problem of non-being.  
As Plato characterized the relation between being and non-being in the Sophist, to get 
clear about the one is to get clear about the other (Soph 250e-251a).  And, were this 
perplexity the case – which I take it to be – in regard to being, then it would pertain, of 
course, to not just Plato‟s dialogs but the study of philosophy itself.  Moreover, the 
reasons for which I will discuss below, it seems as though Plato never put a solution to 
the problem of non-being in writing.  Attempting to solve the problem of non-being, the 
final answer put forward by Theaetetus is “difference,” i.e. difference as non-being.  
Below I will show why this attempt does not solve the problem of non-being.  As Ronald 
Polansky put it in his Philosophy & Knowledge: A commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus,  
                                               
11 Cf. Francis Macdonald Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist, (New 
York: Dover Publishing, 2003), 239 & 244. 
12 G.E.L. Owen, “Plato on Not-Being,” Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Gail Fine, ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 433.  Cf. Ronald M. Polansky, Philosophy and Knowledge: A commentary 
on Plato’s Theaetetus, (London: Bucknell University Press, 1992), 124. 
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We certainly should doubt that the Sophist completes the 
account of nonbeing unless it also completes the account of 
being… Rather than completing these accounts, the 
stranger says so much as necessary to show that not-being 
is something (and perhaps he says nearly as much about it 
as humanly can be said).
13
 
As both Owen and Polansky point out, then, beyond the difficulty of the problem of non-
being, the coupling of Being and Non-Being is often either missed by Socrates‟ students, 
or they are not up to the task. 
§6 Plato’s Solution – In sum, one way to generally account for the above 
indicated lack of sophistication in the dialogs other than the Sophist is to suggest – as is 
suggested in the Apology (28e & 30a-b)
14
 – that “to live the life of a philosopher” is “to 
examine myself and others.”15  In this way, philosophical discourse truly is an examining 
and an attending to (care, concern for) the “souls” involved in the discourse.  So, the 
discourse reveals as much as the souls involved can power. (Cf. Soph 258b6)  Inevitably, 
then, there will be discussions where topics surface – such as non-being – without the 
interlocutors having the capacity to plunge into the depths of the topic(s).
16
  The 
concluding language of Republic Book V itself provides a good example.   
On the one hand, perhaps Socrates ironically couches the problem in a way 
appropriate to his particular interlocutor.  On the other hand, perhaps Socrates honestly, 
as befitting a midwife,
17
 can only remember within the context which his interlocutor is 
able to establish.  At the conclusion of Book V, according to Socrates, whoever discerns 
the difference between becoming and being discerns the difference between a lover of 
                                               
13
 Ronald M. Polansky, Philosophy and Knowledge: A commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus, (London: 
Bucknell University Press, 1992), 176.  
14 Cf. Phaedrus, 270b; Gorgias 464c; Alcibiades 146e. 
15 Plato, Apology, G.M.A. Grube, tr., Plato Complete Works, John M. Cooper, ed., (Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997), 27.  Hereafter cited Apo. 
16 Cf. Mark Moes, Plato’s Dialogue Form and the Care of the Soul, (New York: Peter Lang, 2000). 
17 Cf. Theaetetus 149a-151d.  Hereafter cited Theaet. 
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opinion (θηινδόμνπο) and a philosopher (θηινζόθνπο).  Now, there appear to be two 
words in play here, other than “love of.”  Yet, the term “sophia” is elusive and enigmatic, 
e.g. consider the double entendre of wisdom/cleverness or simply the question: what is 
wisdom?  If the first two terms are to be understood, then it seems as though a third term 
also requires understanding despite the inability to count it as a separately perceived term.  
Similarly, working on the difference between the two terms becoming and being, some of 
Socrates‟ interlocutors fail to attend to the third term, i.e. they pass over – without 
noticing or attempting to solve – the problem of non-being.  Hence, as the Eleatic visitor 
explains in the Sophist, until you examine your soul sufficiently to be able to solve the 
problem of non-being, you do not know the difference between either of the two terms 
above – Being and Becoming or Philosopher and Sophist –; for “the sophist is a clever 
rogue who will not be got out of his hole.”18 (Soph 1895, 239c5)     
§7 Dependency of reckoning with being upon reckoning with non-being – You 
might ask, then, about a context other than Plato‟s dialogs: To what sort of mistake does 
not having a solution to the problem of non-being lead?  It is not so much what should be 
thought as what should not be thought about non-being.  In other words, treating non-
being as a part of being leads to what Kant would call a “transcendental illusion.”  A 
classic example can be found in Jean-Paul Sartre‟s Being and Nothingness: An Essay in 
Phenomenological Ontology.  According to Sartre, “The explanation of the world by 
means of becoming, conceived as a synthesis of being and non-being, is easily given.”19  
As such, Sartre treats non-being as a thing that can be part of a synthesis.  The point here 
                                               
18 Plato, Sophist, Benjamin Jowett, tr. (New York: Echo Library), 62-64.  Hereafter cited Soph 1895. 
19 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, Hazel Barnes, tr. 
(New York: Citadel Press, 2001), 93.  
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is that in contexts other than Plato‟s dialogs, philosophical discourse still contends with 
non-being.   
The influence of Aristotle, in particular his Metaphysics, on Western philosophy 
is unquestionable.  In fact, were I to put this provocatively I might say it was Aristotle‟s 
false solution to Plato‟s Puzzle of non-being which produced the image in which the 
history of philosophy may be found.  This, of course, assumes a widely held belief that 
the history, and perhaps the “Western tradition,” of philosophy began with Aristotle.20  
As I will show below, Aristotle lost sight of non-being by conflating non-being with not-
being, and then taking hypothetical becoming – which is a form of not-being – as ground 
of experience.  The result was a logical rendering of being as inherent substance, which, 
of course, assumes a god‟s eye point of view.   
The problem with Aristotle‟s assumption of a god‟s eye point of view is that it 
reduces ontological negation to logical negation.  Notice, for example, as Ronald 
Polansky points out,
21
 according to Aristotle: God thinks but does not know.  If this is the 
case, then God does not know the principle of non-contradiction.
22
  However, if it is not 
the case that God knows, and is therefore affirming the principle of non-contradiction by 
thinking in a way to be governed by, the principle of non-contradiction, then it must be 
the case that God is governed by the principle of non-contradiction.  Yet, this, of course, 
is tantamount to turning the principle of non-contradiction into God; such a rendition of 
God should sound contradictory indeed.  In other words, the principle of non-
contradiction is not God; hence, Aristotle‟s reduction of ontological negation to logical 
                                               
20 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Vols. 3 & 4, David Farrell Krell, tr. (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 
1987), 48. 
21 Cf. Ronald Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 19.  
“Hence, there is no philosophical reason for attributing any mere knowledge or wisdom to God.”  
22 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Vols. 3 & 4, 115. 
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negation overly narrowed his perspective, and subsequently Aristotle lost sight of non-
being.     
It is in this way that the “history of Western philosophy” has hitherto been unable 
to think the relation between the ideas of Being, Becoming, and Non-Being.  Re-thinking 
Aristotle‟s reduction of ontological to logical negation became a preparatory task to be 
completed by Kant‟s “Copernican revolution.”  So, a brief discussion of Aristotle in this 
dissertation has become inevitable.  First, discussing Aristotle goes toward clarifying the 
mistaken frame promulgated under the name “Aristotle” through which a significant 
amount of historical philosophical thinking engaged the problem of non-being.  Second, 
the Plato I quoted above regarding Becoming at Timaeus (27d5-28a3) already highlighted 
the perplexity in discerning an idea of Becoming in relation to Being and Non-Being.  As 
Plato indicated there, it is always from within the stability of that which is, i.e. being, that 
any negative relation to being can be discerned.  Certainly of “that which becomes but 
never is” you may say “it is not.”23  Within the Aristotelian paradigm, then, process 
philosophy‟s concern with becoming is a concern with not-being.  Hence, in particular, 
then, Deleuze‟s reading of process philosophy expresses an attempt to rethink Aristotle‟s 
reduction of ontological negation for the sake of rethinking Becoming.   
Whereas discussing Plato is a return to the origin of the problem‟s formal 
statement, discussing Aristotle is a return to the initial shift of context – or frame or 
paradigm – away from Plato‟s statement of the problem; and, it was this shift which 
clouded thinking the relation between the ideas of Being, Becoming, and Non-Being.  So, 
what hangs in the balance with Aristotle‟s shift – what is at stake, what is the value of 
                                               
23 Plato, Timaeus, Donald J. Zeyl, tr., Plato Complete Works, John M. Cooper, ed., (Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997), 1234.  Hereafter cited as Tim. 
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discussing the return to Aristotle‟s shift?  Answering this question requires you look at a 
different aspect of the same evidence, as it were, to notice that ultimately Aristotle‟s 
reduction of ontological negation to logical negation assumes – but does not justify – a 
notion of ontological persistence.  This assumption receives its contemporary articulation 
by grounding being in time.  Though, if reckoning with being is contingent upon 
reckoning with non-being, and if Aristotle was mistaken to reduce ontological negation to 
logical negation, then the assumption of persistence turns out to – wrongly – be justified 
by a logical understanding of negation, and the mistaken idea about being derives 
precisely from a mistaken idea of non-being.  Put another way, grounding being in time 
begs the question.      
Recall that above I referred to becoming as “hypothetical,” because, as pure, 
becoming never is, i.e. you cannot even step in such a river “once.”  Becoming is not 
Being.  One way to characterize this is to say the being of your discursive mind is 
displaced from the becoming (its and non-discursive becoming), and thereby unable to 
grasp becoming qua becoming.  But still, becoming is not being.  Hence, a major 
difference between non-being and becoming is lost in the process of Aristotle‟s shifting 
the problem, i.e. becoming‟s relation to being allows for it to be discussed.   
So, Aristotle‟s reduction of ontological negation to logical negation must be re-
thought while keeping in mind Plato‟s perplexing insight that you do not encounter the 
same problem in attempting to discuss becoming as you do when you attempt to discuss 
non-being.
24
  In this regard, Kant‟s Copernican revolution will be successful.  As Kant 
                                               
24 It is important to note that I am not claiming Aristotle thinks of all destruction as the same; rather, I am 
claiming his thought of complete (hypokeimenal) destruction as non-being derives from a mistakenly 
reduced notion of negation.  In other words, instead of thinking the relations between Being, Becoming, 
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points out, simply stating “nihil” is far too heavy handed a style.  You cannot just declare 
it and move on as if it were something which could simply be “unbound.”  The nuance to 
which I adhere in discussing the subtleties encountered in approaching the problem of 
non-being, then, is to follow Plato and make an initial distinction between not-being and 
non-being.
25
  Not-being with a “t” is taken to refer to the power of logical negation, and 
not-being in regard to the physical relates to being as becoming relates to being.  I 
elaborate on this more below.    
Given the perplexities of the problem of non-being and the difficult, though 
unavoidable, task of encountering Aristotle‟s paradigm shift, in this introduction, I will 
first show Plato‟s statement of the problem of non-being in the Sophist.  In showing the 
problem I will also show the two perplexities or impasses you encounter, as discussed by 
Plato, when you attempt to solve the problem.  Second, I will show Plato‟s proposal of 
difference as a solution.  Finally, I will show how Aristotle‟s arsenal,26 i.e. his logical 
apparatus for making distinctions, renders a reading of not-being as a solution to the 
problem of non-being.  As you will see, it is Aristotle who formalizes a strategy for 
mistakenly grounding being in time and equating non-being with death.  This, then, 
should be sufficient for an introduction to such a complicated problem, i.e. it should 
provide you with a foothold for the “heavy going” which will follow.   
§8 Final introductory statement of orientation – Lastly, before getting underway, 
let me conclude this section of the Introduction with some last words of orientation.  It is 
important to keep in mind that there is a significant amount of specificity involved in 
                                                                                                                                            
and Non-Being, Aristotle thinks the relation between Being and Becoming by way of (privative) degrees of 
logical negation.  I will continue to clarify what I mean here below.  
25 Plato, Sophist, Nicholas P. White, tr., Plato Complete Works, John M. Cooper, ed., (Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997), 280.  (257c). 
26 What Spinoza might think of as the “hodgepodge of Peripatetic distinctions.” 
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Plato‟s criteria for solving the problem of non-being, i.e. his criteria can be used to grade 
attempts to solve the problem.  So, grasping the specificity should further help you 
navigate the entirety of the discussion.  For example, in Chapter 2 I will support my claim 
that Kant‟s critical philosophy in general, and specifically his Critique of Pure Reason, 
represents the furthest advance to date on the problem by showing how Kant was the first 
thinker to successfully overcome the first of two impasses which Plato requires be 
overcome if you are to solve the problem.  Further, I will support my claim that Kant 
failed to solve the problem of non-being by showing how he failed to overcome the 
second impasse of Plato‟s two impasses.  These are also the criteria with which I expect 
my solution to the problem to be judged. 
Despite the breadth of thinkers, then, I seek to maintain a focus on the problem 
throughout, and emphasize areas of overlap which constellate the multiple thinkers 
involved.  Hence, I do not consider the breadth of thinkers excessive.  For example, in 
order to justly treat Kant‟s achievement in regard to Plato and Aristotle on the problem of 
non-being, I will devote the entire chapter to discuss the salient points from Kant‟s 
Critique of Pure Reason.  And, by salient, here, I mean salient in regard to the problem of 
non-being, i.e. Kant‟s structure of experience.  Also, I will return to Aristotle to explicate 
both Derrida‟s discussion of the “Metaphysics of Presence” and Deleuze‟s attempts to 
rethink Kant‟s structure of experience.  Moreover, given their prominence in regard to the 
problem of non-being, a discourse with Plato and Kant will persist throughout the 
dissertation, and in contradistinction to Kant, I will provide a rendition of Hegel‟s attempt 
to solve the problem of non-being for the sake of establishing all the pieces needed to 
provide a reading of pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze as their attempts to solve the 
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problem of non-being.  And, by relating these two different readings of pure difference 
back to Plato‟s criteria for solving the problem, I will show how both Derrida and 
Deleuze fail to solve the problem of non-being.   
    Lastly, you may also use the significant amount of specificity involved in 
Plato‟s criteria for solving the problem of non-being to orient yourself to this dissertation.  
In other words, regarding the structural overview of the dissertation, the first part of the 
dissertation may be thought of as my work on the first impasse of the problem of non-
being, and the second part, the second impasse.  Moreover, the order of the first part of 
the dissertation follows the logical and historical direction in treating the problem of non-
being.  Again, the major figures I will discuss on the way to Derrida and Deleuze are 
Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel.  This is certainly a hefty list.  Yet, I am only looking at 
these figures in regard to the problem of non-being.  If it seems outlandish to you, then 
feel free to consider the names – of these thinkers – as mere signs referring to strategies 
for solving the problem of non-being.  You may consider them as if the names were mere 
mnemonic devices for remembering possible approaches to solving the problem.  As you 
will see, beyond merely adhering to the same criteria in regard to the thinking of these 
thinkers, there is a considerable amount of overlap, i.e. they are actually dealing with the 
same problem.   
Plato‟s Puzzle of the Sophist – The Problem of Non-Being 
 “Visitor: „Come on, pull yourself together for us as well as you can and try it  
– since you‟re young.  Try to say something correct about that which is not,  
without attaching either being, one, or numerical plurality to it.‟ 
Theaetetus: „I‟d have to have a strangely large amount of enthusiasm for the project  
to try it myself after seeing what you‟ve gone through.‟”  
~Plato (Soph 1997 239b-c) 
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  §9 Two aporia en route to solving the puzzle: What is non-being? – What is non-
being?  Plato‟s response to this question circa 360 B.C. is embedded in his dialog the 
Sophist, specifically in a passage of his text between 238c to 239c.
27
  I have divided this 
passage into three parts which I refer to respectively as (1) the complicated nature of the 
problem of non-being, i.e. the first perplexity or impasse of the problem of non-being, (2) 
the paradoxical nature of the problem of non-being, i.e. the second perplexity or impasse 
of the problem of non-being, and (3) what I refer to as “Plato‟s Puzzle” of non-being.  
Together these three parts constitute Plato‟s formal statement of the problem of non-
being. 
§10 First Perplexity – Where Plato‟s passage picks up, the Eleatic visitor and 
Theaetetus are in dialog concerning not-being.  The Eleatic visitor to Theaetetus states,  
[W]e maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute 
being to not-being? … Do you see, then, that not-being in 
itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it 
is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable? 
(Soph 1895, 238c)   
[Σπλλνεῖο νὖλ ὡο νὔηε θζέμαζζαη δπλαηὸλ ὀξζῶο νὔη‟ 
εἰπεῖλ νὔηε δηαλνεζῆλαη ηὸ κὴ ὄλ αὐηὸ θαζ‟αὑηό, ἀιι‟ 
ἔζηηλ ἀδηαλόεηόλ ηε θαὶ ἄξξεηνλ θαὶ ἄθζεγθηνλ θαὶ 
ἄινγνλ;] 
In response, Theaetetus agrees with the visitor.  Now, I consider this a concise statement 
of the complicated nature of the problem of non-being and of what I call, “the first 
perplexity” of the problem.  That is, in responding to the question: What is non-being? 
Since we cannot attribute being to any non-being worthy of the name, it seems the 
solution cannot be spoken, thought, or described.  In the effort to make this problem 
clearer, notice how when we speak of, think of, or describe non-being, non-being is being 
                                               
27 I discovered this way of parsing the relations to non-being independently of: John E. Boodin, “Time and 
Non-Being,” Psychological Review: Monograph Supplements, 6.3, (1904), 109-119.  Moreover, on the one 
hand, Boodin finds the two moments to be the “logical” and the “metaphysical,” and on the other, Boodin 
is not interested in solving the problem of non-being.  He merely discusses two moments of non-being. 
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spoken of, being thought of, or being described.  Moreover, because being cannot be 
attributed to non-being, of non-being we cannot even say “non-being.”  This is the 
difficulty in the problem of non-being indeed.  And the common response when faced 
with such difficulty is to suggest non-being is “ineffable.”28  The next part of the passage 
from the Sophist indicates the problem with such a response.  
 Yet, it is valuable to note, before moving on to the next part of the passage, that 
this much of the problem of non-being from the Sophist was already stated in Plato‟s 
earlier text
29
 Parmenides.
30
  The question is posed in the Parmenides:  
When we say something is not, are we saying that in a way 
it is not, but in a way it is? Or does this „is not‟ signify 
without qualification that what is not is in no way at all and 
does not in any way partake of being?
31
 (Parm 163c5-8) 
As you can see, the latter option is the problem of non-being thus far presented from the 
Sophist.  In summary form, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (1919-2001) put it 
thus, “Parmenides‟ argument runs:” 
It is the same thing that can be thought and can be 
What is not can‟t be 
What is not can‟t be thought.32    
Anscombe‟s syllogism serves as a good example of a logical statement of the problem of 
non-being.  As such, her syllogism is summarily appropriate for the first part of the 
Sophist passage.  Moving, then, to the next part of the passage illustrates the problem 
with both such a logical statement and the claim of ineffability noted above.   
 §11 Second Perplexity – The second part of the Sophist passage indicates what I 
refer to as the paradoxical nature and “the second perplexity” of the problem of non-
                                               
28 Cf. Marsilio Ficino, Icastes, Michael J.B. Allen, tr. Masilio Ficino’s Interpretation of Plato’s Sophist, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 230-231. 
29 Cf. Leonard Brandwood, The Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues, (Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
30 Cf. Lewis Campbell, The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1867). 
31 Plato, Parmenides, Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan, tr., Plato Complete Works, (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1997), 394.  Hereafter cited as Parm. 
32 G.E.M. Anscombe, From Parmenides to Wittgenstein, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 3. 
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being.  Where the second part picks up Theaetetus seems to believe he understands the 
problem of non-being as evidenced by his agreement with its statement by the Eleatic 
visitor.  Yet, the Eleatic visitor complicates the problem further by changing the 
standpoint from the perspective of someone who would attempt to prove non-being to the 
standpoint of someone who would attempt to refute non-being.  For anyone attempting to 
refute the notion of non-being “is compelled to contradict himself as soon as he makes 
the attempt.” (Soph 1895, 238d)  The Eleatic visitor clarifies, “For I, who maintain that 
not-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and am still speaking of 
not-being as one; for I say „not-being.‟ Do you understand?” (Soph 1895, 238d)  In this 
way, the Eleatic visitor points to the paradoxical nature of the problem of non-being, i.e. 
both attempting to prove and attempting to refute non-being immediately leads to 
contradiction.   
Further clarifying this paradoxical nature, the visitor reminds Theaetetus, “a little 
while ago I said that not-being is unutterable, unspeakable, [and] indescribable: do you 
follow?” (Soph 1895, 238e)  It is as if the Eleatic visitor is asking: What are we 
discussing if non-being cannot be discussed?  Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) refers to 
such a perplexity as the “supreme paradox of thought,”33 because one sets out to think, 
say, or write, what cannot be thought, said, or written.  In this way, neither a logical 
rendition nor the claim of ineffability suffices to solve the problem of non-being.  Both 
are rather more like restatements of the problem. 
 Allow me to reflect upon what has just been stated by gesturing toward 
conversations to come later in the dissertation.  The contemporary post-Kantian way to 
discuss the “paradoxical nature of the problem of non-being” falls generally within the 
                                               
33 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, (Princeton University Press, 1985), 37. 
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purview of the question of “non-discursivity.”  That is, taking the mind to be discursive 
in its functioning, non-discursivity is supposed to refer to whatever must be beyond the 
mind‟s reach.  This further accentuates the Kierkegaard quote above.  That is, shifting to 
the context of the question of non-discursivity allows for the examination of the paradox 
of thinking about what cannot be thought.  In other words, the claim that the term “non-
discursive” is not an oxymoron can be supported in a number of ways, but due to the very 
nature of discursivity, the viable theoretical options must be hypothetical.   
§12 Non-discursivity, a vocabulary term – Non-discursivity, as the other of 
discursivity, then, may be considered in one of the following two fashions.  (1) 
Discursivity may be thought of as an effect of something non-discursive.  In other words 
if you consider some bit of evidence as an effect (or expression) of a necessary pre-
condition without the condition itself being able to be thought as other than condition, 
then the condition may be said to be non-discursive.  (2) Non-discursivity may be thought 
of as somehow too excessive for the discursive mind to capture, i.e. the non-discursive 
might exceed the discursive mind such that the mind cannot think it.   
Whereas those who affirm non-discursivity think it in one of the two above 
fashions, those who deny non-discursivity consider notions such as “pre-conditions,” 
“excessivity,” and “relationality” to be just as much products of the mind such that “non-
discursivity” can never mean anything other than more discursivity; thereby they 
consider it an oxymoron.  Notice how this discussion of non-discursivity mimics the 
above discussion of the paradoxical nature of the problem of non-being.  Hence, it is 
valuable to mention the notion of discursivity here because within the more general 
discussion of non-discursivity the thinkers whom I will later examine may be mapped 
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specifically regarding their strategy for solving the problem of non-being.  That is, 
whereas Kant and Deleuze affirm, Hegel and Derrida deny, non-discursivity.                          
 §13 Plato’s Puzzle – The third part of the Sophist, then, noted above pertains to 
the conclusion of the passage by Plato with what may be read as an invitation to solve a 
puzzle.  The Eleatic visitor declares, “until we find some one or other who can speak of 
not-being without number, we must acknowledge that the Sophist is a clever rogue who 
will not be got out of his hole.” (Soph 1895, 239c5)  Plato‟s invitation to solve the puzzle 
of non-being is an invitation to accept the first two parts noted above as criteria for 
solving the problem of non-being.  Hence, these three parts together constitute a formal 
statement of the problem of non-being. 
§14 Introductory exposition of the general strategy for solving the puzzle  – 
Lastly, then, as an early indication I take the following quote, reportedly concerning 
Gorgias, as an example of a plausible strategy for solving what I call the “problem of 
non-being.”  That is, the following is an approach to the problem of non-being which 
does not fall victim to “immediate contradiction.”  In other words, the most viable 
strategy for solving the problem of non-being is an approach attributed to Plato‟s 
contemporary Gorgias (c. 485-c. 380 B.C.).   
Though Gorgias himself, it should be noted, did not provide a solution to the 
problem, the strategy he suggested was to broadly distinguish between two types of non-
being, associating one with experience and one with thought, i.e. distinguishing between 
non-being and not-being.  This distinction allows for the experience of non-being even 
though whoever would experience it could not express it.  Concerning Gorgias,    
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In what is entitled On the Nonexistent [On Not-Being]
34
 or 
On Nature [Gorgias] proposes three successive headings: 
first and foremost, that nothing exists; second, that even if 
it exists it is inapprehensible to man; third, that even if it is 
apprehensible, still it is without a doubt incapable of being 
expressed or explained to the next man [my emphases].
35
 
As can be seen in the above quote, distinguishing between the standpoints of experience 
and thought allows one‟s discourse to focus on types of relations rather than on entities in 
relations.  Notice, this allows for the expression that non-being is inapprehensible without 
the immediate contradiction highlighted above.  However, as the quote also captures, it is 
still not clear what this inapprehension might look like in experience.  For example, 
certainly unconsciousness is not experienced, but it is not non-being.  Hence, 
inapprehension is necessary but not sufficient to describe an experiential relation to non-
being.   
To sum, thus far I have described the problem of non-being, and I have indicated 
the general strategy I take to be appropriate for its solution.  If the problem of non-being 
can be solved, then, the following seem to be required.  First, a discursive expression of 
non-being, i.e. not-being, is insufficient as a response to the problem because it either 
entails merely logical negation – being about concepts and thought not about being – or it 
encounters what Plato‟s Eleatic visitor described as the “immediate contradiction” of 
being an expression of not-being.  Second, approaching non-being through experience 
seems to be the best strategy.  However, the necessary inapprehension of non-being 
further entails the requirement of awareness of the inapprehension.  In this way, for 
                                               
34 Nola J. Heidlebaugh, Judgement, Rhetoric, and the Problem of Incommensurability: Recalling Practical 
Wisdom, (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 36. 
35 George Kennedy, “Gorgias,” The Older Sophists, Rosamund Kent Sprague, ed. (Columbia: South 
Carolina Press, 1972), 42.  Also, cf. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, Richard Bett, tr. (New York: 
Cambridge, 2005), 15; cf. Bruce McComiskey, “Gorgias, „On Non-Existence‟: Sextus Empiricus, „Against 
the Logicians‟ 1.65-87,” Philosophy & Rhetoric, 30.1, (1997), 45-49; and cf. Aristotle, On Melissus, 
Xenophanes, and Gorgias, §6.   
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example, the notion of consciousness is far too narrow to be up to the task of solving the 
problem of non-being.  Hence, the solution to the problem of non-being will involve 
looking for non-being in experience not in concepts or logic, and it will involve an 
awareness of the (experiential) structure which allows for being.   
In this way, contra Gorgias non-being will be able to be explained by describing 
where to look in experience for the decisive inapprehension.  And, though what I am 
about to say in this paragraph regarding Kant will not be fully clear until the end of the 
next chapter, it was Kant who fully tapped the beauty of this Gorgian strategy – making 
the crucial distinction in his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes 
into Philosophy between logical and real, i.e. experiential, negation.
36
  In fact, Kant is 
adhering to Gorgias‟ strategy when he locates the thing-in-itself after appearance by 
regressing back “down” the trajectory of experience from the unity of an object of 
experience.  Hence, the (non-discursive) thing-in-itself will be Kant‟s solution to the 
problem of non-being.  Further, as Derrida and Deleuze return in different ways to Plato‟s 
positing of difference as a solution to the problem, they will be returning to Plato‟s puzzle 
by way of Kant, i.e. pure difference will replace the thing-in-itself as the solution to the 
problem of non-being for Derrida and Deleuze.   
Irony Transcends Language: The Platonic Idea of Difference in Itself 
In this last section on Plato, I touch on some of the remaining passages of the 
Sophist.  My purpose for addressing these passages is to specifically show, on the one 
hand, the response to the problem of non-being found in the Sophist, i.e. Difference.  On 
the other hand, I argue there may be another, i.e. more ironic, interpretation which reads 
                                               
36 Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, David Walford and Ralf Meerbote, tr., 211.  
Hereafter cited as NM. 
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Plato‟s Sophist as providing a solution different from Difference.  Again, based on 
Plato‟s own criteria, neither solution is satisfactory.  However, I must note that I find 
what might be Plato‟s ironic solution to the problem of non-being to be brilliant.  In order 
to achieve the purpose of this section, I initiate a discussion of dialectic which will 
continue throughout the first part of the dissertation.  For the sake of clarity, I will use 
upper case letters when referring to formal Being and Non-Being, and lower case letters 
when referring to the being and non-being supposedly “beyond” the forms.   
§15 Ontological Emergence – There are, of course, multiple definitions of 
dialectic depending upon which thinker you consult.  Suffice to say, then, I begin with a 
quite general notion of dialectic as the “process of organizing thought” to be further 
specified throughout the dissertation.  Recalling the distinction made in Timaeus §28, 
quoted above, the process of organizing thought may begin with either the understanding 
or with sense perception.  To begin, then, I provide an example from Plato in which he 
begins dialectic with an image, i.e. sense perception, before considering other ways to 
begin the process of organizing thought as potential solutions to the problem of non-
being.   
Following Plato, then, imagine a light descending from the sky.  The source of the 
light is being and the darkest darkness furthest away from being is non-being.  Moreover, 
neither being nor non-being – though for different reasons – as Plato points out in the 
Republic passage I quoted above, can be “seen.”  Keeping with the metaphor of vision: it 
is as if, at the level of brightness which is bright enough – without being too bright – for 
vision there are the forms of which anything can be.  So out of the darkness of what is not 
being (anything), things begin to be as they emerge into the light of the forms – non-
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being, becoming, being.  In this way, the forms govern both what can be and what can be 
thought.  Though, of course, not a solution to the problem, a metaphorical employment of 
the forms is possible at the outset so as to orient to the problem.  Such is the example of 
movement from darkness into light.  Hence, you can think Being and Non-Being, which 
means there is a form or idea pertaining to each, but you must keep in mind that these are 
merely the forms.   
I mention this metaphor because I think it nicely captures the aspect of formal 
relation involved, and this aspect provides depth to the criteria Plato established for the 
problem‟s solution.  In other words, though you are attempting to think about being and 
non-being, the act of thinking itself indicates the level of light which is neither the pure 
brightness of being nor the pure darkness of non-being.  Here again, then, you see – even 
with this less rigorous, i.e. metaphorical version – a restatement of the paradoxical nature 
of thinking Non-Being.     
 The above image indeed conjures a complicated dialectic.  Yet, there are only two 
aspects of the identifying movement of thought, i.e. dialectic, which need be pursued in 
this introduction.  First, the aspect of relationality involved in thinking Being and Non-
Being, and second, an overview of dialectic as it relates to this relationality.  I will 
engage the issues of dialectic and relationality more thoroughly in later chapters.  So, for 
now, notice by invoking a discussion of the forms in relation to being and non-being 
there are three terms to be dealt with at this level of generality.  In order of the 
descending light metaphor: being, the forms, and non-being.  Yet, since it is with the 
forms or Platonic Ideas that one is able to think, it is as if the movement begins in the 
middle of these terms.  
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 It is neither irrelevant nor tangential to recall here that Plato never explains how a 
prisoner becomes unchained in the Cave Allegory.  Within the dialectical movement of 
the forms, then, there is a form of Being and a form of Non-Being, and organizing these 
forms allows one to think, for example, of Being and Non-Being.  A question which you 
should already be able to answer – given Plato‟s criteria above – is whether the Being and 
Non-Being which can be thought are being and non-being.  Of course, they are not.  
Here, then, the image I am producing – following Plato –, the brightness of the sun : 
being :: the darkness of the cave : non-being, is itself a way to organize that with which 
you can think of as Being and Non-Being, i.e. the forms.  Hence, either images or forms 
can begin a movement of organization toward providing a vision of Being and Non-
Being.  Yet, this vision, as vision – whether imaginal or symbolic – will paradoxically 
always fall short of an unmediated view of being and non-being.   
Notice, then, dialectically there are a number of ways to set up the three terms in 
relation to one another, and depending upon how you set up the terms, the movement 
through these terms will look differently.  After discussing the perplexity of “what is not” 
[ηὸ κὴ ὄλ] (236d9-242ba) and the perplexity of “what is” (242b6-251a4) in the Sophist, 
Plato addresses both the relationality amongst the terms involved in, and the different 
beginnings of the dialectical process of, organizing these relations.  Plato initiates this 
discussion with what he calls the “five great kinds” (Soph 251a5-259d8) which are: 
Movement (or Change) [θίλεζηο], Sameness [ηαὐηόλ], Rest [ζηάζηο], Difference [ἕηεξνλ], 
and Being [ηὸ ὂλ].   
So, of the three terms – being, the forms, and non-being – I will now examine a 
formal (symbolic) beginning to the dialectic.  My examination follows along the same 
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path as Plato‟s discussion in the Sophist.   Moreover, perhaps it makes sense to consider 
the starting point of dialectic a form, rather than a beyond the form, since it is the forms 
which are supposed to allow for the thinking in which the beginning (of dialectic) is 
thought.
37
  Whatever his rationale – the dialog does not speak to it – Plato begins with the 
form of Being, and Movement (or Change) and Rest (or Non-Change) follow since the 
form of Being either moves or does not, i.e. Being may be thought of as at rest or in 
motion.   
Building to his conclusion, at 252d8 Plato invokes what will come to be known as 
the Law of Non-Contradiction: “I suppose it‟s ruled out by very strict necessity that 
change should be at rest and that rest should change [my emphasis].” (Soph 1997, 252d5)  
From here a discussion is begun regarding the relation between the forms.  The Eleatic 
visitor notes, “Since some will blend and some won‟t, they‟ll be a good deal like letters 
of the alphabet.  Some of them fit together with each other and some don‟t.” (Soph 1997, 
253a)  Just as, according to the Eleatic visitor, it takes a grammarian to “know which 
kinds of letters can associate” and a musician to know which musical notes “mix and 
which ones don‟t,” (Soph 1997, 253b) the dialectician will know how the forms associate 
with one another.  It is important to note that Plato culminates these comments regarding 
dialectic and the forms noting that the entire discussion is in the service of attempting to 
“get away with saying that which is not.” (Soph 1997, 254d1) 
Next, from Being, Motion, and Rest come Difference and Sameness (Soph 249c8-
254d15).  Accordingly, “So that which is [Plato‟s emphasis] isn‟t both change and rest; 
it‟s something different [my emphasis] from them instead.” (Soph 1997, 250c)  And, 
                                               
37 Cf. William J. Prior, “Plato‟s Analysis of Being and Not-Being in the Sophist,” The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy, 18.2, (1980), 199-211. 
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from here, it follows that a distinction must be made.  The difference between the forms, 
e.g. Movement and Rest, is not the form of Difference itself.  That is, there is a difference 
between “participation” in the form of Difference and the form of Difference itself.  
Whereas participation in the form of Difference pertains to relationality, the form of 
Difference itself emerges as a dialectical term, i.e. one of Plato‟s “five great kinds.”  The 
forms are different from each other, but they are not all the form of Difference.  Hence, in 
this way, you can state the pervasiveness of the form of Difference by saying that the 
forms “participate” in the form of Difference.  Moreover, this is why Difference must be 
one of the great kinds, because without Difference there would be no plurality (Soph 
256d-e).   
Keep in mind that on the one hand, this is mere formality.  Yet, on the other hand, 
this is the formality which governs thought.  With the distinction, then, between the form 
of Difference – which emerges in the dialectical movement of organizing thought – and 
participation in the form of Difference – which governs plurality and relationality –, it is 
possible to think the form of Being and then think the form of Non-Being as Different.  It 
is as if, participation : Movement :: Sameness : Rest, and though these forms participate 
in Being, they are Different than Being.   
§16 Formal Opacity of the dialectic – Now, here is the importance of the 
paradoxical nature of non-being and what I call the dependency of reckoning with being 
upon reckoning with non-being.  On the one hand, being allows for the forms, so a 
possible snare is to think that the form of Being is being itself.  As you can see, it 
certainly seems – tautologically – true.  Yet, as you are thinking it, the Sameness that you 
think, of course, derives from participation in the form of Sameness.  This should be a 
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sign that you are “in” the forms.  Yet, are the forms not in being?  Notice the difficulty, 
i.e. the perplexity, here.  This will be cleared up by looking not at being but at non-being.  
This is why I refer to this aspect of Plato‟s problem as the “dependency of reckoning with 
being on the reckoning with non-being.”  That is, until you solve the problem of non-
being, you are caught in the sophist‟s snare.   You can only see what the sophist shows 
you, i.e. Being and Difference – neither of which is being or non-being, and both of 
which are forms, i.e. Ideas.  Such then is a value of solving the problem of non-being, a 
different reckoning of being emerges. 
§17 Participation v. In-Itself – Now, none of what I have just said is controversial 
in itself.  For example, some commentators, such as Michael Frede (1940-2007), hold 
that the achievement of Plato‟s Sophist is found in its ability to illustrate that not-being 
can be said.
38
  However, be this as it may, rather than solve the problem of non-being, 
“not-being” shifts the focus to the problem of discerning the relational function of logical 
negation.
39
  This is why Job van Eck suggests, “the theory of falsity and negation we find 
in the Sophist is a masterpiece of logical analysis.”40  According to Paul Shorey, in the 
Sophist absolute being and non-being “remain a mystery” (Cf. Soph 251a, d, 254c); 
moreover, “the Sophist merely fixes the practically necessary conventions of logical 
discourse about them (251a).”41  Hence, despite, or rather in addition to, the accuracy of 
the above claims, Plato is working with a distinction which may point beyond logical 
analysis.  That is, as I will show, logical negation pertains to participation in the form of 
                                               
38 Michael Frede, “Plato‟s Sophist on false statements,” Cambridge Companion to Plato, Richard Kraut, 
ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 398.  
39 Cf. Frank A. Lewis, “Plato on „Not‟,” California Studies in Classical Antiquity, 9, (1976), 89-115. 
40 Job van Eck, “Plato‟s Logical Insights: On Sophist 254d-257d,” Ancient Philosophy, 20, (2000), 78. 
41 Paul Shorey, “The Unity of Plato‟s Thought,” The Decennial Publications, 6.1, (1903), 162, n. 247.  
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Difference, i.e. not-being, and it is still an open question at this point whether Difference 
in itself will emerge as a non-logical negation which solves the problem of non-being.   
Put another way, I am here rehearsing Plato‟s distinction between “in themselves” 
[αὐηὰ θαζ‟αὑηά] and “with reference to others” [πξὸο ἄιια],42 also referred to as standing 
alone and in relation,
43
 in regard to the forms.  This distinction is quite important because 
it succinctly states the results of dialectically moving through Plato‟s “great kinds” on the 
way to solving the problem of non-being, and the difference between two types of 
difference.  This important distinction – which I will return to throughout the dissertation 
– is the distinction between the “ἐλαληίνλ” (enantion) of difference in relation to others 
and the “ἕηεξνλ” (heteron) of difference in itself.44  It is in this way, that difference, i.e. 
the form of Difference in itself, came to be considered a potential solution to the problem 
of non-being.
45
  Neither logical analysis nor the difference between the forms which 
allows for their participation in Being, then, ἕηεξνλ points to an examination of the form 
of Difference by itself.  Hence, beginning the dialectic with the form of Being in itself, 
you arrive at the form of Difference in itself, and as different from Being, Difference 
receives consideration as a solution to the problem of non-being.   
§18 Heteron v. Enantion  – Now, depending upon how you respond to the 
problem of non-being, it is, of course, possible to believe ἕηεξνλ has only one function; 
such is the belief that ἕηεξνλ reduces to ἐλαληίνλ.  From such a mistaken view some have 
even suggested that difference in itself is merely a dream.  However, ἕηεξνλ may be 
                                               
42 Cf. John Malcom, “A Way Back for Sophist 255c12-13,” Ancient Philosophy, 26, (2006), 275-288; also, 
cf. Stanley Rosen, Plato’s Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image, (South Bend: St. Augustine‟s Press, 
1999), 183. 
43 Cf. R.M. Dancy, “The Categories of Being in Plato‟s Sophist 255c-e,” Ancient Philosophy, 19, (1999), 
45-72. 
44 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, tr., (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2003), 386-389. 
45 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 393. 
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viewed a different way.  For example, if the forms govern discursive thinking, then the 
form of difference in itself, i.e. ἕηεξνλ, might point “beyond” the forms to non-being.  As 
such, you could say that the form of difference standing alone is a discursive attempt to 
say non-discursive non-being.  Though such an attempt fails to solve the problem of non-
being, since it does not meet Plato‟s criteria for the solution, it does indicate the 
persistence of the problem even when moving into a purely logical plane or from a 
logical perspective.  In other words, you may still be securely “in” the forms, and yet, 
perhaps, have access to an outside of the forms by way of the form of Difference, and 
remember it was via dialectic that you arrived at the form of Difference in itself.  So, 
even if Plato‟s Sophist is taken to achieve the goal suggested by the above commentators, 
Plato‟s Sophist may also be taken to provide an ironic solution to the problem of non-
being.  As such, it is as if the Sophist is an aporetic dialog
46
 indeed – the place to look for 
the resolution of its central problem is outside the text (!).   
To be clear, I have just discussed a formal beginning to dialectic following Plato 
in the Sophist which moves through his “great kinds” to arrive at the form of Difference 
in itself.  And, in this way I am providing an interpretation of Plato‟s Sophist such that 
Difference is not Plato‟s solution to the problem of non-being.  Rather, this interpretation 
takes Difference (in itself) to point outside the dialectic.  This could be Plato‟s (ironic) 
solution to the problem of non-being because, since it does not state a solution, i.e. it does 
not say non-being, it does not violate the above criteria Plato enumerated for the 
problem‟s solution. 
So, what I am suggesting – keeping in mind descriptors such as ineffable – is that 
Plato‟s dialog may mimic the dialectical arrival of Difference in itself as a term.  Were 
                                               
46 George Rudebusch, “Sophist 237-239,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29.4, (1991), 521. 
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this the case, a reference to the outside of the dialog would be tantamount to a reference 
to non-discursivity, and looking through the form of Difference would be like looking 
through the dialog.  Hence, the dialog dialectically organizes your thinking culminating 
with Difference in itself as the purported formal, dialogical, solution.  The solution would 
be ironic because it does not meet the criteria that the dialog itself establishes.  In this 
way, its very failure to solve the problem of non-being ironically suggests the mechanism 
for the problem‟s solution – “look through” the form of Difference in itself to see what is 
different from the forms (more on this below).   
To sum thus far: as Plato himself indicated (discussed further just below), a 
solution to the problem of non-being is required to gain the ultimate insight involved in 
regard to any “beyond” in relation to the forms.  In this way, Plato‟s thesis of the 
dependency of reckoning with being upon reckoning with non-being should now be clear.  
It is by striving to solve the problem of non-being that you come to consider an “outside” 
to the forms, and being – not the form of Being – is outside the forms.  Hence, the way I 
would organize Plato‟s terms – my dialectic in Platonic terms –, then, would be: The 
Platonic Idea [ἰδέα] itself points “beyond” the (logical) relational certainty between the 
forms [εἰδῶλ], and as the great Kinds [γελῶλ], the forms allow for a determinant 
translation of becoming [γέλεζηο].  Further, from a formal beginning to dialectic, I would 
take the beginning and the end of the dialectical movement, i.e. Being and Non-Being, to 
be Ideas which point outside of the dialectic in a non-determinative way.  As such, after 
solving the problem of non-being, it is possible to speak of Non-Being, so as to reference 
non-being while being mindful that the reference is itself not non-being.   
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§19 Prolêptic: Anticipation of what is to come – Yet, at this point it still remains 
an open question whether the form of Difference serves such a purpose.  On the one 
hand, because I think it does not serve such a purpose, I might seem to be siding with 
Derrida, but really I am not.  On the other hand, since Deleuze pursues the project of 
using Difference to solve the problem of non-being, I might seem to be fully disagreeing 
with him, but really I am not.  Hence, my position will be made clear through the rest of 
the dissertation. 
Having above discussed beginning a dialectical movement with an image and 
with a form or Idea of Being, now consider the last option: what if you suppose the 
dialectic starts with the very beyond the forms which you are attempting to think?  To 
support a claim that a dialectical movement can begin with a beyond the forms, you 
might reference the first exercise above, i.e. the metaphorical use of light and dark, 
suggesting that starting the dialectic with sense perception itself shows that there is an 
outside of dialectic toward which Ideas can point.  As such, the exercise of supposing the 
dialectic to start with an outside to dialectic may look similar – think Gorgias here – to 
beginning with sense perception.   
§20 Initiating Dialectic with a supposed Beyond – So, now, consider the exercise 
of attempting to start the dialectic from an outside:  If you suppose being to be outside the 
forms, then you may refer to the forms in general as Non-Being. (Cf. Parm 162a)  In 
other words, per this exercise the forms are different than being.  Yet, beyond this 
supposition: if once the dialectic is engaged, the dialectic can only produce forms, then 
considering that which allows for the forms as something different from the forms, 
encounters the impasse that perhaps the dialectic has led to the form of difference rather 
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than something different from the forms.  Hence, this supposition does not advance 
toward a solution to the problem because the dialectical result may still be formal.  
Rather, this exercise leads to the same results as the exercise of beginning the dialectic 
“in” the forms, i.e. with a form.  What the dialectic churns out may be Being not being, or 
it may be Difference, rather than being or non-being.   
Put another way, supposing the dialectic starts from outside the forms is 
tantamount to using the forms to recognize that where the forms begin in the dialectical 
movement is actually the second step after an undifferentiated first step.  However, not to 
be escaped, the dialectical undertow in turn differentiates the first step as a form, i.e. the 
form of Being.  Since the dialectic‟s organizational mechanism of identification depends 
on using the forms, there is no non-formal way to engage the dialectic.  Or, at least, there 
is no way to produce a non-formal result upon engaging the dialectic.  Hence, if you are 
to avoid the formal closure of the dialectic‟s undertow, you must discover a way for the 
content of the dialectic to point outside the dialectic.  Consider the following passage.      
Re-invoking the image here from the Sophist, which echoes a passage noted 
above from the Republic,
47
 
The sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not 
[Plato‟s emphasis] … and he‟s hard to see because the 
place is so dark. … But the philosopher always uses 
reasoning to stay near the form being.  He isn‟t at all easy 
to see because that area is so bright and the eyes of most 
people‟s souls can‟t bear to look at what‟s divine [my 
emphasis]. (Soph 1997, 254a-b) 
Having “descended,” then, from being, the form of Being is one of the great kinds; the 
form of Non-Being is not.  Yet, there is a form with which you think otherness such that 
you can indicate Non-Being as the other of (the form) Being.  This form is the form of 
                                               
47 Cf. Ellen Quandahl, “What is Plato? Inference and Allusion in Plato‟s Sophist,” Rhetoric Review, 7.2, 
(1989), 338-348.  
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Difference, i.e. ἕηεξνλ, and, hence, of the great kinds, only Difference seems to fit the bill 
of dialectical content which might point outside the dialectic.   
As such, it can be argued that the undifferentiated starting point is 
undifferentiated because it is a starting point which is different from itself – i.e. 
Difference in itself.  Though this uses reasoning and “stays near the form,” it turns out 
that whether the starting point is being or Difference is undecidable.  What is more, if 
Difference is being, then what is Being?  Hence, through this exercise of attempting to 
start the dialectic from the outside, you should see that dialectic can be used to organize 
the forms and to point beyond the forms, but not to express any “outside” of dialectic.  
Rather, dialectic must claim that it both begins and ends with the forms or that it only 
organizes forms.  And, this because even supposing a non-dialectical or a non-discursive 
starting point, dialectic consumes, i.e. subsumes, your starting point.  So, from a 
dialectical standpoint the “non” of non-dialectical – and also of non-discursive – should 
really be a “not” because it does not have the status of the non which the problem of non-
being takes to refer to the negation of being.  Rather, it has the status of referring to a 
negation of the form, i.e. Being.   
§21 Non-being: What’s at stake? – So, this exercise also speaks to the value of 
solving the problem of non-being, i.e. Plato‟s dependency of reckoning thesis.  A value of 
solving the problem of non-being: non-being is that which the tyrannical movement of 
the dialectic cannot capture.  Or, better put, since dialectic renders all of its terms formal, 
non-being escapes the dialectic.  Hence, the most salient results of the above thought 
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exercises are twofold.  On the one hand, you can see the tyrannical nature of dialectic.
48
  
As such, suddenly all three of the supposed beginnings to the dialectic – sense perception, 
an Idea, an outside of dialectic – are in danger of being aspects of, i.e. already within, the 
dialectic.  On the other hand, you can see how it is possible to treat a form as an Idea so 
as to point outside the dialectic (from within the dialectic).  Whereas formal relation is 
logical, the “pointing” use of an Idea in relation to the non-discursive is heuristic.  Yet, 
combining these two results: you have also seen that once you attempt to understand that 
to which the Idea “points,” then you are again caught in a dialectical undertow which will 
churn out forms deriving their meaning, and ultimately the meaning of your Idea, from 
(internal) relations amongst the forms.  However, as Plato indicates, there is hope, and a 
way to escape the sophist – you just need to solve the problem of non-being.   
Allow me to restate the above using the vocabulary with which this section began.  
You might say, the form Being appears to be determinative due to a sort of dialectical 
eclipse.  In other words, the form of Being dialectically appears to be being itself.  So, 
using the form Being as an Idea does not work as well as using the form Non-Being, but 
as you have seen, Non-Being is not a major or “great” form.  Rather, Difference, i.e. 
ἕηεξνλ, must be used from within the dialectical movement in place of Non-Being.  In 
this way, the Idea of Difference may be used ostensively to ostensibly point outside of, 
and escape, the dialectical undertow.   
Put differently, Difference in itself as different from itself, eclipses non-being 
differently than the way Being eclipses being.  Whereas the difference internal to Being 
which allowed for its motion is eclipsed in Sameness, i.e. Being is the same as itself, the 
                                               
48 I find the description of “tyrannical” to be, perhaps exponentially, appropriate as it further connects the 
Sophist with the Republic where, it will be remembered, the philosopher is not needed until the tyrant 
appears in the city (soul).  Think of the Nietzsche quote I put in the Dedication section. 
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difference internal to Difference, e.g. Difference is different from itself, allows for the – 
albeit paradoxical – formulation of Difference as a solution the problem of non-being.  
Hence, you see the derivation of the concern for the non-discursive which provokes such 
thinkers as Kant, Heidegger, and Deleuze, among others.  That is, if Difference in itself 
by being different from itself points outside the discursivity of the forms, then non-
discursivity becomes a viable topic for consideration in discovering a solution to the 
problem of non-being. 
§22 The Sophist as ironic dialog – Lastly, as promised above, here is my reading 
of the Sophist in regard to the problem of non-being.  I read the Eleatic visitor as clinging 
to dialectic and the use of reason.  I think the philosopher, then, is supposed to be somone 
who is ultimately capable of disciplining the principle of reason within their own 
thinking.  This, of course, as the Republic indicates is predicated upon discipling your 
appetites so as to be able to gain a foothold toward disciplining reason.  Now, what 
remains an open question is whether the Eleactic visitor‟s discourse is to be taken as 
ironic, i.e. is he planting a seed at a level of depth in the soul of Theaetetus which is not 
too deep for Theaetetus to nourish with thought?  As indicated above, I take this question 
to mimic a question at the level of the reader/Plato discourse, i.e. I read the Sophist as 
Plato‟s production of an image which, if the reader nourishes it with thought, is capable 
of invoking the solution to the problem of non-being.  In my opinion regarding such a 
piece of Plato‟s thought, this is a marvellous accomplishment in itself because it forces 
you to acknowledge non-discursivity, i.e. a non-subsumable operation occurring outside 
the text.  Yet, it certainly does not explicitly state the solution to the problem of non-
being.   
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I grant that a consideration of Difference is a fruitful exercise toward a solution to 
the problem, but as the Eleactic visitor‟s comments betray, his overcoming of Parmenides 
– by being able to (logically) say “not” – is not a solution to the problem of non-being.  
Recall that the Eleactic visitor says: 
Nobody can say that this that which is not, which we‟ve 
made to appear and now dare to say is, is the contrary of 
that which is. … With regard to that which is not, which 
we‟ve said is, let someone refute us and persuade us that 
we‟ve made a mistake – or else, so long as he can‟t do that, 
he should say just what we say.  He has to say that the 
kinds blend with each other, that that which is and the 
different pervade all of them and each other, that the 
different shares in that which is and so, because of that 
sharing, is.  But he won‟t say that it is that which it shares 
in, but that it is different from it, and necessarily, because it 
is different from that which is, it clearly can be what is not 
[Plato‟s emphases]. (Soph 1997, 259a-b) 
In this passage, the Eleatic visitor mentions twice (as Plato emphasizes) that he and 
Theaetetus say the not is.  This is the not that at the end of the passage he says Difference 
can be.  So, it seems to me, the Eleatic visitor is himself noting that they have not solved 
the problem of non-being.  Theaetetus does not seem to find a problem in what the 
Eleatic visitor is saying.  In other words, Theaetetus (lacking the soul for it?) cannot 
refute the Eleatic visitor, so he cannot call the “we” into question.  He must say what the 
Eleatic visitor says; he must accept whatever the dialectic churns out for him.  After the 
passage above, Theaetus is reduced to saying, “True.” (Soph 259b6)  Then, as in the 
passage just quoted above and in the passage I refer to as “Plato‟s Puzzle,” the Eleatic 
visitor, again – Plato, again – prompts Theaetetus – the reader – “if anyone doesn‟t 
believe these contrarieties, he has to think about them himself and say something better 
than what we‟ve said.” (Soph 1997, 259b7-8)   
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Further, notice were you to call something into question about what they‟ve said, 
it would not be to question the internal logic – not a challenge to the Law of Non-
Contradiction –; it would be to question Difference as the solution to the problem of non-
being.  In other words, the Difference that is being said – whether for the Eleatic visitor, 
Theaetetus, Plato, Derrida or Deleuze – does not solve the problem of non-being.  
Specifically, it fails to overcome the second impasse of the problem. 
Who knows?  Perhaps Plato knew the answer to the problem of non-being.  He, 
however, did not put it in writing.  Perhaps, he thought – incorrectly – it could not be put 
in writing.  For years now I have been in awe of Plato.  I have communicated more than 
once both that my mind will never equal Plato‟s and that Plato‟s mind towers over mine.  
Yet, since Plato never put the answer in writing, I believe I deserve the credit for solving 
the problem.  After all, it is a matter of faith whether you believe Plato had the solution to 
this problem or not.  Hence, I deserve the credit for putting the solution in writing, so 
readers can “see” the answer for themselves. 
§23 From Plato and Gorgias to Aristotle – To conclude the sections of this 
introduction regarding Plato, notice that in relation to the position taken to be held by 
Parmenides and his student Zeno, namely that that which is not cannot be spoken or 
thought, Plato and Gorgias represent two putative refutations.
49
  Plato‟s approach has 
been taken to highlight the formality of the Eleatic position, and thereby accentuate 
logical negation or formal Difference in refutation.  Gorgias‟ approach has been taken to 
point to an other to formality which cannot be apprehended, and thereby seeks to refute 
the Eleatic position by highlighting a distinction hitherto apparently overlooked.  In 
                                               
49 Cf. Nola J. Heidlebaugh, Judgement, Rhetoric, and the Problem of Incommensurability: Recalling 
Practical Wisdom, (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 36. 
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standard style I have referred to these readings of Plato and Gorgias as putative 
refutations of Parmenides or solutions to the problem of non-being by associating them 
with the locus of their supposed non-beings, i.e. conceptual and experiential, respectively.  
It falls then to Aristotle to organize this trinity of positions through a process of dialectic.  
In the following sections I will discuss how Aristotle organized these thinkers so as to 
formulate his own answer.  As you will see, Aristotle‟s articulation of his own solution is 
ultimately the maintaining of Plato‟s answer and a Gorgias informed positing of not-
being.   
In order to demonstrate Aristotle‟s relation to this trinity it is necessary to discuss 
a bit of his terminology.  On the one hand, certainly the immense scale of Aristotle‟s 
thought, though combined with the scope of my purpose, necessitates that I be prudent.  
On the other hand, it would be an oversimplification to merely point here to “matter” as 
the opposite of “form” or “potentiality” as the opposite of “actuality.”  Aristotle‟s 
position is indeed more subtle.  Hence, in the remaining sections of this introduction, I 
will discuss Aristotle‟s attempt to solve the problem of non-being.  I will focus on 
Aristotle‟s own attack on Parmenides and Zeno, and I will show how Aristotle sought to 
overcome the supposedly inapprehensible, according to Gorgias, nature of that which is 
not. 
This discussion of Aristotle will be fruitful in multiple ways.  First, it will speak 
directly to the movement from Plato toward a contemporary reading of difference and the 
problem of non-being.  Second, it will provide a deeper reading of dialectic, which I have 
merely generally referred to thus far as a means to organize thought, and this is further 
important because it speaks to the method of all the remaining thinkers to be discussed in 
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regard to non-being.  In fact, I devote the entirety of a chapter between Kant and the 
Derrida and Deleuze chapters to the very issue of dialectic as the relation between 
thinking and non-being.  Third, in formulating their putative solutions both Derrida and 
Deleuze rely heavily on Aristotle, specifically his response to Zeno in Physics Book VI.  
Lastly, all three of these aspects, enhanced by looking to Aristotle, further provide a more 
rigorous rendition of what it might mean to “look through” an Idea to see into otherwise 
inapprehensible experience or “outside” the forms.    
Aristotle‟s Paradigm Shift: Aristotle‟s Reading of the Problem of Non-Being 
 “[T]here is a sophistic turn of argument, whereby we draw our opponent into the kind of statement  
against which we shall be well supplied with lines of argument.” 
50
 
~Aristotle (Top 111b31-33)  
  
Aristotle provides his reading of Parmenides and the problem of non-being in the 
culmination and conclusion of the Metaphysics, i.e. Book XIV.  There, “Twill ne‟er be 
proved that things which are not, are.”51 (Meta 1958, 1089a3) stands as Aristotle‟s 
articulation of the Parmenidean expression of the problem of non-being.  Aristotle 
contextualizes the problem as pertaining to plurality suggesting that for Parmenides 
despite the appearance of plurality, “all things that are” must be one, i.e. “being itself.” 
(Meta 1995, 1088b36)  Aristotle then asks a series of directed questions which culminate 
in a transition from asking about non-being to asking about not-being – moving from (a) 
directed questions to (b) a paraphrase of the Parmenidean position to (c) a topic change 
with which Aristotle articulates his attempt at a solution to the problem of non-being.  
However, Aristotle does not acknowledge the shift he invokes.  Rather, he directs the 
                                               
50 Aristotle, Topics, W.A. Pickard-Cambridge, tr. The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol.1, Jonathan Barnes, 
ed.  (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 186.  Hereafter cited as Top.  
51 Aristotle, The Metaphysics: Books X-XIV, Hugh Tredennick, tr. (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1958), 
269.  Hereafter cited as Meta with the publication year to indicate translator. 
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questions as if merely clarifying the vague Parmenidean statement which he chose as 
exemplary.  Yet, this transition constitutes his point of departure for both criticizing the 
Parmenidean denial of non-being and propounding his own solution to the problem of 
non-being.   
Aristotle begins his questioning of the Parmenidean doctrine by asking,  
 
firstly, if „being‟ has many senses (for it means sometimes 
substance, sometimes quality, sometimes quantity, and at 
other times the other categories), what sort of one [or unity, 
i.e. ἕλ]  are all the things that are, if non-being is to be 
supposed not to be? [πνῖνλ νὖλ ηὰ ὄληα πάληα ἕλ, εἰ κὴ ηὸ 
κὴ ὄλ ἔζηαη;] (Meta 1995, 1089a8-10) 
The possibilities Aristotle entertains here are telling, 
Is it the substances that are one, or the affections and the 
other categories as well, or everything – so that the „this‟ 
and the „such‟ and the „so much‟ and the other categories 
that indicate each some one thing will all be one? (Meta 
1995, 1089a10) 
In this way you can see how suddenly Aristotle is asking not about that which is not 
(non-being) but about the not that is (not-being).  Under the assumption that the problem 
is about plurality, Aristotle‟s version of the problem of non-being becomes: “of what sort 
of non-being and being do the [plurality of] things that are consist?” (Meta 1995, 
1089a15)  Moreover, Aristotle has effected a transition with which he is able to draw 
discussants toward the kind of statements against which he is well supplied with lines of 
argument.
52
  In this and the next section, I will comment on this strategy in general, 
concluding with his solution.  I will begin, then, by explaining what I refer to as 
Aristotle‟s “matrix of opposition.”  
§24 Aristotle’s Matrix of Opposition – The texts involved here are Categories 
chapters 7, 10, and 11 and Metaphysics Book X chapters 3 and 4.  Aristotle holds that 
                                               
52 Cf. Aristotle, Topics (111b31-33); this section‟s epigraph. 
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there are four (4) kinds of opposition [ἀληίθεηκαη]53: (a) contraries [ἐλαληία]; (b) relatives 
[ηὰ πξόο ηη] (and their correlatives or reversals [ἀληηζηξέθνληα]); (c) possession and 
privation (or lack) [ἕμηο θαὶ ζηέξεζηο]; (d) affirmation and negation [θαηάθαζηο θαὶ 
ἀπόθαζηο] (or contradictory predication [ἀληηθάζεηο]).54  Notice, though Aristotle uses 
ἕηεξνλ to help define some of the above terms, ἕηεξνλ (in) itself does not appear within 
his matrix of opposition.  With reference here to the Platonic language noted above, it is 
as if the “in itself” – in regard to difference – has been reduced to the “with reference to 
others.”  So, though Aristotle appears to respect so many differences, he (also) defaces 
difference.  Yet, more importantly, it is Aristotle‟s matrix of opposition which will 
determine his reading of non-being, and as such, it will be not-being not non-being upon 
which he ultimately works.  In other words, the problem of non-being for which Aristotle 
proposes a resolution will no longer be the problem as articulated in Plato‟s Sophist.   
In order to see the shift which occurs with Aristotle, notice that contrary 
opposition involves the term ἐλαληίνλ which is the very term opposed to ἕηεξνλ in the 
above discussion of Plato‟s forms.  In other words, whereas ἐλαληίνλ was taken to be 
difference in relation to others, ἕηεξνλ was taken to be difference in itself.  Given the 
reading of Aristotle I am providing here, you should not be surprised to read Aristotle say 
in the Metaphysics X §4, “there is also a greatest difference, and I call this contrariety.” 
(Meta 1995, 1055a5)  The Greek here, of course, for contrariety is ἐλαηίσζηλ.  And, 
notice what Aristotle says he means by “greatest.”  “(a) that is greatest which cannot be 
exceeded, and (b) that is complete outside which nothing proper to it can be found [my 
emphasis].” (Meta 1958, 1055a10-12)   
                                               
53 Cf. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 
156. 
54 Cf. John Peter Anton, Aristotle’s Theory of Contrariety, (London: Routledge, 1957), 91.  
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In other words, there is no opposition outside the greatest contraries, i.e. 
contradiction.  So, the other types of opposition in the matrix, then, fall within the scope 
of contrariety as the greatest difference.  This should be taken as sufficient evidence that 
Aristotle is either not concerned to think about difference in itself or he has somehow 
shifted its meaning away from Plato.  Hence, on the one hand, Aristotle‟s matrix of 
opposition is an expansion of Plato‟s ἐλαληίνλ.  On the other hand, as Aristotle reads non-
being by way of his matrix of opposition he is working on what ἐλαληίνλ referred to in 
Plato, and that is not-being.  Were my goal to merely show that Aristotle does not solve 
the problem of non-being I would stop here.  However, given the influence of Aristotle‟s 
reading of the problem of non-being it is valuable to see both how Aristotle reads the 
problem of non-being and exactly what he offers as a resolution.  
§25 Aristotle’s strategy regarding the problem – It is worth mentioning that I read 
Aristotle‟s strategy for accomplishing a shift from non-being to not-being as following 
the same strategy he encouraged his students to adopt as a debating technique.  In his 
Rhetoric II, §§22-23, Aristotle suggests using the different types of opposition as so 
many amongst possible topoi with which to construct arguments.  He suggests the virtue 
of these topoi is their simplicity in structuring a topic.  For example, of all the ways X 
and Y may or may not relate, saying “X and Y are opposites” is a simple way of 
identifying X and Y in relation to each other.  And the value of such effects, Aristotle 
notes in the Rhetoric, is that they “charm the crowd‟s ears more finely.”55 (Rhet 1395b30)   
So, Aristotle‟s Rhetoric is worth mentioning here because, as it seems to me, this 
is precisely how Aristotle reads his predecessors on the problem of non-being.  In regard 
                                               
55 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, W. Rhys Roberts, tr., The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 2, Jonathan Barnes, 
ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2224.  Hereafter cited as Rhet. 
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to Parmenides, Zeno, Gorgias, and anyone who might oppose the principle of 
(non)contradiction, Aristotle‟s readings range from that of unsympathetic to that of straw 
man.  As there is no topoi for difference in itself, Aristotle does not consider that any of 
his “opponents” could be attempting such an enunciation.  For example, Aristotle in his 
On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias provides a reading as if Gorgias were completely 
unsophisticated.  In other words, Aristotle reads him literally.  As such, Aristotle, after 
providing some paraphrases of Gorgias, simply states, “Now it does not at all follow from 
what he has said that nothing is.”56 (MXG 979a34)  Aristotle then suggests both of 
Gorgias “and others” – for whom Aristotle does not even provide a paraphrase – that 
their “proof” is “refuted thus: if what is not is, it either is simply, or else it is in a similar 
sense something that is not.” (MXG 979a35-36)  In other words, Aristotle has already 
determined that what is not must be read through his matrix of opposition.
57
  As will 
further be shown, his treatment of Parmenides and Zeno is quite similar. 
§26 Being, Unity, and Voice – Returning to Aristotle‟s reading of Parmenides 
with which this section began, it logically follows for Aristotle that if you are asking 
about the different ways in which “being” is meant, then you are inquiring about, on the 
one hand, predication, i.e. the categories, and, on the other hand, you are inquiring about 
iteration, i.e. the various voicings of the word itself.  So, first, in regard to the categories 
as that which is predicable, is there a relation of ontological dependence across the 
categories which suggests some ultimate “thing” of which the categories are predicated?  
Rather than merely “sometimes mean substance, sometimes quality, etc.” is there a 
                                               
56 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, T. Loveday and E.S. Forster, tr., The Complete Works 
of Aristotle: Vol. 2, Jonathan Barnes, ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1549.  Hereafter 
cited as MXG. 
57 Cf. John Peter Anton, Aristotle’s Theory of Contrariety, (London: Routledge, 1957), 89.  
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meaning to which “is” somehow always refers?  Second, as the last question already 
indicates, considering the various voicings of the word itself invokes a discussion of 
synonymy and homonymy, i.e. univocity and multivocity or equivocity. (Cf. Cat 1a)  Is 
each voicing of the term “being” similar merely in voicing alone, or is there a meaning 
which unifies each voicing?  Lastly, on the one hand, these two inquiries might resolve 
with the same answer, e.g. being itself or the One.
58
  On the other hand, somehow 
Aristotle must avoid committing to an infinite regress on either question, i.e. 
categorization or iteration.  
Though Aristotle considers this question regarding whether being and unity have 
some “underlying nature” to be the “hardest inquiry of all,” (1001a3) it is tempting to 
simply say that it is being itself which unifies the categories.  However, to do so gives 
rise to the question of how such unity would occur, e.g. are the categories unified by all 
being species of the genus being?
59
  Aristotle explicitly denies this option, noting: 
it is not possible that either unity [ηὸ ἓλ] or being [ηὸ ὄλ] 
should be a genus of things; for the differentia of any genus 
[γέλνο] must each of them both have being and be one,60 
but it is not possible for the genus to be predicated of the 
differentia taken apart from the species … so that if unity 
or being is a genus, no differentia [δηαθνξὰ] will either be 
one or have being.  But if unity and being are not genera, 
neither will they be [first] principles. (Meta 1995, 998b 23-
27) 
So, notice first and foremost that, again, he has moved from considering being and unity 
or the one to a discussion of plurality. (Meta 1001a3-1001b26)  Aristotle‟s implicit 
critique here suggests Parmenides treats being as a genus, and as such cannot account for 
the differences between individuals, i.e. plurality of being.  In noting, then, that the 
                                               
58 Cf. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, §33 
59 Cf. Donald Morrison, “The taxonomical interpretation of Aristotle‟s Categories: a criticism,” Aristotle’s 
Ontology, Anthony Preus and John Peter Anton, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 31.  
60 Cf. Aristotle, Topics (144a36) 
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differentia – that which differentiates one member of a species from other members 
within the same genus – must both be and be a unit, Aristotle directs attention away from 
genera and toward individual iterations.  Hence the question: in each case (unity) of 
something that is (being) what is the relation across the iterations?  This is a question of 
vocity, i.e. univocity or multivocity because Aristotle wishes to preserve the different 
individuals without losing coherency of meaning. (Meta 1001a29-b1)  So, what is the 
relationship across the various iterations of “is”?  Does “is” mean something different 
every time it appears?  
One of the more celebrated phrases from Aristotle‟s Metaphysics occurs in Book 
IV §2, “There are many senses in which a thing may be said to „be‟, but they are related 
to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not homonymous.”61 (Meta 1995, 
1003a33)  I will use this statement as a point of departure for answering the above 
questions regarding vocity and multiple iterations, but first I will discuss this passage as it 
clearly shows the paradigm shift which the problem undergoes from non-being to not-
being in the thinking of Aristotle.  Consider Aristotle‟s explication of the celebrated 
quote: 
so „being‟ is used in various senses, but always with 
reference to one principle [ἀξρή].  For some things are said 
to „be‟ because they are substances; others because they are 
modifications [(affections) πάζε] of substance; others 
because they are a process toward substance, or 
destructions or privations [ζηεξήζεηο] or qualities of 
substance, or productive or generative of substance or of 
terms relating to substance, or negations of certain of these 
terms relating to substance [my emphases]. (Meta 1933, 
1003b6-9) 
                                               
61 Aristotle, Metaphysics, W.D. Ross, tr., The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 2, Jonathan Barnes, ed. 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1584. 
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This passage captures the notion of focal meaning to be discussed next and sets up 
Aristotle‟s application of privation as a kind of opposition, i.e. “negation,” applied to a 
term relating to substance which equates difference in itself with non-being.  As I will 
discuss below, Aristotle‟s use of principle here [ἀξρή] will be his way of attempting to 
navigate Gorgias‟ criterion of inapprehensibility or imperceptibility.   
However, at this point it is enough to note that with the above Aristotle believes 
he has provided proof for the following conclusion – which is actually the very next 
sentence of the above quote:  
It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is 
non-being [emphasis in Ross translation].  δηὸ θαὶ ηὸ κὴ ὂλ 
εἶλαη κὴ ὂλ θακέλ. (Meta 1995, 1003b10)  
You can see that Aristotle‟s Greek uses “κὴ ὂλ” and Ross translates it accordingly as 
“non-being.”  Yet, noticing the previous sentence‟s reference to the negating of terms, 
Hugh Tredennick‟s Loeb translation reads, “not-being is not-being.” (Meta 1933, 
1003b10)  I suppose it would even be appropriate – in this Aristotelian context – to write, 
“non-being is not-being.”  What I have in mind here is that since Aristotle takes non-
being to be a mistaken or pseudo problem deriving from the Parmenidean and Platonic 
incorrect, i.e. non-Aristotelian, interpretations of being, you can take Aristotle here as 
fully conducting his business, as it were, in the light.  In other words, since Aristotle is 
talking about statements containing terms relating to substance, Aristotle seems quite 
candid about the fact that he is not trying to solve the problem to which “κὴ ὂλ” refers in 
Parmenides and Plato.  Hence, Aristotle has transformed the problem from that which is 
not (non-being) to the problem of the not that is (not-being). 
Returning to the various iterations of being, then, Aristotle‟s celebrated 
Metaphysics Book IV §2, quote, “There are many senses in which a thing may be said to 
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„be‟, but they are related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not 
homonymous” (Meta 1933, 1003a33) speaks directly to the question of vocity.  Though 
“is” is not a genus, it is appropriate – following G.E.L. Owen – to speak of a “focal 
meaning”62 in regard to the various iterations of being.  As Aristotle indicated in Book 
VII, “there are several senses in which a thing is said to be primary: but substance is 
primary in every sense.”63 (Meta 1995, 1028a32)  It is important to note that it is in this 
way – through predication of individuals in regard to substance – that Aristotle has 
appropriated Plato‟s language of θαζ‟αὑηό, i.e. in itself.  In other words, rather than direct 
the language of in itself at universals, Aristotle directs the language of in itself 
predication at individuals.
64
  On the one hand, this is consistent with his Posterior 
Analytics where Aristotle notes, “One thing belongs to another in itself [θαζ‟αὑηό] … if it 
belongs to it in what it is.”65 (Post An 73a34-5)  On the other, it will be remembered that 
“to predicate of an individual” is not to name it.66  In this way, θαζ‟αὑηό predication in 
Aristotle becomes “essential” predication – the in itself as the essence of what it is – 
opposed to “accidental” [θαηὰ ζπκβεβεθόο] predication.  Analogously, then, the 
distinction between a “this” and a “such” can be seen, “thises are items that are 
indivisible and one in number in the category of substance [Lewis‟ emphasis].”67   
In sum, after contextualizing the problem of non-being in Parmenides as a 
problem regarding plurality, Aristotle reformulated the question to ask: “of what sort of 
                                               
62
 G.E.L. Owen, “Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle,” Aristotle and Plato in the 
Mid-Fourth Century, I. Düring and G.E.L. Owen, ed. Göteborg (New York: Humanities Press, 1960), 169. 
63
 Aristotle, Metaphysics, W.D. Ross, tr., The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 2, Jonathan Barnes, ed. 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1623. 
64
 Cf. P.F. Strawson, Individuals, (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2003), 137. 
65 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Jonathan Barnes, tr., The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 1, Jonathan 
Barnes, ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 118.  Hereafter cited as Post An. 
66
 G.E.L. Owen, “Inherence,” Phronesis, 10.1, (1965), 98. 
67 Frank A. Lewis, Substance and Predication in Aristotle, (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), 34. 
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non-being and being do the [plurality of] things that are consist?” (Meta 1995, 1089a15)  
With this question as point of departure Aristotle‟s paraphrase of the Parmenidean 
position amounts to this: “The [above] question evidently is, how being in the sense of 
substances is many [emphasis in Ross translation].” (Meta 1995, 1089b8)  Notice 
Aristotle has moved from Parmenides on non-being to plurality to substances in the 
plural.  So it will be a discussion of substance with which Aristotle will respond to the 
problem of non-being, and I will focus on this discussion in the next section. 
§27 Aristotle on plurality – Coming full circle, as it were then, recall at 
Metaphysics X §3, Aristotle described plurality in the following way:  
The one and the many are opposed in several ways, of 
which one is the opposition of the one and plurality as 
indivisible and divisible; … And the one gets its meaning 
and explanation from its contrary, the indivisible from the 
divisible, because plurality and the divisible is more 
perceptible than the indivisible [my emphases]. (Meta 
1995, 1054a20-27) 
Pulling this all together, following the model of the focal meaning of the multiple 
iterations of being, a plurality of perceptibles are predicated not as so many iterations of 
universal being but as so many iterations toward the essence of an individual substance.  
“We have now outlined the nature of substance, showing that it is that which is not 
predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated.” (Meta 1995, 1029a7)  
Moreover, “the question which both now and of old, has always been raised, and always 
been the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance?” 
(Meta 1995, 1028b2-4)  Hence, the Parmenidean being as one has become substance 
individually encountered as essentially one (individual).  It is each individual which is 
one.  Plurality is saved, and Aristotle has separated substantiality from universality.   
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§28 Aristotle on heteron – Lastly then, having just discussed the opposition 
between the one and the many – quoted directly above – Aristotle explains where he 
locates difference, i.e. ἕηεξνλ, in regard to plurality as plurality of individual substances.  
Not only, then, is this precisely how Aristotle enunciates his understanding of non-being, 
but this is also precisely how Aristotle responds to – Parmenides‟ student – Zeno in 
regard to change and motion.  Addressing the one and the many (or plurality) by way of 
his matrix of opposition Aristotle explains, 
To the one belong, as we have indicated graphically in our 
distinction of the contraries, [i.e. the matrix of opposition,] 
the same and the like and the equal, and to plurality belong 
the other [ηὸ ἕηεξνλ] and the unlike and the unequal [my 
emphasis]. (Meta 1995, 1054a30) 
Notice, then, what Aristotle has accomplished.  In this section I argued – or rather 
“described” since Aristotle is pretty explicit about his interpretive violence – that with the 
notion of focal meaning Aristotle shifts the understanding of being as either a genus or a 
universal – whether either Parmenides or Plato actually held these positions is a different 
question
68
 – to an understanding of being as substance. (Cf. Meta 1028b2-4)   
In this way, I showed you how Aristotle appropriated Plato‟s language of 
θαζ‟αὑηό, i.e. in itself, toward directing the problem of non-being away from universality 
toward substantial plurality – again, whether Plato actually held such a view of 
“universality” is a different question.  I also showed you ἕηεξνλ‟s conspicuous absence 
from Aristotle‟s matrix of opposition.  Now, I will continue showing you how Aristotle‟s 
application of his matrix of opposition to individual substances goes toward his solution 
for the problem of non-being.  Yet, keep in mind, as the above constitutes Aristotle‟s shift 
                                               
68 Cf. A.H. Coxon, “Parmenides on Thinking and Being,” Mnemosyne, 56.2, (2003), 210-212. 
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of the problem from non to not being, Aristotle certainly does not solve the problem of 
non-being.   
Priority & Privation: Reckoning, Counting, and Being 
“Visitor: „So it has to be possible for that which is not to be, in the case of change and also as applied to all 
the kinds.  That‟s because as applied to all of them the nature of the different makes each of them not be, by 
making it different from that which is.‟ [Plato‟s emphases]” 
~Plato (Soph 1997, 256d-e) 
 
 §29 Aristotle’s solution to the problem of non-being: Death (unqualified 
destruction) – The passages I will be examining in this section may be considered as 
further textual evidence supporting my claim that Aristotle‟s reading shifted the problem 
of non-being to a problem regarding not-being.  However, the focus of this section is to 
show the mistaken way in which Aristotle‟s reading resolves the problem of non-being.  
Toward this end I will continue showing you how Aristotle‟s application of his matrix of 
opposition to individual substances goes toward reinstating difference as ἕηεξνλ, and you 
will notice this Aristotelian use of ἕηεξνλ pertains to a specifically designated kind of 
not-being, i.e. a derivation from the logical structure of his matrix of opposition.  What I 
am doing here, then, is picking up the thread of a question Aristotle began in Metaphysics 
Book XII which he takes his discussion of Parmenides in Book XIV to resolve.  The 
thread begins with Aristotle asking, “One might raise the question from what sort of „not-
being‟ generation takes place; for not-being has three senses.” (Meta 1995, 1069b27)  As 
Hugh Tredennick indicates in his Book XII footnote, the three senses concern (1) “the 
negation of various predications,” (2) “falsity,” and (3) “unrealized potential.”69   
Now, there are, of course, a number of ways to organize these three “senses,” and 
though Aristotle does not acknowledge it in Book XII, he takes the question of not-being 
                                               
69 Hugh Tredennick‟s commentary here appears at: Aristotle, The Metaphysics: Books X-XIV, Hugh 
Tredennick, tr. (London: William  Heinemann, 1958), 127. 
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in regard to generation – as a type of change – to be a different iteration of the problem of 
non-being.  This is clear by the culmination of the thread in Book XIV.  To follow 
Aristotle‟s own organization, then, is to cross reference types of change, the privative 
type of opposition, and his understanding of priority all in a trajectory of convergence 
such that his shift from non to not being overlaps with his demonstration of the type of 
not-being which pertains to generation.  What makes this clear, for example, in Book 
XIV is Aristotle‟s comment that “since non-being in the various cases has as many senses 
as there are categories [(1)], and besides this the false [(2)] is said not to be and so is [(3)] 
the potential, generation proceeds from the latter [my emphasis].” (Meta 1995, 1089a27)  
In general, then, showing Aristotle‟s arguments along this trajectory will show the 
mistaken way in which his reading resolves the problem of non-being.  In particular it 
will show how Aristotle‟s reading of the opposition between potentiality and actuality as 
privative provides his response to the problem of non-being.   
So, in order to fully understand his response, it is also necessary to understand 
how Aristotle argues for the priority of actuality in the above mentioned opposition with 
potentiality.
70
  In Metaphysics IX §8 Aristotle holds that actuality precedes potentiality in 
account [ιόγῳ] (Meta 1049b12-17), time [ρξόλῳ] (Meta 1049b17-1050a3), and being 
[νὺζίᾳ] (Meta 1050a4-11).  Hence, the meaning of this section‟s title: privation and 
priority provide Aristotle with three types of not-being which coincide with the ways in 
which actuality is prior to potentiality.  His various negations of predications and falsity 
pertain to priority in account.  Any negation of being, as negation of actual substance 
having priority to its potential for change or destruction, pertains to priority in being.  As 
                                               
70
 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ 1-3, Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek, tr., 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 49. 
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already indicated, this will be his response to the problem of non-being.  Lastly, his 
treatment of priority in time is a little less straight forward than the other two.
71
  Suffice 
to say at this point, counting as a potentiality constitutes a type of not-being.  For 
example Aristotle says, “Time is not number with which we count, but the number of 
things which are counted.”72 (Phys 1995, 220b9)  The relevance and efficacy of 
Aristotle‟s account of priority in time, then, derive from his use of it to criticize Zeno‟s 
attempt to defend Parmenides.  Moreover, a brief examination of his discussion of time 
will be beneficial for later chapters, i.e. 3 and 4.  Therefore, in addition to priority in 
account and being, I will also address the sense in which time is not-being. 
Whereas at Categories §14 Aristotle distinguished between “six kinds of 
change”73 (Cat 15a14-15) – those being: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, 
alteration, and change of place –, in On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle 
distinguishes between “unqualified” and “qualified” “coming-to-be and passing-away.”74 
(GC 318b13-318b17)  The first two of the six kinds of change, then, from Categories §14 
pertain to unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away, and the last four kinds of change 
pertain to qualified coming-to-be and passing-away.  And, in Physics Book I §7 since he 
is discussing “becoming,” i.e. γίγλεζζαη, Aristotle brackets destruction and separates the 
other kinds of change into “absolute becoming” which is generation or “coming into 
                                               
71 For a learned discussion of various historical readings of time: Cf. G.J. Whitrow, “Reflections of on the 
History of the Concept of Time,” The Study of Time, J.T. Fraser, F.C. Haber, G.H. Müller, (New York: 
Springer-Verlag, 1972), 1-11. 
72 Aristotle, Physics, R.P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, tr. The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 1, Johnathan 
Barnes, ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 373.  Hereafter cited as Phys with year to 
indicate translator. 
73 Aristotle, Categories, J.L. Ackrill, tr., The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 1, Jonathan Barnes, ed. 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 23. 
74 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, H.H. Joachim, tr. The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 1, 
Johnathan Barnes, ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 520.  Hereafter cited as GC. 
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existence,” and the other kinds of change as “coming to be this or that.” (Phys 1957, 
190a33)   
§30 Aristotle’s Assumption: Persistence – Now across these different groupings 
of change, the distinguishing feature around which they revolve is the question of 
persistence.  For example, Aristotle explains that “in all cases of becoming there must 
always be a subject – the thing which becomes or changes, and this subject, though 
constituting a unit, may be analyzed into two concepts and expressed in two [opposed] 
terms [my emphases].” (Phys 1995, 189b34)  This subject is the infamous Aristotelian 
ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon.  According to Liddell and Scott it means “to underlie, as 
the foundation in which something else inheres, to be implied or presupposed by 
something else [my emphases].”75  This is important because, on the one hand, Aristotle 
will need to employ the entirety of the apparatus I pointed to in the introduction of this 
section to argue for the ὑπνθείκελνλ.  In other words, arguing for the hypokeimenon 
invokes Aristotle‟s matrix of opposition, actuality and potentiality, analogical reasoning, 
and priority of actuality.  On the other hand, destruction as unqualified passing-away gets 
its meaning from the claim that the ὑπνθείκελνλ no longer persists.  “Thus perishing 
[destruction] is change to not-being.”76 (Phys 1995, 224b9)  Again, this requires moving 
through Aristotle‟s apparatus of argumentation to fully understand his claim.  However, 
you can already see how Aristotle is poised to mistakenly equate non-being with death.    
Arguing for a subject that persists across change, then, Aristotle suggests “the 
subject [ὑπνθείκελνλ] is numerically one [ἓλ] thing, but has two conceptually distinct 
                                               
75 Cf. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 
1884.   
76 Aristotle, Physics, R.P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, tr. The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 1, Johnathan 
Barnes, ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 379. 
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aspects.” (Phys 1957, 190b24)  As Aristotle explains it, “the actual change itself takes 
place between the terms of an antithesis,” (Phys 1957, 190b33) i.e. the two conceptually 
distinct opposed terms.  In fact, Aristotle justifies his positing of an underlying subject 
which persists through the process of change by regarding the binary opposition‟s two 
terms in the following way, 
considering one of its terms taken singly as competent, by 
its absence or presence, to accomplish the whole change. 
… And of this „underlying‟ factor we can form a 
conception by analogy; for it will bear the same relation to 
concrete things in general, or to any specific concrete thing, 
which the bronze bears to the statue before it has been 
founded [my emphasis]… (Phys 1957, 191a9)   
The reason analogy is possible here is because “the two terms of the opposition itself 
stand on a different footing from each other.” (Phys 191a19)  Specifically in this case the 
terms are privative.  In other words, given the presence [παξνπζία] or absence [ἀπνπζία] 
of an identifying aspect, Aristotle suggests that you may truthfully affirm or negate the 
presence or absence of the related privation.  This is somewhat complicated, so let me 
provide an example. 
 Socrates changes.  For example, he looks different in middle age than he did in 
his youth.  Yet, Aristotle maintains that the individual who was Socrates in youth is still 
Socrates in middle age, despite his changes.  How?  This invokes a discussion of 
Aristotle‟s famous four causes [ἄηηηα]. (Cf. Post An 74b5)  Briefly, so as to not get too far 
afield, consider Physics Book II §3. Here, invoking ἐλαληίνλ, i.e. logical difference, 
Aristotle notes, “the same cause is often alleged for precisely opposite effects.  For if its 
presence [παξνπζία] causes one thing, we lay the opposite to its account if it is absent 
[ἀπνπζία].” (Phys 1957, 195a12)  So, there is an initial logical distinction between what 
is present and what is absent, and with this distinction Aristotle is able to deduce that 
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which is inapprehensible.  What is more, due to the analogical justification Aristotle is 
working with, despite its absence in regard to perception Aristotle deduces the presence 
of a persisting inapprehensible subject, i.e. ὑπνθείκελνλ.  The four causes, then, are: (1) 
the agent or initiator of change [ἀξρὴ], i.e. the efficient cause; (2) the essence, “the whole 
or synthesis or form” [ὅινλ θαὶ ἡ ζύλζεζηο θαὶ ηὸ εἶδνο], i.e. the formal cause; (3) “the 
for the sake of which” [ηέινο], i.e. the final cause; and, (4) the “substratum” 
[ὑπνθείκελνλ], i.e. the material cause.77 (Phys 195a15-25)  Aristotle also discusses the 
four causes in his philosophical lexicon at Metaphysics V §2 (Meta 1013a-1014a).  
Moreover, of the four causes, or “becauses,” at Physics II §7Aristotle notes, “in many 
cases three of these „becauses‟ conicide.” (Phys 1957, 198a25)  In this way, the formal, 
efficient, and final causes may be grouped together in opposition to the material cause, 
and this opposition provides the ground for various analogical relations to the opposition. 
 Aristotle suggests it is key, if one is to overcome Parmenides, that you 
“distinguish matter and privation.”  For Aristotle holds that “the matter, accidentally is 
not, while the privation in its own nature is not.” (Phys 1995, 192a4-5)  As Aristotle 
explains it,   
we distinguish between „matter‟ and „privation‟ (or absence 
of form) … privation as such, is the direct negation or non-
existence of the form of which it is the privation.  So that 
matter, though never existing in isolation, may be pretty 
well taken as constituting the „concrete being‟ of which it is 
the basis, but privation not in the least so.
78
 (Phys 1957, 
192a5-7)   
In this way, whereas informed matter is apprehended through perception, absence as 
inapprehensible is arrived at by analogy.  Rather than “look through” the Idea in itself of 
                                               
77 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, Richard Rojcewicz, tr. (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2008), 31. 
78 Replacing “shortage” with “privation” throughout. 
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ἕηεξνλ, Aristotle provides his justification with an analogy based on privation in regard 
to that which has priority.  Likewise will be the mechanism for arriving at matter in itself 
and privation in itself.  Lastly, Aristotle provides an extended definition of privation at 
Metaphysics Book V §22.  Of his treatment there it is worth noting, “There are just as 
many kinds of privations as there are of words with negative prefixes.”  (Meta 1995, 
1022b33)  Hence, again the efficacy of Aristotle‟s separation of substantiality from 
universality or being from thinking is that you can think of not-being despite an entitiy‟s 
being.  In fact, it is from the priority of an entity‟s being that you can analogically think 
its not-being, and that by way of privation.  Further, this may be taken as Aristotle‟s 
attempt to resolve or deny the descriptive criterion of ineffability regarding non-being, 
i.e. according to Aristotle non-being can be said analogically as privation.  
§31 Aristotle on Analogy – The celebrated Aristotle on analogy (ἀλαινγία) quote 
appears at Metaphysics IX §6.  It is also here that Aristotle explains the potentiality 
actuality opposition.  
What we mean can be plainly seen in the particular case by 
induction; we need not seek a definition for every term, but 
must grasp the analogy: that as that which is actually 
building is to that which is capable of building, so is that 
which is awake to that which is asleep; and that which is 
seeing to that which has the eyes shut, but has the power of 
sight; and that which is differentiated out of matter to the 
matter; and the finished article to the raw material.  Let 
actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and 
the potential by the other.  But things are not all said to 
exist actually in the same sense, but only by analogy – as A 
is in B or to B, so is C in D or to D ; for the relation is 
either that of motion to potentiality, or that of substance to 
some particular matter [my emphases]. (Meta 1995, 
1048a35-b8) 
Mary Hesse suggests, “these metaphysical analogies seem to be primarily concerned with 
the understanding of metaphysical terms.  Thus they are examples of the introduction of 
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novel language by means of analogy [Hesse‟s emphases].”79  The value of analogy here, 
then, is that you may arrive at the inapprehensible by way of analogy from the 
apprehensible.  This is quite similar to Physics I §9 (192a27-34) where Aristotle explains 
that privation in relation to matter in itself may be thought along a continuum of 
actualization.  In other words, regressing toward the more privative from an apprehended 
individual, i.e. informed matter, the continuum spans the point at which form and matter 
separate.  In this way, you can supposedly think matter in itself though you cannot 
perceive it – you cannot perceptibly apprehend it.   
Pushing the distinction between matter and privation that Aristotle deemed 
important for overcoming Parmenides, privative opposition provides access to Aristotle‟s 
reworking of ἕηεξνλ.  Privative opposition yields a distinction between an in itself 
[θαζ‟αὑηό] as matter and an in itself as not-being, i.e. “the privation in its own nature is 
not-being.” (Phys 1957, 192a4-5)  Therefore, on the one hand, as Norbert Luyten pointed 
out, 
We can say that matter, as opposed to substantial 
determination, cannot be anything more than mere 
determinability. … Thinking this through, one seems 
compelled to say that such mere determinability must 
exclude any determination.  In other words, it [matter] has 
to be pure indetermination [my emphasis].
80
   
On the other hand, since “potentiality and actuality are different … it is possible that a 
thing may be capable of being and not be, and capable of not being and yet be [emphases 
in Ross translation].” (Meta 1995, 1047a19)  The capacity or potential involved here 
though inapprehensible to perception yields its presence as absence to reason by analogy.  
                                               
79 Mary Hess, “Aristotle‟s Logic of Analogy,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 15.61, (1965), 336; also ff. 
Ronald Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima, 149. 
80 Norbert Luyten, “Matter as Potency,” The Concept of Matter in Greek and Mediaeval Philosophy, E. 
McMullin, ed. (Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1962), 106-107. 
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This is precisely how Aristotle‟s attempt to solve the problem of non-being produced an 
ambiguity between matter in itself as not-being and privation in itself as not-being.  In 
order to clear up this ambiguity Aristotle assigns privation in itself to the non-becoming 
kind of change, i.e. destruction.  Hence, this is the argumentation with which Aristotle 
mistakenly equated non-being with death, i.e. destruction.
81 
 §32 From Actuality and Analogy to Potentiality and Persistence – In order to 
keep all this clear it is important to discuss the manner in which actuality for Arisotle is 
thought to be prior to potentiality.  To begin with, the terms involved here are δύλακηο, 
i.e. potentiality, ἐλέξγεηα, i.e. activity or actuality, and ἐληειέρεηα, i.e. unfolding or 
activity toward perfecting its end.  There is evidently a significant debate regarding how 
to translate and relate these terms.
82
  However, it is not necessary for me to enter into this 
debate here.  The below may be understood without resolving their terminological debate.  
Moreover, as Zev Bechler points out, “that the connection between the potential and the 
actual in Aristotle‟s ontology is strictly logical is readily seen by the fact that no physical 
principles are ever considered in inferring either from the other.”83  Also, Aristotle‟s 
                                               
81 Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, Reidar Thomte and Albert Anderson, tr. (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1980); cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson, tr. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 228-235; 279-304; cf. Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” 
David Farrell Krell, tr., Basic Writings: from Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), (San 
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993), 101; 106; 108. 
82 Cf. Oded Balaban, “The modern misunderstanding of Aristotle‟s theory of motion,” Journal for General 
Philosophy of Science, 26.1, (1995), 1-10. Cf. George Alfred Blair, Energeia and Entelecheia: “Act” in 
Aristotle, (Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 1992).  Cf. Daniel W. Graham, “The Development of 
Aristotle‟s Concept of Actuality: Comments on a Reconstruction by Stephen Menn,” Ancient Philosophy, 
15, (1995), 551-564.  Cf. Dag Haug, Aristotle‟s kinesis/energeia-test and the semantics of the Greek 
perfect,” Linguistics, 42.2, (2004), 387-418.  Cf. L.A. Kosman, “Aristotle‟s Definition of Motion,” 
Phronesis, 14.1, (1969), 40-62.  Cf. Christos Y. Panayides, “Aristotle on the Priority of Actuality in 
Substance,” Ancient Philosophy, 19, (1999), 327-344.  Cf. Ronald Polansky, “Energeia in Aristotle‟s 
Metaphysics IX,” Ancient Philosophy, 3, (1983), 160-170.  Cf. Joe Sachs, Aristotle’s Physics: A Guided 
Study, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2004). 
83 Zev Bechler, Aristotle’s Theory of Actuality, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 11. 
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description of potentiality is clear enough to support the claim that potentiality exceeds 
actuality;  
we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is 
in the block of wood, and the half-line is in the whole, 
because it might be separated out, and even the man who is 
not studying we call a man of science, if he is capable of 
studying. (Meta 1995, 1048a33) 
Potentiality, then, clearly exceeds
84
 actuality in that whatever becomes actual had the 
potential to become in various ways other than it actually did.  The implicit claim, i.e. the 
assumption of persistence, is supported in the same analogical way ideas of potentiality 
and matter were supported.  In other words, the absence as presence of a hypokeimenon 
allows for the assumption of persistence.  Further, Aristotle may also  
mean by potentiality not only that definite kind which is 
said to be a principle of change in another thing or in the 
thing itself regarded as other, but in general every principle 
of movement or of rest.  For nature also is in the same 
genus as potentiality; for it is a principle of movement – 
not, however, in something else but in the thing itself qua 
itself. (Meta 1995, 1049b4-1049b9) (Cf. Cat 14a27-14b8) 
So, actuality precedes potentiality in account [ιόγῳ] (Cat 1049b12-17), time [ρξόλῳ] 
(Cat 1049b17-1050a3), and being [νὺζίᾳ] (Cat 1050a4-11).  As Aristotle concluded, “We 
have distinguished the various senses of „prior‟, and it is clear that actuality is prior to 
potentiality.” (Meta 1995, 1049b4-1049b9)  Aristotle amplified, “it is obvious that 
actuality is prior in substance to potentiality; and as we have said, one actuality always 
precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover.” (Meta 
1995, 1050b2-1050b6)  Put another way, “In all the productions of nature and art what 
exists potentially is brought into entity [into being] only by that which is in actuality.”85 
                                               
84 Think of the second way noted above to discuss non-discursivity. 
85 Aristotle, Generation of Animals, A.L. Peck, tr. (London: William Heinemann, 1953), 148-9. Hereafter 
cited as GA. 
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(GA 734a30-31)  Hence, these passages confirm Aristotle‟s claim regarding the priority 
of actuality.   
The particular combinations of privation, then, with (1) priority of being, (2) 
priority of time, and (3) priority of account reveal the three not-beings in play here.  First, 
matter in itself, or – what logically amounts to the same – the hypokeimenon, is absent 
compared to the present form matter combination which constititutes the perceived 
substance.  Second, privation in itself as destruction is absence as not-being, i.e. the no 
longer being present of the already absent hypokeimenon.  This is privation from 
proximate to remote to unqualified passing-away.  Third, in so far as potentiality is 
predicated of apprehended substance as inapprehensible, then potentiality is an 
intellectual product rationally constructed to indicate absence.  Though the opposition 
involved is logical, and the supposition involved is rational, still the lack of 
correspondence between physicality and logic highlights the idea of potentiality as 
lacking being in comparison with actuality.  This is like the difference between all maps 
and the territory they are supposed to describe.
86
  Every map qua map is not – is different 
than – the territory.  In sum, the three terms involved here are: potency, annihilation, and 
intellectual identification.  Furthermore, intellectual identification, as I have been 
gesturing above, is opposed to identification through perceptual apprehension.  This is 
further confirmed in Aristotle‟s comments from Metaphysics Book IX §9 and §10: 
“Potentiality is discovered from actuality (and therefore it is by an act of construction 
that people acquire the knowledge) [my emphasis].” (Meta 1995, 1051a29-1051a33)  
Hence, “The terms „being‟ and „non-being‟ are employed firstly with reference to the 
                                               
86 Cf. Marcus A. Doel, “Proverbs for Paranoids: Writing Geography on Hollowed Ground,” Transactions of 
the British Geographers, 18.3, (1993), 377-394. 
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categories, and secondly with reference to the potentiality or actuality of these or their 
opposites.” (Meta 1995, 1051a34-36) 
 §33 Aristotle v. Zeno – Lastly, then, Aristotle‟s attack on Zeno both completes his 
attack on the Eleactic understanding of non-being and sheds further light on the 
ontological lack assigned to counting and time.
87
 (Cf. IL 969a27-33)  What, then, is 
Zeno‟s contribution to the Eleatic reading of non-being?   As Plato put it in the 
Parmenides, on the one hand, “Can something that is in some state not be so, without 
changing from that state? – It cannot.” (Parm 162b-c)  On the other hand, “So everything 
of the sort we‟ve described, which is both so and not so, signifies a change. … And a 
change is a motion.”(Parm 162b-c)  Hence, “if it is nowhere among the things that are –as 
it isn‟t, if in fact it is not – it couldn‟t travel from one place to another.” (Parm 162c-d)  In 
this way, Zeno‟s puzzle is presented here as: Change and motion are supposed to involve 
non-being; but if an object is not being, then the object cannot change or be in motion.  
Hence, there can either be no non-being, or there can be no change and motion.   
This as Zeno suggests at the beginning of the dialog is the way he hopes to defend 
the Parmenidean notion that all is one. (Cf. Parm 128d)  If you hope to save plurality over 
oneness, then you must have some account of not-being – this one is not that one – so as 
to account for plurality, but if you believe in not-being, then you must reject change and 
motion.  Notice, this is perfectly reasonable, if there is no object, i.e. the object is not, 
then the object cannot be in motion or be changing.  Aristotle resolves this puzzle with 
his idea of potentiality, and, this is yet another way you can see his idea of potentiality in 
his attempt to say what is not, i.e. solve the problem of non-being.    
                                               
87 Cf. Aristotle, On Indivisible Lines, H.H. Joachim, tr., The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 2, Jonathan 
Barnes, ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1530.  Hereafter cited as IL. 
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Aristotle advertises Physics VIII, §8, as a solution to Zeno‟s paradox of motion,88 
and paraphrases “Zeno‟s argument” in the following way: 
before any distance can be traversed half the distance must 
be traversed, that these half-distances are infinite in 
number, and that it is impossible to traverse distances 
infinite in number … in the time during which a motion is 
in progress we should first count the half-motion for every 
half-distance that we get, so that we have the result that 
when the whole distance is traversed we have counted an 
infinite number, which is admittedly impossible. (Phys 
1995, 263a5-263a10)   
Aristotle indicates he has solved the apparent perplexity here because, “we put forward a 
solution to this difficulty turning on the fact that the period of time contains within itself 
an infinite number of units.” (Phys 1995, 263a11)  Now, at this point, neither his 
paraphrase of Zeno‟s argument nor his solution seem to have much to do with the 
problem of non-being.  However, both of these relations become apparent as soon as 
Aristotle discusses motion in terms of potentiality.  According to Aristotle,  
In the act of dividing the continuous distance into two 
halves one point is treated as two, since we make it a 
beginning and an end; and this same result is produced by 
the act of counting halves as well as by the act of dividing 
into halves.  But if divisions are made in this way, neither 
the distance nor the motion will be continuous; for motion 
if it is to be continuous must relate to what is continuous; 
and though what is continuous contains an infinite number 
of halves, they are not actual but potential halves.  If he 
makes the halves actual, he will get not a continuous but an 
intermittent motion [my emphases]. (Phys 1995, 263a23-
30)  
Notice, then, “what is continuous” is “potential,” and as potential, it is infinite.  The two 
aspects brought to the fore here are notions of positionality and variability in 
measurement.  Just as the referential content of “two minutes from now” depends upon 
when you read it, so does the placement of concreteness or the determination of a unit 
                                               
88 Cf. F.A. Shamsi, “A Note on Aristotle, Physics 239b5-7: What Exactly Was Zeno‟s Argument of the 
Arrow?” Ancient Philosophy, 14, (1994), 51-72. 
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depend on what one measures.
89
  And, this is precisely how counting pertains to not-
being.  
Jacob Klein in his Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra poses 
the question provocatively: 
The continual practice of counting and calculation 
gradually fosters within us that familiarity with numbers 
and their relations which Plato terms „arithmetic and 
logistic art‟ (ἀξηζκεηηθή  ινγηζηηθή [ηέρλε]) which enables 
us to execute any operation of counting or calculating we 
wish.  But those numbers which we have at our disposal 
before we begin counting or calculating and which must 
clearly be independent of the particular things which 
happen to undergo counting – of what are these the 
numbers? [Klein‟s emphases]90 
That these numbers lack being enables them to be used in the manner of “Zeno‟s 
argument” noted above.  Each determination of a now is a counting, and therefore not an 
actual continuity.
91
  It is not time which persists but the persistence that is counted which 
is time.  This persisting subject is, of course, the ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon.  
However, recall that the logical structure of the justification of time as potentiality is the 
same as that in the justification for the existence of the ὑπνθείκελνλ.  Looking at 
potential, then, whether as measurement, or ground of being is like looking through a 
Platonic Idea at what is not (an Idea).  Yet, as Aristotle‟s apparatus of privation, priority, 
and analogical reasoning show, it certainly is a rational construction as supposition which 
is accounting for these not-beings in Aristotle. 
§34 Priority & Privation – In conclusion, in this section I have shown the 
mistaken way in which Aristotle resolves the problem of non-being.  Since for Aristotle it 
                                               
89
 Cf. “„One‟ evidently means measure.” (Meta 1088a14) 
90
 Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, (New York: Dover Publications, 
1992), 49. 
91
 Cf. John Protevi, Time and Exteriority: Aristotle, Heidegger, Derrida, (Philadelphia, Bucknell 
University Press, 1994), 70-71.  
 66 
 
is by way of privation from the priority of an entity‟s being that you can analogically 
think its not-being, analogically posited not-being, such as potentiality, is taken as that 
which allows for change – Parmenides trampled.  Similarly despite Socrates‟ changes in 
appearance, Socrates as a specimen of substance is supposed to persist.  Here focal 
meaning of predication coincides with subject persisting through change to account for 
“how” the individual who was Socrates in youth is still Socrates in middle age, despite 
changes.  In this way, a difference between a substantial and a non-substantial change 
emerges, and substantial change involving the greater privation is taken to be non-being.   
Despite the implicit critique, then, that Aristotle‟s apparatus functions like a 
reverse engineered post hoc justification – as if saying, “it is through analogy that I 
constructed this, therefore its analogical reasoning is its justification” –  Aristotle‟s 
resolution to the problem of non-being contains even greater faults.  As the previous 
section showed, Aristotle is not working on the problem of non-being as found in Plato‟s 
Sophist.  And, as this section showed, Aristotle‟s apparatus, as logical, fails to indicate a 
non logical negation of being.  In this way, Aristotle‟s reading of non-being collapses the 
Non-being, Becoming, Being triad from Socrates‟ Republic Book V exchange with 
Glaucon, noted previously, into Being and Becoming with not-being to account for 
change.  As a result, it is an unqualified change, i.e. destruction, which he mistakenly 
posited as a solution to the problem of non-being, since otherwise there is only being and 
becoming.  Having, on the one hand, just examined not-being as it relates to priority in 
being as Aristotle‟s resolution to the problem of non-being, i.e. his response to 
Parmenides and Plato, and, on the other hand, just examined not-being as it relates to time 
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as Aristotle‟s response to Zeno, the next and final Aristotle section examines not-being as 
it relates to priority in account. 
Dialectic : Discovery :: Demonstration : Justification 
§35 Aristotle & Priority of Logos, Dialectic v. Demonstration – By the end of this 
section I would like for you to understand the difference between dialectic and 
demonstration according to Aristotle, in particular how they differ in regard to starting 
points.  This difference is involved in each of the remaining thinkers to be discussed.  I 
have already gestured toward stating this difference.  However, this section constitutes an 
extended examination.  As such, a number of the threads which I will tie together here 
have already been introduced.  The primary thread for this section, then, is priority in 
account, and this is because demonstration and dialectic differ from one another in regard 
to the kind of account that is prior in each case.  Roughly put, though both begin with 
assumptions, demonstration begins with axioms and dialectic begins with problems.  
Demonstrations are taken to be pedagogical and pertain to providing justification for 
holding a belief or position.  Dialectic is taken to be exploratory, in the sense of 
discovering first principles, through a process of organizing thought based on initial 
assumptions for the purpose of testing those assumptions.  In this way, whereas deductive 
arguments are formulated in both demonstration and dialectic, induction is taken to 
pertain more to dialectic.  Put another way, on the one hand, the ideas with which 
demonstrations begin are ideas taken to be somehow constitutive in regard to the beings 
demonstrated.  That is, one‟s demonstrations are successful because the ideas involved in 
the demonstration are correct in regard to the object of demonstration.  On the other hand, 
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the ideas with which dialect begins are regulative.
92
  Because you are seeking to know, 
you organize your thinking by regulating the ideas with which you think.  The final 
distinguishing difference between demonstration and dialectic which I will explore in this 
section is their different relations to experience.
93
 
Looking at the passages where Aristotle explicitly refers to the beginnings of 
demonstration and dialectic provides a better understanding of the difference involved.  
The relevance of a passage from the Prior Analytics requires it be quoted in full, 
The premise of demonstration differs from the premise of 
dialectic in that the former is the assumption of one 
member of a pair of contradictory statements (since the 
demonstrator does not ask a question but makes an 
assumption), whereas the latter is an answer to the question 
which of two contradictory statements is to be accepted.  
This difference, however, will not affect the fact that in 
either case a syllogism results; for both the demonstrator 
and the interrogator draw a syllogistic conclusion by first 
assuming that some predicate applies or does not apply to 
some subject.
94
 (Pr An 23b24-24a34) 
This passage supports my claim above that both demonstration and dialectic begin with 
assumptions.  It also supports my claim that dialectic begins with problems or questions.  
In regard to demonstration, then, on the one hand, “hypotheses are the origins of 
demonstrations.” (Meta 1995, 1013a16)  On the other hand, “By the starting points of 
demonstration I mean the common beliefs, on which all men base their proofs.” (Meta 
1995, 996b26-30)  That is, “all demonstrative sciences use the axioms. … The axioms are 
most universal and are principles of all things [emphasis in Ross].” (Meta 1995, 997a10)  
So, in attempting to better understand the starting points of demonstrations, there seems 
                                               
92 Cf. Richard D. McKirahan, Jr. Principles and Proofs: Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstrative Science, (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 74-75.  
93 Cf. John David G. Evans, Aristotle’s Concept of Dialectic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), 22-28. 
94 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Hugh Tredennick, tr. (London: William  Heinemann, 1962), 199-200.  
Hereafter cited as Pr An. 
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to be some discrepancy regarding their status as assumptions.
95
  Approaching from a 
different set of quotes might help. 
 According to Aristotle in the Topics a demonstration proceeds from premises 
which “are true and primitive, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally 
come through premises which are primitive and true.”96 (Top 100a26)  Yet, “Dialectic 
does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of 
crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion.” (Rhet 1356b35)  In fact, 
“dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.” 
(Top 101b3-4)  So, you can see that the starting ground for demonstration is to be more 
solid, so to speak, than dialectic.  And, given the stronger language of the Topics, why 
maintain that the principles with which demonstration begins are assumptions?  Aristotle 
makes this clear in the Posterior Analytics noting,  
I call principles in each genus those which it is not possible 
to prove to be.  Now both what the primitives and what the 
things dependent on them signify is assumed; but that they 
are must be assumed for the principles and proved for the 
rest [my emphases]. (Post An 76a32-34)
97
 
Hence, “it is impossible that there should be a demonstration of everything.” (Meta 1995, 
1006a10)  This helps clear up the relationship between dialectic and demonstration nicely 
because it is – as noted above – dialectic which provides the “principles of all inquiries.”  
So, the regulative use of ideas chosen “out of materials that call for discussion” helps to 
identify more solid starting points for demonstrations from principles which seem 
                                               
95 The question which has appeared: Are the so called “axioms” as starting points of demonstration still 
assumptions? 
96
 Aristotle, Topics, W.A. Pickard-Cambridge, tr. The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol.1, Jonathan 
Barnes, ed.  (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 167.  Hereafter cited as Top. 
97
 Cf. Topics (Top 101a26b4) and (Pr An 24b12-16).  
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adequate enough to be considered constitutive, i.e. indicative or demonstrative, of the 
materials in question.   
In this way, a hypothesis is a proposition you assume for the purpose of 
demonstration.
98
  And, as such, you can see how commentators, for example Jonathan 
Barnes, suggest demonstrations are ultimately pedagogical.  Pointing to the more solid, 
axiomatic, beginnings of demonstration Barnes holds, “the theory of demonstrative 
science was never meant to guide or formalize scientific research; it is concerned 
exclusively with the teaching of facts already won”; moreover, “it does not describe how 
scientists do, or ought to, acquire knowledge; it offers a formal model of how teachers 
should present and impart knowledge [Barnes‟ emphases].”99  This last part of Barnes‟ 
comment gestures toward the other distinction with which I compare demonstration and 
dialectic, i.e. the contexts of justification and discovery.
100
  As Aristotle points out in the 
Physics, 
When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have 
principles, causes, or elements, it is through acquaintance 
with these that knowledge and understanding is attained. … 
therefore, in the science of nature too our first task will be 
to try to determine what relates to its principles.  The 
natural way to do this is to start from the things which are 
more knowable and clear to us and proceed toward those 
which are clearer and more knowable by nature. (Phys 
1995, 184a10-17) 
                                               
98 Orna Harari, Knowledge and Demonstration: Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, (Netherlands: Kluwer, 
2004), 47.   
99 Jonathan Barnes, “Aristotle‟s Theory of Demonstration,” Articles on Aristotle: 1. Science, Jonathan 
Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji, ed. (Londong: Duckworth Publishing, 1975), 77.  
100 There are a number of ways to reiterate this fundamental distinction between dialectic and 
demonstration.  For example, Karl Popper (1902-1994) in the Logic of Scientific Discovery refers to “the 
distinction between the psychology of knowledge which deals with empirical facts, and the logic of 
knowledge which is concerned only with logical relations [Popper‟s emphases].” Karl Popper, The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery, Karl Popper, tr. (London: Routledge, 2002), 7.  However, I prefer the terms context of 
discovery and the context of justification.    
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Commenting on this very passage, Wolfgang Wieland suggests, “In the context of inquiry 
into principles this means: we start with the thing which is already known to us, but 
which we wish to know with a knowledge derived from principles.”101   
Now I chose to quote Wieland not just to continue bolstering my appeal to the 
authority of various respected commentators, but also because his language broaches the 
topic of what is other than “knowing derived from principles.”  Notice in the above 
passage with which Aristotle opened the Physics, his language points to the different 
starting points which seem to suggest either having or not having the principles required 
for demonstration.
102
  Given Aristotle‟s emphasis earlier on priority in actuality and 
account, ignorance will turn out to be having the wrong or inappropriate first principles. 
(Post An 77b20-77b27)  Even if your first principle is correct in one science, it may not 
function in another; for example, geometers are said not to concern themselves with 
whether shapes are good or evil.  Again, dialectic, then, is required to organize thought so 
as to bring about appropriate first principles.  If you cannot justify, then you seek to 
discover the first principles with which you can demonstrate knowledge. 
§36 Aristotle on justifying your discovery – As G.E.L. Owen (1922-1982) points 
out in his “Tithenai ta Phainomena,” dialectic begins with phenomena in that 
“phenomena” may refer to opinions or products of perception.103  So, on the one hand, 
dialectic may begin with opinions related to the material which calls for discussion.  On 
the other hand, dialectic may begin with experience.  The former road is that of logical 
                                               
101 Wolfgang Wieland, “Aristotle‟s Physics and the Problem of Inquiry into Principles,” Articles on 
Aristotle: 1. Science, Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji, ed. (Londong: Duckworth 
Publishing, 1975), 129. 
102 Cf. Richard D. McKirahan, Jr. Principles and Proofs: Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstrative Science, 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 29. 
103 G.E.L. Owen, “„Tithenai ta Phainomena‟,” Articles on Aristotle: 1. Science, Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm 
Schofield, and Richard Sorabji, ed. (Londong: Duckworth Publishing, 1975), 115. 
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analysis of the propositions involved, e.g. “It is clear then that in every problem we must 
look to the … relations of the subject and predicate; for all deductions proceed through 
these.” (Pr An 44a36-7)104  In regard to the latter road, then, “it is the business of 
experience to give the principles which belong to each subject.” (Pr An 46a24)   
Now logical analysis can play a role in the former because it is possible to 
articulate a starting point for dialectic by reading your predecessors through a regulative 
idea.  In other words a regulative idea may be used as a heuristic.
105
  And, this is when 
the process of discovery resembles the process of invention.  Recall, according to 
Aristotle in the Poetics,     
Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs 
to something else; the transference being either from genus 
to species, or from species to genus, or from species to 
species, or on grounds of analogy [my emphasis].
106
 (Poet 
1457b6-9) 
Further, “a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars.” 
(Poet 1459a8-9)  This makes Aristotle‟s arsenal composed of causes, opposition, analogy, 
etc. even more comprehensible in that it contextualizes Aristotle‟s efforts in regard to the 
invention and discovery of principles with which to secure knowledge for 
demonstration.
107
   
Consider for example, a celebrated passage from Aristotle‟s De Anima, 
Suppose that the eye were an animal – sight would have 
been its soul, for sight is the substance of the eye which 
corresponds to the account [εἰ γὰξ ἦλ ὁ ὀθζαικὸο δῷνλ, 
ςπρὴ ἂλ ἦλ αὐηνῦ ἡ ὄςηο αὕηε γὰξ νὐζία ὀθζαικνῦ ἡ θαηὰ 
ηὸλ ιόγνλ], the eye being merely the matter of seeing; 
                                               
104 Cf. (Pr An 43a20-43a24) and (Pr An 46a6-46a9). 
105 Cf. (Post An 89b27); (Post An 89b36); (Post An 93a35). 
106 Aristotle, Poetics, I. Bywater, tr., The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 2, Jonathan Barnes, ed. (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2332.  Hereafter cited as Poet.   
107 Cf. Heather Brodie Graves, Rhetoric In(to) Science: Style as Invention and Inquiry, (New Jersey: 
Hampton Press, 2004), 33-39. 
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when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except 
in name – no more than the eye of a statue or of a painted 
figure.
108
 (Anim 412b17-21) 
First off, this is, of course, an analogy (the eye : sight :: living creature : soul).  Yet, it is 
worth pausing on this term logos, i.e. ιόγνο.  For example, Smith‟s translation above 
renders θαηὰ ηὸλ ιόγνλ as “corresponds to the account” and W.S. Hett‟s Loeb translation 
has “in the sense of formula.”109  What you do not want to miss is that “logos” is a third, 
if you count eye and creature as one and two.  So, once you grasp the analogy, for 
example, by starting from either the eye or the creature, you can later start from the logos 
by naming the ratio involved.  For example, rather than ask, how does a dog relate to an 
eye, you can ask, “Does a dog have a soul?”  On the one hand, you are using the term 
whose meaning the analogy has provided.  On the other hand, the meaning of the term 
you are using is its ratio among the other terms in the analogy.  In other words, you may 
use the idea of soul to regulate your thinking about entities such as dogs.
110
      
Moving now to an examination of the experiential gateway into dialectic, in Book 
II §2 of his De Anima Aristotle suggests “what is clear and more familiar in account 
emerges from what in itself is confused but more observable by us.” (Anim 413a11)  
And, “This brings us to the crucial distinction between the aestheta and the noëta in 
Greek, the sensibilia and the intelligibilia in Latin,”111i.e. sensibility and intelligibility.  
To see how regulative ideas are at work here consider an example from Aristotle‟s 
Metaphysics.  According to Aristotle, “some matter is perceptible and some intelligible 
… and intelligible matter is that which is present in perceptible things not qua 
                                               
108 Aristotle, On the Soul, J.A. Smith, tr. The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol.1, Jonathan Barnes, ed.  
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 657.  Hereafter cited as Anim. 
109 Aristotle, On the Soul, W.S. Hett, tr. (London: William Heinemann, 1964), 71. 
110 Cf. Metaphysics (1046a9-15) 
111 Philip H. Wicksteed and Francis M. Cornford, “General Introduction,” The Physics: Vol. 1, (London: 
William Heinemann, 1957), l.    
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perceptible, i.e. the object of mathematics.” (Meta 1995, 1036a9-12)  How something 
may be present, then, in a perceptible thing  not by perception is through dialectic.  That 
is, you make assumptions about the perceptible matter, say a perceived object, and 
depending upon how well these regulative ideas fit with what you already know, the 
ideas may be incorporated as further formative of the object‟s identity – an intellectual 
identification.
112
 
Notice how this functions toward Aristotle‟s attempt to overcome Gorgias.  If 
apprehensible is perceptible, then intelligible – as opposed to perceptible – is Aristotle‟s 
way of perceiving not-being, i.e. through a type of intellectual apprehension.  Remember 
the idea involved here is an assumption.  So, on the one hand, the idea itself is a kind of 
not-being akin to the manner in which counting is a not-being noted in regard to Zeno 
and time above.
113
  On the other hand, not-being as an idea derived from a type of logical 
opposition may be supposed in the perceived object as potentiality.  To the extent the 
supposition fits with knowledge about the object – does it move?; does it change? – the 
potency of an object perceived may be credited to a kind of intellectual apprehension or 
identification, dependent upon intellect, which is not the apprehension of perception 
which Gorgias is taken to have had mind.  It is, perhaps, actually easier just to follow the 
logic involved here.  The logic which enables Aristotle‟s move is modus tollens.  Let A 
stand for apprehensible, and let P stand for perceptible.  If P, then A.  Not A, therefore 
not P.  It may be said, then, that the principles detected intellectually relate to the object 
in a regulative way.  As such, Aristotle may claim to have overcome Gorgias‟ criterion of 
(perceptual) inapprehensibility – yet, to no avail for the problem of non-being. 
                                               
112 Cf. Otis Lee, “Dialectic and Negation,” The Review of Metaphysics, 1.1, (1947), 2-23. 
113 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, St. Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Richard J. Blackwell, Richard J. Spath, 
and W. Edmund Thirlkel, tr. (South Bend: St. Augustine‟s Press, 1999), 28-30. 
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§37 Aristotle’s solution to the problem of non-being – At this point the difference 
between the starting points of dialectic and demonstration should be clear, including the 
manner in which dialectic provides starting points for demonstration.  To conlude, 
consider Aristotle‟s response to the problem of non-being one more time.  According to 
Aristotle, “Change from subject to non-subject is perishing [εἰο νὐρ ὑπνρείκελνλ 
θζνξά].” (Phys 1957, 225a17)  The destruction of the ὑπνρείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon, is 
taken to be the extreme of privation which is, according to Aristotle, non-being.  I have 
sufficiently argued the fact that the negation involved here is governed by Aristotle‟s 
matrix of opposition.  Moreover, as you should be able to see now: the extreme of 
privation is an assumption, the persistence of the ὑπνρείκελνλ is an assumption, and 
potentiality as persisting indication of the ὑπνρείκελνλ is an assumption.  Further, the 
absence taken to indicate the presence of a persisting ὑπνρείκελνλ amounts to an 
invention which Aristotle justifies through his analogical apparatus, etc. (Cf. Phys 195a)   
Recall, according to Aristotle, “It is necessary, as we say, to presuppose for each 
thing that which is it potentially [my emphasis].” (Meta 1995, 1089b32)  And, as one 
commentator put it, “The non-existent object can exist potentially (δπλάκεη) … This 
account provides a reply to Parmenides‟ rejection of non-being.”114  Hence, “Potentiality 
is discovered from actuality (and therefore it is by an act of construction that people 
acquire the knowledge) [my emphases].” (Meta 1995, 1051a29-1051a33)  And, it is from 
the above assumptions that Aristotle is able to conclude, “Thus perishing [destruction] is 
change to not-being.” (Phys 1995, 224b9)  Again, the heavy logical hand of Aristotle‟s 
demonstration of non-being misses the subtle problem in Plato‟s Sophist.  Hence, 
                                               
114 Daniel W. Graham, “The Development of Aristotle‟s Concept of Actuality: Comments on a 
Reconstruction by Stephen Menn,” Ancient Philosophy, 15, (1995), 552. 
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Aristotle arrived at “three senses of not-being,” i.e. potency, annihilation, and intellectual 
identification from his logical apparatus.   
Aristotle‟s On Interpretation comment now seems predictably (logically) 
prescient, “Perhaps, indeed, the necessary and not necessary are first principles of 
everything‟s either being or not being, and one should look at the others as following 
from these.”115 (Interp 23a19-24)  To sum, in his attack on Parmenides, Aristotle moved 
from (a) being and unity or the one to (b) plurality to (c) individuals in plurality to (d) the 
way in which individuals are thought about to (e) the way in which you think about 
negation, and in combining (d) and (e) he constructed his attempt to solve the problem of 
non-being, or rather, provide a demonstration of non-being. 
Introductory Summary 
 The above should constitute an “introduction” to the problem of non-being.  As 
you move through the dissertation, then, remember the criteria stated for the solution of 
the problem by Plato in the Sophist.  You should remember the different starting points 
for dialectic.  I will focus on the topic of dialectic specifically in the chapter after Kant.  
This topic permeates the dissertation.  To this end, the distinction between regulative and 
constitutive ideas – which truly will not reach its zenith of formalization until Kant – will 
also factor largely in later discussions regarding non-discursivity.  Be sure to remember 
how I use “not-being” to signify logical not or negation, as opposed to non-being.  And, 
as I move through the chapter on Kant, you will recognize the manner in which he seems 
to be following the suggestion of Gorgias toward arriving at non-being.  Both of the 
chapters dealing with Derrida and Deleuze will refer back to both Plato and Aristotle 
                                               
115 Aristotle, On Interpretation, J.L. Ackrill, tr., The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 1, Jonathan Barnes, 
ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 36.  Hereafter cited as Interp. 
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from this Introduction.  What I have above referred to as the “dependency of reckoning” 
thesis, or the manner in which discerning being depends on solving the problem of non-
being, will be returned to in the chapter on Deleuze and at the end of the dissertation.   
Ultimately, there are two aspects which Kant, Hegel, Derrida, and Deleuze all 
mistakenly adopt from Aristotle.  The first is Aristotle‟s paradigm shift.  This, of course, 
will not be fully clear until you are reading about it in the following chapters.  Given the 
peculiarity of Kant‟s position, he, again, will come closest to escaping Aristotle‟s shifting 
of the problem.  However, and this brings me to the second aspect adopted by these 
thinkers from Aristotle, Kant‟s belief in the priority of imagination in regard to memory 
kept him from escaping Aristotle‟s paradigm.  I will briefly discuss the origin of 
imagination‟s priority in Aristotle in the next chapter.  Yet, given the structural overhaul 
Kant provides to Aristotle‟s thought, the issue is really with Kant and no longer with 
Aristotle regarding imagination and memory. 
 To sum, the next chapter is concerned to articulate Kant‟s attempt to solve the 
problem of non-being, and also to make clear Kant‟s structure of experience.  This is 
important because it is with – as is consistent with Gorgias‟ suggestion – Kant‟s novel 
structure of experience that he advances upon a solution to the problem.  The chapter 
after Kant is concerned to explicate two formal and mistaken approaches to the problem 
of non-being.  First, I provide a formal logical reading of negation toward illustrating the 
manner in which formal logic fails to solve the problem.  In essence I have already made 
this claim above in regard to ἐλαληίνλ, etc.  However, I will briefly take some space at the 
beginning of chapter after Kant to explicitly support this claim.  Possibly a large barrier 
for many people, unfortunately, is that they – following Aristotle‟s Metaphysics – might 
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try to read me as if I am denying the principle of non-contradiction.  I am not.  Rather, I 
am giving to the principle of non-contradiction, what belongs to the principle of non-
contradiction.  I do not think the principle of non-contradiction is God.  Without lapsing 
into a less rigorous way of expression, I would like to say being – as revealed by non-
being – exceeds the jurisdiction of the principle of non-contradiction. 
 Given the influence, reminiscent of the provocation to discuss Aristotle, of Hegel, 
I will also explicitly discuss Hegel in regard to dialectic and non-being after the chapter 
on Kant.  On the one hand, the Hegel Kant combination is much like the Aristotle Plato 
combination.  Hence, many of those who adopt or address the views of Kant or Plato – 
such as Derrida and Deleuze – do so by way of Hegel or Aristotle, respectively.  On the 
other hand, Hegel offers a response to the problem of non-being, and it is fruitful to 
recognize how it both fails to solve the problem and yet is influential.  Chapters 4 and 5 
are concerned to articulate the accounts given by Derrida and Deleuze, respectively, of 
pure difference.  I will also examine comments made by Derrida and Deleuze specifically 
in regard to non-being.  I will briefly sum and conclude the chapters of Part 1 before 
beginning Part 2.  Part 2 will contain its own much briefer Introduction.  Suffice to say 
here that, following the title of the dissertation, Part 1 is concerned with non-being, and 
Part 2 is concerned with memory.  Further, in Part 2, I will present a reading of multiple 
findings from contemporary memory research.  I will conclude the dissertation 
connecting Part 2 with Part 1, explicitly critiquing pure difference in Derrida and 
Deleuze, and presenting my solution to the problem of non-being.        
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“Plato employed the expression „Idea‟ in such a way that we can readily see he understood by it something 
that not only could never be borrowed from the senses, but that even goes far beyond the concepts of the 
understanding … our reason, however, now no longer finds itself in its original state, but must laboriously 
recall the old, now much obscured, ideas through a recollection (which is called philosophy).” 
~Immanuel Kant116 
  
“The inaccuracy of scales used for commercial measurements, according to civil law,  
is discovered, if we let the merchandise and the weights exchange pans.  
So the partiality of the scales of reason is revealed by the same trick...” 
~Immanuel Kant117 
 
“The pleasure of believing what we see is boundless, as we wish our souls to be…” 
~Percy Bysshe Shelley118 
Chapter Two: Non-Being and the Thing-in-itself 
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 2 Sections and Objectives 
“There is a saying among philosophers, „You can philosophize with Kant or against Kant, 
but you cannot philosophize without him.‟”119  In the spirit of this famous Lewis White 
Beck quote, I begin here with Immanuel Kant.  And, the specificity of my purpose for 
invoking Kant precludes the involvement of the entire Kantian oeuvre.  Specifically, 
then, this chapter regarding Kant contains three main sections which correspond to the 
three aspects I will discuss from the “A” and “B” editions of Kant‟s Critique of Pure 
Reason [Kritik der reinen Vernunft] (1781/1787) – Kant‟s “Copernican revolution,” the 
structure of experience, and the thing-in-itself.  In the Preface of the B edition Kant 
divides his Copernican revolution into two parts.  Generally speaking, the three parts of 
the Critique of Pure Reason just noted which I discuss in this chapter pertain to Kant‟s 
Copernican revolution itself, its first part, and its second part respectively.  Also, I have 
                                               
116 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, tr. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 395, (A 313/B 370).  Translation modified.  Hereafter cited CPR 1998.  
117 Immanuel Kant, Dreams of a Spirit Seer,. Emanuel F. Goerwitz, tr. (New York: The Macmillan Co, 
1900), 85.  
118 Percy Bysshe Shelley, “Julian and Maddalo,” The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley. (Boston: 
Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1857), 552.  
119 Lewis White Beck, “Introduction: Kant and his Predecessors,” Critique of Practical Reason and Other 
Writings in Moral Philosophy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 1. 
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added a brief section for the sake of explicating an important principle for reading Kant.  
I refer to this principle as the principle of perspective within Kant‟s system. 
Concerning the problem of non-being, after Plato and Aristotle Kant is the thinker 
whom I credit most with changing the way the problem is understood.  In other words, 
Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason provides a sophisticated vocabulary and a unique 
structure of experience with which to engage the problem of non-being.  In particular, the 
two distinctions, derived from Kant, which provide a new vista to the problem of non-
being are the discursive/non-discursive and experiential/conceptual distinctions.
120
  These 
distinctions are, of course, intimately connected to both Kant‟s articulation of the 
structure of experience and his discussion of the thing-in-itself.  Together Kant‟s 
structure of experience and his two innovative distinctions provide a unique 
understanding of what may be called the “ground of experience.”  This concerns me 
because I believe the ground of experience is the key to solving the problem of non-
being.   
Kant presents an interesting case in the history of Western philosophy because – 
as I will show in this chapter – Kant‟s structure of experience yields his innovative 
distinctions by providing a new way of accounting for order and change in experience.  
Central to his account of experience is the role he attributes to imagination.  Yet, 
ultimately, I see Kant‟s privileging of imagination as at the cost of properly depicting the 
role of memory in the structure of experience.  Whereas, imagination receives the status 
of a “condition for the possibility of experience,” memory is depicted as solely in the 
service of imagination.  Hence, imagination has a constitutive role, and memory does not.  
                                               
120 Ultimately it is fair to credit Kant with these innovations because they derive from his Copernican 
Revolution. 
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For Kant memory is solely a concern for empirical psychology.  So, whereas Kant‟s 
structure of experience and the distinctions which derive from it advance significantly 
toward solving the problem of non-being, his privileging of imagination at the cost of 
memory kept him from solving the problem.  Rather, resulting from the central role he 
attributes to imagination, and perhaps still under the spell of Aristotle‟s paradigm shift, 
Kant was led to wrongly posit the thing-in-itself as his solution to the problem of non-
being.  Similarly, thinkers in Kant‟s wake who adopt his structure of experience suffer 
the same ontological commitments from which Kant posits the thing-in-itself.  
In this chapter, then, I will discuss Kant‟s innovative distinctions and his 
privileging of imagination within the wider discussion of his parts of the Copernican 
revolution – the structure of experience and the thing-in-itself.  However, by the end of 
this chapter I will not have fully shown the role I attribute to memory in the structure of 
experience.  Given the complexity of memory‟s involvement in experience, I devote the 
entirety of the chapter after Derrida and Deleuze to memory.  Though by the end of this 
chapter, I will have presented an outlining sketch of the role I attribute to memory by 
discussing Kant‟s structure of experience.  Further, my claim that the Kantian structure of 
experience which privileges imagination should be recast with a more potent and vibrant 
role for memory should be supported by this chapter, and by the end of the dissertation 
my recasting of the structure of experience in light of contemporary memory research 
should fully show the role I attribute to memory.  Ultimately this recasting of the 
structure of experience precludes the misguided ontological commitments which lead to 
various versions of the thing-in-itself.   
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Before proceeding with my discussion of the Critique of Pure Reason, a few 
comments should be made by way of disclaimer.  In 1993, echoing a claim already made 
by Karl Ameriks in 1982,
121
 Günter Zöller states, “Over the past twenty-five years, 
scholarship on Kant has taken on colossal proportions, effectively defying summary 
assessment and manageable presentation.”122  Yet, and in fact, there is not to be found a 
concise summary of the structure of experience in the Critique of Pure Reason.  
However, what is most important by way of disclaimer is the realization that there will 
always be various strategies and alternative readings available in regard to the Critique of 
Pure Reason.  Commentators have written from two volumes on the first half of the 
Critique
123
 to two quite different editions of a book on one thesis in the Critique
124
 to a 
seventeen page article on one word which Kant uses in the Critique
125
 to an almost five 
hundred page book on the shortest section of the Critique,
126
 etc.
127
  Given that my 
purpose for invoking Kant is primarily confined to his structure of experience, I set out to 
show salient alternative readings only when textual support from Kant is wanting or 
when – even with textual support – the issue‟s complexity requires I show alternative 
readings for the sake of explication.  This is my method for presenting Kant in light of the 
colossal nature of the secondary literature.  
                                               
121 Karl Ameriks, “Recent Work on Kant‟s Theoretical Philosophy,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 
19.1, (1982), 1-23. 
122 Guenter Zoeller, “Main Developments in Recent Scholarship on the Critique of Pure Reason,” 
Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, 53.2, (1993), 445. 
123 Herbert James Paton, Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience, vols. 1&2, (Virginia: Thoemmes Press, 1997). 
124 Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 
125 Wilfrid Sellars, “Is There a Synthetic a Priori?” Philosophy of Science, 20.2, (1953), 121-138. 
126 Falkenstein, Lorne. Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995). 
127 Cf. M.J. Scott-Taggart, “Recent Works on the Philosophy of Kant,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 
3, (1966), 171-209. 
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Regarding translations of Kant‟s German Kritik der reinen Vernunft, I am 
consulting my German editions, the Norman Kemp Smith, the Werner S. Pluhar, and the 
Paul Guyer translations.  As such, there is really only one German term I need to 
comment on at the outset, i.e. “Erkenntnis.”128  Whereas Kemp Smith translates this term 
as “knowledge,” Pluhar and Guyer translate the term as “cognition.”  Moreover, the 
German term “Wissen,” which also appears in the Critique, is translated as “knowledge” 
by all three translators.  The author of A Kant Dictionary, Howard Caygill, preferring the 
translation of Erkenntnis into “cognition” notes, “Cognition is with occasional exceptions 
(such as CPR A 69/B 94) distinguished from both knowledge and thinking.”129   
Though it is now standard to translate Erkenntnis in Kant as cognition instead of 
knowledge,
130
 the issue is more complicated than just a swapping of terms.  For one 
thing, as Karl Ameriks points out, there are times when it is appropriate to translate 
Erkenntnis as knowledge.
131
  According to Ameriks, the business of translating 
Erkenntnis must be understood with “the proviso” “in German the correlates for 
„knowledge‟ here, [quoting Kant at (B 147)] viz., „Erfahrung’ and „Erkenntnis,‟ function 
more like our term „cognitive state,‟ since they can be false, although their standard form 
is to purport to be true.)”132  Further, Rolf George, consulting a dictionary from 1793, 
                                               
128 I follow the standard of reading “Vorstellung” as “representation,” and I thereby modify the translation 
by Pluhar who, as opposed to Kemp Smith and Guyer, translates Vorstellung as “presentation.”   
129 Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 113. 
130 Carol W. Voeller, “Review: [untitled],” Ethics, 109.2, (1999), 445.  Reviewing Mary Gregor‟s 
translation of the Critique of Practical Reason, Voeller states, “Under the editorial policy of the Cambridge 
edition of Kant‟s Works … (technical terms are consistent throughout the Cambridge translations) … 
„cognition‟ („Erkenntnis’).” 
131 Karl Ameriks, “Problems from Van Cleve‟s Kant: Experience and Objects,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 66.1. (2003), 197-198. 
132 Ameriks, “Problems from Van Cleve‟s Kant,” 198. 
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suggests in his “Vorstellung and Erkenntnis in Kant,”133 the verb form of Erkenntnis, i.e. 
“erkennen” “may be translated as „to come to know‟ or „to know‟.”134  Yet, some 
commentators such as Rudolf A. Makkreel and Predrag Cicovacki suggest the English 
term “knowledge” should be reserved for cognition of a higher sort, i.e. “cognition that 
has attained certainty by being part of a rational system.”135   
As I shall discuss below, there are multiple species of cognition in the Critique of 
Pure Reason.  For example, a particular cognition may be an intuition or a concept, and a 
concept may be empirical or pure.  Further, the experience of an object is equivalent to 
having a determinate cognition of the object, and will count as knowledge of the object.  
In this way, my strategy will be to look at the context in which the term Erkenntnis is 
being used, and if the term refers to cognition in the specific sense equivalent to having a 
determinate cognition of the object, then I will read Erkenntnis along with Kemp Smith 
as “knowledge.”  Otherwise, I follow Pluhar and Guyer in reading Erkenntnis as 
“cognition.”  Moreover, I will often show the German text when quoting Kant.  It is 
ultimately my hope that by the end of the chapter, the specificity of my purpose for 
delving into the Critique of Pure Reason, and the clarity of my discussion will preclude 
the significant confusion which might otherwise result from the complex issues to 
consider in translating the German term Erkenntnis. 
 
                                               
133 Rolf George, “Vorstellung and Erkenntnis in Kant,” Interpreting Kant, Moltke S. Gram, ed. (Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 1982), 31-39. 
134 George, “Vorstellung and Erkenntnis,” 34. 
135 Rudolf A. Makkreel, “The Cognition-Knowledge Distinction in Kant and Dilthey and the Implications 
for Psychology and Self-Understanding,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 34.1, 
(2003), 149; Predrag Cicovacki, Anamorphosis: Kant on knowledge and ignorance, (Oxford: University 
Press of America, 1997), 45. 
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Kant‟s “Copernican Revolution” is a Regulative Idea 
 
“[T]he soul is in a way all existing things.”  
~Aristotle (Anim 431b20) 
 
Though Kant himself did not refer to his project as a “Copernican revolution,”136 
it is customary to speak of, and begin with, his Copernican revolution, or his Copernican 
turn, in philosophy.
137
  So, I will use the customary quotation from Kant on the way to an 
articulation of his structure of experience.  According to Kant, 
It has been previously assumed
138
 that all our knowledge 
must conform to objects. [Bisher nahm man an, alle unsere 
Erkenntnis müsse sich nach den Gegenständen richten;] 
But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by 
establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means 
of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure.  
[aber alle Versuche über sie a priori etwas durch Begriffe 
auszumachen, wodurch unsere Erkenntnis erweitert würde, 
gingen unter dieser Voraussetzung zu nichte.]139 
We must therefore make trial whether we may not have 
more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose 
that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would 
agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be 
possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining 
something in regard to them prior to their being given. We 
should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of 
Copernicus' primary hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory 
progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly 
bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the 
spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success 
if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain 
at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics, as 
regards the intuition of objects.
140
 (CPR 1996, B xvi)     
                                               
136 Tom Rockmore, Marx After Marxism: The Philosophy of Karl Marx, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 84. 
137 For an excellent review of the relation of Kant‟s reference to the Copernican text see: Norman Kemp 
Smith, “The Meaning of Kant‟s Copernican Analogy,” Mind: New Series, 22.88, (1913), 549-551. 
138 Notice, this is suggesting a different assumption with which to begin (dialectic), i.e. a different 
regulative idea. 
139 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Jens Timmerman and Heiner Klemme, ed. (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag, 1998), 21. 
140 Translation slightly modified. 
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The suggestion with which the Kant quote begins is that pre-Kantian thinkers assumed 
(human) cognition and thereby (human) knowledge must conform to the way objects are.  
To put this in the singular: to know an object is for your knowledge to conform to what 
the object is.  Being precedes knowing.  The “failure” of this assumption, according to 
Kant, is that no amount of experience can make the connection between knowing and 
being a necessary one.  Analogously, this is the perennial problem discussed when 
contrasting induction and deduction.  Though you may have experienced myriad swans, 
all of which were black, it neither follows that all swans are black nor that the next swan 
you experience will be black. 
In the larger discussion of metaphysics this concern may be characterized in terms 
of the relationship between order, change, and experience.  The relationship between 
order and change may be thought through the cosmological distinction between the 
eternal and the perishable; the ontological distinction between the necessary and the 
contingent; or, the logical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.
141
  That is, 
since, necessity is a requirement for knowledge.  If it is not necessarily the case that the 
next swan you experience will be black, then – despite past experience – you do not know 
that swans are black.  You may certainly think or infer that the next swan you experience 
will be black.  Or you may harbor the opinion that all swans are black, but without 
awareness of a necessity involved, you do not know.  As evidenced by skeptical concerns 
such as those found in the writings of David Hume,
142
 pre-Kant‟s Copernican revolution, 
the way of thinking about order, change, and experience leaves a gap between necessity 
                                               
141 Cf. José A. Bernardete, “The Analytic a Posteriori and the Foundations of Metaphysics,” The Journal of 
Philosophy, 55.12, (1958), 503.  
142 Cf. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Other Writings, Stephen Buckle, 
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).   
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and experience.  In other words, if there is necessary order beyond changing experience, 
then how is one to become aware of the necessity?  What inside of experience shows that 
there is order outside of experience?  Or as Kant once put it, “How am I to understand the 
fact that, because something is, something else is?” (NM 239)  Since, “Experience does 
indeed tell us what is, but not that it must necessarily be so and not otherwise,” (CPR 
1996, A 1) experience is in danger of turning out to be inductive, and all deduction in 
danger of resting on induction.  Changes in experience may lead you to use the words 
“cause” and “effect,” but this does not mean that the cosmos is ordered by cause and 
effect.  Without an Archimedean point of necessity, the proposition that “being precedes 
experience,” from which is derived the proposition “being precedes knowing,” are both 
nothing more than opinions. 
Kant‟s Copernican revolution begins, then, by supposing objects must conform to 
“our knowledge [Erkenntnis].”  This performs what Henry Allison refers to as “a 
„paradigm shift‟ from a theocentric to an anthropocentric model [of thinking]” which he 
unpacks as “also a shift from an intuitive to a discursive conception of cognition” and “a 
shift in our understanding of what counts as knowing.”143  Kant, then, locates the 
necessity required for knowledge in the logical necessity of general or formal logic.  He 
takes general logic to “correspond quite precisely with the division of the higher faculties 
of cognition.” (CPR 1998, A 131/B 169)  In this way, Kant has located the Archimedean 
point as a point within the mind, and because this necessity involved derives from general 
logic, Kant is able to speak of “our” knowledge.  Logic as the ground of understanding 
means a universality of understanding akin to logical validity.  This is an attractive aspect 
of Kant‟s project.  Yet, the resulting ontology is often too much for theorists to admit, 
                                               
143 Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, xv-xvi. 
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and Kant‟s solutions get passed over.  That is to say, with the Copernican revolution it is 
necessarily the case that the propositions “being precedes experience” and “being 
precedes knowing” are merely opinions, i.e. they cannot be based on experience.  Hence, 
an examination of Kant‟s structure of experience is needed to explore its ontological 
commitments and identify the aspects of the mind responsible for these commitments.  It 
is my claim that Kant‟s structure of experience results in an ontology which came closest 
in the history of Western philosophy to solving the problem of non-being. 
Kant‟s relation to his predecessors – especially that of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
–  is well documented.144   In fact, Kant himself suggested that “the Critique of Pure 
Reason might well be the true apology for Leibniz, even against those disciples [of 
Leibniz] who heap praises upon him.”145  Despite avowed differences the following quote 
from Leibniz is strikingly similar to Kant‟s quote above which announces his Copernican 
revolution.   
[N]othing enters our minds naturally from outside, and it is 
a bad habit of ours to think as if our souls received some 
messenger species or had gates and windows.  We have all 
the forms in our minds, for all time even, because the mind 
always expresses all its future thoughts, and already thinks 
confusedly everything it will ever think distinctly.  Nothing 
could be taught us whose idea was not already present in 
our minds as the matter from which this thought was 
formed.  That is what Plato understood so well when he put 
                                               
144 Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1969); Alison Laywine, Kant’s Early Metaphysics and the Origins of the Critical 
Philosophy, (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1993); Rae Langton, “Leibniz and Kant,” Kantian 
Humility: Our ignorance of things in themselves, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 68-97; Anja 
Jauernig, “Kant‟s Critique of the Leibnizian Philosophy: Contra the Leibnizians, but Pro Leibniz,” Kant 
and the Early Moderns, Daniel Garber and Béatrice Longuenesse, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008), 41-63; Predrag Cicovacki, “Kant‟s Debt to Leibniz,” A Companion to Kant, Graham Bird, ed. 
(New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2010), 79-92.   
145 Immanuel Kant, “On a Discovery whereby any new critique of pure reason is to be made superfluous by 
an older one (1790),” Henry Allison, tr., Theoretical Philosophy: 1755-1770, Henry Allison and Peter 
Heath, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 336. 
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forward his doctrine of reminiscence [i.e. anamnesis, 
recollection].
146
 
Beyond Leibniz‟s locating “all the forms” in the mind, his similar sounding declaration to 
that of Kant‟s Copernican revolution begins and ends with references to memory.  On the 
one hand, Leibniz seems to suggest a habit of thinking may be responsible for false 
notions regarding the soul, and this notion in itself is reminiscent of a statement by 
Nicolas Malebranche who held that “when we reason, the memory acts; and where there 
is memory, there can be error.”147  On the other hand, Leibniz seems to suggest Plato‟s 
theory of recollection, which Kant explicitly refers to as the activity of “philosophy” 
itself, (CPR 1998, A 313/B 370) might be thought of along the lines of what 
contemporary memory research refers to as spreading activation and elaboration.
148
  That 
is, suspending judgment on any notion of innateness in Leibniz‟s work, his movement of 
Plato‟s forms into the mind and the subsequent attempt to work out a theory of memory is 
not only viable but intimately related to Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason beyond even his 
Copernican revolution. 
Arthur Schopenhauer‟s (1788-1860) homage to Kant‟s Copernican revolution 
helps indicate the ontological commitments resulting from such a revolution.  In his The 
World as Will and Representation [Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung], Schopenhauer 
declares, 
“The world is my representation”: this is a truth valid with 
reference to every living and knowing being, although man 
alone can bring it into reflective, abstract consciousness.  If 
he really does so, philosophical discernment has dawned on 
                                               
146 G.W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics and related writings, R. Niall D. Martin and Stuart Brown, tr., 
(Oxford: Manchester University Press, 1988), 700. 
147 Nicolas Malebranche, The Search after Truth, Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp, eds. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 480.  
148 To the best of my knowledge no contemporary memory researchers – or anyone else for that matter – 
make this connection or claim.  However, I am not incorrectly applying their technical terminology here. 
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him.  It then becomes clear and certain to him that he does 
not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a 
sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world around him is 
there only as representation, in other words, only in 
reference to another thing, namely that which represents, 
and this is himself.  If any truth can be expressed a priori, it 
is this; for it is the statement of that form of all possible and 
conceivable experience, a form that is more general than all 
others, than time, space, and causality, for all these 
presuppose it.
149
 (WWI 3) 
Thinking of Leibniz‟s “all the forms” in the mind as forms of “all possible experience” 
Kant‟s Copernican revolution, beyond epistemologically establishing the inseparability of 
perception from conception, established an epistemologically enclosed ontology.  What I 
mean is that for Kant in order to experience an object there must be an object to 
experience.  Yet, object formation necessarily requires the process of conforming to 
concepts such as – those Schopenhauer notes – space, time, and causality such that 
without these concepts the object would not be as such.  Kant‟s ontology, or his 
“Metaphysics of all metaphysics,”150 as he called it, is further perplexing in that it is the 
“end of metaphysics” which is supposed to derive from Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason 
and specifically his Copernican revolution.  On the one hand, then, it seems contradictory 
to speak of Kant‟s ontology or ontological commitments.  On the other hand, what I 
mean by Kant‟s ontology, by way of his ontological commitments, is precisely the 
reconciling of the metaphysics of metaphysics with the end of metaphysics. 
 Upon completing the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant wrote a 
letter to his friend Marcus Herz stating, “This sort of investigation will always remain 
                                               
149 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1, E.F.J. Payne, tr. (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1969), 3.  Hereafter cited as WWI or WWII depending on Volume cited. 
150 Immanuel Kant, “[Letter:] To Marcus Herz, after May 11, 1781,” Correspondences, Arnulf Zweig, tr. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 181. 
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difficult, for it includes the metaphysics of metaphysics.”151  It was, of course, in the 
second edition Preface that Kant formulated the initial assumption of the Critique in 
relation to Copernicus, and it is in the subsequent paragraph to the announcement of the 
Copernican revolution that Kant mentions the end of metaphysics in conjunction with 
“things in themselves.”  In this subsequent paragraph, then, Kant deems the Copernican 
revolution a success (CPR B xviii) and divides the Copernican revolution into two parts.  
The first part includes the notion that objects must conform to our concepts (CPR B xix), 
and Kant declares the second part to indicate “that with this power to cognize a priori we 
shall never be able to go beyond the boundary of possible experience, even though doing 
so is precisely the most essential concern.” (CPR 1996, B xix-xx)  Further, this second 
part is where Kant first mentions the thing-in-itself in relation to the Copernican 
revolution stating, “our rational cognition applies only to appearances, and leaves the 
thing in itself uncognized by us.” (CPR 1996, B xx)  These indications of Kant‟s 
ontological commitments culminate in Kant‟s restatement of the Copernican revolution in 
terms of the thing-in-itself.   
Suppose, now, we find that the unconditioned cannot be 
thought at all without contradiction if we assume that our 
experiential cognition conforms to objects as things in 
themselves, yet that the contradiction vanishes if we 
assume that our representation of things, as these are given 
to us, does not conform to them as things in themselves, but 
that these objects are, rather, appearances that conform to 
our way of representing.  Suppose that we find, 
consequently, that the unconditioned is not to be met with 
in things insofar as we are acquainted with them… but is to 
be met with in them insofar as we are not… [First two 
emphases Kant‟s; last emphasis mine]. (CPR 1996, B xx) 
There are three ways to extradite Kant‟s ontological commitments here, and only the 
third reconciles the metaphysics of metaphysics with the end of metaphysics. 
                                               
151 Immanuel Kant, “[Letter:] To Marcus Herz, after May 11, 1781,” 181. 
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 These three are: First, perhaps spatial and temporal properties are instantiated in 
the mind by concepts, but also are properties of things-in-themselves.  In this way, 
perhaps the properties of things-in-themselves cause their instantiation in the mind.  As a 
general statement this interpretation may be attributed to Adolf Trendelenburg
152
 (1802-
1872). Second, perhaps things-in-themselves, at least, contain primary properties of space 
and time, and the secondary properties are added as a priori concepts from categories of 
the understanding.  In this way, space and time may be thought in the thing-in-itself 
without attributing causation to it.  Both of these strategies for distinguishing between 
Kant‟s epistemology and ontology attribute being beyond physical experience, i.e. they 
contain metaphysical claims.  Moreover both of these strategies negate what has been 
gained by the Copernican revolution.   
The first strategy denies the stalemate in metaphysics to which Hume responded 
and which prompted Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason in the first place, and the second 
strategy turns Immanuel Kant into John Locke.  To suppose either of these strategies to 
be correct is to suggest there was never a reason, historical or otherwise, for the Critique 
of Pure Reason to be written.  The third strategy, then, posits the thing-in-itself as some 
version of non-being, i.e. the thing-in-itself is posited as the solution to the problem of 
non-being.  Only this strategy resonates with the Copernican revolution.  This is neither a 
negative theology of the thing-in-itself nor an attribution of any properties whatsoever to 
the thing-in-itself.  Rather, Kant is faced with following problem: All that is is known 
through experience by conforming to concepts of cognition.  Beyond concepts of 
                                               
152 Graham Bird, “The Neglected Alternative: Trendelenburg, Fischer, and Kant, A Companion to Kant, 
Graham Bird, ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), 490-491; Cf. Lorne, Falkenstein, Kant’s Intuitionism: A 
Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 292, 424 & 
425. 
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cognition, i.e. the uncognized, being cannot be attributed, i.e. it cannot be said that it is or 
that things are.  Hence, Kant is ontologically committed to attribute being to that which 
can be experienced, and to deny being to what is beyond concepts of cognition.   
Otherwise, he takes the position of either of the first two strategies above and his 
Copernican revolution becomes internally inconsistent.  Furthermore, the third strategy 
reconciles the end of metaphysics with the metaphysics of metaphysics by solely doing 
epistemology, and in allowing the epistemological stance to close the book on 
metaphysics through its ontological commitments alone by making the negative 
metaphysical claim precluding other metaphysical claims.  Put another way, by 
epistemologically enclosing ontology, positive ontological claims become 
epistemological claims, and negative ontological claims derive from one epistemological 
question: What is non-being?  In sum, working on what Kant referred to as the problem 
of the unconditioned and the uncognized, Kant attempted to solve the problem of non-
being by positing the thing-in-itself. 
Now those who rarely adventure away from the cavernous depth of focusing on 
merely one thinker, and those who rarely focus at all might think that these questions – 
such as “what is non-being?” – are of little import to the world, i.e. the grating and 
derogatory claim that they are merely “academic.”  However, this could not be further 
from the truth.  On the contrary, it was a peculiar prejudice of the early twentieth century 
to distinguish sharply between the thinking of the practitioners of physical science and 
the thinking of philosophers, i.e. philosophers of science and philosophers of mind, 
psychology, religion, etc.  By the end of the twentieth century, the news had finally 
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reached the majority that one could no longer sharply distinguish between theory and 
practice.   
Similarly, and thankfully, even the distinction between analytic and continental 
philosophers in the twenty-first century seems to be merely nominal or a matter of taste.  
In other words, as Tom Rockmore articulates it in his book, In Kant’s Wake: Philosophy 
in the twentieth century, directly and indirectly “the complicated development of 
twentieth-century philosophy … can largely be understood as a series of reactions to 
Kant.”153  In fact, Albert Einstein154 (1879-1955), Niels Bohr155 (1885-1962), Erwin 
Schrödinger
156
 (1887-1961), Werner Heisenberg
157
 (1901-1976), and Kurt Gödel
158
 
(1906-1978) avowedly take Kant as their point of departure, and quantum physics itself 
may be characterized as a concern to establish an interrogation site – post the Copernican 
turn – at the limits of what can be experienced.159  In Gödel‟s own words, “the agreement 
described between certain consequences of modern physics and a doctrine that Kant set 
up 150 years ago in contradiction both to common sense and to the physicists and 
                                               
153 Tom Rockmore, In Kant’s Wake: Philosophy in the twentieth century, (New York: Blackwell, 2006), 
161. 
154 Hao Wang, “Time in Philosophy and in Physics: From Kant and Einstein to Gödel,” Synthese, 102.2, 
(1995), 215-234; Don Howard, “Einstein, Kant, and the Origins of Logical Empiricism,” Logic, Language, 
and the Structure of Scientific Theories, W. Salmon and G. Wolters, eds., (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University 
Press, 1994), 45-105. 
155 C. Cevalley, “Niels Bohr‟s Words and the Atlantis of Kantianism,” Niels Bohr and Contemporary 
Philosophy, J. Faye and H. Folse, eds., (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 33-55; David I. Kaiser, “More Roots of 
Complementarity: Kantian aspects and influences,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 23, 
(1992), 213-239. 
156 Philip Clayton, “Philosophy of Science and the German Idealists,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 
14.3, (1997), 287-304; Here, Schrödinger even references Kant‟s Copernican revolution noting Kant is 
responsible for: “I see my tree and you see yours (remarkably like mine), and what the tree in itself is we 
do not know.”  Erwin Schrödinger, What is Life? and Mind and Matter, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1967), 89. 
157 Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science, (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1999), 90-91; Cf. Emmanuel Monod, “Einstein, Heisenberg, Kant: Methodological 
distinction and conditions of possibilities,” Information and Organization, 14.2, (2004), 105-121. 
158 Kurt Gödel, “A Remark about the Relationship between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy,” 
Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, P.A. Schilpp, ed. (La Salle: Open Court, 1949), 557-562. 
159 Cf. Hermán Pringe, Critique of the Quantum Power of Judgment: A transcendental foundation of 
quantum objectivity, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007).  
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philosophers of his time, is greatly surprising.”160  And, as Carsten Held notes, “the key 
idea of Kant‟s epistemology” can be found “throughout Bohr‟s works … Bohr, therefore, 
independently reproduces Kant‟s Copernican turn toward transcendental idealism.  And 
this turn is the more remarkable as it is not initiated by philosophical reflection, but 
provoked by the problems of quantum theory.”161  Hence, in the twentieth century while 
some philosophers were busy bickering in regard to their team names, i.e. analytic v. 
continental,
162
 other philosophers in Kant‟s wake were busy building atomic bombs.163  
Certainly these questions are not merely “academic.” 
“[R]efusing to sit still and be measured … as if the atom were an impulsive 
thing,”164 Heisenberg‟s uncertainty principle, published in 1927, Bohr‟s notion of 
complementarity, formulated in 1927, and Gödel‟s incompleteness theorems, published 
in 1931, in many ways reflect the undecidability associated with the thing-in-itself.
165
  As 
H.J. Paton asks in his commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason, 
The development of physics forces on our minds the 
contrast between appearance and reality, between the world 
as it seems to common sense and the world as it is to the 
scientific observer.  This in turn gives rise to further 
reflections.  If what is obviously real to common sense 
becomes mere appearance to the deeper insight of the 
scientist, may there not be a still deeper insight to which the 
real as known by the scientist is merely the appearance of a 
reality beyond?
166
 
                                               
160 Kurt Gödel, Collected Works, vol. 2, S. Feferman, et al, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
236. 
161 Carsten Held, “Bohr and Kantian Idealism,” Proceedings of the Eight International Kant Congress, 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 397.. 
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American Philosophical Quarterly, 36.2, (1999), 159-163. 
163 Cf. F.G. Gosling, The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb, (Washington D.C.: History 
Division of the U.S. Department of Energy, 1999). 
164 D.H. Lawrence, “Relativity,” The Complete Poems of D.H. Lawrence, (New York: Wordsworth, 1994), 
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165 Cf. Patrick A. Heelan, Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity: A study of the physical philosophy of 
Werner Heisenberg, (Netherlands: M.Nijhoff, 1965), 140. 
166 Herbert James Paton Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience, vol. 1, (Virginia: Thoemmes Press,1997), 68. 
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From these Kantian concerns developed by the physicists, the relationship between 
observation and evidence, i.e. a different understanding of the meaning of the 
inseparability of perception from conception, began to emerge.
167
  The sound bite echoed 
from the voice of Norwood Hanson (1924-1967), “seeing is a theory laden enterprise.”168  
And, figures such as the later Karl Popper
169
 (1902-1994), Willard Van Orman Quine
170
 
(1908-2000), Thomas S. Kuhn
171
 (1922-1996), and Paul Feyerabend
172
 (1924-1994), 
among others, may be seen as concerned to promulgate an understanding of scientific 
observation as theory-laden so as, in part, to dispel notions of pre-theoretical evidence or 
pre-theoretical ways seeing.
173
  The influence rippled into the late twentieth century and 
can be seen in the work of philosophers such as Donald Davidson
174
 (1917-2003), Gilles 
Deleuze
175
 (1925-1995), Richard Rorty
176
 (1931-2007), and Jacques Derrida
177
 (1930-
2004), among others.  In the very least, these twentieth century insights stand on the 
shoulders of Kant‟s Copernican revolution.  Surely Kant‟s predecessors provided an 
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alphabet of ideas, but for the anthropocentric spelling out of phenomena to be read as 
experience, Kant is to thank for the idiom.       
The Kantian Structure and Trajectory of Experience 
“Do I contradict myself? 
Very well then, I contradict myself, 
(I am large, I contain multitudes).”178 
~Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, 51, lines 7-9  
 
The purpose for this section of the chapter is to show Kant‟s structure and 
trajectory of experience.  This is valuable because moving from a schematic 
representation of Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience I am able to regressively 
focus in, as it were, on Kant‟s discussion of the ground of experience.  Given what Kant 
says about the ground of experience I am able to indicate his error in choosing 
imagination as the power responsible for grounding experience.  He should have chosen 
memory.  Further, in the process of regressively focusing in on the ground of experience I 
am able to discuss the importance of Kant‟s distinction between the discursive and non-
discursive content of experience.  Hence, this section proceeds by way of regressive 
focus toward the ground of experience such that it is separated into two parts.   
First, following Kant, I will discuss the components of the structure of experience 
as if discussing species of the genus experience.  As such, Kant‟s first division is between 
sensibility and understanding.  After following out this division I will have presented a 
skeleton of the structure of experience by indicating the progression of powers involved 
in an experience from initial point to terminal point along with their respective modes of 
representation.  Second, I will discuss the ground of experience by discussing the 
ultimate synthesis which is necessary for experience.  This, of course, is the synthesis of 
                                               
178 Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, (New York: The Modern Library, 1921), 77. 
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sensibility and the understanding.  Kant discusses this synthesis in the section of the 
Critique titled the Transcendental Deduction.  After having discussed the Transcendental 
Deduction, then, I will be able to fully show both the structure and trajectory of 
experience and the ground of experience in Kant.   
The Critique of Pure Reason is a veritable terminological cornucopia.  
Consequently, constellating Kant‟s cant can confound commentators.  As a guiding 
thread, however, the origin of some of Kant‟s terminology coupled with the structure of 
the Critique itself lead to a coherent rendering of his discussion of experience.  I trace the 
origin of Kant‟s terminology to three general sources.  An ancient debate within the 
Socratic schools, specifically the issue of assent to true knowledge as figured between the 
stoics and the skeptics, i.e. “from the Stoic-Academic debates about epistemology from 
the third and second centuries BCE.”179  Also, I trace a cluster of terms to Leibniz and a 
contribution to Kant‟s understanding of logic from the Port Royal Logic (1662) [La 
logique, ou l’art de penser] published by Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) and Pierre Nicole 
(1625-1695). 
Regarding Ancient Stoic epistemology Cicero (106-43 BC) recounts the four 
stage process of the Stoic doctrine as demonstrated by Zeno of Citium
180
 (c. 334-262 
BC), founder of the Stoic school – the “Stoa poikilê,” i.e. “the painted porch.”  According 
to Cicero,   
Zeno used to demonstrate this with gestures.  When he had 
put his hand out flat in front of him with his fingers 
straight, he would say: “An impression [phantasia, i.e. 
θαληαζία] is like this.” [visum huius modi est]  Next, after 
contracting his fingers a bit: “Assent [ζζγθαάζεζηο] is like 
                                               
179 Charles Brittain, “Introduction,” On Academic Scepticism, Marcus Tullius Cicero, (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2006), xiii. 
180 This is, of course, a different Zeno than the one discussed in relation to Aristotle in the Introduction. 
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this.” [adsensus huius modi est]  Then, when he had 
bunched his hand up to make a fist, he would say that that 
was an “apprehension” or “grasp.” [θαηάιεςηο]  (This 
image also suggested the name he gave to it, katalêpsis, 
which hadn‟t been used before.)  Finally, when he had put 
his left hand on top, squeezing his fist tight with some 
force, he would say that scientific knowledge was like that: 
a state none but the wise enjoyed – though as for who is or 
ever was wise, even they [the Stoics] aren‟t in a rush to 
say.
181
 
Cicero‟s quote describes the Stoic notion of grasping an appearance by way of 
impression, i.e. phantasia, in an apprehension, i.e. katalêpsis.  The biographer Diogenes 
Laertius in his The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers notes first that for the 
Stoics, perception “is an impression produced on the mind, its name being appropriately 
borrowed from impressions on wax made by a seal.”182  Impressions, then, are 
“comprehensible and incomprehensible” which correspond with the two types of 
impressions, i.e. katalêptic or non-katalêptic. (LOP 276)  Moreover, to assent to an 
impression is to judge it affirmatively.  Hence, the Stoic is to affirm only a katalêptic 
impression and suspend judgment on non-katalêptic impressions.   
Now, during this early period in the history of the Stoa, skepticism
183
 had become 
the mode of Plato‟s Academy [Ἀθαδεκία] under the direction of Arcesilaus (316-242 
BC).  Cicero describes a debate between the heads of the two schools, i.e. the stoic Zeno 
of Citium and the skeptic Arcesilaus.  According to Cicero, Arcesilaus considered the 
idea of not holding opinions to be valuable, and as such thought the wise person should 
withhold assent, i.e. suspend judgment.  So, the skeptic asked the stoic what the wise 
                                               
181 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, Charles Brittain, tr., (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), 84. 
182 Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, C.D. Yonge, tr. (London: Henry 
G. Bohn, 1853 ), 276.  Hereafter cited as LOP. 
183 Though I am well aware of the distinction to be drawn between the Pyrrhonian and Academic skeptics, 
in the effort to keep this discussion brief, I will not focus on distinguishing amongst the skeptics.  Further, 
in regard to the specific debate I discuss here, it is not relevant to dwell on distinctions amongst the skeptics 
themselves.   
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person should do just in case the wise person “couldn‟t apprehend anything,” i.e. should 
the wise person suspend judgment?   
The stoic responds by denying such a case to be possible because there is always 
“an impression from what is, stamped, impressed, and molded just as it is.”184  As 
rebuttal the skeptic proposes two scenarios in which the wise person, rather than 
apprehend nothing, encounters supposed indiscernible apprehensions such as twins or 
apprehensions in abnormal states such as dreaming.
185
  The skeptic proposes these 
scenarios so as to illustrate an instance without clear [enargês] and distinct [ektypos] 
criteria, thereby undermining the possibility of affirmatively judging an appearance, i.e. 
assenting to a katalêptic impression.
186
  The story, of course, does not end there.  Yet, 
before showing the relevance of the story for Kant‟s terminology, there is another salient 
part.  
Judgment remained a major point of contention between the stoics and the 
skeptics even by the time of the third leader of the stoic school, Chrysippus (c. 279-206 
BC).  Chrysippus‟ innovative contribution to the debate was to borrow ideas from 
Epicurus (c. 341-270 BC).  Though lost in history, Epicurus wrote a treatise titled On the 
Standard or Canon [Πεξὶ θξηγεξίνπ], the name referring to a stick or rule with which to 
measure or set limits.  Laertius tells us this book contained the Epicurean criteria for 
truth. (LOP 435)  Now, “Chrysippus adopted two of Epicurus‟ three criteria, sense-
perception and prolêpsis, i.e. πξόιεςηο.  These two criteria appear to be subdivisions of 
                                               
184 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, Charles Brittain, tr., 45. 
185 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, 49-51. 
186 Cf. Michael Frede, “Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions,” The Skeptical Tradition, 
Myles Burnyeat, ed., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 65-93. 
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Zeno‟s single criterion, katalêpsis („apprehension‟).”187  Whereas, Zeno of Citium 
receives credit for the term katalêpsis, Epicurus receives credit for the term prolêpsis, and 
this term – prolêpsis – has been assimilated into Latin as both notion (notio) and 
anticipation (anticipatio).
188
   
Epicurus, in contrast to the Academy of Plato, the Lyceum of Aristotle, the 
Cynosarges of the cynics, and the Stoa of Zeno, conducted his hedonistic school in his 
garden just outside Athens, whereby his school name, “The Garden.”  Indeed, Epicurus 
was neither stoic nor skeptic, for example, he held, “If you resist all the senses, you will 
not even have anything left to which you can refer, or by which you may be able to judge 
of the falsehood of the senses which you condemn.” (LOP 476)  Hence, the senses and 
that by which one is able to anticipate, i.e. achieve prolêpsis, may be used so as to 
correctly assent, i.e. judge of appearances.  It is in this way, that the stoics, under the 
direction of Chrysippus, formulated a richer account of experience with which to enhance 
their epistemology and respond to the skeptics.
189
 
In his Against the Logicians, Sextus Empiricus (c. 160-210 AD) notes the 
“Skeptical Method” is directed not merely at stoics or hedonists but at all 
“Dogmatists.”190  Further, Sextus in his Outlines of Skepticism enumerates various 
skeptical methods with which to combat dogmatists beginning with the methods 
                                               
187 Henry Dyson, Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 3. 
188 Lia Formigari, A History of Language Philosophies, Gabriel Poole, tr., (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 
2006), 29. 
189 In fact, the stoics even used the notion of prolepsis in response to Meno‟s paradox, cf. Dyson, p. 66. 
190 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, Richard A.H. Bett, tr., (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 7. 
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proposed by the skeptic Pyrrho (c. 360-270 BC).  In general, Pyrrhonian skepticism may 
be said to follow a principle of interpretation.
191
  In other words,  
[the Pyrrhonists] affirmed that facts are not by nature such 
as they appear to be, but that facts only seem as such; and 
they said, that what they doubt is not what they think – for 
their thoughts are evident to themselves, but the reality of 
the things which are only made known to them by their 
sensations. (LOP 408) 
As a clear example, out of the ten modes of Pyrrhonian skepticism consider that the 
“sixth mode has reference to the promiscuousness and confusion of objects; according to 
which nothing is seen by us simply and by itself.” (LOP 411)  Or the first mode, 
according to Sextus,  
we are not able to prefer our own appearances to those 
produced in the irrational animals.  So, if the irrational 
animals are no more convincing than we are when it comes 
to judging appearances, and if different appearances are 
produced depending on the variations among animals, then 
I shall be able to say how each existing object appears to 
me, but for these reasons I shall be forced to suspend 
judgment on how it is by nature.
192
  
Finally, of the modes in total Sextus boasts,  
That every object of investigation can be referred to these 
modes we shall briefly show as follows.  What is proposed 
is either an object of perception or an object of thought, 
and whichever it is it is subject to dispute. … Now, will 
they say that the dispute is decidable or undecidable?  If 
undecidable, we have it that we must suspend judgment; for 
it is not possible to make assertions about what is subject to 
undecidable dispute.  But if decidable, we shall ask where 
the decision is to come from [my emphases].
193
 
Asking for the origin, of course, Sextus contends will also lead to undecidability.  In sum, 
Sextus says, “no object is ever perceived independently and entirely by itself.” (LOP 413)  
                                               
191 Cf. Frank Scalambrino, “The Ubiquity of Interpretation: Truth and the Unconscious,” Proceedings of 
the Ohio Philosophical Association, 5, (2008), (http://www.ohiophilosophy.org/). 
192 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, tr., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 22. 
193 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, 41-42. 
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That is, “Those things which are known in relation to others are unknown of themselves 
[my emphasis].” (LOP 412) 
 Both terminologically and strategically, in determining his structure and trajectory 
of experience, Kant borrows from the Socratic Schools, as evidenced by the above 
depiction of the stoic-skeptic debate.  The terms dogmatism, apprehension, the 
incomprehensible/comprehensible contrast, the conception of judgment in relation to 
experience, the awareness of prolêptic features in experience, and the unknowable nature 
of things in themselves all make their way into Kant‟s structure of experience.  What is 
more, Kant‟s Copernican turn may be thought of as the unification of the stoic, skeptic, 
and Epicurean contributions regarding epistemology.  In other words, the point at which 
Sextus leaves off the debate amongst the Socratic schools, Kant enters the scene and 
grants each faction their initial premise with his Copernican revolution.   
Strategically, Kant has maneuvered his epistemological stance so as to 
incorporate the components upon which the debate amongst the Socratic schools hinged, 
while at the same time formulating an initial premise which precludes choosing any one 
position in the debate over another.  In other words, things in themselves cannot be 
known – to the skeptics, there are some contributions from the senses of which one can 
neither apprehend nor have knowledge, i.e. a katalêptic grasp – to the stoics, and the 
manner in which one comes to judge the objects of experience, and thereby having 
knowledge of them, is through some prolêptic function of the mind – to the Epicureans.  
Hence, Kant‟s structure of experience moves from the unknowable thing-in-itself through 
the senses, which combining with imagination forms an appearance [θαληαζία], and into 
the logically structured understanding where the object of knowledge is grasped and 
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known.  The wise person – the sage – for Kant is one who uses reason critically to reflect 
upon this structure and trajectory so as to formulate and to assent to scientific principles – 
formulating a canon – regarding experience rather than mere opinion. 
 The Critique of Pure Reason is riddled with references to the Socratic schools, 
including specifically epistemological references to the stoic-skeptic debate (A 569/B 
597) and Epicurus (A 853/B 881); in addition, there are references to both Diogenes 
Laertius (B xi) and Cicero (A 689/B 717).
194
  For example, in a section titled, “On the 
impossibility of a skeptical satisfaction of pure reason that is divided against itself,” Kant 
begins the section by noting, “The consciousness of my ignorance (if this is not at the 
same time known to be necessary) should not end my inquiries;” on the contrary, 
according to Kant, such “is rather the proper cause to arouse them.  All ignorance is 
either that of things or of the determination and boundaries of my cognition.” (CPR 1998, 
A 758/B 786)  Shortly thereafter Kant references David Hume as a modern proponent of 
skepticism, and notes, “The first step in matters of pure reason, which characterize its 
childhood, is dogmatic.  The just mentioned second step is skeptical, and gives evidence 
of the caution of the power of judgment sharpened by experience [my emphasis].” (CPR 
1998, A 761/B 789)  For Kant, the “nomadic” skeptics preferred undecidability to any 
“permanent cultivation of the soil.” (CPR 1998, A ix)   
Before Kant, with Kant, and in Kant‟s wake, it seems tenable, then, to link the 
thing-in-itself with skeptic undecidability.  Recall, Sextus took pains to indicate that the 
justification for skeptical suspense of judgment derives from the “undecidability,” or the 
“undecidable” quality, of any judgment which would purport to determine the identity of 
                                               
194 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kant’s Introduction to Logic and his Essay on the Mistaken Subtlety of the Four 
Figures, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, tr. (London: Longmans, 1885), 172.  
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the thing-in-itself.  In this way, it is as if the skeptics are wielding the power of non-being 
against their fellow Socratics.  And, in unifying the positions of the debate into one 
epistemological position Kant has embraced the thing-in-itself as undecidable.    
 The division into undecidable, on the one hand, and the necessary, certain, clear, 
and distinct, on the other, may be clearly seen in Kant‟s structure and trajectory of 
experience.  In general, the structure of experience is divided in two.  Kant says, “Only 
this much appears to be necessary by way of introduction or anticipation, namely, that 
there are two stems of human knowledge, sensibility [Sinnlichkeit] and understanding 
[Verstand], which perhaps spring forth from a common, but to us unknown, root.” (CPR 
2003, A 15/B 29)  Whereas, I refer to Leibniz to help explicate the first stem, I will refer 
to logic in general to explicate the second stem.   
Kant deals with the “unknown root” in his “Transcendental Analytic” section of 
the Critique, specifically the “Transcendental Deduction.”  In fact, an initial glance at the 
structure of the Critique of Pure Reason will help facilitate a discussion of the stems of 
knowledge and the structure and trajectory of experience.  Following the Kant scholar 
Howard Caygill, I have included a schematic representation of the “Table of Contents” of 
the Critique of Pure Reason.  This graphic provides an at-a-glance look at the structure of 
Kant‟s text which largely coincides with what I refer to as the structure and trajectory of 
experience. 
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195
 
The “Transcendental Doctrine of Elements” is the section of the Critique devoted to 
describing the elements of the structure and trajectory of experience.  As the above 
schematic of Kant‟s text shows – from left to right – in order to suppose objects of 
experience must conform to “our knowledge,” there is a movement from the 
“Transcendental Aesthetic” to the “Transcendental Logic.”  Kant tells us this division 
                                               
195 Inspired by Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 146.  This schematic is, of 
course, not exhaustive of the Table of Contents. 
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may be described as the division between “lower” and “higher” cognitive faculties, 
respectively, (CPR 1998, A 130/B 169) and this division indicates the sections which 
deal with the undecidable, on the one hand, and the necessary, certain, clear, and distinct, 
on the other, i.e. the aesthetic and the logic respectively.   
The Transcendental Logic section of the Critique is further divided into two 
sections, i.e. the “Transcendental Analytic” and the “Transcendental Dialectic.”  Whereas 
in the Transcendental Analytic Kant discusses the complex operation of applying the 
categories within an experience, in the Transcendental Dialectic Kant discusses the 
application of the categories both within and outside experience.
196
  Lastly, regarding 
Figure 1.1, the Analytic of Principles may be thought of as the center hub of the 
architectonic structure of the experience.  Were I to assign an exact point, I would place 
the point between the “Deduction of the Categories,” a.k.a. the “Transcendental 
Deduction,” and the “Schematism.”  That point for Kant acts as a crossroads where he 
branches out into multiple views of the entire architectonic.  I will have further explained 
this in the Interlude below.  For now, I will explain how the trajectory of experience may 
be thought of as a movement of limiting from the passive lower faculties which are 
“near” in relation to the thing-in-itself to the active higher faculties which are “remote” in 
relation to the thing-in-itself.  I borrow the terms near and remote from Leibniz, as it is 
perhaps Leibniz to whom Kant owes the most for his description of the bottom of the 
structure of experience. 
                                               
196 An analogy is appropriate here, analytic : justification (& demonstration) :: dialectic : discovery. 
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Aesthetic, “in its original Greek form (αηζζεηηθόο), means anything that has to do 
with perception by the senses, and this wider connotation was retained by Kant.”197  
Consider a highly readable passage – worth quoting at length – from Kant‟s Lectures on 
Logic, specifically what has come to be known as the Jäsche Logic,    
The first degree, then, of perfection of our knowledge as to 
quality is its clearness.  A second or a higher degree of 
clearness is distinctness. This consists in the clearness of 
attributes. We must first distinguish logical from aesthetic 
distinctness in general.  Logical distinctness rests on the 
objective, aesthetic on the subjective clearness of attributes.  
The former is a clearness by means of concepts, the latter a 
clearness by means of intuition.  The latter kind of 
distinctness, then consists in a mere vividness and 
intelligibility, that is, in a mere clearness by means of 
examples in concreto (for much may be intelligible which 
is not distinct, and conversely much may be distinct which 
is yet hard to understand, because it reaches back to remote 
attributes, the connection of which with intuition is only 
possible through a long series) [all emphases Kant‟s].198 
The limiting movement of the trajectory of experience perfects subjectively in aesthetic 
distinctness by means of intuition and objectively in logical distinctness by means of 
concepts.  The former is the first stem of sensibility, and the latter is the second stem of 
the understanding – both of which are dealt with in the Transcendental Aesthetic and 
Transcendental Logic, respectively.  Whereas the understanding may act upon itself and 
produce abstract results, experience is the condition sine qua non of sensibility, i.e. there 
is intuition only where there is experience.  In order to make experience objective, then, 
the product of sensibility must be combined with the understanding in a further limiting 
process.  Hence, this process resulting in the experience of an object, i.e. objective 
knowledge, must begin with subjective experience, i.e. by way of subjective experience. 
                                               
197 James Sully and George C. Robertson, Aesthetics, Dreams, and Association of Ideas, (New York: 
Humboldt Publishing, 1888), 1.  
198 Immanuel Kant, Kant’s Introduction to Logic and his Essay on the Mistaken Subtlety of the Four 
Figures, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, tr. (London: Longmans, 1885), 52.  
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Not only do the stems differ, then, in their perfections, but they also differ in their 
negations.  In his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into 
Philosophy, Kant makes the following distinction: 
Two things are opposed to each other if one thing cancels 
that which is posited by the other.  This opposition is two-
fold: it is either logical through contradiction, or it is real, 
that is to say, without contradiction [Kant‟s emphases].  
This first opposition, namely logical opposition, is that 
upon which attention has been exclusively and uniquely 
concentrated until now. … The second opposition, namely 
real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are 
opposed to each other, but not through the law of 
contradiction. … Its meaning is the same as that of 
negation (negatio), lack, absence – notions which are in 
general use among philosophers – albeit with a more 
precise determination which will be specified later on. (NM 
211)  
The difference between the two negations relates to the intelligences in which they reside.  
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant refers to these intelligences as discursive and 
intuitive, i.e. non-discursive.  In other words, sensibility contains non-discursive aspects, 
but the understanding is solely discursive. (Cf. CPR A xvii & B 93)   
Now, in order to respect Kant‟s distinction between negations, I use the term 
“not” when referring to logical distinction and the term “non” to refer to what he calls 
“real” negation.  Recall this may be read as Kant‟s appropriation of Gorgias‟ strategy 
noted in the Introduction and invokes the terms ἐλαληίνλ and ἕηεξνλ.  What is more, Kant 
was correct to indicate that attention had been focused solely on the “not” form of 
negation before his teachings.  Moreover, I will continue to press this distinction in the 
next chapter, i.e. the difference between not-being and non-being.  However, for the 
purpose of understanding Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience, it is important to 
recognize the different stems – as Kant refers to them – of sensibility and understanding, 
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their different perfections, and their different negations.  With this information in place, I 
can now discuss the structure and trajectory of experience beginning with sensibility, 
moving to the understanding, and finishing with the unknown root which combines them. 
I have already indicated that – in an experience – the structure of experience 
amounts to a limiting structure.  “Accordingly, the understanding limits sensibility, but 
without therefore expanding its own realm.” (CPR 1996, A 288/B 344)  As such, the non-
discursive is limited first by sensibility and then by the understanding into an objective 
experience resulting in knowledge of the object of experience.  When Kant refers to a 
multiplicity prior to its limiting, he refers to the multiplicity as a “manifold.”  Note, the 
adjective mannigfaltig literally means many [mannig] creases or folds [faltig], and the 
noun das Mannigfaltige, then, refers to a diversity or multiplicity in so far as it refers to a 
grouping of potential intuitions.  For example, Kant will say, 
[E]very appearance contains a manifold, so that different 
perceptions are in themselves encountered in the mind 
sporadically and individually, these perceptions need to be 
given a combination.  Hence, there is in us an active power 
to synthesize.  This power we call imagination; and the act 
that it performs directly on perceptions I call apprehension.  
For the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition to 
an image. (CPR 1996, A 120-121) 
Here Kant tells us the manifold of intuition contains a multiplicity which must be limited 
so as to fit, so to speak, into an image.  Thus, the limiting at the intuitive level is a 
limiting of potentials within and across the groupings which constitute an appearance 
once apprehended.   
Post apprehension of an appearance, a regression to a singular intuition – by the 
mental operation of mathematics – arrives at a manifold in the singular intuition itself.  
Once the image is further processed by the active stem of understanding, the image is 
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further limited so as to fit the appropriate concepts and be an object of knowledge.  The 
beginning of the limiting within the structure of experience may be referred to as the 
“bottom” of the structure, and the top of the structure of experience which accounts for 
the limiting may be referred to as the “top.”  As I will show, Kant seems to have been 
influenced by Leibniz in his thinking about both the bottom and top of the structure of 
experience.  The guiding question here: If the bottom of the structure of experience is 
most near the thing-in-itself, then how are we to think of the manifold at the very bottom 
of the structure of experience? 
The section of the Critique of Pure Reason titled “On the Amphiboly of Concepts 
of Reflection” is widely read as Kant‟s distancing himself from Leibniz.  It is there that 
Kant famously claimed Leibniz “intellectualized appearances” just as Locke “sensualized 
all of the concepts of understanding.” (CPR 1996, A 271/B 327)  To answer the guiding 
question, then, I will examine the way in which Kant criticizes Leibniz‟s intellectualizing 
of appearances.  Kant‟s criticism both draws from Leibniz and answers the guiding 
question.  Kant‟s strategy here is to use the sensibility/understanding distinction in 
general and the discursive/non-discursive distinction specifically to criticize Leibniz‟s 
principle of the identity of indiscernibles and then Leibniz‟s principle of determination.   
Kant notes that Leibniz, “compared all things with one another merely by 
concepts”; in this way he “naturally found among them no differences other than those by 
which the understanding distinguishes its pure concepts from one another.” (CPR 1996, 
A 270/B 326)  In other words, regarding Leibniz Kant thought that “Appearance was for 
him the representation of the thing-in-itself, although a representation different in logical 
form from cognition through understanding [Kant‟s emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 270/B 
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326)  Kant is here saying that Leibniz did not consider appearance to contain the non-
discursive.  Though, interestingly, Kant seems to have derived his reading of non-
discursivity precisely from Leibniz.  Kant makes a complicated but rewarding move here.  
In order to fully understand what Kant accomplishes it is important to provide an 
example from Leibniz. 
According to Leibniz, God‟s perfection entails that he does not create in a 
haphazard way.  Now, combined with the principle of sufficient reason, i.e. “nothing 
takes place without a sufficient reason,”199 it is possible to “understand in a wonderful 
way how a kind of divine mathematics or metaphysical mechanism is used in the origin 
of things.”200  That is, God “acts perfectly” like a Geometer or “a good architect who 
makes the most advantageous use of the space and the capital intended for a building.”201  
This should help illuminate Leibniz‟s two principles which Kant criticizes, i.e. the 
principle of the identity of indiscernibles and the principle of determination.  Leibniz‟s 
principle of the identity of indiscernibles holds that “there are not in nature two real, 
absolute beings, indiscernible from each other, because, if there were, God and nature 
would act without reason in ordering the one otherwise than the other.”202  From this 
principle it follows for Leibniz that “each singular substance expresses the whole 
universe in its own way,” i.e. “every substance is like an entire world, and like a mirror of 
God … as the same city is represented differently depending on the different positions 
                                               
199 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “The Principle of Nature and of Grace, based on Reason,” Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Leroy E. Loemker, tr. (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 639.  
Admittedly, Leibniz phrases the principle in different ways in different places, but this statement of the 
principle is sufficient to the purpose at hand. 
200 Leibniz, “On the Radical Origination of Things,” Philosophical Papers and Letters, 488. 
201 Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics,” Philosophical Papers and Letters, 305. 
202 Leibniz, “The Controversy between Leibniz and Clarke, 1715-16,” Philosophical Papers and Letters, 
699. 
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from which it is regarded.”203  Despite, then, Leibniz‟s mortality, given these principles, 
“it is possible to make some general remarks touching the course of providence in the 
government of things.”204  It is to such affairs that the principle of determination pertains. 
Leibniz‟s essay, “On the Radical Origination of Things,”205 is instructive here.  
Given the complexity involved in Leibniz‟s following game analogy, I quote him at 
length.  My comments afterward connect the principle of determination with the 
aforementioned work from Leibniz so as to explicate the difficult notion of non-
discursivity in Kant. 
[O]nce it is established to be such as it is [by God], it 
follows that things such as they are will come into being. 
…  There is always a principle of determination in nature 
which must be sought by maxima and minima; namely, that 
a maximum effect should be achieved with a minimum 
outlay, so to speak.  And at this point time and place, or in 
a word, the receptivity or capacity to the world, can be 
taken for the outlay, or the terrain on which a building is to 
be erected as commodiously as possible, the variety of 
forms corresponding to the spaciousness of the building 
and the number and elegance of its chambers.  The case is 
like that of certain games in which all the spaces on a board 
are to be filled according to definite rules, but unless we 
use a certain device, we find ourself at the end blocked 
from the difficult spaces and compelled to leave more 
spaces vacant than we needed or wished to.  Yet there is a 
definite rule by which a maximum number of spaces can be 
filled in the easiest way [my emphases].
206
 
This is like the games where blocks are to be specifically organized or any game where a 
chaotic dispersion of species is organized.  From the initial moment of encounter to the 
point of organization it may be said that there is a rule (or series of rules) for moving 
                                               
203 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics,” Philosophical Papers and Letters, Leroy E. 
Loemker, tr. (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 308. 
204 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology, 
George r. Montgomery, tr. (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1902), 8. 
205 Leibniz‟s translator here, Leroy E. Loemker, suggests the essay may also go by the titles: “On the 
Process by Which the World Comes into Being from Its Roots” and “On the First Principles of Creation.” 
206 Leibniz, “On the Radical Origination of Things,” Philosophical Papers and Letters, Leroy E. Loemker, 
tr., 487. 
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from the first point to the second.  It is in this way that God is like a Geometer for 
Leibniz.  Yet, as a divine Geometer the components with which God works are infinite.  
Similarly, once having assumed that being involves more 
perfection than nonbeing, or that there is a reason why 
something should come to exist rather than nothing, or that 
a transition from possibility to actuality must take place, it 
follows that even if there is no further determining 
principle, there does exist the greatest amount possible in 
proportion to the given capacity of time and space (or the 
possible order of existence), in much the same way as tiles 
are laid so that as many as possible are contained in a given 
space [my emphases].
207
 
Given all the above principles, then, with which God governs creation, Leibniz is able to 
draw an analogy between God‟s creating and the playing of a game.  The focus here is on 
time and space.   
According to Leibniz, the vastness of God‟s creating is such that time and space 
are infinite.  Yet, from our (human) perspective it is as if we – with our physical eyes – 
see merely the finite consecutive tiles on a game board comprised of time and space, each 
tile – each thing – of which is like a looking glass into infinity.  William Blake (1757-
1827) is perhaps appropriate here, “To see a world in a grain of sand, and heaven in a 
wild flower, hold infinity in the palm of your hand, and eternity in an hour.”208 
 Space and time, then, for Leibniz are like the tiles on the game board which, when 
compared to the infinite vastness of God‟s creation, derive their reality more from their 
relation to each other than their  determination of coordinates for us – even though they 
do determine coordinates for us.  It is as if God‟s vastness is somehow folded into each 
tile we experience.  For example, a different intellect – an intellect with a different 
“receptivity or capacity” – could determine, i.e. understand, different sized tiles by 
                                               
207 Leibniz, “On the Radical Origination of Things,” Philosophical Papers and Letters, 487. 
208 William Blake, The Poetical Works of William Blake, vol. 1, Edwin J. Ellis, ed. (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1906), 138. 
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parsing God‟s vastness differently.  Put another way, space and time are ideal and derive 
from the attempt of a finite mind to experience the infinite mind of God.  With God as 
most real, time and space are ideal, not real.  According to Leibniz, “By the word thing 
we mean that which appears, hence that which can be understood.”209  Moreover, it is 
“not necessary for that which expresses to be similar to the thing expressed.”210   
The thing is perspectival.  Leibniz draws an analogy, as the view of a city from 
above “differs from the almost infinite horizontal perspectives with which it delights the 
eyes of travelers who approach it from one direction or another,” so “the appearance of 
parts differs from the appearance of their positions.”211  In other words, we reify or 
hypostasize time and space by treating them as real due to our inability to fully grasp the 
mind of God or God‟s creation.  Though things are infinitely divisible, they need not 
have an infinite number of parts – which would be a determination by our mind – because 
the number of parts depends on the type of mind “looking” at the thing.  Leibniz puts this 
beautifully in saying, “there always remain in the abyss of things parts which are still 
asleep.”212  It is as if the universe itself – insofar as we can still speak of an “in-itself” – is 
a phantasm in the mind of God.    The universe conceived as a sensorium or imaginarium 
of the mind of God.
213
  Such a notion might call to mind Isaac Newton‟s (1643-1727) 
reference in Optics, to God‟s “boundless uniform sensorium … [God] being everywhere 
present to the things themselves.”214  (Bk 3, pt 1, q28) 
                                               
209 Leibniz, “What is an Idea? (1678),” Philosophical Papers and Letters, 207. 
210 Leibniz, “What is an Idea? (1678),” Philosophical Papers and Letters, 207. 
211 Leibniz, “What is an Idea? (1678),” Philosophical Papers and Letters, 207. 
212 Leibniz, “Studies in Physics and the Nature of Body, 1671” Philosophical Papers and Letters, 491. 
213 For an account of contemporary physicists exploring this idea sometimes referring to the universe as a 
“hologram,” see: A. Aspect, “To be or not to be local,” Nature, 446, (2007), 866-867. 
214 Isaac Newton, Philosophical Writings, Andrew Janiak, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 138-139. 
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Non-discursivity, then, refers to the “parts which are still asleep” “in the abyss of 
things,” and these parts will always remain asleep for a (human) mind like ours.  For 
Kant, “Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in 
general, but a pure intuition.” (CPR 1998, A 25/B 39)  Similarly, “Time is no discursive, 
or as one calls it, general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition.  Different times 
are but parts of one and the same time.” (CPR 1998, A 32/B 47)  Whereas Leibniz seems 
to stress the relationality of each tile in his metaphoric example, Kant seems to stress the 
singularity of each tile.  Kant has space and time as conditions for the possibility of 
intuiting the manifold which is itself a limiting of the abyss.  Yet, even the limiting 
contains the non-discursive within each singular intuitive grasp contributing to the 
manifold of sensibility in which an appearance can be apprehended – an unimaginable 
depth.  Hence, for Kant, we can never know the thing-in-itself.   
Kant draws a distinction between the thing-in-itself and an appearance in space 
and time.  Space and time remain contributions from our mind, and the manifold at the 
“bottom” of the structure of experience may be described as an abyss containing parts 
which remain asleep to the experiential apparatus of our mind.  In sum, moving from the 
unknowable thing-in-itself toward the object of experience moves along a limiting 
trajectory through the forms of intuition – space and time – to a manifold of sensibility 
which will be further limited as an appearance is apprehended in the process of 
combining the two stems of sensibility and understanding. 
Nietzsche‟s seemingly prescient remark is appropriate here: “when you look long 
into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.”215 (§146)  If you might see a world in a 
                                               
215 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Walter Kaufmann, tr. (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 
89. 
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grain of sand, what do you see when you turn that gaze toward you?  Where are you in 
this structure of experience, i.e. in the structure with which you experience?  Insofar as 
the limiting involved along the trajectory of experience is also a unifying, you might 
imagine the figure of a cone whose convergence points to you in the structure of 
experience.  The term used by Kant is apperception, and Leibniz coined the term in his 
New Essays on Human Understanding [Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain] 
(1765) commenting on John Locke‟s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(1690).   
Within the structure of experience there are two types of syntheses which can 
occur – the synthesis combining the stems of knowledge in an experience or a synthesis 
which is merely intellectual, i.e. not involving intuition.  Kant calls the first a figurative 
synthesis and the second an intellectual synthesis. (CPR 1998, B 152)  So, the 
combination which occurs between the two stems, i.e. sensibility and understanding is 
performed by the power of imagination.  Further, the unity to which the synthesis points 
– like the converging in a cone – is the transcendental unity of apperception. (CPR 1998, 
B 141)  In the New Essays, Leibniz says, “The apperception of that which is in us 
depends upon attention and order.”216  Like following along the chain of words in this 
sentence, out of paying attention to the order of the flowing appearances emerges an 
awareness of that which is paying attention, and that is you.   
In other words, the figurative synthesis is not a one to one synthesis; it is a 
limiting of a multiplicity, i.e. a manifold of sensibility that is unified.  Whereas 
perception for Kant – like a series of tiles from Leibniz‟s game board – consists in a 
                                               
216 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Alfred Gideon Langley, tr. 
(Chicago: The Open Court, 1916), 76. 
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series of appearances each of which comes with an awareness of you as the (empirical) 
apprehender of the appearance, the unity of apperception is the (non-empirical) unity of 
these perceptions.  In Kant‟s words, on the one hand there is the “flow of inner 
appearances” called “inner sense or empirical apperception,” and on the other hand, there 
is the numerical identity across the appearances in the flow, i.e. the unity which means all 
these appearances relate to me [Kant‟s emphases]. (CPR 1996, A 107)  This numerical 
identity is the unity of pure – as opposed to empirical – apperception. (CPR A 107)  And, 
this unity “precedes all cognition of the object, as the intellectual form of that cognition.” 
(CPR 1996, A 129)  Hence, apperception “is an act of spontaneity; i.e. it cannot be 
regarded as belonging to sensibility,” and it produces the representation “I think that must 
be capable of accompanying all other representations [Kant‟s emphasis].” (CPR 1996, B 
132)    
Now though the structure of experience – with its converging trajectory – takes 
place between the thing-in-itself and the “I think,” it is still not clear how the “I think” 
accompanies all of the structure‟s representations.  This can be cleared up by looking at 
the way Kant conceived of discursive cognition.  In brief, discursive thought is 
judgmental.  Pure apperception is spontaneous, which means between the two stems – the 
passive sensibility and the active understanding – pure apperception involves the stem of 
the understanding in the structure of experience.  Similarly, according to Kant, “We can 
… trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in 
general can be represented as a faculty for judging.” (CPR 1998, A 69/B 94)  Moreover, 
“judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity 
of apperception.” (CPR 1998, B 141)  Borrowing a phrase from Arnauld in his Port 
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Royal Logic, “Man is an intellectual cause, in relation to that which he does with 
judgment.”217  Hence, it is through judgment, then, that the I think can accompany all 
representations.  And, according to Kant, “in every judgment I am always the 
determining subject of that relation that constitutes the judgment.” (CPR 1998, B 407)  
Now, judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason may be parsed in a number of 
ways.  In regard to the subjective/objective distinction, I follow Béatrice Longuenesse in 
characterizing the difference between these judgments as subjective coordination and 
objective subordination.
218
  The value of this distinction will be seen below in my 
discussion of the Transcendental Deduction.  Suffice to say for now, the flow of 
appearances are coordinated in a subjective judgment and subordinated to a concept in an 
objective judgment.   
The standard way to parse Kant‟s judgments, then, is by way of the various logics 
to which the different judgments relate.  The two different logics in the Critique of Pure 
Reason are general logic and transcendental logic. (CPR 1998, A 77/B 102)  According 
to Errol Harris, Kant‟s hope for the transcendental logic “is to give an account of the 
experience of an objective world in terms of the necessary synthesis effected … a priori 
in the act of cognition, as the condition of apprehending any object whatsoever.”219  
Further, according to Kant, general logic, as the logic (ινγόο) of Aristotle, (CPR 1998, B 
viii) abstracts from the content of objects and deals only with the forms of thinking.  It is 
divided into analytic and dialectic.  Analysis, i.e. Aristotelian demonstration, rests on the 
                                               
217 Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, The Port Royal Logic, Thomas Spencer Baynes, tr. (London: 
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principle of non-contradiction, and dialectic rests on the use of syllogism.  
Transcendental logic pertains to the form of experience and of objects, i.e. the logic of the 
conditions for the possibility of experience.  It is concerned with the a priori concepts of 
objects, i.e. the construction of objects not the content.  Synthesis, then, in transcendental 
logic provides the basis for the connections which allow for the representation of an 
object of experience. Synthesis in general logic allows for inferences. 
Because I am interested in the structure of experience, I am interested in 
transcendental logic more than general logic.  To be specific about this interest, I will 
refer back to the Kant quote above from his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative 
Magnitudes into Philosophy.  There Kant distinguished between real and logical 
opposition. (OM 211)  As its name implies, “logical opposition” pertains to general logic.  
This is the logic, then, in which – according to Aristotle – “it will not be possible for the 
same thing to be and not to be.” (Meta 1995, 1006b19)  However, it is real opposition 
which pertains to the structure of experience.  Examining the structure of experience and 
its transcendental logic, then, the specific judgments I will look at will be judgments of 
perception and judgments of experience.  These judgments involve both stems of 
knowledge and their synthesis.  After pausing here to summarize the ground covered thus 
far, I will discuss the judgments by way of the synthesis of the two stems discussed by 
Kant in his Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason.   
For ease of reference I refer to the “three standpoints” which are involved in what 
I have been discussing thus far.  Retaining, perhaps, something of Leibniz‟s 
perspectivism noted above, Kant explained that “Every concept may be regarded as a 
point which, as the station for an observer, has its own horizon, that is, a variety of things 
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which can be represented, and as it were, surveyed from that standpoint [my emphasis].” 
(CPR 2003, A 685/B 686)  The three standpoints, then, are the experiential, the 
conceptual, and the performative or apperceptive.  The experiential covers the structure 
of experience from the bottom to the determination of the object of experience.  This 
standpoint is best thought in conjunction with sensibility.  The conceptual covers the 
structure of experience pertaining to the understanding broadly designated.  Lastly, the 
performative, or the apperceptive, pertains to the transcendental unity of apperception.   
The performative standpoint is best thought of by the aspects with which it hangs 
together, i.e. the revelation of the “I think” performed by the transcendental synthesis of 
imagination or the performance of judgment by the “I think.”  These standpoints are quite 
helpful because just referring to the stems and their combination muddles the influence of 
imagination in each of the stems prior to combination.  For example, the standpoints are 
helpful in discussing the Transcendental Deduction below.  Moreover, Kant has an 
experiential standpoint whereas those before him do not.  This is because the experiential 
standpoint is opened up by the Copernican revolution, and the experiential standpoint 
includes non-discursive content.  And, these aspects of the experiential standpoint just 
noted advance significantly toward solving the problem of non-being. 
Before discussing the combination of the two stems of knowledge – sensibility 
and understanding – I pause here to summarize the large amount of terminology covered 
thus far.  I have already indicated the top and bottom,
220
 as it were, of the structure of 
experience.  Sensibility is composed of the pure forms of time and space.  They are 
considered pure because they are contributions from mind, not from experience.  That is, 
they constitute the way in which the mind determines an intuition – like sizing a tile in 
                                               
220 For Kant‟s use of this language see (A 44/B 61). 
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Leibniz‟s example.  The multiplicity captured by these intuitions, then, is limited, and 
these intuitions taken together comprise a manifold to be apprehended as an appearance.  
Sensation provides the matter for these forms; the appearance, then, contains the non-
discursive.   
Kant explains the next stage in the trajectory of experience as follows: 
[T]here is in us an active power to synthesize this manifold.  
This power we call imagination; and the act that it performs 
directly on perceptions I call apprehension.  For the 
imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition to an 
image; hence it must beforehand take the impressions up 
into its activity, i.e. apprehend them [my emphases]. (CPR 
1996, A 120) 
I delve further into this below.  However, it is important to note here that the above 
covers the components of the beginning of the structure and trajectory of experience.  
Pertaining to the powers of the mind, Kant designates three original sources of all 
experience.  According to Kant there are 
three original sources (capacities or faculties [or powers] of 
the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of 
all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any 
other faculty [or power] of the mind, namely sense, 
imagination, and apperception [Kant‟s emphasis]. (CPR 
1998, A 94/B 127)   
So far I have, at least, indicated all of these powers above.  What remains is to discuss the 
specific ways that these conditions for the possibility of all experience relate to one 
another – I will delve into this below. 
With the exception of apperception (as it is a higher power of the mind), the 
above summarizes the lower cognitive faculties.  Hence, I quote here Kant‟s own 
summary of the higher cognitive faculties.  Kant explains,  
These are: understanding, the power of judgment, and 
reason.  In its analytic that doctrine accordingly deals with 
concepts, judgments, and inferences, corresponding exactly 
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to the function and the order of those powers of mind, 
which are comprehended under the broad designation of 
understanding in general [Kant‟s emphases]. (CPR 1998, A 
131/B 169) 
So, what is “broadly designated” as – the stem of – “the understanding” consists of the 
power of understanding, the power of judgment, and the power of reason.  The function 
of understanding – using the term to refer to one of the higher cognitive faculties – is 
conceiving, the function of judgment is judging, and the function of reason is inferring.   
Now, these three higher faculties taken together (broadly designated as 
understanding) perform the function of thinking,221 and this thinking can take place in 
combination with input from sensibility or without input from sensibility.  These three 
powers taken together can also perform the function of knowing in which case input from 
sensibility is necessary.
222
  Kant indicates the subtle difference in explaining the power of 
judgment,  
All judgments are accordingly functions of unity among my 
representations, since instead of an immediate 
representation a higher one, which comprehends this and 
other representations under itself, is used for the cognition 
of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby 
drawn together into one.  We can, however, trace all action 
of the understanding back to judgments, so that the 
understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for 
judging. … Concepts, however, as predicates of possible 
judgments, are related to some representation of a still 
undetermined object. (CPR 1998, A 69/B 94)   
Here Kant recalls the emphasis I have laid upon judgment above.  Recall the combination 
of sensibility and understanding is a requirement for empirical knowledge. (CPR 2003, A 
15/B 29)  Insofar as I will be pursuing the experiential standpoint, I will not be examining 
                                               
221 Cf. “the understanding … is a faculty for thinking.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Paul 
Guyer and Allen W. Wood, tr., (A 69/B 94), 205. 
222 Cf. (A 93); (A 95); (B 147); (B 161); (B 169). 
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a number of the aspects just noted.  Yet, the above goes toward summarizing the 
components of the structure and trajectory of experience. 
 Lastly, then, by way of a summary before discussing the complex Transcendental 
Deduction,  since all of the powers just mentioned above have different modes of 
representation, it is possible to provide an summary figure here.  Kant is most explicit 
regarding representations as he looks back and summarizes his broadly designated 
understanding of the Transcendental Analytic before he discusses the use of pure reason 
in the Transcendental Dialectic.  I quote Kant at length here as he summarizes the “terms 
properly suited to each species of representation…” 
Here is their progression [All emphases are Kant‟s]: The 
genus is representation in general [Die Gattung ist 
Vorstellung überhaupt] (repraesentatio). Under it stands 
the representation with consciousness (perceptio).  A 
perception [Perzeption] that refers to the subject as a 
modification of its state is a sensation [Empfindung] 
(sensatio); an objective perception is a cognition 
[Erkenntnis] (cognitio).  The latter is either an intuition or a 
concept [Anschauung oder Begriff] (intuitus vel conceptus).  
The former is immediately related to the object and is 
singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a mark, which 
can be common to several things [Dingen].  A concept is 
either an empirical or a pure concept [empirischer oder 
reiner], and the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin 
solely in the understanding (not in a pure image of 
sensibility) [(nicht im reinen Bilde der Sinnlichkeit)], is 
called notio.  A concept made up of notions, which goes 
beyond the possibility of experience, is an idea or a concept 
of reason [die Idee, oder der Vernunftbegriff ].223 (CPR 
1998, A 320 /B 376-377) 
In what may be taken as Kant‟s very own summary of the structure and trajectory of 
experience,
224
 then, Kant summarizes the above progression at the end of the Doctrine of 
Elements noting, “Thus all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from 
                                               
223 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Jens Timmerman and Heiner Klemme, eds. (Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998), 426-427. 
224 I.e. from the conceptual standpoint. 
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thence to concepts, and ends with ideas.” (CPR 2003, A 702/B 730)  Given Kant‟s 
reference to the above list of terms as constructed according to genus and species, I have 
constructed Figure 1.2 to provide an at-a-glance image for the reader. 
 
            Representation 
 
          
w/o Cs                       w/ Cs 
     ø                          Perception 
 
 
                  (Subjective)           (Objective) 
                    Sensation                Cognition 
 
 
                                       Intuition           Concept 
 
 
        Illustration of  
Critique of Pure Reason           Empirical                Pure 
    (A 320/B 376-377) 
                               
      *Notion has its origin solely in the understanding.                     Notion* 
                                
      ** A concept made up of notions which goes 
      beyond the possibility of experience is                                         Idea of Reason** 
        a concept of reason or an idea. 
 
Figure 2.2 
I will now discuss the Transcendental Deduction toward fully describing the structure of 
experience in the Critique of Pure Reason.   
The Thing-in-itself ex priority of Being: Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction 
“Everything profound loves a mask; the profoundest things of all even have a hatred of image and 
parable…  
Every profound spirit needs a mask: what is more, around every profound spirit a mask is continually 
growing, thanks to the constantly false, that is to say shallow interpretation  
of his every word, his every step, of every sign of life that he gives.”225 
~Nietzsche, Beyond Good & Evil §40 
 
                                               
225 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 50. 
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The Critique of Pure Reason was first published in mid July of 1781, and from 
the earliest reviews such as the “Göttingen Review,” which appeared in January of 1782 
to the present day the Transcendental Deduction has received heavy criticism.
226
  This 
includes, of course, the perhaps most famous of the reviews by – Kant‟s friend, the 
“Sorcerer of the North” – Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788).227  As one of Kant‟s 
friends, Hamann had been receiving proofs of the Critique from Kant, and as a result he 
had already completed a review by the end of July 1781.  In fact, though he wrote two 
reviews in total, given his friendship to Kant and his style of criticism his most scathing 
criticisms were only published posthumously.   
In his first review, Hamann suggests that by Kant outdated metaphysics “is 
suddenly transformed from a two-thousand-year-old arena of endless strife into a 
systematically arranged inventory of all that we possess by means of pure reason.”228  
Hamann further suggests that Kant proceeded “ass first” using “the weapons of light to 
spread the kingdom of darkness.”229  As Hamann‟s second review (1784) makes clear, he 
takes issue first and foremost with Kant‟s distinguishing between sensibility and 
understanding only to have such “learned troublemaking” culminate in a “meaningless, 
rutting, unstable, indefinite something = x” pointing directly to the Transcendental 
                                               
226 Cf. Jennifer Mensch, “Kant and the Problem of Idealism: On the Significance of the Göttingen Review,” 
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 64, (2006), 297-317. 
227 Manfred Kuehn, “Kant‟s critical philosophy and its reception – the first five years (1781-1786),” The 
Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, Paul Guyer, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 630-665. 
228 Johann Georg Hamann, “Review of Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason and Metacritique of the Purism of 
Reason,” 207-223, J.G. Hamann 1730-1788, Study in Christian Existence: With selection from his writings, 
Ronald Gregor Smith, tr. (New York: Harper Bros, 1960), 209. 
229 Johann Georg Hamann, Study in Christian Existence, 212. 
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Deduction.
230
  Hamann‟s position, however, should have been already clear to Kant as 
Hamann had written to him in a 1759 letter, “I must almost laugh at the choice of a 
philosopher to try to change my mind.  I look upon the finest logical demonstration the 
way a sensible girl regards a love letter … [Hamann‟s emphasis].”231  Contemporary 
criticisms of Kant‟s Critique, though rhetorically more moderate, point to the same 
difficulty of the Transcendental Deduction, i.e. how to put sensibility and understanding 
back together again. 
The influence of the reviews from Kant‟s contemporaries can be seen in Kant‟s 
subsequent writing: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics [Prolegomena zu einer 
jeden künftigen Metaphysik] (1783), his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
[Metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft] (1786), and in the second (B) 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787).  In fact, Kant explicitly asks in the 
Prolegomena for the anonymous reviewers to show themselves, as it were, and enter into 
an open debate.
 232
 (Proleg 130)  Acutely aware of his public reception, in the Preface to 
the second edition of the Critique Kant summarizes the four major changes made from 
the first edition. 
(1) the misunderstanding in the Aesthetic, chiefly the one in 
the concept of time; (2) the  obscurity in the 
[Transcendental] Deduction of the Concepts of the 
Understanding; (3) the supposed lack of sufficient evidence 
in the proofs of the Principles of Pure Understanding; (4) 
the misinterpretation of the paralogisms advanced against 
rational psychology. (CPR 1998, B xxxviii) 
                                               
230 Johann Georg Hamann, “Metacritique on the Purism of Reason,” Kenneth Haynes, tr., Writings on 
Philosophy and Language, Karl Ameriks and Desmond M. Clarke, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 210. 
231 Immanuel Kant, “[Letter:] From Johann Georg Hamann, July 27, 1759,” Correspondences, Arnulf 
Zweig, tr. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 52. 
232 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, James W. Ellington, tr. (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 2002), 130.  Hereafter cited as Proleg. 
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The second and fourth revisions, i.e. (2) the Transcendental Deduction and (4) the 
paralogisms, amount to quite substantial revisions.  In fact, commentators refer to the two 
different Transcendental Deductions as the “subjective” or “psychological” deduction of 
the 1781 first edition and the “objective” or “linguistic” deduction of the 1787 second 
edition.
233
  Kant himself, however, thought of the revisions as merely a difference in their 
“method of presentation.” (CPR 1998, B xliii)  To stress this last point even further, in 
the Preface to his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant insists, “There is no 
more to be done, or to be discovered, or to be added here.”234  Despite this, of course, the 
following year in the second edition of the Critique Kant substantially revised the 
Transcendental Deduction to such an extent that commentators treat it as a separate 
deduction.                        
  Since its first publication, then, the Transcendental Deduction has remained a 
focus of scholarship and considered variously, for example, as the “very heart of the 
Critique of Pure Reason,”235 the “mystery,” or as “the jungle.”236  Moreover, it seems as 
though commentators span all the logical possibilities in regard to preference and the two 
editions of the deduction.  Primarily, there are those who reject both editions on various 
grounds; those who prefer the first edition, e.g. Schopenhauer and Heidegger; those who 
prefer the second, e.g. many contemporary commentators; and, those who, like Kant 
consider the difference between the two merely stylistic.
237
  Influenced by Hans 
                                               
233 Cf. Graham Bird, Revolutionary Kant, (Chicago Open Court, 2006), 46-47. 
234 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Michael Friedman, tr. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 12. 
235 Dieter Henrich, “The Proof-Structure of Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction,” The Review of Metaphysics, 
22.4, (1969), 640. 
236 Paul Guyer, “Psychology and the Transcendental Deduction,” Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: The 
Three Critiques and the Opus postumum, Eckart Förster, ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 
47.   
237 Dieter Henrich, “The Proof-Structure,” 640. 
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Vaihinger‟s (1852-1933) comments from 1902238 a number of commentators have 
suggested the “Transcendental Deduction” is a “patchwork.”  By this, these 
commentators literally mean that it is a “patchwork, of different arguments composed at 
different times and representing very different points of view.”239  The suggestion here is 
that the deduction is out of order and so badly bungled by Kant that it is unsalvageable, 
and perhaps should be looked upon as modest eyes look upon a love letter.  There at least 
seems to be general agreement that the “Transcendental Deduction is central to the 
Critique,” and Kant‟s project in the Critique “to explain how synthetic judgments are 
possible a priori”240 stands or falls with the deduction.   
The problem of the Deduction may be seen clearly in juxtaposing the following 
two quotes from Kant.  On the one hand, referring to the sections of the Critique which 
correspond with sensibility and the understanding, Kant states that transcendental logic 
“has lying before it a manifold of a priori sensibility, offered to it by transcendental 
aesthetic.  Transcendental aesthetic offers it this manifold in order to provide it with a 
material for the pure concepts of understanding.” (CPR 1996, A 77/B 102)  On the other 
hand, “Pure concepts of the understanding,” Kant notes, “are quite heterogeneous from 
empirical intuitions (indeed, from sensible intuitions generally) and can never be 
encountered in any intuition.  How, then, can an intuition be subsumed under a category, 
and hence how can a category be applied to appearances…? [Kant‟s emphases]” (CPR 
1996, A 137/B 176)   
                                               
238 Hans Vaihinger, Die Transcendentale Deduktion der Kategorien, (Germany: Niemeyer-Haller, 1902).   
239 H.J. Paton, “Is the Transcendental Deduction a Patchwork?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 30, 
(1929-1930), 144. 
240 Michel Meyer, “Why Did Kant Write Two Versions of the Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories?” Synthese, 47.3, (1981), 357-383. 
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In regard to the former combination problem, Kant is restating what 
commentators refer to as the “blindness thesis” and the “emptiness thesis.”  That is, the 
two stems of knowledge are sensibility and understanding, “Through the former, objects 
are [intuitively] given to us; through the latter, they are thought.” (CPR 2003, A 15/B29)  
Moreover, “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind 
[my emphases].” (CPR 1996, A 51/ B75)  In regard, then, to the latter combination 
problem, Kant introduces some “third” component which is the infamous “=x” (CPR 
1998, A 250) or “transcendental object.”  The =x may be seen as Kant‟s attempt to 
characterize a sort of conceptual prolêptic within his structure of experience.  The 
transcendental object – as the condition for the possibility of an object – is meant to solve 
the latter combination problem by supposing that it shares properties with both sensibility 
and understanding.  You can imagine commentators suggest this is an ad hoc insertion by 
Kant to solve the otherwise unsolvable problem.  Notice, however, this ad hoc aspect of 
Kant‟s deduction pertains to the second strategy.  The first strategy might still be viable 
were there a way in the first strategy to deal with this heterogeneity problem of the 
second strategy.  A number of thinkers have tried to work this out.        
The most popular candidates for salvaging Kant‟s deduction are: apperception, 
judgment, and imagination.
241
  Commentators privilege, then, specific passages related to 
these candidates.  For example, H.J. Paton (1887-1969) privileges judgment and believes 
the section prior to the Transcendental Deduction to be the “key.”242  This section is titled, 
“On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding.”  To be clear, it 
is common among Kant scholars to refer to this section as the “Metaphysical Deduction,” 
                                               
241 Consciousness à la Husserl or time à la Heidegger may be considered as falling under one of, or some 
combination of, these three candidates. 
242 See H.J. Paton, “The Key to Kant‟s Deduction of the Categories,” Mind, 40.159, (1931), 310-329.   
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since Kant referred to it as such in concluding the Transcendental Deduction of the 
second edition Critique. (CPR 1998, B 159)   
Now, as Arthur Melnick points out, “In the first edition Transcendental Deduction 
of the Categories Kant does not mention the logical functions of judgment.  In the second 
edition (the B edition) the deduction can be said to be dominated by the logical functions 
of judgment.”243  Dieter Heinrich suggests this may be accounted for by supposing Kant‟s 
purpose to change from the first edition to the second believing he had solved his 
objective problem sufficiently by the first edition.  In other words, the second “objective” 
deduction “makes the validity of the categories intelligible,” and “the subjective side 
investigates their relation to the cognitive faculties in us which must be presupposed if 
these categories are to be used [my emphasis].”244  In this way, the second edition 
deduction demonstrates that the categories of the understanding are valid, and the first 
edition deduction demonstrates how such validity is possible.   
As Paton reminds, “the categories are not innate ideas, but ways in which the 
mind must judge, or ways in which thought must unite the manifold of sense,” i.e. “ways 
in which all objects of thought must be united.”245  Hence, one can see the emphasis of 
judgment in reading the second edition deduction, and one can see the way in which a 
successful second edition still requires a successful first edition.  Even if Kant is able to 
show that the categories have validity, the main problem of the deduction, i.e. how 
sensibility combines with understanding is left unsolved.  All this supports the claim that 
despite the two types of strategies, any attempt to salvage the deduction must eventually 
                                               
243 Arthur Melnick, “Categories, Logical Functions, and Schemata in Kant,” The Review of Metaphysics, 
54.3, (2001), 615.   
244 Dieter Henrich, “The Proof-Structure of Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction,” The Review of Metaphysics, 
22.4, (1969), 643. 
245 Paton, “The Key,” 328.   
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confront what Kant refers to as the “indispensable function” of the imagination. (CPR 
1998, A78/B 103) 
As my way into discussing the Transcendental Deduction, then, I will discuss the 
deduction from the perspective of logic.  This approach is most efficient as it makes the 
deduction comprehensible first, so as to allow a more focused examination afterward.  
This neither equates my comprehensible rendering of the deduction with a reading of 
Kant as successful in the deduction, nor does it suggest that I believe Kant to be 
successful in the subjective deduction.  Ultimately I harbor a deep and significant respect 
for the mind that constructed the Critique of Pure Reason.  However, I believe, for 
whatever reason, Kant picked the wrong power of the mind to privilege, i.e. he gave too 
much credit to the imagination.  Treating the deduction, then, from the perspective of 
logic uses both edition deductions without privileging either.  However, the approach 
does emphasize judgment – over apperception or imagination – as is to be expected from 
the perspective of logic.  After this treatment of the deduction from the perspective of 
logic, I will then focus on the first edition deduction.  I focus on the first edition 
deduction because I follow Kant in thinking of this deduction as not only the groundwork 
for both editions but also of the structure of experience itself.   
 According to Kant, “We can … trace all actions of the understanding back to 
judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for 
judging.” (CPR 1998, A 69/B 94)  Further, there are three types of judgments to which 
we can trace back – synthetic a posteriori, analytic a priori, and synthetic a priori.  Now, 
a posteriori means after or from experience, i.e. dependent upon experience, and a priori 
means prior to experience, i.e. independent of experience.  Synthetic (ζύλ-ζεζηο) refers to 
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the bringing of two positions or points together, and analytic (ἀλά-ιύζηο) refers to taking 
apart.  Hence, analytic a priori judgments are those judgments which do not require 
experience to be considered valid.   
To judge that all bachelors are unmarried males, for example, is to take apart the 
concept “bachelor,” or, more specifically, it is to formulate a categorical judgment by 
taking apart the concept.  This categorical judgment can be reformulated into a different 
type of judgment.  Consider the judgment: if a person is an unmarried male, then the 
person is a bachelor.  This is an example of an a priori analytic hypothetical judgment.  
These judgments are a priori because given the concept of “bachelor” alone I do not need 
to validate these judgments by looking at experience.  Rather, I can check to see if my 
judgment is valid merely by understanding the concept itself, i.e. independent of 
experience.  As a priori judgments are independent of experience, there is no need for 
analytic a posteriori judgments because in an analytic judgment I already have all I need 
in the concept alone for validation. 
 Synthetic a posteriori judgments, then, are judgments dependent on experience, 
i.e. they necessarily involve intuitive input from sensibility.  In fact, these are the 
judgments which are constitutive of an experience.  By bringing the results of sensibility 
together with a concept from the understanding, I synthesize a judgment of experience.  
In this way, the link between sensibility and understanding in an experience concerns 
synthetic a posteriori judgments.  Lastly, synthetic a priori judgments are those 
judgments made independently of intuitional input from experience.  Now, these may be 
of two different types.  There are synthetic a priori judgments which regard the products 
of synthetic a posteriori judgments and those which regard the products of a priori 
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analytic judgments.  The former type of judgment is to be used for scientific discovery, 
and the latter is typical of pure reason – which Kant wished to critique.  Referring back 
to my comments made above, pure reason is exemplary of the (mistaken) dialectical use 
of formal logic.  And, though the ideas derived from such use of the broadly designated 
understanding can be regulative, they should not be considered constitutive.   
For example, the ontological proof for the existence of God begins with the 
concept that God is perfect.  On the one hand, the proof analyzes this concept, and just as 
“unmarried male” may be analyzed out of the concept of bachelor, “not lacking in any 
way” may be analyzed out of the concept of perfect, i.e. complete.  On the other hand, the 
concept of “lack” may be analyzed out of the concept of non-existence, since to not exist 
is considered to lack existence.  The results, then, of these analyses are combined in a 
synthetic a priori judgment – a priori because intuitional input has not been required to 
get this far in the proof.  Now then, there are a number of ways to synthesize the analytic 
results.  Taking each analytic judgment up as a hypothetical judgment, a chain argument 
can be formed: If God is perfect, then God does not lack in any way (or attribute), and if 
God does not lack in anyway, then God (does not lack existence) exists.  Put 
symbolically:  
 PC  [Judgment 1: Analytic a priori] 
 CE  [Judgment 2: Analytic a priori] 
 PE  [Judgment 3: Synthetic a priori] 
The first two judgments are analytic a priori and the third judgment – the one that 
combines the first two – is a synthetic a priori judgment.  Though this is a logically valid 
argument, this process without intuitional input – in fact precisely because it lacks 
intuitional input – can ever only provide a logical view of God, i.e. a view of God from 
the conceptual standpoint.  Such a process results from a use of “pure reason.”  Now, 
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synthetic a priori judgments which involve synthetic a posteriori judgments are the types 
of judgments involved in making experimental predictions.  They are the types of 
judgments involved in judging about experience, not merely conceptuality. 
 It is important to note how these judgments, then, fit into the overall structure of 
experience.  Kant provides a reminder just prior to entering into the Transcendental 
Deduction noting that “cognition of any understanding, or at least human understanding, 
is a cognition through concepts; it is not intuitive, but discursive.”246 (CPR 1996, A 68/B 
93)  This is important because despite the fact that all use of concepts is discursive, there 
is a distinction to be made.  On the one hand, there is the solely discursive use of 
understanding, and on the other hand, there is the use of understanding which, though 
discursive, includes non-discursivity by way of intuitions.  Hence, the synthetic a priori 
judgments which involve only a priori judgments are solely discursive, and synthetic a 
priori judgments which involve a posteriori judgments include non-discursivity.   
This is just one way to see the importance of Kant‟s distinction between the 
discursive and the non-discursive.  For the sake then of examining the experiential, as 
opposed to conceptual, parts of the structure of experience – and therewith the form of 
negation which pertains to the experiential part of the structure of experience – I will be 
looking at the function of synthetic a posteriori judgments.  These are the judgments 
which contain the non-discursive; these are the judgments which combine the products of 
sensibility with the understanding; and these are the judgments upon which Kant focuses 
in the Transcendental Deduction.  In fact, the Transcendental Deduction refers to the 
section of Kant‟s text titled “Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding,” and 
Kant says of “the categories: they are concepts of an object as such whereby the object‟s 
                                               
246 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Werner S Pluhar, tr., 158. 
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intuition is regarded as determined in terms of one of the logical functions in judging.” 
(CPR 1996, B128)  See Figure 2.3.  Hence, the Copernican revolution culminates in the 
determination of an object by way of the pure concepts of the understanding, i.e. the 
synthesis of sensibility and understanding through judgment. 
 
Kant’s Logical Table of Judgments (A 70/B 95) 
I. 
According to Quantity of Judgments 
Universal 
Particular 
Singular 
II.     III. 
According to Quality   According to Relation 
Affirmative    Categorical 
 Negative    Hypothetical 
Infinite     Disjunctive 
 
IV. 
According to Modality 
Problematic 
Assertoric 
Apodictic 
Figure 2.3 
 Before discussing the relation between the forms of judgment and the pure 
concepts of the understanding, it is important to reflect upon the consequences of what 
Kant has accomplished thus far.  Kant suggests the following relations “of thought in 
judgments”: in a categorical judgment “a relation of the predicate to the subject,” and the 
categorical judgment considers only “two concepts”; in a hypothetical judgment “the 
relation of ground to consequence,” and the hypothetical judgment considers two 
judgments; in a disjunctive judgment “the relation in a divided cognition, of all of the 
division‟s members to one another,”247 and a disjunctive judgment considers “several 
judgments.” (CPR 1996, A 73/B 98)  Regarding logical form, i.e. general logic, every 
judgment must contain one of the three aspects from each of the four groups in Figure 
                                               
247 Cf. “the parts of a cognition‟s sphere.” (A74/B 99) 
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2.3.  Hence, a matrix could be devised to work out all of the possible combinations within 
the “Table of Judgments.”  Such a matrix would begin to look like Figure 2.4. 
Categorical (IIIa) rendering of 
Quantity (I a&b) with Quality (II a&b) 
Beginnings of a matrix of 
judgments. 
Quality Quality 
Affirmative Negative 
Quantity Universal All S are P. No S are P. 
Quantity Particular Some S are P. Some S are not P. 
Figure 2.4 
A visual representation of the beginnings of a matrix of judgments shows that the internal 
kernel, i.e. Kant‟s Archimedean point, of the mind‟s power of the understanding is the 
“Square of Opposition.”248  Compare Figure 2.4 with Figure 2.5. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 
                                               
248 I would like to point out here, that this is solely my interpretation.  I have never heard anyone make this 
claim.  But, after spending more time than I would care to admit (hence the motivation for this footnote) in 
attempting to make sense of what Kant is saying across multiple texts, it dawned on me that he was using 
one of my favorite bits to teach in Principles of Thinking courses, i.e. the “Square of Opposition.”  
Afterward, my reading (below) of the relation between the Table of Judgments and The Table of Categories 
followed quickly after.   
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So, why is all this important?  This is important because since formal or general 
logic is able to characterize the relationship between sensibility and understanding, Kant 
has ushered in the possibility of valid synthetic a priori judgments regarding experience.  
By having objects of experience conform to the logical functions of judgment – think the 
Copernican revolution here –using the same logical functions to think about experience 
then has the possibility of sustaining the validity which was involved in the forming of an 
experience.  This is because the objective validity has to do with the form not the content, 
so Kant divides out beforehand the content which would confound this emphasis on form.  
In other words, synthetic a priori judgments might be valid so long as the reason 
employed is not pure.   
In regard to the objective determination of an object of experience in general, 
then, the categorical judgment of affirming all of the apprehended manifold, i.e. the 
limiting of the manifold of sensibility in a manifold of apprehension, is “=x,” i.e. an 
object of experience.  Since this =x is a “predicate” of a categorical judgment combining 
sensibility with understanding, it is perhaps easier to show via predicate logic the 
determining process of subordinating judgments by way of moving from one form of 
judgment to another in a chain of analytic a priori judgments.  For example, for any x, if 
x is an A, then x is a B; if x is a B, then x is a C; if x is a C, then x is a D, etc. 
(x)(AxBx), (x)(BxCx), (x)(CxDx), etc.   
Though this apprehension of intuition from sensibility is inductive, the form of 
apprehension itself is deductive.  So, structurally Kant is on solid ground to begin 
dialectic.  In other words, the objective side of his story is successful in showing that the 
process of determining the object ensures the objective validity of the object as such.  In 
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fact, this is the same process I outlined above in dealing with the Ontological Argument 
for the existence of God, but the difference in this case is that the synthesis is experiential 
not solely conceptual.  I will say more about this distinction just below.  The important 
thing to remember thus far is that the objective side of this process is a process of 
conception involving the power of understanding and terminating at the point of 
conception, i.e. recognition in a concept.  Hence, regarding the objective side of the 
combination of sensibility and understanding, the =x represents the combination in the 
determination of an object through judgment.  
Now, I have just indicated that the experiential synthesis resulting in the 
combination of sensibility and understanding is a logical combination.  However, this 
formulation is not yet precise enough.  A distinction should be made between the form of 
the combination of sensibility with understanding and the content.  I have shown above 
that the forms of the connections involved in the combination of sensibility with 
understanding are logical, i.e. they are the logical forms of judgment itself, and thereby 
ensure that the combination will have objective validity.  However, this regards just the 
form of the combination.  Validity regarding the content of that which is apprehended 
from sensibility is more difficult to see.  Kant argues for the validity of the content in two 
ways.  First, he continues to push the possibility of a logical derivation by further 
specifying the concepts of the understanding which are involved by way of the forms of 
judgment prior to even the determination of the object of experience in a concept.  This 
way is made more explicit in the second edition Transcendental Deduction, especially 
§26, yet perhaps Kant had it in mind, though not stated as such, in the first edition.  
Second, Kant‟s other way of arguing for the validity of the content coincides with the 
 140 
 
first edition Transcendental Deduction.  There Kant focuses on the subjective processes 
involved in providing content to the determination of the object of experience.  This 
involves the “three-fold synthesis of imagination.”  Yet, Kant‟s ultimate decision 
regarding how to validly ground the content appears in both edition Transcendental 
Deductions of the Critique of Pure Reason, and this decision has tremendous 
consequences for his system.   
In trying to ground the validity of the content of experience elsewhere than in 
logic, Kant points to an “empirical law.”  In the first edition, there is one empirical law 
regarding the manifold of sensibility and a corresponding rule to be found in the three-
fold synthesis of imagination.  Kant calls the former law, “the law of affinity,” and he 
calls the latter rule, the “rule of association.” (CPR 1998, A112-113)  In the second 
edition, specifically §19 Kant maintains the law of affinity, and Kant changes the status 
of association from a rule to a “law of association.” (CPR 1998, B 142)  As Kant would 
have it, these laws are intimately involved with imagination.  Yet, given the names of 
these laws and from the perspective of the 21
st
 century, it is difficult to construct any 
narrative suspense here.  In other words, as you may be able to anticipate, these laws are 
laws of memory.  The fact that Kant in the 18
th
 century was not able to see them as such 
meant that he was not able to close the door on metaphysics as he would have liked.  
Indeed, had he recognized these laws as indications of the power of memory he would 
have been able to solve the problem of non-being. 
You might wonder why this problem of combination is so troubling for Kant.  In 
fact, this problem is the Achilles heel of Kant‟s system.  Why can‟t Kant just resort to 
some generalization like the real is rational, and then just include question begging as 
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valid for determining the content of experience?  It is because here is precisely where 
Kant must pay his debt for the Copernican revolution.  He cannot now just assume that in 
the object‟s conforming to the mind‟s modes of knowing that the mind is also conforming 
to the object as it really is.  If the program of the latter option were viable, then there was 
no need for the program of the former, etc.  Which is why Kant, here, is acknowledging 
the consequences of memory in affinity and association, and he takes himself to be 
justified in commenting on the identity of the ground of these consequences since he is 
dealing with the empirical content of experience.  He acknowledges the lawful regularity 
produced by this ground, and in fact grounds the validity of the content of the 
combination of sensibility with understanding on this regularity.  Yet, he ultimately takes 
the power of imagination to be more primary in the trajectory of experience, the 
trajectory which results in an object of experience.   
I discuss Kant‟s thoughts on the relationship between imagination and memory in 
the final section of this chapter along with a more extensive treatment of Kant‟s 
grounding of subjective validity, i.e. the how of the combination of sensibility and 
understanding.  For now, I will address the first way indicated above which Kant employs 
to argue for the validity of the content of the combination of sensibility with 
understanding.  It is here for Kant that the concepts of the understanding, i.e. the 
categories, along with the forms of judgment play a leading role.  What this means can be 
seen in the relation between the Table of Judgments and the Table of Categories.   
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Kant’s Transcendental Table of Categories (A 80/B 106)  
[Concepts of the Understanding]  
I. 
Categories of Quantity 
Unity 
Plurality 
Totality 
II.     III. 
Categories of Quality   Categories of Relation 
              Reality                             Of Inherence and Subsistence 
            Negation                             (Substance & Accident) 
           Limitation                                            Of Causality and Dependence                             
                                                                   (Cause & Effect) 
                                                       Of Community (Reciprocity      
                                                                       between Agent & Patient) 
IV. 
Categories of Modality 
Possibility - Impossibility 
Existence - Non-existence 
Necessity - Contingency 
Figure 2.6       
As Kant puts it in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,  
All determinations of the general concept [my emphasis] of 
a matter in general must be able to be brought under the 
four classes of [pure concepts of] the understanding, those 
of quantity, of quality, of relation, and finally of modality – 
and so, too, [must] all that may be either thought a priori in 
this concept, or presented in mathematical construction, or 
given as a determinate object of experience [my 
emphasis].
249
    
Notice Kant is talking about determinations of the general concept.  This general concept, 
as evidenced by the second part of the above quote, acts as a sort of hub or central hinge 
in the architecture of the mind.  The concept of an object in general functions in 
describing all that may be thought a priori in the concept, conceived in terms of 
mathematics, or given in experience.
250
  In relation to the Square of Opposition, the 
question might be: How can the movement from a form of judgment which determines an 
object in general to a form of judgment from which derives a “determinate object of 
                                               
249 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Michael Friedman, tr., 11-12. 
250 This list of three options indicates the treatment of the general concept by Derrida, Deleuze, and 
Scalambrino, respectively.  This will be clear by the end of the dissertation. 
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experience” relate to the Square of Opposition?  The answer is in the Table of Categories 
so long as you start at the bottom of each class and work your way up to the top.   
Recall from the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique that after assuming the 
Copernican revolution, 
The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, 
insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation.  That intuition 
which is related to the object through sensation is called 
empirical.  The undetermined object of an empirical 
intuition is called appearance [Kant‟s emphases]. (CPR 
1998, A 20/B 34) 
This process involves the three-fold synthesis of imagination along with the forms of 
judgment and the concepts of the understanding.  For example, take Quantity from the 
above tables.  The initial judgment is a singular categorical judgment such that the 
totality of the intuitive input apprehended from sensibility is singularly reproduced as an 
appearance, i.e. an undetermined object of empirical intuition.  The singular judgment 
involves unity because the stage of apprehension in the three-fold synthesis limits the 
sensible manifold, and the reproduction singularly represents the totality which was 
apprehended from the sensible manifold.   
Like pinching a cloth into a fold, the totality of that which constitutes the fold is 
represented as a unity.  This unity constitutes the empirical perception of an appearance.  
From there, this appearance may be further determined by moving up the class to 
particular judgments by regarding a plurality of appearances in a strand of associated 
appearances.  The movement from a singular judgment to either a particular or universal 
judgment is both the movement of fully determining an appearance as an object of 
experience and the movement from the subjective validity of the singular judgment to the 
objective validity which may be found in the particular or universal judgments.  In order 
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to make a judgment which is particular or universal, then, a plurality of appearances must 
be involved.  Once a plurality of appearances are involved, a particular or universal 
judgment, which results in the recognition of the plurality in a concept =x, necessarily 
entails the unity of the plurality, in so far as the very subsumption under the concept has 
unified the plurality.   
The logic is the same here as what I just went over regarding empirical unity.  Just 
think of a plurality of pinches in a cloth tied together – at one unified spot – like a bindle 
on a hobo stick for carrying along whatever mysterious content strikes your fancy.  Now, 
this unity is conceptual unity.  In fact, the unification of the plurality of appearances 
constitutes entrance into conceptuality – it is retrospectively that you are no longer blind 
to the ladder steps of plurality and totality upon which you have just climbed.  Likewise, 
in order to grasp this unity you must climb into the logic of relations, and in doing so, you 
enter the Square of Opposition.  Relations in this part of the structure of experience are 
no longer governed by empirical laws.  Rather, this conceptual part of the structure of 
experience is governed by the law of non-contradiction.  Lastly, since perceptions “are 
representations accompanied with sensation,” (CPR 1998, B 147), another way to 
characterize the difference between the singular judgment and the other two types of 
judgment is to follow Kant‟s teaching from the Prolegomena §18 and refer to the singular 
judgment as a “judgment of perception” and the other judgments – due to their 
determinacy in regard to the Square of Opposition – as “judgments of experience.” 
(Proleg 130)  I will comment further on this in the next section.   
Now despite the logical consistency demonstrated above, the deeper problem of 
the Transcendental Deduction remains.  As I noted previously, Kant‟s comments 
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regarding this problem are ambivalent.  At times he would have his readers believe there 
was never a need to reformulate the deduction, and at other times he would have his 
readers believe the first deduction could be overlooked.  Yet, to be sure, the how of all 
synthetic judgments in regard to experience is still at stake.  Kant has not shown how the 
manifold of sensibility is to be combined with understanding.  He has only shown that if 
it were to be combined, then logical validity could be conferred upon judgments 
regarding experience.  So as to see what hangs in the balance, recall that formal logic is 
the discursivity of thought, and therefore does not account for the non-discursive in 
experience.  Some commentators – and possibly Kant himself – want judgment to 
account then for the act of combining sensibility with understanding, but judgment, 
again, is a power of understanding.  In other words, judgment only spans the gap – as 
discursive power of the understanding – in regard to that with which it is homogeneous.  
Judgment deals with cognitions, i.e. concepts and other judgments.  Yet, perhaps, 
judgment points to a power which fully spans the gap between sensibility and 
understanding.  In the second edition deduction Kant does say, “judgment is nothing 
other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.” 
(CPR 1998, B 141)  Before plunging into this deeper problem of the deduction, it is 
important to be clear about the purpose of such an expedition.   
I have just shown the general outline – within the scope of my project – depicting 
how Kant is successful in establishing the objective validity of the combination of 
sensibility with understanding.  What remains is to work out the how problem which 
Kant attempted to solve in the first edition Transcendental Deduction of the Critique.  In 
other words, whereas judgment objectively determines the manifold of sensibility, 
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imagination subjectively determines the manifold of sensibility.  In an experience, then, 
judgment depends upon imagination to further along the trajectory of experience 
culminating in the experience of an object.  As I have dealt with judgment above, I will 
deal with imagination below.  The guiding question is, namely: How is the non-discursive 
of sensibility carried over into a judgment so that such judgments are experiential and 
not merely conceptual?   Not only is this the problem of the first edition Transcendental 
Deduction, but this problem characterizes the problem of experience in general.   
In other words, somehow Kant must account for the non-logical involved in 
experience, or else Kant has leveled the distinction with which he was to critique pure 
reason.  As such, it would be as if in entering the labyrinth of logic by way of the 
Copernican turn Kant was unable to find his way back out.  Hence, I will treat this 
question as a guiding thread to investigate Kant‟s proposed solution in the first edition 
deduction.  Kant refers to his proposed solution as the “three-fold synthesis” of 
imagination.  Lastly regarding my purpose for treating of this three-fold synthesis below, 
this investigation of the three-fold synthesis accomplishes the following in regard to my 
overall project: first, investigating the three-fold synthesis provides the remaining pieces 
to the structure and trajectory of experience by describing the difficult to describe 
connection between sensibility and understanding; second, the three-fold synthesis 
indicates how the success of the Critique of Pure Reason hinges upon the power of 
imagination; finally, following Kant‟s distinction between a logical and a real relation, 
i.e. the conceptual and the experiential standpoints, an investigation of the three-fold 
synthesis shows why Kant from an experiential standpoint was required to posit the 
thing-in-itself in response to the problem of non-being. 
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Brief Interlude: Three Standpoints of the Architectonic 
It is worth pausing here to make a few observations about the ground just covered 
in the structure of experience, and draw some important conclusions.  In the structure and 
trajectory of experience, once the blindness thesis no longer holds, i.e. upon entering 
conceptuality, the acquired vision, as it were, with which you can look back over the 
synthesis of which you were previously blind is not the vision of perception but the 
vision of apperception.  I referred to this product of Leibniz‟s influence on Kant above as 
“the top” of the structure of experience.  Whereas, perception pertains to the empirical 
appearance, apperception pertains to the unity of the perceptions.  Kant truly seems to 
enjoy employing the pattern of unifying multiplicities.  The purpose of this interlude is to 
briefly discuss these two aspects of the structure of experience.  First, I will comment on 
the rhetoric of specification that Kant relentlessly employs and which figures throughout 
the architecture of the Critique of Pure Reason.  Second, I will comment on the 
perspectival capacity for which the advent of conceptuality allows.  
It requires, perhaps, multiple readings of the Critique in addition to scavenging 
across sections to figure the faculties of the mind.  Yet, doing so reveals that the genus-
species structure is so pervasive throughout the text
251
 that the Critique of Pure Reason 
may be thought of a as fractal of the genus-species character.  In fact, Kant‟s critique of 
pure reason is designed to provide a Canon for reason.  According to Kant,  
Such a critique is accordingly a preparation, if possible, for 
an organon, and, if this cannot be accomplished, then at 
least for a canon, in accordance with which the complete 
system of the philosophy of pure reason … [can] be 
exhibited. (CPR 1998, A 12/B 26)   
                                               
251 Cf. (CPR A 656/B 684) and (CPR A 658/B 686). 
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Hence, scavenging across sections of the Critique in a mode of discovery using the 
genus-species character as a heuristic, I was able to put together what may be thought of 
as Kant‟s Canon for reason.   
When viewing Figure 2.7, you must keep in mind the movement of the figure goes 
from largest multiplicity at the bottom to unity in the notion of a Canon at the top.  This is 
a schematic, then, of the entire limiting trajectory and structure of experience.  Above 
apperception in the schematic indicates where thought has the capacity to become 
involved with itself alone, i.e. pure reason.  Therefore, I will be focusing in the area 
around apperception to discuss different ways of considering, i.e. viewing, the “complete 
system of the philosophy of pure reason,” as Kant put it just above.  My concern, of 
course, is not the “complete system,” though I point out the manner in which it can be 
understood.  Rather, I am concerned with just one of these different ways of considering 
the system, i.e. the experiential aspect of Kant‟s system.     
Kant’s Canon in the Critique of Pure Reason 
Power of the Mind Function in Regard to Experience 
Reason Principles (cf. A 299/B 356) 
Understanding Rules (cf. A 126) 
Apperception Judgments (cf. B 141) 
Imagination Syntheses (cf. A 78/B 103) 
Sensibility Sensible Manifold (cf. A 77/B 102) 
      Figure 2.7 
I have already indicated that I take there to be three main standpoints in Kant‟s 
system of pure reason, and each “as the station for an observer, has its own horizon, that 
is, a variety of things which can be represented, and as it were, surveyed from that 
standpoint [my emphasis].” (CPR 2003, A 685/B 686)  The three main standpoints of the 
Critique of Pure Reason I refer to as “the experiential,” “the conceptual,” and “the 
performative” or “apperceptive.”  First, the experiential is the standpoint from which I 
have been discussing the structure and trajectory of experience thus far, covering the 
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structure of experience at bottom to the terminal point where the object of experience is 
determined.  This standpoint is best thought in conjunction with sensibility.  Second, the 
conceptual covers the structure of experience pertaining to the understanding broadly 
designated or in general.  According to Kant, “If the understanding in general is 
explained as the faculty of rules, then the power of judgment is the faculty of subsuming 
under rules, i.e., of determining whether something stands under a given rule.” (CPR 
1998, A 132/B 171)  Kant explains that “the power of judgment is a special talent that 
cannot be taught but only practiced.” (CPR 1998, A 133/B 172)  Despite the caveat, Kant 
indicates that an analysis of principles “teaches” the power of judgment “to apply to 
appearances the concepts of the understanding, which contain the condition for rules a 
priori.” (CPR 1998, A 132/B 171)  And, here comes the multiplicity into a unity pattern 
again.   
Just as a multiplicity of rules is unified into a principle, Kant concludes, “If the 
understanding may be a faculty of unity of appearances by means of rules, then reason is 
the faculty of the unity of the rules of understanding under principles.” (CPR 1998, A 
302/B 359)  It is in this way that reason “never applies directly to experience or to any 
object but instead applies to the understanding, in order to give unity a priori through 
concepts to the understanding‟s manifold cognitions.” (CPR 1998, A 302/B 359)  Hence, 
“One can call all cognition through which I can cognize and determine a priori what 
belongs to empirical cognition anticipation.” (CPR 1998, A 166)  This anticipation is 
structured by principles which have developed from the practice of using judgment in 
regard to experience.  Anticipation, then, is both a hallmark of the conceptual standpoint 
as a prolêptic and the way in which synthetic a priori judgments are made.  Because 
 150 
 
there is continuity from the rules of combination to the principles with which reason 
operates, synthetic a priori judgments, then, are possible.  Kant‟s comments here both 
indicate the possibility of viewing the understanding broadly designated from some 
standpoint as separate and offers further justification for Figure 2.7.     
The last of the three standpoints, then, is what I have referred to as the “top” of 
the structure of experience, i.e. the performative, or the apperceptive.  This standpoint 
pertains to the transcendental unity of apperception.  I refer to it as the performative to 
reflect a double sense in the reference.  On the one hand, Kant has indicated that the 
transcendental unity of apperception is also known as the “I think” (§16, B 132) or “I am, 
which accompanies all my judgments and actions of my understanding.” (CPR 1998, B 
xl)  On the other hand, according to Kant this “I, of which one cannot even say that it is a 
concept … accompanies every concept;”252 that is, “Through this I, or He, or It (the 
thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of 
thoughts =x, which is recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates…” 
(CPR 1998, A 346/B 404)  Whereas the previous =x marked the spot of the unity of the 
(transcendental) object, this =x marks the spot of the unity of the (transcendental) subject. 
(Cf. CPR A 109)  
For Kant since, “I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose 
in order to cognize an object at all,” (CPR 1998, A 402) apperception is alêtheatic (cf. 
                                               
252 It is interesting to note Nietzsche‟s association of the apperceptive I with a passage from the New 
Testament.  Consistent with Kant‟s depiction here, Nietzsche – at the beginning of the Preface to On the 
Genealogy of Morals, [Walter Kaufman, tr. (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 15] – suggests “We are 
unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge – and with good reason.”  Especially the reference of good 
reason seems to point to Kant and further the transcendental status of the apperceptive I.  Nietzsche follows 
this with an explicit reference to Matthew 6:21.  And, in Matthew 6:22 you find, “The eye is the lamp of 
the body; so then if your eye is clear your whole body will be full of light.” [Translation from: New 
American Standard Bible, (Anaheim: Foundation Publications, 1995).] Also, cf. the lamp metaphor here 
with Nietzsche‟s famous declaration in the Gay Science, §125.  
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αιήεηα),253 and in the teaching of Friedrich Wilhelm J. Schelling, regarding this I or 
transcendental self, “one cannot say of the self that it exists, precisely because it is being-
itself [Schelling‟s emphasis].”254  This is of notable import regarding Schelling‟s concern 
with non-being.  Schelling thinks,    
If the I were to vanish, then nature would have absolutely 
no meaning.  It is there only to limit the I, not something in 
its own right similar to the I and just as substantial, but 
rather precisely as something that is pure „Not-I‟ which 
really is in its own right a non-being.  The I, in the primal 
act of positing [sic] itself, sets this nonbeing in an 
incomprehensible manner in opposition to itself… [my 
emphases]
255
  
Regarding the former hand, then, it appears as though the I performs the “acts” of the 
understanding.
256
  Like the copula in a judgment (x is y).  Regarding the latter hand, 
gathering itself from its acts in the world, though perhaps always already there, the I is 
revealed by the unification of sequences of mental (psychical) performances in the world.  
It is this – following J.G. Fichte257 – to which Schelling refers as the “act of positing 
itself.”  Apperception, then, may be seen as its own standpoint from which to view Kant‟s 
system, i.e. differently from both the experiential and the conceptual purviews.
258
  In fact, 
it is tempting to associate Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel (1770-1831), and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) with the 
                                               
253 Apparently, the term “Alethic” has already been appropriated into a linguistic context. 
254 F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), Peter Heath, tr. (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 2001), 32. 
255 F.W.J. Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures, Bruce Matthews, tr. 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 125. 
256 Cf. Karl Ameriks, Kant’s Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982), 250-253. 
257 Cf. J.G. Fichte, The Science of Knowing: J.G. Fichte’s 1804 Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre, Walter 
E. Wright, tr. (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), 116. 
258 Cf. Karl Leonard Reinhold, “Eight Letter: Continuation of the preceding letter: The Master Key to the 
Rational Psychology of the Greeks,” James Hebbeler, tr., Letter on the Kantian Philosophy, Karl Ameriks, 
ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 104-123. 
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apperceptive, conceptual, and experiential standpoints respectively.  However, such a 
claim would take me too far afield to support. 
The trajectory moving up the structure of experience, then, begins with sense and 
moves through imagination to the terminal point from which a number of standpoints for 
regarding Kant‟s system derive.  This terminal point itself belongs within imagination.  
Hegel in Faith and Knowledge refers to this point as “the organic Idea of productive 
imagination” which “stands in antithesis to the empirical manifold, either determining it 
or reflecting on it.”259  Referring to the structure of the text – see Figure 2.1 above –, this 
is the point between the Transcendental Deduction and the Schematism.  Referring to the 
reviews of the Critique of Pure Reason noted above, this is the =x.  Specifically, this is 
the =x which marks the unity of the object in the structure of experience.   
Recall the blindness and emptiness theses.  According to Kant, “Thoughts without 
content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind [my emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 
51/ B75)  The subjective unity of =x stands as the initial point of vision, i.e. non-
blindness, in considering the performance of an experience.  The objective unity of =x 
stands as the initial point of vision in considering an object of experience.  When looking 
back, as it were, over the trajectory leading up to the objective unity of =x, this is =x as 
determining the object of experience.  When =x stands opposed to the empirical manifold 
in a relation of reflection, because you are reflecting on the object not experiencing the 
object, then, despite its current non-blindness, =x is empty.  In sum, you find the 
experiential standpoint (1) when the objective =x culminates an object of experience in a 
judgment of experience; you find the conceptual standpoint (2) when the objective =x 
                                               
259 G.W.F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris, tr. (New York: SUNY Press, 1977), 
92. 
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initiates (reflective) conceptual analysis as the subject term in an analytic judgment; and, 
you find the apperceptive standpoint (3) at the copula of these judgments.   
 It is also possible to contrast Kant‟s standpoints with one another.  From the 
apperceptive standpoint, for example, Kant can say that perception “is properly only a 
determination of apperception.” (CPR 1998, A 368)  Notice, this is a different view of 
perception than the one from the experiential standpoint I noted earlier.  From the 
experiential standpoint, perception is the (performance of) the three-fold synthesis of 
imagination.  What is more, Kant describes apperception as, “The supreme principle for 
the possibility of all intuition in reference to understanding,” and noted that “everything 
manifold in intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of 
apperception.” (CPR 1996, B 136)  From here Kant says, “If, however, I investigate more 
closely the relation of given cognitions in every judgment … then I find that a judgment 
is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of 
apperception [Kant‟s emphasis].” (CPR 1998, B 142)  Hence, the apperceptive standpoint 
provides a view of judging which relates the structure of experience to the transcendental 
subject.   
Yet, Kant explains that the “ascent to ever higher conditions to approach 
completeness in them” is a “need of reason.” (CPR 1998, A 309/B 365)  And, further, 
“Reason is driven by a propensity of its nature” (CPR 1998, A 798/B 826) not by the 
transcendental subject, i.e. the apperceptive I.  The insight here highlights the manner in 
which inference seems to “work on its own.”  It is as if the procedure of applying reason 
so as to draw inferences functions with or without a focus of attention.  Now, in my 
opinion, if you wish to understand the relations amidst the constellation of Kant‟s 
 154 
 
philosophy and philosophy in Kant‟s wake, keeping this principle of perspective in mind 
is imperative.  By keeping the three standpoints in mind you are able to recognize, for 
example, the difficulty of putting Hegel and Heidegger into dialog is the difficulty of 
putting the conceptual and apperceptive standpoints into dialog.
260
  With this separation 
between the views you can see that the difference between logic and being is the 
difference between a technology in the mind with a life of its own and the host of being 
upon which it is parasitic.
261
 
To sum, consistent with Kant‟s declaration, “All our cognition starts from the 
senses, goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is 
nothing higher to be found in us to work on the matter of intution.” (CPR 1998, A 298/B 
355) I have shown thus far in the chapter how a multiplicity of sense is unified into a 
series of multiple appearances, i.e. a multiplicity of imagination.  The multiplicity of 
imagination is then unified into a series of objects of experience, i.e. a multiplicity of 
appearances subsumed under concepts of the understanding.  The mechanism, of course, 
for subsuming these concepts was judgment.  Kant, then, has it that a multiplicity of 
judgments as rules for combining concepts may be unified into a series of principles.  
Post the blindness thesis, i.e. post entering into conceptuality there is also a retrospective 
depicting of the trajectory of experience.
262
  The three views I have commented on above 
are the determining, the reflecting, and the apperceptive i.e. the experiential, the 
conceptual, and the performative respectively.  To draw a summary analogy, the 
                                               
260 Cf. §241, G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, A.V. Miller, tr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), 146.  Hereafter cited as PS. 
261 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, Albert Hofstadter, tr. Bloomington, 1988), 
178. 
262 Another interesting use of this perspectival type of heuristic: Cf. Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The 
Perspective of Experience, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2003), 8.  
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experiential : the conceptual and apperceptive :: the affecting influences of an object : the 
effecting influences of an object.  Furthermore, I have stressed that once experience is no 
longer within sight, then the emptiness thesis is encountered.  In this way, the conceptual 
standpoint may be considered empty in so far as it pertains to a reflecting beyond the 
experience which provided the =x standpoint for reflection.  In other words, from the 
conceptual standpoint, what the x equals is undecidable.    
 
The Thing-in-Itself & Imagination 
I begin this section of the dissertation by investigating the three-fold synthesis of 
imagination which allows for the combination of sensibility and understanding.  The 
three-fold synthesis is viewed from the experiential standpoint.  So when Kant discusses 
this synthesis he does not presuppose unity of apperception or reason‟s dialectical 
inferring.  In terms of the Transcendental Deduction, the three-fold synthesis regards the 
combination of the content of an experience as opposed to the form which is regarded by 
judgment and apperception through the categories of the understanding.  Therefore, the 
three-fold synthesis of the first edition Critique is considered the subjective, rather than 
the objective Transcendental Deduction.  Kant is dealing here with the problem for which 
imagination, as his solution, is an “indispensable function of the soul.” (CPR 1998, 
A78/B 103)   
In other words, if Kant were to say that the concept of an object of experience 
were waiting, as it were, in the mind for the object to come into contact with the senses, 
then Kant would be proposing a version of innate ideas.  Not wanting this, Kant must 
come up with a way to transform that which is provoking an object of experience into the 
dimension of conceptuality.  This regards the subjective side of the Deduction, and not 
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the objective side.  Kant avoided proposing a version of innate ideas on the objective side 
of the Deduction – as indicated above – by claiming that judgment is a procedure 
developed from practice.  In addition to the subjective side problem here, Kant needs to 
similarly account for the way concepts are applied to an absent object of prior experience.   
Recalling, then, the three “original sources” which “contain the conditions of the 
possibility of all experience,” i.e. “sense, imagination, and apperception [Kant‟s 
emphases],” (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127) Kant, of course, picks the one in the middle – 
imagination.  With this strategy Kant focuses on the imagination as the ground from 
which consequently proceeds the combination of sensibility with understanding.  Hence, 
Kant will transform the non-discursivity of the sensible manifold, by way of a three-fold 
synthesis of imagination, into an object of experience.  As I will show, imagination spans 
both the subjective and objective sides of the Deduction, and as continuous, then, guards 
against the loss of non-discursivity due to the ultimate heterogeneity between the two 
stems which imagination combines.     
To begin, then, consider all the possible outcomes in the attempt to combine 
sensibility and understanding.  First, the intuitive product of sensibility may be 
determined in general with merely subjective validity.  This is what Kant refers to as a 
judgment of perception in the Prolegomena. (Proleg 130)  Second, the intuitive product 
of the sensibility may be determined in such a way as to yield objective validity.  This is 
what Kant refers to in the second edition Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR 
1998, B 11-12) and in the Prolegomena (Proleg 130) as a judgment of experience.  
Lastly, the intuitive product of the sensibility, if the understanding “has no concept ready 
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for the given intuition,”263 may be paused in its relation to the concept of an object in 
general, i.e. without being determined by it.  This is what Kant refers to in the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment as a reflecting judgment or a judgment of reflection.
264
  Though 
these possibilities regarding the combination between sensibility and understanding are 
specified under the genus of judgment, the specific difference is determined by the 
function of the power of imagination.   
That is, what Kant refers to as the three-fold synthesis (CPR A 97) in the first 
edition Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason determines the type of 
judgment for the subject.  It is not, and cannot be, the other way around.  The “changing 
free play of sensations,” from which the intuitive product of sensibility is derived, “is not 
grounded in any intention.”265 (CPJ 208)   According to Kant, the subject cannot force a 
judgment beyond the capacity limitations of imagination.  In looking at the three-fold 
synthesis of imagination, then, be sure to focus on the way in which imagination, through 
synthesis, grounds the object of experience.  Put another way, regressing from the object 
of experience down the structure and trajectory of experience in the attempt to arrive 
back at the object‟s origin, one cannot proceed beyond imagination.  Proceeding beyond 
imagination, one encounters the blindness thesis. 
So what is this three-fold synthesis of the imagination?  It is important to 
remember this is one synthesis with three parts, i.e. one process with three stages.
266
  
According to Kant, the three parts of this synthesis are: First, “the apprehension of the 
representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition”; second, “the reproduction of 
                                               
263 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, tr., (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 26.  Hereafter cited as CPJ. 
264 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, tr., 26. 
265 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, tr., 208. 
266 Cf. H.J. Paton, Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience, vol. 1, 354-5. 
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them in the imagination”; and, third, “their recognition in the concept [Kant‟s 
emphases].” (CPR 1998, A 98)  The terminal point of this trajectory is the concept in 
which the apprehended representations are “recognized,” in one form of judgment or 
another.  What then is the initial point of this trajectory?  The initial point is the product 
of the receptive sensibility upon being affected in an experience.  Kant notes, “I ascribe a 
synopsis to sense, because it contains a manifold in its intuition.” (CPR 1998, A 98)  
Kant‟s prose moves fast, and, in particular, here it is important not to disregard the 
synopsis of sense or treat it as a synthesis.   
Were it not a gross overgeneralization to equate Robert Brandom with the 20
th
 
century division of Analytic philosophy and Edward Casey with the division of 
Continental philosophy, I might suggest both the Analytic and Continental schools of 
philosophy misunderstand this particular teaching of Kant‟s.  In commenting on Kant‟s 
Critique, Brandom, blurring the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, makes 
explicit the mistake of considering the synopsis to be itself a synthesis.  The synopsis is 
not a synthesis, but the synopsis is necessary (but not sufficient) for there to be a 
synthesis of imagination.  For example, because Brandom refers to the synopsis as a 
synthesis, “there is synthesis in intuition and imagination also [my emphasis]” by way of 
chain argument, i.e. synthesis occurs in both stems, and “synthesizing activity is an 
aspect of judgment,” he arrives at the misleading conclusion – central to his project – 
“Thus all our cognitive activity consists of judgment and aspects of that activity.”267  In 
explicitly making the mistake of referring to the synopsis as a synthesis, the regrettable 
                                               
267 Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 80. 
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result follows that the value of non-discursivity in Kant is lost on Brandom, i.e. for him 
the mind is totally discursive.   
Brandom, however, is in good company as Edward Casey similarly misattributes 
synthesis to the sensible manifold.  Conflating the initial passive point of the trajectory of 
experience with the initial active part of the three-fold synthesis Casey suggests,  
[Running-through] is a moment expressly singled out by 
Kant as well as by Husserl, both of whom designate it with 
the same verb: “durchlaufen.”  For Kant, it represents the 
basic action of “synopsis,” the lowest-level synthesis of the 
sensible manifold as effected by apprehension [my 
emphasis].
268
   
It seems to me Casey‟s mistaking of synopsis for synthesis reflects a Husserl-like 
overvaluing of intentionality, and such an overvaluing of intentionality under values the 
non-phenomenal peripherality of the synopsis.  It may also be the case that Casey thinks 
of the three-fold synthesis as three syntheses, as evidenced by his use of the descriptor 
“lowest-level” in regard to synthesis.  In either case, the consequence: Casey‟s comments 
regarding memory, “what Kant called „reproductive‟ imagination in its empirical 
employment involves the mere combination of what is already presented in the sensible 
manifold,”269 constitute a misreading.  In the first stage of the three-fold synthesis, i.e. 
apprehension, only several aspects – or tiles, recalling Leibniz‟s metaphor – are 
maintained from the synopsis of the sensible manifold.       
If you forget the separation between sensibility and understanding, both the depth 
and the value of Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience are lost.  Kant insists, “Our 
cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind,” and “through the former an 
object is given to us, through the latter it is thought.” (CPR 1998, A50, B74)  Hence, at 
                                               
268 Edward S. Casey, “Perceiving and Remembering,” Review of Metaphysics, 32.3, (1979), 425.  
269 Edward S. Casey, “Imagination: Imagining and the Image,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 31.4, (1971), 479. 
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the beginning of the Metaphysical Deduction Kant notes that Transcendental Logic “has 
a manifold of sensibility that lies before it a priori, which the transcendental aesthetic has 
offered to it;” (CPR 1998, A 76-77/B 102) he is referring to the synopsis just 
(structurally) prior to the three-fold synthesis of imagination.  As Longuenesse notes, “it 
is one thing to have present to mind an intuition „containing a manifold,‟ quite another to 
apprehend this manifold „as‟ manifold.”270  Loosely characterized by James Ward, 
“Objective experience, structurally regarded, is … from end to end a synthesis of what he 
[Kant] termed „a manifold‟.”271  In other words, it must be remembered that the trajectory 
of experience is a limiting one.  Recalling Leibniz‟s tile game here, the non-discursive 
exceeds our discursive intellect.   
Heuristically you might approach an idea of such excessivity by way of way of 
analogy from the specificity of a concept of understanding regressively to the synopsis of 
the manifold in sensibility and beyond; yet, since what is exceeded is the very framework 
with which we are able to think, we cannot even think the non-discursive by way of 
relation to our framework, i.e. “relation” is itself a part of the framework.  Albeit no 
image can do justice to the excessivity involved in non-discursivity, a figuration of the 
limiting trajectory of experience may be helpful here.  Think of the manifold of 
sensibility, an appearance, and the concept which determines that appearance in terms of 
increasing clarity and distinctness.  Such as structure coupled with the limiting trajectory 
of experience might be thought of as a cone rotated so an X-axis runs through its tip.  As 
such a movement from left to right toward the focal point of the cone may be thought of 
                                               
270 Béatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 41. 
271 James Ward, A Study of Kant, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 80. 
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as the trajectory from the initial point of the manifold of sensibility to the terminal point 
of the cone tip determining concept.  Consider Figure 2.8 below.    
 
Figure 2.8 
Figure 2.8 is meant to represent the state of the manifold of sensibility, the subsequent 
three-fold synthesis of the imagination, and the laws involved across the trajectory.   
The structure and trajectory of experience within the purview of the experiential 
standpoint begins with the synopsis of the manifold of sensibility moving through the 
three-fold synthesis of imagination to the determination of the object of experience in the 
objective unity of =x.  As indicated in Figure 2.8, examining the laws governing the 
synopsis of sense and the synthesis of imagination yields the correct reading of the 
structure and trajectory of experience.  I quote Kant at length here given the importance 
of the quote.  According to Kant – post the Copernican revolution – there are three 
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original sources of experience, “namely sense, imagination, and apperception [Kant‟s 
emphasis]. (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127)  Now, according to Kant,  
On these are grounded 1) the synopsis of the manifold a 
priori through sense; 2) synthesis of this manifold through 
the imagination; finally 3) the unity of this synthesis 
through original apperception [Kant‟s emphases]. (CPR 
1998, A 94/B 127) 
Notice, apprehension as part of the three-fold synthesis is not included with synopsis by 
Kant, but rather appears to coincide with imagination under Kant‟s heading “2)”.  
Further, each one of these grounds has its own law.  Whereas you might expect a 
temporal law regarding sensibility, the law governing synopsis is actually “affinity.” 
(CPR A 113)  The law governing the (three-fold) synthesis is “association.” (CPR A 123)  
And, the law governing the unity of the synthesis, i.e. the reference through judgments to 
apperception, is “non-contradiction.” (CPR A 151/B 191)  The synopsis hangs together 
by the law of affinity, and the initial “fold” of the three-fold synthesis must “run through” 
the synopsis in a certain way.  “For apprehension is only a placing together of the 
manifold of empirical intuition; and we can find in it no representation of any necessity 
which determines the appearances thus combined to have connected existence in space 
and time.” (CPR 2003, A 177/B 219)  Rather, their “connected”-ness derives from their 
affinity. 
Notice the rhetoric of specification at work in the following Kant quote.  Devoting 
less than a page to apprehension Kant notes,  
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which 
however would not be represented as such if the mind did 
not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions 
[my emphasis] on one another; for as contained in one 
moment no representation can ever be anything other than 
absolute unity. (CPR 2003, A 99)  
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First, notice how the quote indicates that time itself derives from “the succession of 
impressions” which is unified in a moment.  Here is the genus-species figure again.  
Apprehension, taking place in time, will be reproduced into a series of appearances to be 
unified by apperception via recognition in a concept =x.  Notice how this coincides with 
the three original sources and the laws Kant noted above.  This describes the first two 
stages of the process Kant calls the three-fold synthesis of imagination.  It is instructive to 
consider Kant‟s language here.     
Kant‟s first mention of the three fold synthesis occurs in The Metaphysical 
Deduction, i.e. the section just prior to the Transcendental Deduction.  Recall, this section 
is titled by Kant, “On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the 
Understanding.”272  There – in the translation of Paul Guyer and Allen Wood – Kant 
says, “the spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold first be gone through, 
taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for cognition to be made out of it.” 
(CPR 1998, A 77/B 102)  Here is Kant‟s German: Allein die Spontaneität unseres 
Denkens erfordert es, dass dieses Mannigfaltige zuerst auf gewisse Weise 
durchgegangen, aufgenommen, und verbunden werde, um daraus eine Erkenntnis zu 
machen.
273
   
Concerning “taken up;” J.M.D. Meiklejohn translates “aufgenommen” as 
“received into,”274 and the cluster of related terms involved here are “absorbed,” 
“affiliated,” “recorded.”  Similar to Guyer and Wood, Werner Pluhar translates the term 
                                               
272 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith, tr., 210.  
273 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft,153-154. 
274 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, John Miller Dow Meiklejohn, tr. (London: Henry G. Bohn, 
1855), 62. 
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as “taken up.”  In the Transcendental Deduction, then, using different terms Kant‟s 
language alludes to the earlier passage of the Metaphysical Deduction: 
Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this 
[synopsis] manifold (as, say, in the representation of 
space), it is necessary first to run through and then to take 
together this manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis 
of apprehension… (CPR 2003, A 99) 
This is the passage mentioned by Casey above.
275
  The German reads:  
Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfaltigen Einheit der 
Anschauung werde, (wie etwa in der Vorstellung des 
Raumes) so ist erstlich das Durchlaufen der 
Mannigfaltigkeit und denn die Zusammennehmung 
desselben notwendig, welche Handlung die Synthesis der 
Apprehension nenne…276 
This running through which Brandom and Casey conflate with the synopsis – recall the 
long Kant quote two paragraphs above – is the distinguishing of time in the succession of 
impressions which sense has placed in succession, governed by affinity.  Running 
through belongs to apprehension, not synopsis.  This is easy to miss, but it is the very 
reason why Fichte considered time to be imaginary.  That is, time is determined in 
apprehension by imagination in the process of the three-fold synthesis, and hence, for 
Fichte “only for imagination is there time.”277      
 Comparing the German passages above, Kant‟s verbs at A 77 become nouns at A 
99.  That is, what Kant refers to at A 77 as to be gone through becomes the running 
though at A 99.  This describes apprehension in relation to the synopsis of sense.  This 
next comparison is less obvious.  At A 77 Kant‟s “aufgenommen” becomes “die 
Zusammennehmung,” from received into or taken up at A 77 to take together or gathering 
                                               
275 Cf. Edward S. Casey, Imagining: A phenomenological study, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2000), 33. 
276 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 209. 
277 J.G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, A.E. Kroeger, tr. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & co., 1868), 
181. 
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together in A 99.  This gathering together does include a change from sense or impression 
to image.  In other words, imagination must produce an image, but the production of this 
image derives from what has been apprehended from sense.  Like the change of pitch in a 
voice, the two different pitches are parts of the same one breath.  So, this production by 
imagination is a re-production of what has been apprehended.  Which is why Kant says, 
“the reproductive synthesis of the imagination belongs to the transcendental acts of the 
mind [therefore]… let us call this power the transcendental power of imagination.”278 
(CPR 1996, A 102)  In other words, reproduction is the first sign of imagination as an 
original source or power of the mind, recall (A 94/B 127) above. 
So, the other side of imagination as an original source or power of the mind is the 
productive imagination.  These two sides of imagination or two imaginations show how 
Kant establishes a continuity of power which spans the gap between sensibility and 
understanding while spanning the gap between the empirical and the pure.  Referring 
back to Kant‟s metaphorical introduction at (A 2-3/B 6), John Sallis refers to this 
transition “from one kind of ground to another” as a transition from “ground to flight”279 
indicating this second ground to which imagination has lifted as the point of departure of 
reason, i.e. the conceptual standpoint.  The conceptual purview requires a “schema” as its 
initial point of departure.  Moreover, “A schema is, in itself, always only a product of the 
imagination.” (CPR 1996, A 140/B 179)  When the conceptual purview is coupled with 
that of the experiential, i.e. when sensibility is combined with understanding in an 
experience, the productive imagination provides this schema – derived from the workings 
of sensibility and the first two folds of the three-fold synthesis.  When the conceptual 
                                               
278 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Werner S Pluhar, tr., 155. 
279 John Sallis, Spacings – of Reason and Imagination In Texts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago, 1987), 23. 
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purview regards itself, i.e. it is not coupled with the experiential, this exemplifies pure 
reason.  As such, the schema is still produced by imagination; however, the schema is 
“provided by logic.” (CPR 1996, A 406/B 433)  Hence, whereas the product of the 
reproductive imagination is empirical, i.e. empirical appearances, the product of the 
productive imagination in regard to objective unity is “the nonempirical object, i.e. the 
transcendental object = x.”280 (CPR 1996, A 109)   
Kant uses the formulation “=x” seven (7) times in the Critique of Pure Reason.  
The first six refer to objective unity of an object of experience, and the seventh refers to 
the subjective unity of apperception.  Of the first six, four of the uses appear in the five 
page section Kant devotes to “Recognition in the Concept,” i.e. the productive 
imagination‟s role in the three-fold synthesis of imagination.  Remember the three-fold 
synthesis takes place in the first edition Transcendental Deduction.  Notice what Kant 
believes he has accomplished, and how he thinks he accomplished it.   
The three-fold synthesis is all of imagination, so the reproductive imagination 
deals with the empirical aspects of sensibility, and the productive transforms them into 
something judge-able by apperception so as to be explicated by the understanding 
broadly designated, i.e. including reason.  By placing this movement within the 
continuity of one power, i.e. imagination, Kant thinks he has solved the heterogeneity 
issue, derived from sensibility‟s stem of knowledge compared to the understanding‟s 
stem of knowledge, by combining them with the original power which resides between 
them – imagination.281  Now this is actually a viable strategy.  However, Kant would 
have done better if he could have found some power of the mind residing within all of the 
                                               
280 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Werner S Pluhar, tr., 160. 
281 Cf. Bernard Freydberg, Imagination and Depth in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1994). 
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original sources, rather than merely situated between them.  Moreover, Kant‟s choice of 
imagination as the power to combine the stem containing non-discursivity, i.e. sensibility, 
with the discursive stem, i.e. understanding, committed him to posit a thing-in-itself.  
And, it was precisely this commitment which kept Kant from solving the problem of non-
being.     
Though it will require the entirety of Chapter 8 for me to ground my criticism of 
imagination in Kant‟s first Critique, I can generally state my criticism here within the 
context of what I have said above.  There are two objectives for the remainder of the 
chapter, then; to expand my comments on the relation of imagination to memory in 
Kant‟s thinking, and to indicate the connection between imagination and the thing-in-
itself within the context of the experiential standpoint.  Ultimately, I believe Kant 
overlooked the importance of memory in the structure of experience, and this committed 
him to positing the thing-in-itself from the experiential standpoint.  In his defense, and 
considering passages in the critique such as the one reporting on the laws of affinity and 
association, Kant was not concerned to fully articulate the ground of experience.  He was 
concerned to critique the use of pure reason.  Yet, it seems to me Kant did not see the full 
import of the laws of memory whose position in the structure of experience he indicated.   
Regarding memory in Kant‟s Critique, psychologist Herbert Nichols (1852-1936) 
made the following observation. 
I would call attention to one of the most unique facts in all 
of literature, (one I have nowhere seen mentioned), namely 
that in Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason … the subject of 
memory is not once referred to, nor even the word memory 
or its equivalent once used, not even incidentally 
throughout. … [Kant] actually builds up his system of mind 
utterly without memory.
282
 
                                               
282 Herbert Nichols, “The Psychology of Time,” The American Journal of Psychology, 3.4, (1891), 464.  
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I certainly concur with the spirit of Nichols‟ comment.  Of course, much has been learned 
about memory from the late 18
th
 century to the 21
st
, so perhaps Kant cannot be faulted for 
not recognizing the potential in his system regarding memory.  Yet, it is remarkable that 
of the usual German words for memory, i.e. “Gedächtnis” and “Erinnerung,” 
“Gedächtnis” does not appear at all in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft.  Now the word 
“Erinnerung” may be translated as “recollection,” “remembrance,” or “reminiscence;” 
and, Erinnerung appears nine (9) times in the Critique.  Once Kant offhandedly uses it to 
refer to Plato‟s theory of recollection (anamnesis) – (A 313/B 370) –, twice he uses it to 
refer to the power of memory when he is just listing powers of the mind – both occur at 
(A 649/B 677) –, and the remaining times Kant uses this term in direct communication 
with the reader, e.g. “to remind,” “a reminder,” etc.  Yet, Kant discussed memory outside 
of the first Critique, mainly in his Anthropology.  So, it is possible to figure a view of the 
relation between imagination and memory to Kant‟s mind.  Therefore, I will comment on 
those passages here to support my claim that Kant privileged imagination over memory 
prior to addressing the relation between imagination and the thing-in-itself. 
Despite the conspicuous absence of memory from Kant‟s Critique of Pure 
Reason, it cannot be suggested that the possibility of featuring memory instead of 
imagination never crossed Kant‟s mind.  Kant was aware of Leibniz‟s Monadology (A 
266/B 322); yet, where Kant attributes succession of appearances to imagination, Leibniz 
in the Monadology §26 explicitly refers it to memory, e.g. “Memory provides the soul 
with a kind of consecutiveness, which resembles reason but which is to be distinguished 
from it.”283  Further, in Kant‟s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View284 
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[Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht] Kant specifically considers both imagination 
and memory, in sections §31 and §34 respectively.  Kant published this work in 1798, i.e. 
eleven (11) years after the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and six (6) 
years before his death in 1804.  When considering memory in his Anthropology, i.e. 
section §34, Kant uses the term “Gedächtnis.”  However, it is important to note the title 
of this section in which Kant discusses memory, it is “On the faculty of visualizing the 
past and the future by means of the power of imagination.”  So, Kant treats memory here 
as a subsection of using the power of imagination to “visualize.”   
What is more, section §31 is titled, “On the productive faculty belonging to 
sensibility according to its different forms,” and in this section Kant considers the 
subsections regarding the “faculty of association” and the “faculty of affinity.”  In fact, he 
considers both apprehension and reproduction from the three-fold synthesis of the 
Critique, and he labels them “imaginatio plastica” and “imaginatio associans” 
respectively. (Anth 284)
285
  Oddly, he acknowledges that imaginatio associans “produces 
a habit in the mind,” (Anth 285) but he seems to consider “habit” a minimally effective 
storehouse both controlled by the power of imagination and for the power of imagination. 
(Anth 284)  Hence, it seems safe to say, not only that Kant privileges imagination over 
memory, but Kant even considers association and affinity to derive from imagination, not 
memory.  From the perspective of the 21
st
 century memory research, he was, of course, 
wrong. 
                                                                                                                                            
284 Immanuel Kant, “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,” Robert B. Louden, tr., Anthropology, 
History, and Education, Robert B. Louden and Manfred Kuehn ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 
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 As Wayne Waxman would have it in his Kant’s Model of the Mind, thinking of 
faculties of the mind in regard to unfolding and self-affection, basically all that there is in 
experience is imagination, and in encountering constraints, space, time, and the law of 
non-contradiction result; further – following such a ubiquity of imagination reading –, 
with imagination as pre-discursive apperception, it is as if imagination later imagines 
itself as you along with your existence.
286
  Whereas the Aristotelian model of theocentric 
mind has been characterized as thinking thinking thinking,
287
 with Waxman it is as if the 
description of the Kantian model of anthropocentric mind should be imagining imagining 
imagining.
288
  Waxman also holds that what otherwise would be thought of as memory is 
thought of as imagination in Kant‟s Critique.289   
Such a reading – as Waxman‟s – may not be as farfetched as it might initially 
appear.  In his discussion of productive imagination in the Anthropology Kant points out 
that imagination‟s “offences” range from the “unbridled” to the “perverse.”  Kant, then, 
provocatively claims, “The inventive power of imagination produces a kind of 
intercourse with ourselves” which he considers “incurable: except through marriage 
[Kant‟s emphasis].” (Anth 290)  What is important here is that Kant clearly thinks 
powers of the mind can affect themselves – compare the comment regarding apperception 
from the Critique at (CPR B 68).  So, toward supporting Waxman‟s accentuation of 
Kant‟s privileging of imagination, Kant can be taken to hold a self-activity/self-affection 
reading of imagination.  Yet, importantly, Kant does not consider memory capable of 
                                               
286 Wayne Waxman, Kant’s Model of the Mind: A New Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 103. 
287 Cf. Thomas De Koninck, “Aristotle on God as Thought Thinking Itself,” The Review of Metaphysics, 
47.3, (1994), 471-515. 
288 Wayne Waxman, Kant’s Model of the Mind, 157. 
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such self-activity.  Moreover, it is in the Anthropology where Kant explicitly indicates the 
difference between memory and the reproductive imagination.
290
  
Memory is distinguished from the merely reproductive 
power of imagination in that it is able to reproduce the 
former representations voluntarily, so that the mind is not a 
mere plaything of the imagination [Kant‟s emphasis]. (Anth 
291)   
In the language of the 21
st
 century memory research: Kant is not aware of the power of 
unconscious memory, i.e. the manner in which memory can affect itself and function 
without the subject‟s awareness.  Lastly, of “forgetfulness (obliviositas),” in such a state, 
Kant claims “the head” is “empty like a barrel full of holes.” (Anth 293) 
As I mentioned above both Kant and Martin Heidegger considered the “unknown 
root” which combines sensibility with understanding to be (a complex performance by 
the) imagination.
291
  And, given the comments of the Anthropology above, it seems Kant 
could not have considered memory the “unknown root” responsible for combining the 
stems of sensibility and understanding.  For Kant, imagination “as an original source” “of 
the conditions for the possibility of all experience” (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127) is necessary 
prior to the functioning of memory.   
This privileging of imagination may be characterized by suggesting: imagination 
– for Kant – must convert the sensible products into something which can be 
remembered.  Ultimately, however, such an understanding of memory is too narrow.  
Yet, Kant is not the only philosopher to think of the relation between imagination and 
memory in such a way.  Though an exhaustive history including the proponents of this 
relation between imagination and memory is outside the scope of this dissertation, the 
                                               
290 Cf. (CPR A 120-121). 
291 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, tr. (Indiana: Bloomington, 1997), 188; cf. (CPR 
2003, A 102). 
 172 
 
pervasiveness of this relation prompted Casey to refer to it as the “classical sequence of 
„first perception-then memory,‟ [Casey‟s emphases]”292  Notably, then, before Kant: 
Aristotle
293
 (384-322 BC), Thomas Hobbes
294
 (1588-1679), John Locke
295
 (1632-1704), 
Nicolas Malebranche
296
 (1638-1715), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
297
 (1646-1716), George 
Berkeley
298
 (1685-1753), David Hume
299
 (1711-1776), Étienne Bonnot de Condillac
300
 
(1715-1780), and Thomas Reid
301
 (1710-1796) amongst others, and in Kant‟s wake, 
Heidegger (1889-1976), Deleuze (1925-1995), and Derrida (1930-2004), amongst others, 
fundamentally agree with imagination‟s priority over memory in the structure of 
experience.  Given the Copernican revolution, Kant‟s twist to the classical sequence 
might read something like “first imagination, as a condition for perception, then 
perception and memory.” 
If I may venture a speculative interpretation here, I would suggest that Kant 
preferred to go with imagination over memory for two reasons.  One, it is difficult to 
separate the notion of memory from ideas of a power used solely for the purposes of 
storage and looking into past experience.  Two, imagination is conveniently ambiguous 
                                               
292 Edward S. Casey, “Perceiving and Remembering,” Review of Metaphysics, 32.3, (1979), 435. 
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299 Cf. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Other Writings, Stephen Buckle, 
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as to where it is grounded.  So, you can move up the trajectory of experience in the 
purview of the experiential standpoint establishing imagination as a ground, then you can 
switch over to the apperceptive view, and because of imagination‟s ambiguity, it cannot 
be determined whether imagination derives from empirical workings or the self-activity 
of being.  In comparison, it seems more clear that memory is bound to empirical 
workings.  This, of course, is neither to say that the power of memory out of empirical 
workings does not function to reveal being, i.e. memory as the ground and catalyst of 
ontological emergence, nor is it to suggest being is diminished in anyway if memory is in 
fact bound to empirical workings.            
 Addressing the thing-in-itself, then, it is fair to say that Kant‟s thing-in-itself is 
infamous.
302
  The thing-in-itself is the most easily, and most frequently, criticized aspect 
of Kant‟s philosophy, especially by those who do not take the time to understand what 
Kant actually says in the Critique of Pure Reason.
303
  It would take me too far afield to 
discuss all the ways which the thing-in-itself has been criticized.  Rather, my interest here 
is to pinpoint the two commitments due to which Kant posited such a controversial entity.  
Or, put another way, what in Kant‟s structure of experience required him to talk about the 
thing-in-itself?  I approach this question with the heuristic of the three standpoints – 
experiential, conceptual, and apperceptive.  I have already indicated Kant was not the 
first to use the expression “thing-in-itself [Ding an sich].”  Above I have quoted Leibniz 
and Newton, among others, using the same phraseology.  Moreover, there is, of course, a 
history of thinking in regard to the thing-in-itself.  For example, pointing to a Platonic 
origin, Giorgio Agamben and Juliana Schiesari declare,  
                                               
302 Cf. Carveth Read, “On the English of Ding-An-Sich,” Mind, 8.31, (1883), 412-415. 
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[T]he expression,  “the thing itself” (ηό πξᾶγκα αὐηό) … 
[is] a formulation that remained so determinate as the 
indication of the task of philosophy itself, that one finds it 
again more than two thousand years later, like a watchword 
passed from mouth to mouth, in Kant, in Hegel, in Husserl, 
in Heidegger.
304
 
Moreover, this language of “in itself” should conjure for you Plato‟s language of 
θαζ‟αὑηό and the problem of “looking through” an Idea – both discussed in the 
Introduction.  However, like the history of imagination, Kant‟s Copernican revolution – 
as a new beginning – not only provides a different vista of imagination and the thing-in-
itself, but also Kant‟s revolution in thinking provides a new vista of the problem of non-
being.  I address this new vista in the next chapter. 
To the thing-in-itself, regarding the structure of the text – compare with Figure 
2.1 above – in the final major division of the Transcendental Logic, the Transcendental 
Dialectic, and specifically in the section titled “Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason” 
Kant discusses “The Antinomy of Pure Reason [Der Antinomie der reinen Vernunft].”  
Antinomy here brings forth the “against” of “anti-” and the “law” of “nomos,” which 
coupled with the double genitive in “of pure reason,” suggests something of a paradox.  It 
is as if reason, specifically the “demand of reason” (CPR 1996, A 409/B 436) for totality 
i.e. systematic completeness, transgresses its governing law regarding these antinomies.  
It is in this way that speculation into unknown matters may seem reasonable, despite 
exceeding the bounds of (even possible) experience.   
This is the way in which the =x as transcendental object becomes equated with the 
thing-in-itself.  As the schema provided by productive imagination to meet the demands 
of reason for systematicity, the productive imagination provides the thing-in-itself as a 
transcendental object, i.e. the condition for the possibility of the trajectory of experience 
                                               
304 Giorgio Agamben and Juliana Schiesari, “The Thing Itself,” Substance, 16.2, (1987), 19. 
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as seen from the conceptual standpoint.  This then, is the way to arrive at the thing-in-
itself from the conceptual standpoint.  Yet, the way to arrive at the thing-in-itself which I 
am primarily concerned with is from the experiential standpoint. 
Having already assumed objects must conform to our knowledge, i.e. the structure 
by which we come to know an object, Kant refers to any concern for what is “outside” 
the structure by which we come to know an object as a “cosmological” concern.  From 
the experiential standpoint for instance, beginning at =x, if you attempt to regress back to 
the origin of the sensation(s) which resulted in your experience of a particular object, you 
will not be able to proceed beyond the limit of that which allows ultimately for our 
knowledge in the first place.  For Kant, regardless of standpoint, this final frontier is 
imagination.   
Put another way, begin with any object of experience, and regressively trace the 
series within that to which it was supposed objects must conform, i.e. to the structure by 
which we come to know an object.  Regressing along this series out to the limit of the 
cognitive capacity which allows for experience, at the ground you encounter sensibility 
governed by affinity.  Yet, the Grundkraft or fundamental power which performs the 
apprehension of a manifold out of the synopsis of the sensible manifold is, for Kant, 
imagination.  As we are blind to what initiates the series along the trajectory of 
experience, the three postulates of origin coincide with the three standpoints in the 
architectonic.  From the conceptual standpoint the postulated initial point is thought to be 
“noumenal,” as opposed to “phenomenal.”  From the experiential standpoint, the 
postulated initial point is thought to be the thing-in-itself, as opposed to the appearance.  
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Lastly, from the apperceptive standpoint, the initial point is postulated – following 
Schelling – as the Not-I or non-being.   
Regarding the thing-in-itself, paradoxically, Kant tells us, “what things may be in 
themselves I do not know – nor do I need to know, since, after all, I can never encounter 
a thing otherwise than in appearance.” (CPR 1996, A 277/B 333)  Kant has already told 
us imagination is a condition for the possibility of appearances.  However, it seems now 
that dividing imagination out of the appearance leaves us with a remainder – the thing-in-
itself.  As Nicholas Rescher describes it “To be fully objective and authentic, an 
appearance must be an appeance of something [Rescher‟s emphasis]; there must be an 
underlying something that does the appearing, that grounds it in a nonphenomenal [my 
emphasis].”305  Yet, if we need to divide out imagination in order to arrive at the thing-in-
itself, then there cannot, of course, be an image of the thing-in-itself.   
Likewise, having moved back down the trajectory which must be traversed to 
experience an object, concepts of the understanding are not applicable, and – what is 
more – in arriving at the bottom of the structure of experience the sensible intuitions of 
space and time have been regressively divided out of the appearance as well.  So, it 
cannot be said that the thing-in-itself is in space or time.  Despite its name, suddenly, the 
thing-in-itself seems to be ineffable.  Furthermore, for Kant being experienced requires 
the unity provided for by our experiential apparatus.  Since the experiential apparatus has 
been regressively divided out, about the thing-in-itself it cannot be said that it is, i.e., it is 
not.  Hence, the difficult problem for Kant, i.e. how to describe the origin of experience 
when that origin lacks being?  This, of course, for Kant after Aristotle‟s paradigm shift is 
the problem of non-being.      
                                               
305 Nicholas Rescher, “On the Status of „Things in Themselves‟ in Kant,” Synthese, 47.2, (1981), 292. 
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Now, the apperceptive standpoint may look out over the landscape of 
conceptuality – using pure reason –, or it may look out over experience – regressively, cf. 
the A edition Deduction.  As I have established above, in both cases, the ground for Kant 
is some version of imagination i.e. either a product of or the power of imagination 
respectively.  My question can be stated in the following way: From the experiential 
standpoint, how does Kant’s decision to make imagination the Grundkraft commit him to 
the thing-in-itself as his solution to the problem of non-being? 
Wilhelm Wurzer (1948-2009) illuminated thoroughly the imaginal dimension in 
Kant‟s works – so to him I turn briefly to answer the above question.306  In his Filming 
and Judgment
307
 Wurzer posits “filming” to articulate the covering or, to use the 
phraseology I prefer, “Lêtheic (cf. Λήζε) flowing” of images whose river like flowing at 
the ground of experience covers over the thing-in-itself.  Wurzer uses an excerpt from the 
Epicurean Lucretius‟ On the Nature of Things [De Rerum Natura] to punctuate a 
unification of Kant‟s imagination and his own notion of “filming.”  Wurzer translates the 
following from the poem of Lucretius,  
… I now begin to teach you about images, so-called.  A 
subject of most relevant importance.  These images are like 
a skin, a film, peeled from the body‟s surface, and they fly 
… Let me repeat: these images of things [rerum 
simulacra]
308
 … you might call them film, or bark. (F&J 
xiii)   
Playing again on the double entendre derived from a phonetic focus on the word “site,” 
Wurzer explains, “Philosophy, suddenly, shall have awakened on a radically different site 
                                               
306 Though I was not able to fully articulate my thesis prior to Dr. Wurzer‟s death, I was fortunate enough 
to have shared a good number of conversations with him.  I am grateful for those conversations and his 
influence. 
307 See Wilhelm S. Wurzer, Filming and Judgment, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1990).  Hereafter cited 
F&J. 
308 Cf. Eva M. Thury, “Lucretius‟ Poem as a Simulacrum of the Rerum Natura,” The American Journal of 
Philology, 108.2, (1987), 273. 
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through the medium of film.” (F&J xiii)  Note, it is important not to hypostasize this 
“site,” i.e. equate it with a world such as the penchant of certain French psychoanalysts 
and phenomenologists.  Filming points to the instability of images in regard to becoming, 
not being.  Therefore, though it is correct to speak of standpoints or (virtual) dimensions, 
it is incorrect to speak of imaginary and symbolic orders or worlds.  You may gain access 
to a standpoint, but the world as constantly becoming, non-discursively exceeds even my 
designation of it here.   
As Wurzer taught, “Filming deconstructs the dialectic empire in the genealogy of 
metaphysics … it emerges in a philosophical discourse for which judgment is no longer 
under the spell of the identity of reason and ground.” (F&J 2)  In this way, Wurzer is 
working at describing a moving figure – making a film – casting Kant‟s ground of 
experience by suspending the conceptuality involved in the power of judgment.  Notice 
this is intimately related to one of the ways discussed in the Introduction regarding 
entering the dialectic (empire).  With such an aesthetic suspension of judgment a “shift 
from an epistemic to an aesthetic spacing allows imagination the freedom to reflect upon 
a different grounding, one that lets Anschauung be.” (F&J 33)  By stopping short of the 
conceptual standpoint, once again “It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence 
and the world are eternally justified [Nietzsche‟s emphasis].”309    
 Regarding the thing-in-itself from a non-conceptual standpoint, then, Kant‟s 
following remark fully establishes the thing-in-itself as his response to the problem of 
non-being from the experiential standpoint:  “we cannot have cognition of any object as 
thing in itself [Gegenstande als Dinge an sich selbst], but can have such cognition only 
                                               
309 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music, Clifton P. Fadiman, tr. (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1975), 17; Cf. Wilhelm S. Wurzer, “Nietzsche‟s Return to an Aesthetic Beginning,” 
Man and World, 11.1-2, (1975), 72.    
 179 
 
insofar as the object is one of sensible intuition, i.e. an appearance. [Objeckt der 
sinnlichen Aunschauung is, d.i. als Erscheinung.]” (CPR 1996, B xxvi)  Hence,  
otherwise an absurd proposition would follow, viz. that 
there is appearance without anything that appears [my 
emphasis].” [Denn sonst würde der ungereimte Satz daraus 
folgen, dass Erscheinung ohne etwas wäre, was da 
erscheint.] (CPR 1996, B xxvii) 
In reference to the distinction between “logical” (conceptual) and “real” (experiential) 
negation discussed by Kant in his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative 
Magnitudes into Philosophy (NM 211), the antinomous positing of a thing-in-itself 
pertains to the conceptual standpoint and logical negation.  The imaginal-re-productive 
positing of a thing-in-itself pertains to the experiential standpoint in Kant and real 
negation.  In this way, then, from the conceptual standpoint Kant‟s solution to the 
problem of not-being (with a “t”) is the noumenon.310  From the experiential standpoint, 
Kant‟s solution to the problem of non-being (with an “n”) is the thing-in-itself. 
 To sum in concluding, I have shown you the structure and trajectory of experience 
in Kant.  I have pointed out the three standpoints, i.e. the experiential, the apperceptive, 
and the conceptual.  I have indicated the purview of these standpoints, and their relation 
to negation.  I have presented Kant‟s distinction between logical and real negation.  I 
have associated Kant‟s types of negation with the conceptual and experiential 
standpoints.  Thereby, I have precisely located the discussion of the problem of non-
being in regard to Kant‟s system generally and his structure of experience specifically.  I 
have indicated his privileging of imagination over memory.  I have shown his 
commitment to the solution of the problem of non-being – negation from the experiential 
                                               
310 Though I will discuss noumena briefly in the next chapter, as this is expressly not my focus, and a full 
treatment of noumena would take me too far afield; I will not extensively explore the noumenal aspect of 
Kant‟s system in the dissertation.  Moreover, I have made the distinction sufficiently clear as to preclude 
such a treatment of noumena.  
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standpoint – which results from his privileging of imagination.  Therefore, I have shown 
how the thing-in-itself is Kant‟s attempt to solve the problem of non-being. 
 In the remaining chapters of Part I (the non-being part) of the dissertation, I will 
show the evolved and compounded reading of Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason which 
Derrida and Deleuze encounter – Chapter 3.  I will then relate Derrida and Deleuze to 
Kant‟s system by indicating from where in the structure of experience they attempt to 
locate pure difference, i.e. their points of departure.  Derrida takes the high ground, as it 
were, the conceptual standpoint, and Deleuze takes the low ground, i.e. the experiential 
standpoint.  I, then, show how pure difference functions for each of them respectively as 
a response to the problem of non-being.  In the chapters of Part II (the memory part) I 
will critique pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze by drawing them together with Kant 
and solving the problem of non-being.  I have already indicated above how I will 
accomplish this.  Affinity and association in Kant should refer to memory not 
imagination.   
By my lights memory is the continuous power traversing the structure of 
experience.  Using contemporary memory research, I will show you memory as the 
Grundkraft.  And, with memory as the fundamental power in the structure of experience 
(not imagination), I eliminate the need for not only pure difference but also the thing-in-
itself.  You should already be able to see not only by the logic of my overall move in 
looking back on this chapter – so long as I am able to account for memory as the 
Grundkraft – but also by the consistency of my overall argument: I have found the 
solution to the problem of non-being. 
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“So we won‟t agree with somebody who says that denial signifies a contrary.  We‟ll only admit this much: 
when „not‟ and „non-‟ are prefixed to names that follow them, they indicate something other than the 
names, or rather, other than the things to which the names following the negation are applied.”311 
 ~Plato, Sophist (257b-c) 
 
“[T]hink through mediation and then give a little credit to the Greeks.   
The Greek explanation of the theory of being and nothing,  
the explanation of „the moment,‟ „non-being,‟ etc. trumps Hegel.”312 
~ Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition §1 
 
“It is so difficult to find the beginning.  
Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning.   
And not try to go further back.”313 
~Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty §471  
Chapter Three: Dialectic and Difference – Apprehending Non-Being 
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 3 Sections and Objectives  
 
There are two overarching goals for this chapter.  First, I provide standard logical 
treatment of the various types of propositions as possible ways to state non-being.  As 
you should be able to predict, neither the propositions – piecemeal or whole –, nor their 
respective logical negations solve the problem of non-being.  Second, I provide a reading 
of G.W.F. Hegel‟s dialectic with explicit reference to Kant‟s structure of experience from 
the previous chapter.  As if providing the transitional form of Aristotle‟s 
demonstration/dialectic divide bridging the previous two chapters with the subsequent 
two chapters.  This chapter, then, like the Introduction contributes material to the topic 
which could stand at the beginning of both the Derrida and the Deleuze chapters.  I 
decided to put the material in a separate chapter to decrease redundancy.  Hence, on the 
one hand, this chapter does not require the length of the previous chapter.  On the other 
hand, this chapter is designed to decrease the length of both of the subsequent chapters.   
                                               
311 Plato, Sophist, Nicholas P. White, tr., Plato Complete Works, John M. Cooper, ed., 280. 
312 Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, tr. (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), 148-149. 
313 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, tr., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1969), 62e. 
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 Historically, a number of influential thinkers appear between Kant and Derrida 
and Deleuze.  Though an exhaustive treatment of all the thinkers appearing between them 
is beyond the scope of my project, I have selected key figures to historically substantiate 
what the combination of the previous two chapters coupled with the subsequent two 
chapters, respectively, should logically substantiate.  The thinkers with which I will deal 
in this chapter include: Hegel and Jean Hyppolite.  Hegel is important because, as will be 
clear in the next two chapters, contemporary French philosophy in general, and 
specifically the philosophy of Derrida and Deleuze, is widely considered a reaction to the 
philosophy of Hegel.  What is more, the reactions of Derrida and Deleuze indicate an 
attempt to overcome Hegel which is grounded in a return to Kant, specifically Kant‟s 
structure of experience.  Hyppolite is important because contemporary French 
philosophy‟s return to Kant was largely fueled by Hyppolite‟s book Logic and Existence 
(1952).  In regard to my discussion of Kantian standpoints, in their reaction to Hegel‟s 
dialectic Derrida and Deleuze represent unique – “post-structuralist” – returns to Kant‟s 
conceptual and experiential standpoints respectively.      
Recall Plato‟s two impasses generally coincide with the conceptual and 
experiential standpoints of Kant‟s structure of experience.  I read Kant‟s Copernican 
revolution as in itself going far toward overcoming Plato‟s first impasse.  Yet, ultimately, 
the strength of Kant‟s structure of experience resides in its ability to think non-
discursivity.  As such, Kant‟s structure of experience overcomes Plato‟s first impasse.  
Further, then, I read Kant‟s thing-in-itself as his attempt to overcome the second of 
Plato‟s two impasses.  However, ultimately Kant‟s thing-in-itself falls short of providing 
a solution to the problem of non-being. 
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Similarly, I have divided the post-Kantian influences into two groups of two to 
represent what I see as the post-Kantian oscillation between the two impasses of the 
problem of non-being.  I refer to this movement as an oscillation because it is as if after 
Kant‟s progress to the second impasse of the problem, Hegel‟s attempt to sublate Kant‟s 
structure of experience results in a return to the first impasse.  I see the work of Derrida 
and Deleuze, then, as resulting in a return to the second impasse.  To make sense of this 
return to the second impasse I show the movement from Hegel through Hyppolite to 
Derrida and Deleuze.  This chapter, then, further serves as a bridge connecting Kant‟s 
structure and trajectory of experience, the problem of non-being, and pure difference.   
Can Non-Being Be Stated Symbolically? – A Thoughtful Experiment 
 
“the ability to contradict [is] the attainment of a good conscience.”314 
~Friedrich Nietzsche, The Cheerful Science (§297) 
 
Those who ridicule discussing the topic of non-being usually do so by appealing 
to logic.
315
  On the one hand, they – such as Rudolf Carnap – suggest lacking logical 
rigor one may lapse into making “pseudo-statements.”316  On the other hand, those who 
resist providing a logical reading – the likes of Martin Heidegger – defend such an 
approach suggesting, “the nothing is more original than the (logical) „not‟ and 
negation.”317  Notice how this exchange mimics the so called digressive section of Plato‟s 
Sophist and the two impasses indicated there.  First, there is the charge that a certain type 
                                               
314 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Walter Kaufmann, tr. (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 239. 
315 Cf. Theodore de Laguna, “The Logical-Analytic Method in Philosophy,” The Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology and Scientific Methods, 12.17, (1915), 449-462. 
316 Rudolf Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language,” Arthur Pap, 
tr. Logical Positivism, A.J. Ayer, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1959), 69. 
317 Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” David Farrell Krell, tr., Basic Writings: from Being and 
Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993), 97; cf. Martin 
Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Richard Taft, tr. (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1997), 167.  
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of statement should not be made.  Second, the final answer provided in the text makes 
just such a pseudo-statement in suggesting that non-being is (difference).  As I contend, 
correctly solving the problem of non-being shows that both Carnap and Heidegger are 
correct in that pseudo-statements should be avoided, and logical negation cannot assume 
the appropriate relation from which to reveal non-being.  Moreover, it may be suggested 
that Heidegger merely lacked the contemporary vocabulary with which to provide a non-
pseudo-statement solution.  In other words, with the solution to the problem of non-being, 
neither Carnap nor Heidegger loses ground by affirming each other‟s statements noted 
above.   
 In this brief section, then, I seek to show how the logical negations involved miss 
the problem of non-being.  This discussion hearkens back to Aristotle from the 
Introduction.  Yet, this discussion should be relevantly different as it explicitly engages 
the problem from a formally logical perspective.  In other words, I take Carnap‟s 
challenge seriously.  Though I find Heidegger‟s style to be excellent and enchanting, by 
not resorting to pseudo-statements I hope to show I have truly solved the problem.  As 
this section, then, goes toward illustrating that logical negation is insufficient to think 
non-being, I will begin with straightforward examples from formal logic.  That is, I will 
illustrate various logical negations as they are found in propositional logic.  I chose to use 
propositional logic as it is the approach to investigating symbolization which will be 
viewed as involving the least amount of smoke and mirrors.  Hence, even non-experts in 
logic should be able to recognize both that this approach treats the topic logically and 
also fails to account for non-being.  In concluding this discussion I will also briefly 
discuss predicate logic as faring no better on the topic. 
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 I will proceed, quite simply, by showing the different standard form propositions 
emphasizing their delineation into components, and I will show the various ways to 
negate the components toward discovering which negation should be associated with 
non-being.  Moreover, it should be noted that it is unnecessary for me to consider 
paraconsistent logic.  As Anscombe‟s syllogism318 stated in the Introduction clearly 
indicates, neither the problem of non-being nor the (non-pseudo) statement of non-being 
requires what calls for paraconsistent logic, i.e. taking a contradiction as point of 
departure.
319
  It should be further noted that in saying this I have also breached the 
difference between my approach and the generally referred to – and perhaps misnamed – 
“Buddhist” approach to non-being.  For example, Graham Priest in his Towards Non-
Being: The logic and metaphysics of intentionality seeks to indicate the appropriateness 
of paraconsistent logic
320
 to an idea of non-being as expounded in texts generally 
considered “Buddhist.”321      
 
Standard 
Letter 
Standard Form Propositions  
Quantity 
 
Quality  
Quantifier 
Subject 
Term 
 
Copula 
Predicate 
Term 
A All  S are P. Universal Affirmative 
E No  S are P. Universal Negative 
I Some  S are P. Particular Affirmative 
O Some  S are not P. Particular Negative 
      Figure 3.1 
                                               
318 G.E.M. Anscombe, From Parmenides to Wittgenstein, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 3. 
319 Cf. Graham Priest, “What is so Bad about Contradiction?” The Journal of Philosophy, 95.8, (1998), 
410-426. Also, cf. Graham Priest, “Truth and Contradiction,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 50.200, (2000), 
305-319. 
320 Cf. Graham Priest, Towards Non-Being: The logic and metaphysics of intentionality, (Cambridge: 
Clarendon University Press, 2005), 19. 
321 It seems to me that the most salient result – in so far as one may even speak of Buddhism as such – of a 
comparison with the problem of non-being would be the notion of “momentariness.”  However, as an 
extended comparison is beyond the scope of this dissertation, suffice to say the very reference to time, i.e. 
“momentariness,” hearkens to the not-being of time as potentiality discussed in the Introduction.  In other 
words, though I do not consider “momentariness” exhaustive of whatever “Buddhism” may mean, as an 
alternative attempt “momentariness” fails to solve the problem of non-being.    
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Now then, considering Figure 3.1, there are a number of possible components to 
be negated, and, this is, moreover, an exercise in the Square of Opposition.  Whereas, 
quantity pertains to what amount of the subject is predicated, quality pertains to whether 
that which is predicated is predicated affirmatively or negatively of the subject.  Put 
another way, some quantity of S is or is not (affirmative or negative) considered to 
belong in the group of P.  Hence, as you can see, negating an affirmative quality gives 
you a negative, and negating a negative gives you an affirmative – switching between A 
and E or between I and O.  Yet, since none of the standard letter propositions refer to 
non-being, negating quality does not yield non-being.   
The same is the case with quantity.  On the one hand, to perform a complete 
opposition, i.e. a contradiction, switches between standard letters A and O or standard 
letters I and E.  On the other hand, mere negation instead of contradictory negation refers 
the letter in question to the two letters other than the contradictory: negating a quantity of 
A might refer to I or E; negating E might refer to A or O, etc.  Notice, this type of 
negation fails for the same reason.  Hence, such a logical attempt to solve the problem of 
non-being is a dead end.  Yet, there are still more components to negate. 
 Negating the subject and predicate terms themselves is a more fruitful exercise.  
Other than the terms, only the copula remains to negate.  It just so happens that there is a 
specific way to reference the negation of a term; it is called a “term complement” or just 
“complement.”322  What is more, you state it by placing “non-” in front of the term to 
complemented.  Hence, the complement of S is non-S.  Yet, despite its prefix, its 
description rules it out in regard to non-being.   
                                               
322 Cf. Patrick J. Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic, tenth edition, (California: Thomson Wadsworth, 
2008), 208-210. 
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The “non-” is actually taken as an attempt to include everything else that is not 
whatever the “non-” prefixed.  This everything else, of course, must be read as referring 
to logical entities only.  In other words, if given the choice of Being, Becoming, or Non-
Being and asked to which one should you associate the above iteration of “everything,” 
then the answer you would give is Being, since – given these options – there are no 
entities to speak of other than those which are Being.
323
  The force of this insight is 
twofold.  First, it mimics Aristotle‟s idea of priority in account.  That is, the meaning of 
“term complement” derives from its participation in a language (game).  In other words, 
it is not supposed to refer to any “outside” in regard to its own structure.  Second, it 
shows that the logical notion of being a complement, a fortiori, cannot solve the problem 
of non-being.  Not only is the “non-” of a term complement “within” being, it derives its 
meaning from its relation to other entities, not from its non-being.  It is worth noting that 
a number of psychoanalysts precisely make this mistake of equating the subject term with 
Being. 
 How about negating the copula?  Certainly this seems to be the right approach.  
After all, “the copula” refers to the “is.”  Yet, notice that in this context you cannot get 
the copula by itself in order to negate it.  It is as if there is a terminological priority, and 
you must get outside the terminology.  Hopefully you can remember the Introduction 
well enough to notice that this difficulty is the same as the difficulty which pertains to 
attempting to, and needing to, look outside or beyond the forms.  Hence, turning to logic 
to attempt to solve the problem of non-being encounters and cannot proceed beyond its 
own inability to see being.   
                                               
323 Note that I am talking here neither about time nor being-in-time. 
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This leaves one lunging from a logical ledge to posit the negation of either the 
language (game) or logic to arrive at non-being.  However, beyond the difficulty of 
getting fully clear on what negating the totality of language or logic might be like, neither 
non-linguistic nor non- (or il-) logical successfully state non-being.
324
  Recalling the 
dependency of reckoning with being on reckoning with non-being from the Introduction, 
formal logic is stalemated by the same issue which stalemated Plato‟s forms in the 
Sophist.  Oppositions and negations between beings do not result in the opposition or 
negation of being.  
Summarily appropriate, then, is John Neville Keynes‟ (1852-1949) 
 
Definition of Formal Logic – Formal logic may be defined 
as the science which investigates those regulative principles 
of thought that have universal validity whatever may be the 
particular objects about which we are thinking.  It is a 
science which is concerned with the form as distinguished 
from the matter of thought [Keynes‟ emphases].325   
In a reflection on this definition you can see a reference to the regulative use of ideas 
discussed in relation to both Aristotle and Kant.  The solidity which Keynes attributes to 
these regulative ideas indicates the standard association between logic and demonstration 
as opposed to dialectic.  Further, his reference to the particular objects indicates the 
manner just discussed in which logic derives its meaning from internal relations and 
those – in turn – from being.  Moreover, further symbolizing Keynes‟ definition – 
moving from propositional to predicate logic – will not succeed at increasing the capacity 
of logic to indicate the solution to the problem of non-being.   
                                               
324 Cf. According to Aristotle, “if „this is‟ signifies something, one cannot truly assert the contradictory.” 
(Meta 1995, 1062b10). 
325 John Neville Keynes, Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic: Including a generalization of logical 
processes in their application to complex inferences, (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894), 1.   
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Consider standard letter E proposition: No S are P.  The symbolic formulation 
would be: (x) (Sx  ~Px).  And, the way it reads clearly indicates what I concluded just 
above, i.e. “For any x, if x is an S, then x is not a P.”326  The logical relations between S 
and P are contingent upon what is being “x.”  So the application of formal logic itself 
displaces the problem to a realm of demonstrative certainty, a specialized discursivity, 
even further removed from any difficulty of beyond the forms.  The more viable 
approach seems to be dialectic. 
Without trivializing the matter, indulge me in a metaphorical expression of the 
ground just covered.  For the metaphorical part of this thought experiment, then, suppose 
you are in a room and the lights are on.  In fact, as long as you can remember the lights 
have always been on.  In this room there are pamphlets and on the pamphlets there is 
writing.  Since the lights are on you can read the writing, and one of the pamphlets reads: 
“The lights are out.”  Now, certainly you will agree that there is a difference between 
reading this pamphlet and being in a room with the lights out.  Yet, suppose another 
pamphlet to read, “The lights are on.”  With this pamphlet, you may think that this 
proposition is true.  Yet, if you have never been in a room with the lights out, then the 
truth of the proposition is merely mechanical.  In other words, you either communicate 
rightly or wrongly.  However, there is a different way to relate to the truth of the 
statement “The lights are on” when you have been in the dark.   
Even beyond speaking to the value of light, a relation results which cannot be 
captured in a logic of opposition.  Loosely stated, it is as if you do not really “know” the 
light until you have been in the dark, but the demonstrative attempt to pin down the 
                                               
326 Cf. Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic, 407. 
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meaning of “know” and “true” obscure the message to be communicated.  On the one 
hand, however you come to know the light will depend upon what you can read while in 
the light.  On the other hand, without encountering the darkness, whatever truth you come 
to know about the light will be both limited and ungrounded – though taking the darkness 
as ground is, of course, an illicit move if you deny (certainly I cannot here say “the 
existence of”) such darkness.  Hence, were it the case that you could come to notice the 
light in the room flicker, then you could catch a glimpse of the darkness, and come to 
better “know” the light. 
 Pointing to an underlying subject, i.e. hypokeimenon, it is as if since A=A, A & 
A : Sameness :: A & ~A : Difference.
327
  The dialectically provided first principle here of 
the “law of identity” (A=A) provides the starting point for the demonstration, and the 
difference internal to the demonstration is, of course, ἐλαληίνλ, i.e. logical difference.328  
Dialectic, then, is more viable, as noted above, because if difference is to find the latch of 
being, so to speak, it must look to the beginning of dialectic insofar as it is possible 
without assumption.  In fact, some commentators
329 
go so far as to suggest an analogy 
such that truth : play :: demonstration : dialectic.   
 Recalling G.E.L. Owen‟s “Tithenai ta Phainomena,” with the Kantian 
language from Chapter 1, dialectic begins with either conceptual or experiential 
products.
330
  Hence, the question: can non-being be symbolized?  If you do not start the 
dialectic with an experiential product, then you beg the question.  To suppose a 
conceptual starting point is already to assign a symbol for non-being.  In order for the 
                                               
327 Taking the tilde (~) here, of course, to mean “not.” 
328 Cf. Plato (Soph 255e1-3) 
329 Andrew Low, “The Return of Dialectic to Its Place in Intellectual Life,” Rhetoric Review, 15.2, (1997), 
365. 
330 G.E.L. Owen, “„Tithenai ta Phainomena‟,” Articles on Aristotle, 115. 
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symbol to get its meaning – think Aristotle‟s priority of account – a network of symbols 
is involved.  Such a derivation of non-being is, of course, logical, pertaining to ἐλαληίνλ, 
and better labeled as not-being.  You might say, for example, watching someone try to 
connect oddly shaped blocks together speaks to the experiential conceptual distinction.  
Often they will try the same combination of moves repeatedly despite being unsuccessful 
at completing the combination.  This shows them responding more to thoughts than to 
perception.  The situation from the perceptual point of view, so to speak, is experiential, 
and from thought, conceptual.    
Kant‟s Attempt to Discover and Demonstrate Nothing 
 
“The man and his wife were both naked, and they felt no shame.”331 
~Genesis 2: 25 
 
In commenting on Hegel‟s work Heidegger notes, “In the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant opened up the problem of an ontology of nature,” Heidegger clarifies that 
this problem entails the question “of how to determine … extant and accessible beings as 
to what and how they are.  The determinations of the being of beings are called 
„categories‟.”332  What Heidegger is articulating is a view of the performance of concept 
application from the apperceptive standpoint.  As already mentioned, this entails the use 
of the transcendental object, as the productive imagination‟s conditon for the possibility 
of objectively unifying a sensible manifold or schematically initiating reflection upon a 
not currently experienced object.  Since Kant worked from mulitiple standpoints, when 
he worked from the conceptual standpoint he described the movement of retrospection or 
sublation for deriving the objective =x as mirroring the alêtheatic movement from the 
                                               
331 Quest Study Bible, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 5. 
332 Martin Heidegger, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, tr. (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1988), 102.  
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apperceptive standpoint for deriving the subjective =x, i.e. the transcendental unity of 
apperception.   
Kant notes,  
The highest concept with which one is accustomed to begin 
a transcendental philosophy is usually the division between 
the possible and the impossible.  But since every division 
presupposes a concept that is to be divided, a still higher 
one must be given, and this is the concept of an object in 
general [Gegenstande überhaupt]. (CPR 1998, A 290) 
And, notice how Kant moves from a “division” – for example, the possible and the 
impossible –, i.e. of two concepts, to the one concept which they logically presuppose.  
Kant is here describing the process of sublation.  You have already seen this in Aristotle‟s 
supposition of the ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon, from the division into binary 
opposites of it concepts.  Similarly, multiple empirical perceptions sublate to reveal their 
transcendental unity as the apperceptive I.  The difference from the conceptual standpoint 
is that the sublated concept of an object in general is the =x, i.e. the transcendental object. 
(Cf. CPR A 290)  Hence, Kant employs the hypokeimenal movement “upward” to derive 
the =x.
333
 
Regarding the =x then, Kant parenthetically states the object in general is “(taken 
problematically, leaving undecided whether it is something or nothing [my emphasis].)” 
(CPR 1998, A 290)  Here, again, Kant employs the notion of undecidability, and – notice 
– it is regarding the being or not-being of that which is in question.  Kant‟s employment 
of undecidability is important to note because – from the conceptual standpoint – Kant 
claims the being of the =x, as initial point in conceptual specification, to be undecidable.  
This claim will prove to be decisive in distinguishing between the positions of various 
                                               
333 Moreover, though you might not see it until after the next chapter, Derrida has taken this from Kant in 
order to formulate his Différance. 
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philosophers, including Kant, in regard to non-being.  Kant supports this claim noting, 
“Since the categories are the only concepts that relate to objects in general, the distinction 
of whether an object is something or nothing will proceed in accordance with the order 
and guidance of the categories.” (CPR 1998, A 290)   
Now, if Kant just said that the matter of the =x is to be considered undecidable, 
then why is he now talking about using the categories to guide in the decision as to 
whether the =x is something or nothing?  The answer: From the perspective of 
conceptuality, it is possible to use the categories to make decisions about the =x.  Yet, at 
the same time, the experiential perspective, which does not extend far enough into 
conceptuality for such decisions, only knows the =x as determining an object of 
experience.  Hence, whereas within the conceptual perspective the =x is maintained, i.e. it 
is supposed to persist at least relationally, so as to possibly be reflected upon, from the 
experiential perspective, the =x flickers.  Reflective decisions require access to 
conceptuality which the experiential standpoint does not have.  This conceptuality is the 
use of the Categories themselves to, as Heidegger noted, determine “the being of 
beings.”334   
Notice then, this is precisely why in attempting to determine non-being from the 
conceptual standpoint that non-being is determined as a concept, i.e. as not-being not 
non-being.  Think of ἐλαληίνλ from the Introduction, and logical structure from above.  In 
explicating this concept of not-being, i.e. negation or nothing, using the Categories as a 
guide Kant constructs a “Table of Nothing [Nichts],” Figure 3.2.  It is worth noting that 
according to the Word Index to Kant’s Collected Works [Wortindex zu Kants 
gesammelten Schriften] Kant uses the locution “nichtsein,” i.e. not or non being – it is 
                                               
334 Martin Heidegger, Hegel’s Phenomenology, 102.  
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also translated at times as “nothing” –, over twice as many times in the Critique of Pure 
Reason than any of the other (entire) volumes of his Collected Works, i.e. 26 times.
335
 
  Now before looking to the Table, it is important to make a few prefatory 
remarks.  It is not due to whimsy that Kant‟s Table of Nothing appears in an Appendix 
immediately before the Transcendental Dialectic. The section of the Critique of Pure 
Reason in question here is appropriately titled “Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection,” 
since he discusses the use of concepts to reflectively make decisions about non-
conceptual genesis.  This is one of two bridging chapters between the Transcendental 
Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic.  Referring to the Analytic, Kant suggests at 
the point of beginning the bridging that “We have now not only traveled through the land 
of pure understanding, and carefully inspected each part of it, but we have also surveyed 
it, and determined the place for each thing in it [my emphasis].” (CPR 1998, A 235/B 
294)  Kant makes a point to establish that “This land, however, is an island, and enclosed 
in unalterable boundaries.” (CPR 1998, A 235/B 294)  These bridging sections, then, are 
meant to clarify the relation between representations and the faculties to which they 
belong so as to further justify the critique of drawing inferences by highlighting the 
dependence of these representations upon the faculties from which they originate.   
You might recall that this is why Kant required a continuous power – which he 
deemed imagination – to bridge the gap which already appeared between sense and its 
synopsis on one side and understanding and its categories on the other.  Referring, then, 
to the critique of using one faculty‟s representations to account for the product of a 
different faculty – such as understanding‟s concepts to account for sensibility‟s genesis – 
                                               
335 Dieter Krallmann and Hans Adolf Martin, ed., Wortindex zu Kants gesammelten Schriften, Band 2, 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1967), 656. 
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Kant explains, “What makes this critique of the inferences from the mere actions of 
reflection useful above all is that it clearly establishes the nullity of all inferences about 
objects that one simply compares with each other in the understanding… [my 
emphasis].” (CPR 1998, A 278/B 334)  In other words, since concepts of reflection do 
not involve sensibility, the emptiness thesis, i.e. the other side of the blindness thesis, is 
encountered.  Remember the two stems of knowledge are sensibility and understanding, 
“Through the former, objects are [intuitively] given to us; through the latter, they are 
thought.” (CPR 2003, A 15/B29)  And, “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions 
without concepts are blind [my emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 51/ B75)        
Defining Amphiboly from the section title noted above, Kant explains that a 
“transcendental amphiboly” is “a confusion of a pure object of understanding with 
appearance.” (CPR 1996, A 270/B 326)  In other words, the fallacy of amphiboly is 
committed when you fail to recognize that reflective concepts, which are without 
experiential content, are empty.  Kant‟s target here is Leibniz, but in regard to amphiboly, 
it might as well be Hegel also.  To this end, then, Kant provides an abstract example of 
Leibniz‟s Law, i.e. the identity of indiscernibles.  According to Kant,  
Suppose that an object is exhibited to us repeatedly but 
always with the same intrinsic determinations (qualitas et 
quantitas).  In that case, if the object counts as object of 
pure understanding then it is always the same object, and is 
not many but only one thing [numerical identity]. (CPR 
1996, A 263/B 319) 
Now, the contrary case regarding appearance is one which includes input from 
sensibility. 
But if the object is appearance, then comparison of 
concepts does not matter at all; rather, however much 
everything regarding these concepts may be the same, yet 
the difference of the locations of these appearances at the 
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same time is sufficient basis for the numerical difference of 
the object (of the senses) itself [Kant‟s emphasis]. (CPR 
1996, A 263/B 319) 
Whereas in the former case of the conceptual standpoint, difference in time and space is 
sublated into a pure concept, in the latter case of the experiential standpoint the difference 
in time and space cannot be sublated by a concept but merely indexed.
336
  The industry 
terminology being here: dialectical difference for the former and differential difference 
for the latter.  In other words, “the understanding can a priori never accomplish more 
than to anticipate the form of a possible experience as such.” (CPR 1996, A 246/B 303)  
Hence, it is in the spirit of conceptual anticipation, then, that Kant constructs his Table of 
Nothing.  To take the Table of Nothing map for the territory (of non-being) would be to 
commit the fallacy of Amphiboly. (Cf. CPR A 270/B326) 
 It is highly remarkable that having so thoroughly discussed the structure of 
experience by the end of the Transcendental Analytic, Kant just prior to the 
Transcendental Dialectic still maintains: “we have no insight whatever into the intrinsic 
character of things [Kant‟s emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 277/B 333)  And with his usual 
reference to a different kind of mind he justifies this claim stating that “to be able to 
cognize things” would require “us to be able to intuit [things], even without senses,” an 
ability “wholly different from the human one not merely in degree but even in its 
intuition and kind.” (CPR 1996, A 277-8/B 333-4)  In other words, “those transcendental 
questions that go beyond nature we would … still never be able to answer, even if nature 
were uncovered for us.” (CPR 1996, A 279/B 335)  What is most significant, however, is 
what Kant says next in regard to the human mind.  After all his work on the structure of 
experience, Kant says, “This is so because we have not been given [the ability] to observe 
                                               
336Cf. Jaegwon Kim, “Inference, Explanation, and Prediction,” The Journal of Philosophy, 61.12, (1964), 
360-368. 
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even our own mind,” and specifically “in it lies the secret of our sensibility’s origin by 
means of an intuition other than that of our inner sense.” (CPR 1996, A 279/B 335)   
Kant clarifies what he means by this “secret” in the following highly important 
passage:  
Its relation to an object, and what might be the 
transcendental ground of this unity [formerly referred to by 
Kant as original faculty of “sense”], undoubtedly lie too 
deeply hidden for us, who know even ourselves only 
through inner sense [from apprehension “up” in the 
trajectory of experience], thus as appearance, to be able to 
use such an unsuitable tool of investigation to find out 
anything except always more appearances, even though we 
would gladly investigate their non-sensible cause. (CPR 
1998, A 279/B 335)  
Kant is referring here to the unity of the synopsis.  And the unity of the synopsis – 
remember – is governed by affinity.  Yet, Kant laments that the depths of affinity are still 
too hidden for18
th
 century eyes.  This is tantamount to Kant‟s concession that the mind 
has yet to exceed the velocity of the unreeling which constitutes filming.  Hence, 
filming‟s contribution to a barrier of being – for Kant – cannot be broken.  It is in this 
way that Kant arrives at his Table of Nothing.  Accordingly, all attempts to conceptually 
account for what would be the “boom” of breaking the being barrier result in the 
boomerang action of being merely conceptual.  Since imagination performs a “radical 
displacement” (F&J 33) in regard to non-being, the pure understanding is thrice removed 
(Cf. Rep 597e) from that which it would call “nothing.”     
Kant‟s Table of Nothing, then, presents the categorical, i.e. conceptual, 
determinations of nothing, i.e. not-being.  Accordingly, Béatrice Longuenesse declares, 
“As a pure concept of the understanding, negation is the concept of a „privation‟ or „lack‟ 
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of a real determination [my emphasis].”337  Another telltale sign that the emptiness thesis 
has been encountered can be seen by the inclusion of the word “empty” in each division 
of the table.  Here then is Kant‟s conceptual analysis of nothing, i.e. Figure 3.2.  
Kant’s Table of Nothing [Nichts] (A 292)  
I. 
Empty Concept 
without Object 
ens rationis 
 
II.     III. 
                Empty Object                  Empty Intuition  
                 of a Concept                                                  without object  
               nihil privativum                                     ens imaginarium 
                
IV. 
Empty Object  
without Concept 
nihil negativum 
 
Figure 3.2 
Kant‟s Table illustrates my division of the problem of non-being into two impasses.  The 
first impasse is “II,” nihil privativum, from the perspective of “I,” ens rationis.  The 
second impasse is “IV,” nihil negativum, from the perspective of “III,” ens imaginarium.  
Notice imagination as the ground here.  Also, remember, this second impasse is 
paradoxical.  So, it looks like nihil negativum, or absolute nothing, refers to non-being.  
Yet, you must not forget the conceptual standpoint which made this Table possible.  In 
other words, as a discursive, i.e. conceptual, statement of absolute nothing, it is a 
statement – it is not non-being.  This is why in describing his Table Kant distinguishes 
between “the thought-entity [das Gedankending] (no. 1)” and “the non-entity [Un-dinge] 
(no. 4)” noting that neither of them are “possible”; and, neither are possible because “the 
                                               
337 Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 303. 
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thought-entity” is “mere invention,”338 and “the non-entity” because “as the concept [it] 
annuls even itself.” (CPR 1996, A 292/B 348)  This, again, mirrors the second impasse of 
the problem of non-being in pointing to the paradoxical nature of thinking that which 
cannot be thought.   
Upon reading Kant‟s Table of Nothing, Schopenhauer applaudingly repeats the 
manner in which “IV” may be thought of as “II” because it is being viewed from the 
conceptual standpoint.  According to Schopenhauer,  
 [A]n absolute nothing, a really proper nihil negativum, is 
not even conceivable, but everything of this kind, 
considered from a higher standpoint or subsumed under a 
wider concept, is always only a nihil privativum. … Even 
logical contradiction is only a relative nothing… (WWI 
409) 
It should not be a surprise, then, that from here Schopenhauer immediately sees a 
connection with Plato‟s Sophist.  Here is Schopenhauer‟s rendition of “Plato‟s Puzzle” 
following on the heels of his discussion of Kant‟s Table of Nothing:  
[I]f we look for such an example [of non-being], we shall 
stick to the non-sense as the positive we are just looking for 
[IV], and skip the sense as the negative [II].  Thus every 
nihil negativum or absolute nothing, if subordinated to a 
higher concept, will appear as a mere nihil privativum or 
relative nothing, which can always change signs with what 
it negates, so that that would then be thought of as 
negation, but it itself as affirmation.  This also agrees with 
the result of the difficult dialectical [my emphasis] 
investigation on the conception of nothing which is given 
by Plato in the Sophist (258d&e). (WWI 409) 
Notice from the Introduction, there Schopenhauer cannot help but use Plato‟s language of 
in relation to others, i.e. πξὸο ἄιια, as opposed to in itself, i.e. θαζ‟αὑηό, and this 
                                               
338 Recall the Introduction section which associates dialectic and invention as opposed to justification and 
demonstration. 
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opposition brings to mind ἐλαληίνλ and ἕηεξνλ respectively.339  Lastly, then, 
Schopenhauer is in agreement with Kant‟s categorical-logico-discursive analysis of 
nothing, and all three of us recognize non-being as paradoxically ineffable.   
Now because Schopenhauer thinks of conation, i.e. “the will,” as the Grundkraft – 
neither Kantian sense nor imagination –, Schopenhauer defines non-being as “denial of 
the will.”340  Schopenhauer yields “If, however, it should be absolutely insisted,” then he 
refers to non-being as “that state which is experienced by all who have attained to 
complete denial of the will”; further referring to this state as “ecstasy, rapture, 
illumination, union with God, and so on … that cannot further be communicated.”(WWI 
410)  Whereas Schopenhauer ultimately resorts to metaphors just before retreating to 
“ineffability,” I can actually “speak of non-being without number,” and provide a way for 
you to see that you too experience non-being.  Though, again, it will take until the end of 
the dissertation for me to provide a full treatment of the problem.   
 In sum, at this point you should be able to see the connection between the 
problem of non-being, as stated in Plato, and Kant‟s nihil negativum as discussed by both 
Kant and Schopenhauer.  Kant‟s Table of Nothing provides a fourfold nothing in 
accordance with the conceptual and experiential starting points of dialectic.  Further, you 
should have noticed how Kant and Schopenhauer both describe this nihil negativum, 
absolute nothing, or non-being in a way following Gorgias.  That is, all three recognize 
that a conceptual treatment of non-being fails to solve the problem.  So this is their 
unanimously agreed upon jumping off point for landing in non-being.  Kant has it as 
                                               
339 Cf. Francis Jeffrey Pelletier, Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago, 1990), 40-43. 
340 Cf. Kwang-Sae Lee, East and West: Fusion of Horizons, (New Jersey: Homa & Sekey Books, 2006), 
91. 
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thing-in-itself, and Schopenhauer has it as denial of the will.  Neither solves the problem, 
but both are closer than where Hegel will take it by attempting to sublate the jumping off 
point.   
Conceptually “Stepping Back” – Hegel & the Closure of Discursivity 
 
“The one and only thing for securing scientific progress is knowledge of the logical precept  
that Negation is just as much Affirmation as Negation.”341 
~G.W.F. Hegel (SL 64) 
 
Some regard Kant‟s Copernican revolution as an admission of his own humility, 
i.e. he is humble enough to admit he cannot know everything.  In particular, he admits he 
cannot know things in themselves.  In fact, Kant‟s ascription of cognitive, 
epistemological and ontological limits as requisite for his system has led commentators 
such as Karl Ameriks and Rae Langton to speak of “Kantian humility.”  Ameriks, 
commenting on Langton‟s book titled Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in 
Themselves, describes Kantian humility in the following way:  
[T]ranscendental idealism can be expressed as not so much 
a metaphysical extravagance as rather a principle of 
modesty, as a reminder that things in their intrinsic 
character need not be the way that our specific modes of 
knowing must take them to be.
342
   
With such a “principle,” Kant was able to point out that, despite reason‟s inevitable 
reaching for beyond the sphere of being, such speculation is – without experience – 
groundless.  Speculations regarding such matters, though reasonable, “neither may hope 
to be confirmed in experience nor need they fear being refuted in it.” (CPR 1996, A 
421/B 449)  Kant illustrates this claim in regard to the unconditioned “origin of the 
world” (CPR 1996, A 451/ B 479) with the antinomies of pure reason in the 
                                               
341 G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, W.H. Johnson and L.G. Struthers, tr. (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1929), 64.  Hereafter cited as SL. 
342 Karl Ameriks, Interpreting Kant’s Critiques, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 140. 
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Transcendental Dialectic of his Critique of Pure Reason.  Hence, Kant concluded that 
such employment of “pure” reason should be critiqued.  Hegel, in comparison, was not so 
modest. 
 In this section of Chapter 3 I examine Hegel primarily due to his influence on 
contemporary French thought.  Yet, at the same time, since Hegel represents a return to 
the first impasse of Plato‟s puzzle, I show how Hegel‟s logic and insistence upon the 
conceptual standpoint necessitated that he in fact make the return to the first impasse.  
This, however, does not stop Hegel from speaking as though he has solved the problem 
of non-being.  As Tom Rockmore points out in discussing Hegel‟s Science of Logic, 
Hegel affirms that „Nothing is, therefore, …‟ The 
conclusion that follows is that pure being and nothing are 
exactly alike .  They are exactly the same, without any 
difference [my emphases].”343   
As I will show below, this nothing or non-being as Hegel sees it is not a return to the non-
discursivity of Kant‟s thing-in-itself.   
In fact, the terms “discursive,” “discursivity,” and “non-discursive” never appear 
in Hegel‟s Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes] (1807).  What is 
more, of these terms only “discursive” appears in his Science of Logic [Wissenschaft der 
Logik] – the Greater Logic – (1812-1816), and it only appears once.  Hegel employs this 
term precisely at the point at which he is disputing the antinomies in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, i.e. specifically Kant‟s conclusion (mentioned above) in the Transcendental 
Dialectic.  The dispute, at this point, is about space, and Hegel notes, “[space] is an 
intuition, that is, according to the Kantian definition, a representation which can only be 
given through a single object, and is not a so-called discursive concept [my emphasis].” 
                                               
343 Tom Rockmore, Before and After Hegel: A historical introduction to Hegel’s thought, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993), 116. 
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(SL 196)  Hence, as you will see below, Hegel has little use for the discursive/non-
discursive distinction. 
What is at stake in the dispute is the justification of supposing the thing-in-itself.  
Hegel reveals his desire to collapse the hierarchical distinction between intuition and 
concept – the Kantian distinction which gives rise to the discursive/non-discursive 
distinction – with the following: “This Kantian distinction between intuition and concept 
has, as everyone knows, given rise to a deal of nonsense about the former.” (SL 196)    
The deal of non-sense – of which Hegel speaks and Schopenhauer affirms – is, of course, 
the thing-in-itself.
344
  Before discussing the details of the dispute below, it is important to 
note, “the nature of quantity,” Hegel tells us, “gives rise” to this dispute between he and 
Kant. (SL 196)  And in rejecting Kant, Hegel expresses his preference for “the ancient 
Eleatic school” by which he means “the pure being of Parmenides” and “the flux of 
Heraclitus [Hegel‟s emphasis].” (SL 196)  My comments above, then, regarding the 
Parmenidean statement in Anscombe‟s syllogism hold here for Hegel.   
Hegel has already stated the entirety of his position with reference to Parmenides 
and Heraclitus.  Hegel wants solid being, i.e. he wants being to be closed.  He wants “the 
One” to cover it all, i.e. be it all.  Further, becoming will account for not-being and 
change.  Yet, becoming is enclosed within being.  Put briefly, there is no becoming being 
other than being becoming itself.  The consequence for non-being, as Rockmore pointed 
out above, non-being and being are “exactly the same.”  
Now, as I will show below, it will be the “the nature of quantity,” which Hegel 
takes to be central in his dispute with Kant over the thing-in-itself, and in discussing this 
dispute I will already be tracing the understanding of difference inherited by Derrida and 
                                               
344 Cf. John McTaggart, Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), 26. 
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Deleuze.  Whereas Kant had a mechanism for thinking of difference outside the structure 
of experience – the “impossible” possibility of nihil negativum –, Hegel has it that all 
difference is difference within being.  The confusion here resembles the difference 
between looking through a cone from the point of its convergence at what is beyond the 
cone and looking at the cone from the side to say what is outside the cone – cf. Figure 
2.8.  Yet, perhaps Bruce Lee (1940-1973) is instructive here since in both cases one may 
think of the cone as if “It is like a finger pointing a way to the moon.  Don‟t concentrate 
on the finger or you will miss all that heavenly glory.”345  Figured this way, it is as if 
Hegel takes a quantity of pointing for the moon.   
Both Derrida and Deleuze will be working against this Hegelian closure toward a 
Kantian openness.  Moreover, though I dealt extensively with Kant in the previous 
chapter, recall I focused primarily on what I refer to as the purview of his experiential 
standpoint, and also in the previous chapter I associated Hegel with the conceptual 
standpoint.  Therefore, though I will be referring below to some material which I covered 
in the previous chapter, I do so here from the conceptual standpoint.  In this way, I am 
being fair in assessing Hegel‟s reading of Kant‟s thing-in-itself.  In other words, looking 
at Kant from the conceptual standpoint so as to be fair in evaluating what is at stake 
between Kant and Hegel on Hegel‟s terms, i.e. the composition of a concept.  To this end, 
I quote Kant extensively below.  In this way, I intend to clearly show Hegel‟s 
interpretation of Kant‟s teaching in regard to the thing-in-itself without merely relying on 
Hegel.  Further quoting Kant provides the background for their dispute, i.e. space, 
quantity, and discursivity.   
                                               
345 Bruce Lee and John Little, Striking Thoughts: Bruce Lee’s Wisdom for Daily Living, (Hong Kong: 
Tuttle Publishing, 2000), xxv; Cf. Osho, Finger Pointing to the Moon: Discourses on the Adhyatma 
Upanishad, (London: Element Books, 1994), 205. 
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I have already shown that from the experiential standpoint Kant seeks to retain 
something of the non-discursive which, for him, distinguishes the experiential from the 
conceptual standpoint.  This Kantian humility in the attempt to retain non-discursivity 
leads him – from an experiential standpoint – to posit a thing-in-itself and – from the 
conceptual standpoint – to posit a noumenon.  As Hegel wishes to avoid the thing-in-
itself, Hegel also seeks to avoid non-discursivity.  The point of contention, then, is the 
moment of the objective unity of =x within the conceptual purview.  In order to collapse 
Kant‟s discursive/non-discursive distinction, Hegel will seek to provide a reading of the 
=x which regards any non-discursivity as merely an unclear moment to be clarified in the 
very process which initially determined it unclear.  For Hegel, the moon is the pointing; 
the difference is merely an experiential confusion to be conceptually clarified.  I am 
referring here to the process of conceptual analysis.  So, I will here examine the =x from 
the conceptual viewpoint to which I only gestured in the previous chapter.  And, in 
looking at conceptual analysis I will begin to show the evolution of the Kantian 
revolution on its way to the 21
st
 century.     
In the first edition (1781) Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant says, 
As regards distinctness, finally, the reader has a right to 
demand, first, the discursive (logical) distinctness arising 
through concepts, but then also an intuitive (aesthetic) 
distinctness arising through intuitions, i.e. through 
examples or other illustrations in concreto [Kant‟s 
emphasis]. (CPR 1996, A xvii-xviii)   
In regard to space, then, Kant is consistent in saying, “Space is not a discursive or, as we 
say, universal concept of things as such; rather, it is a pure intuition [my emphasis].” 
(CPR 1996, A 24/B 39)  As befits Kant‟s concern for architectonic systematicity, the 
above quote is taken from the Transcendental Aesthetic of his Critique, and the following 
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quote is taken from the Transcendental Logic, specifically the Transcendental 
Analytic.
346
  Here, Kant – as his section title suggests – provides a “Guide for the 
Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding” stating, “When we bring into play a 
cognitive power, then, depending on the various ways in which we may be prompted to 
do so, different concepts come to the fore that allow us to recognize this power [my 
emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 66/B 91)  However, concepts discovered as such, according to 
Kant,  
reveal themselves in no order or systematic unity; instead 
they are ultimately only paired according to similarities, 
and arranged in series according to the quantity of their 
content, from the simple concepts on to the more composite 
[my emphases]. (CPR 1996, A 67 /B 92) 
Now as I indicated in the previous chapter, the Kant quote above points to the excessivity 
of the non-discursive.  For Kant then, conceptual specification, which would be 
tantamount to systematic unity and order according to categorical analysis, is not the 
arrangement which derives from the imagination‟s association of appearances underlying 
an experiential quantity of =x.  It is important to keep the two different views here of the 
=x in regard to quantity separate, because from the conceptual standpoint, conceptual 
specification may in fact be merely unpacking what is already latent in the =x.  Yet, from 
the experiential standpoint, first – and this is the very reason for using the notion of non-
discursivity – whether the conceptual specification fully unpacks the experiential content 
of the =x must remain a matter of speculation.  And, by speculation I mean non-verifiable 
and an idea of pure reason.   
It is tempting to suggest the mere difference between thought and sensation itself 
indicates that conceptual specification does not fully unpack the experiential content of 
                                               
346 For a contemporary critique of systematicity see: Jerry Fodor, and Zenon Pylyshyn, “Connectionism and 
cognitive architecture: A critique,” Cognition, 28, (1998), 3-71.   
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=x.  This is because if thought could fully unpack the experiential content, then thinking 
of the content should be experiencing the content.  Since, this seems absurd: if thought is 
to be equated with being, equated here must indicate a sort of mathematically mimetic 
equation like isomorphism.  Yet, retreating to isomorphism opens the door again for Kant 
to suggest that the form in experience may indeed be imitated by the form in thought with 
the difference that experience provides more than the form of thought can imitate.  How 
to characterize such excessivity?  Kant‟s answer is to use the notion of non-discursivity.  
Keep in mind, then, that Hegel‟s description of conceptual specificity may be successful 
at collapsing the discursive/non-discursive distinction so long as this collapse is 
understood ultimately in reference only to the conceptual standpoint.  That is, a full 
closure of discursivity can only mean a full retreat into the contemplative state of thought 
alone.  
Just prior to Kant‟s celebrated example regarding the judgment “all bodies are 
divisible,” Kant pushes his discursive distinction again.  Kant notes, “the cognition of any 
understanding, or at least human understanding, is a cognition through concepts; it is not 
intuitive, but discursive.  All our intuitions, as sensible, rest on our being affected; 
concepts, on the other hand, rest on functions.”347 (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93)  And, Kant 
clarifies, “By function I mean the unity of the act of arranging various representations 
under one common representation.”348 (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93)  Elaborating on my 
treatment from the previous chapter, the “unity of the act” of arranging derives from the 
logical form of the judgments employed.  These judgments serve to unify experience 
objectively in the object of experience and – via an alêtheatic (cf. αιήζεηα) reference – 
                                               
347 Translation modified. 
348 Translation modified. 
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subjectively to the unity of apperception.  At this point, the logical structure has already 
been imposed upon the object in its determination, i.e. even if only latently in a quantity 
= x.  Hence, conceptual specification via logical, i.e. discursive, analysis of the quantity 
may succeed at fully identifying the quantity in question.   
With the imposition of the logical structure, then, it is as if a seed were planted – 
just as picking a judgment in the Square of Opposition commits you to various other 
forms of the judgment – such that it blossoms in an analytic unfolding on its own.  Hegel 
similarly suggests,  
The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, 
and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter; 
similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up 
in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit 
now emerges as the truth of it instead.  These forms are not 
just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one 
another as mutually incompatible. (PS 2) 
In Kantian language, Hegel‟s metaphor here is supposed to describe the movement from 
the bud of =x to the blossom of conceptual analysis, and finally to its fruition through 
dialectic.  However, the analogy does not hold when Hegel introduces the description of 
disappearance.  Despite Hegel‟s hope, the non-discursivity inherent in experience does 
not disappear as the trajectory of experience enters conceptuality.  Experiential non-
discursivity can only be said to disappear during pure (reason) contemplation.  That is, 
even in the full bloom of an experience where the bud has vanished, the stem of 
sensibility remains.  Hence, you may pick and enjoy the truth of the fruit, but in regard to 
the ground, it is the fruit that has vanished. 
       Returning to Kant‟s description of conceptual analysis, it will be helpful to 
reproduce Kant‟s Table of Categories here. 
 
 209 
 
Kant’s Transcendental Table of Categories (A 80/B 106)  
[Concepts of the Understanding]  
I. 
Categories of Quantity 
Unity 
Plurality 
Totality 
II.     III. 
Categories of Quality   Categories of Relation 
                    Reality                                           Of Inherence and Subsistence 
            Negation                        (Substance & Accident) 
               Limitation                                      Of Causality and Dependence                             
                                                                          (Cause & Effect) 
                                                          Of Community (Reciprocity      
                                                                            between Agent & Patient) 
IV. 
Categories of Modality 
Possibility - Impossibility 
Existence - Non-existence 
 Necessity - Contingency  
 
Figure 3.3  
Regarding Figure 3.3 – from the conceptual standpoint – Kant holds,  
If we abstract from all content of a judgment as such and 
pay attention only to the mere form of understanding in it, 
then we find that the function of thought in judgment can 
be brought under four headings, each containing under it 
three moments [my emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 70/B 95) 
Remember, it is from this standpoint of abstracting from all content that Kant constructs 
his “Transcendental Table of Concepts of the Understanding” (Proleg 55), i.e. Figure 3.2.  
The first heading of which is, of course, “Quantity.”  Kant explains, “the only use that the 
understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them [my emphasis].” 
(CPR 1996, A 68/B 93)  And, again, for Kant the discursive distinction is decisive.  Kant 
continues,  
But in such a judging, a concept is never referred directly to 
an object, because the only kind of representation that deals 
with its object directly is intuition.  Instead, the concept is 
referred directly to some other representation of the object 
(whether that representation be an intuition or itself already 
a concept).
349
 (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93) 
                                               
349 I have modified Pluhar‟s translation throughout by taking “representation” for “Vorstellung.” 
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Notice, of course, when Kant refers to intuition above, he is invoking the notion of non-
discursivity.  Hence, I am repeatedly showing you the difference between Kant and 
Hegel, i.e. the experiential and the conceptual, regarding non-being.   
Further, these three quotes just above are decisive for the issue Hegel will take 
with Kant.  I quote Kant here, then, so that as you read Hegel‟s supposed closure of 
discursivity below, you can recognize the interpretive violence Hegel performs on Kant‟s 
text.  Moreover, regarding these quotes, Kant is, in fact, preparing to show how 
conceptual analysis works.  Beginning with the point of an initial judgment Kant is 
maneuvering to show the relationship between the transcendental object = x and the 
concepts which explicate it.  That is, Kant is attempting to describe the process of 
deriving further concepts from an analysis of the transcendental object = x.  Recall, this 
=x is produced by imagination, and either schematizes the categories when thinking of an 
absent object or determines the appearances associated – though not exhaustively – in 
reproductive imagination when experiencing an object. Furthermore, keep in mind each 
move involved in explicating the =x is an analytic judgment.  It is as if Hegel wishes to 
make synthetic a posteriori judgments – the judgments which contain the non-discursive 
for Kant – out to ultimately be analytic judgments.     
Consider now Kant‟s example: “In every judgment there is a concept that holds 
for many [representations], and, among them, comprises also a given representation that 
is referred directly to the objects, e.g. in the judgment, All bodies are divisible [Kant‟s 
emphasis].”  (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93)  Kant explains his example stating,  
[T]he concept of the divisible refers to various other 
concepts; but among these, it is here referred specifically to 
the concept of body, and the concept of body is referred in 
turn to certain appearances that we encounter.  Hence, 
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these objects are represented indirectly through the concept 
of divisibility.  Accordingly, all judgments are functions of 
unity among our representations.  For instead of cognizing 
the object by means of a direct representation, we do so by 
means of a higher representation comprising both this 
direct [intuitive] representation and several other 
representations; and we thereby draw many possible 
cognitions together into one. (CPR 1996, A 68-69/B 93-94) 
To be sure, Kant thinks he has just described (discursive) thinking.  He says, “thought is 
cognition through concepts; and concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, refer to 
some representation of an as yet undetermined object.” (CPR 1996, A 68-69/B 93-94)  In 
support of Hegel‟s reading, the as yet undetermined object may be taken to refer to the =x 
as schema merely for thought.  However, given my emphases in the lengthier quote prior, 
non-discursivity does not reside merely in the undetermined nature of the object.   
What is more, Kant seems to consider this example within the experiential scope, 
as if analyzing a synthetic a posteriori judgment.  For example, in judging “All bodies 
are divisible” you recognize a quantity of appearances just as much as you recognize an 
appearance of a body.  In other words, in the categorical judgment “All bodies are 
divisible” “bodies,” as the subject of the judgment is being used to determine a plurality 
of appearances.  Notice, this explication is now taking place within the purview of the 
conceptual standpoint, as evidenced by the fact that Kant has entered into the Square of 
Opposition.  He is not talking here about a totality of impressions unified in an 
appearance, as I discussed in the previous chapter.  Rather, this is already a judgment of 
the “I” type from the Square of Opposition.  Therefore, this analytic judgment is vying 
for objective validity in thinking about the quantity of appearances you have recognized 
as a body.   
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Put another way within the Kantian terminology, “body,” here, is heuristic not 
ostensive.  The distinction being that the concept (body) “indicates not what the character 
of an object is, but how we ought, under this concept‟s guidance, to search for the 
character and connection of experiential objects.” (CPR 1996, A 671/B 699)  So, in this 
case, body – not beings, boxes, spheres, animals, vehicles, etc. – indicates how one ought 
to search amongst the encountered appearances so as to think about the experience of 
them.  At this point, i.e. without the predicate, of course, the object is still not determined 
with universal validity – despite the heuristic concept in the subject position of the 
judgment.  The predicate then inserts the object – by being in the predicate position – into 
the Square of Opposition.  In this case, as a categorical judgment of the “A” type, i.e. all 
bodies are divisible.   
Kant, then, shows how further judgments may become involved in the process of 
conceptual specification by moving the subject term from the initial judgment to the 
predicate position, i.e. replacing the =x with the concept from the subject term in the 
initial judgment.  Kant illustrates this staying with his example in stating, “Thus the 
concept of body signifies something – e.g. metal – that can be cognized through that 
concept. … Therefore the concept of body is the predicate for a possible judgment, e.g. 
the judgment that every metal is a body.” (CPR 1996, A 69/B 94)  From this Kant 
concludes, “Therefore we can find all of the functions of the understanding if we can 
exhibit completely the functions of unity in judgments.” (CPR 1996, A 69/B 94)  Hence, 
when in the Transcendental Dialectic Kant addresses the antinomies regarding the “origin 
of the world” – the material of the dispute with Hegel regarding the thing-in-itself – Kant 
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will mobilize the fruits of all the above labor to justify his agnosticism toward the thing-
in-itself as origin beyond the bounds of experience. 
As evidenced by what Kant says (above) about the subject term in a judgment and 
what Hegel says about Kant‟s description of intuitive cognition (also above), Kant and 
Hegel agree that the act of identification is conceptual.  Yet, Kant and Hegel disagree in 
regard to the work involved in experiential identifications.  And, this disagreement is 
most striking in regard to space – the outer sense and first of the components in the 
trajectory of experience which may be used to identity an object of experience.  What is 
at stake in regard to experiential identification is the experiential standpoint itself.  Put 
another way, if Hegel succeeds in collapsing the Kantian discursive/non-discursive 
distinction, then with this leveling a way of seeing in the structure of experience is lost.  
Without the discursive/non-discursive distinction, the experiential standpoint is just the 
conceptual standpoint as initially confused.  Having, then, discussed Kant above, I will 
discuss Hegel further below before making my final comparison. 
    Returning to the Science of Logic, Hegel tells us that thinking, “in its reception 
and formation of material does not go outside itself.” (SL 45)  Rather, according to Hegel 
thinking accomplishes this work by modifying “its own self, it does not result in thought 
becoming the other of itself.” (SL 45)  Invoking Kant, Hegel continues, “In its relation to 
the object, therefore, thinking does not go out of itself to the object; this, as thing-in-
itself, remains a sheer beyond of thought.” (SL 45)  Now, Hegel himself was thinking 
when he arrived at the above conclusions regarding thinking.  So, with an inference 
whose conclusion begs the question (Petitio Principii) by being merely the assumption 
with which he began, Hegel concludes: “such an abstraction as the thing-in-itself is itself 
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only a product of thought.” (SL 62)  And, thereby, Hegel announced the closure of 
discursivity.  That is, any positing of an outside of thought must itself take place within 
thought; therefore, the outside of thought is inside thought.  In reading the following 
obscure remarks by Hegel, remembering Hegel‟s assumption of the so-called closure of 
discursivity will help provide clarity. 
To go further, it might be helpful to go over what Hegel is suggesting by using 
Kant‟s language.  Hegel is pointing out that when thinking occurs, concepts do not go 
outside of the understanding.  This claim is essentially tautological, i.e. the concepts of 
the understanding are in the understanding.  Yet, it must be admitted, this claim is also 
consistent with Kant‟s structure of experience, i.e. concepts of the understanding are in 
the understanding.  Since non-discursivity is at stake, consider an example from Kant 
including non-discursivity: Kant holds that the unity resulting from the productive 
imagination‟s production of the transcendental object =x works in more than one way.  
On the one hand, the objective =x culminates an object of experience in a judgment of 
experience, and thereby constitutes the experiential standpoint including non-discursivity.  
On the other hand, the objective =x initiates conceptual analysis as the subject term in an 
analytic judgment, and thereby constitutes the totally discursive conceptual standpoint.   
Remember, you find the experiential standpoint (1) when the objective =x 
culminates an object of experience in a judgment of experience; you find the conceptual 
standpoint (2) when the objective =x initiates conceptual analysis as the subject term in 
an analytic judgment; and, you find the apperceptive standpoint (3) at the copula of these 
judgments.  The experiential standpoint regards non-being; the conceptual standpoint 
regards not-being; and, the apperceptive standpoint may regard either non-being or not-
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being.  Yet in all cases, the =x results from the original source of imagination.  Even in an 
experiential case including non-discursivity – here is Hegel‟s point –, whatever you end 
up thinking about is initially the product of a power of the mind, i.e. imagination.  As 
Hegel would have it, then, thinking does not go outside itself. 
Trailing Hegel here to see where he leads, what Hegel has done is to deny Kant‟s 
distinction between different negations.  The only negation there can be for Hegel now is 
logical negation, i.e. discursive negation.  In other words, Hegel has barred the use of 
(Kant‟s real) negation upon the notion of discursivity, i.e. there is no non-discursivity, 
unless you consider the non-discursive to itself be discursive.  And, of course, if you do 
so, then there is no need to speak of non-discursivity.  This is how Hegel has closed 
discursivity.  Further, it is in the wake of an assumed closure of discursivity, then, that 
Hegel is able to make pronouncements about the “identity of identity and non-identity.” 
(SL 74)  And, it is within this context that he is disputing both Kant‟s assertions 
regarding identification and Kant‟s humility in regard to the “origin of the world.”  For 
his contribution to the dispute with Kant Hegel states, “When substance, matter, space, 
time, etc., are taken only as discrete, they are absolutely divided; their principle is the 
one.  When they are taken as continuous, this one is only a sublated one.” (SL 197)     
Hegel clarifies his above quote by invoking concepts of the understanding as 
listed in Kant‟s table, i.e. Figure 2.3.  According to Hegel,  
Quantity [latently] contains the two moments of continuity 
and discreteness.  It is to be posited in both of them as 
determinations of itself.  It is already their immediate unity, 
that is, quantity is posited as first only in one of its 
determinations, continuity, and as such is continuous 
magnitude. (SL 199)  
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Hegel goes on, “Or we may say that continuity is indeed one of the moments of quantity 
which requires the other moment, discreteness, to complete it.” (SL 199)  What Hegel is 
rehearsing here is the movement through Kant‟s concepts of the understanding in the 
order of their moments, i.e. Quantity to Quality.  However, Hegel‟s innovation which 
makes this movement more Hegelian than Kantian is an operation that precisely imitates 
what happened to the thing-in-itself in the retroactive motion of the closure of 
discursivity.  In other words, Hegel will have solved the problem of the origin of the 
world by encountering every objection as if it were merely the other half of a binary 
opposition which can be traced back to the origin from which the split – into binary 
opposites – derived.  That is, for Hegel, the Quantity =x is conceptual, and as conceptual 
it is dichastic, i.e. capable of spontaneously subdividing.   
If you were to attempt to move from the origin to the binary opposition you might 
observe this process as Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) described it, “purely observe each 
concept until it starts moving, until it becomes unidentical with itself by virtue of its own 
meaning – in other words, of its identity.”350  Adorno‟s description captures what occurs 
in conceptual analysis, i.e. a concept is taken apart.  When predicating the concepts 
derived from analysis to each other, the result is a tautology.  Now, I stressed in Chapter 
2 that from the experiential standpoint you must start at the bottom of the categories of 
Quantity, since experience passes into the categories of Quantity as a totality of 
impressions.  However, Hegel is treating these categories from the standpoint of the 
conceptual, as evidenced by his consideration of explication from the moment of 
Quantity in general.  Hence, for Hegel, beginning with the =x from the productive 
imagination, then, means beginning with a Quantity, and – invoking Adorno‟s description 
                                               
350 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, E.B. Ashton Pluhar, tr. (New York: Continuum, 2005), 156. 
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here – Hegel observes the bud of Quantity as it dichastically specifies itself blossoming 
through analysis.     
As Schopenhauer accuses, the perplexity here derives from Hegel‟s, perhaps 
purposefully, obscure description.  Kant‟s language, I think, seeks to be less obscure.  
Notice, once the =x is analyzed into two concepts the reality of the unity of the Quantity 
of concepts has changed.  You now have plurality by way of negation, i.e. two concepts 
instead of one.  Focusing on the matter this way, you can say the concepts are different 
from one another – after all they are two.  Yet, focusing on the identity of the concept, 
you can say they are one – after all the two came from one, and their meaning is identical.  
Here is the “identity of identity and non-identity.” (SL 74)  Perhaps this is what Arthur 
Schopenhauer had in mind when he said,  
[L]ike a man who sits some time in the conjurer‟s booth at 
a fair, and witnesses the performance twice or thrice in 
succession.  The tricks were meant to be seen only once; 
and when they are no longer a novelty and cease to deceive, 
their effect is gone.
351
   
On the one hand, Schopenhauer and I take the same issue with Hegel, no matter how that 
issue is articulated it is ultimately Hegel‟s closure of discursivity.  On the other hand, 
Schopenhauer, Hegel and I are all in agreement that the thing-in-itself is unsatisfactory.  
Moreover, all three of us read the thing-in-itself as a response to the problem of non-
being.  Following Kant, Schopenhauer and Hegel seem keenly aware that non-being must 
be accounted for if full systematicity is to be achieved.  Yet, and this perhaps accounts for 
the obscurity of Hegel‟s language, Hegel seems to sacrifice all to method.  As I will show 
below Hegel is consistent in his depiction of dichastasis, i.e. spontaneous conceptual 
analysis.  However, the method is a retreat to the pure contemplation of contemplation, 
                                               
351 Arthur Schopenhauer, The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer, T. Bailey Saunders, tr. (Charleston: 
Bibliolife, 2009), 341-342. 
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which though perhaps correct about contemplation cannot venture beyond mere pointing 
and cannot even account for that toward which it points other than by pointing back at the 
pointing.     
So, Schopenhauer‟s rants against Hegel highlight the fact that Hegel‟s language, 
whether intentionally or not, seems to cover over not only the fact that Kant already 
sketched the beginnings of Hegel systematic logic regarding the “concepts of reflection,” 
but also that Kant already indicated that Hegel‟s use of conceptuality is amphibolous.  
And, as Kant explains “transcendental amphiboly” is “a confusion of a pure object of 
understanding with appearance.” (CPR 1996, A 270/B 326)  Hegel is most certainly 
guilty of this.  As Schopenhauer put it,     
[If] the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-
itself, and hence the doctrine of the complete diversity of 
the ideal from the real, is the fundamental characteristic of 
the Kantian philosophy [as Schopenhauer holds that it is], 
then the assertion of the absolute identity of these two … 
was a return to the crudeness of the common view, masked 
under the imposing impression of an air of importance, 
under bombast and nonsense.  It became the worthy 
starting-point of even grosser nonsense of the ponderous 
and witless Hegel. (WWI 418-419) 
Hence, Hegel‟s controversial move is to work the logic of the ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. 
hypokeimenon, backward.  This is, of course, controversial because – it begs the question 
– the hypokeimenonally revealed “one” was a supposition, but Hegel treats it as evidence. 
Consider a passage from Hegel‟s Phenomenology of Spirit which begins with a 
claim regarding the necessary determination of things in experience and ends with the 
elimination of all things non-discursive:  
§126, “The conceptual necessity of the experience through 
which consciousness discovers that the Thing is 
demolished by the very determinateness that constitutes its 
essence and its being-for-self, can be summarized as 
 219 
 
follows.  The Thing is posited as being for itself, or as the 
absolute negation of all otherness, therefore as purely self-
related negation; but the negation that is self-related is the 
suspension of itself; in other words, the Thing has its 
essential being in another Thing [Hegel‟s emphases]. (PS 
76) 
 
Die Notwendigkeit der Erfahrung für das Bewusstsein, dass 
das Ding eben durch die Bestimmtheit, welche sein Wesen 
und sein Für-sich-seyn ausmacht, zugrunde geht, kann kurz 
dem einfachen Begriffe nach so betrachtet werden.  Das 
Ding ist gesetzt als Für-sich-seyn, oder als absolute 
Negation alles Andersseins; daher absolute, nur sich auf 
sich beziehende Negation; aber die sich auf sich 
beziehende Negation ist Aufheben seiner selbst, oder sein 
Wesen in einem andern zu haben.
352
 
Here Hegel defers the positing of the thing-in-itself to the process of determination, and 
the process of determination to the conceptual necessity of dichastasis, i.e. both the 
necessity as spontaneous and the necessity as logical outcome of conceptual 
specification.  From here, the thing-in-itself represents more a Hegelian moment in the 
process of conceptual analysis than a Kantian relation in the structure of experience.  The 
necessity involved in the dichastasis which posited the thing-in-itself, then, “demolishes” 
the thing-in-itself as the being posited of non-being.  Hence, the being for itself of the 
thing-in-itself cancels itself in the being of (the Parmenidean) One-being through 
reflective sublation [Aufhebung].   
Now notice, with what Hegel calls the thing [das Ding] above, he correctly 
identifies Kant‟s thing-in-itself as Kant‟s structural indication of nihil negativum, i.e. 
what Hegel here refers to as absolute negation.  Hegel, then, much like the Eleatic visitor 
from Plato‟s Sophist points out that in the conceptual determination of experience this 
non-being is being said, i.e. being posited as a thing-in-itself.  Here comes the closure of 
discursivity again.  Hence, as being (posited) this non-being [das Ding] is “being for 
                                               
352 G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun. GmbH & Co., 1987), 100. 
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itself.”  Voilà what Hegel has just accomplished in two sentences is the closure of being 
along with the closure of non-discursivity.   
Put another way, by accentuating the being posited of non-being as being for 
itself, Hegel moved from III to IV in Kant‟s Table of Nothing.  He, then, equates IV with 
II, and steps back to I.   See Figure 2.2.  The problem with all this is that Hegel misses 
what I have referred to as the paradoxical nature – or second impasse – of the problem of 
non-being.  That is, regarding Kant‟s Table of Nothing, Hegel misses that II can only be 
equated with IV in thought alone.  Hegel‟s trick here is the assumption of the closure of 
discursivity such that IV necessarily becomes II since the difference between the two, i.e. 
non-discursivity, has been eliminated from the equation.  What is more, Hegel‟s 
amphiboly is fortified by being only testable conceptually.   
Of this fortification Schopenhauer accuses the “serving up sheer nonsense … such 
as had previously been heard only in madhouses, [which] finally appeared in Hegel.” 
(WWI 429)  In fact, Schopenhauer found it so detestable he suggested, “If I were to call 
to mind the way in which Hegel and his companions have misused such wide and empty 
abstractions, I should necessarily be afraid that both the reader and I would be ill.” (WWI 
84)  Furthermore, it is worth noting that when Schopenhauer “stoops” to ad hominem 
attack of Hegel, despite the criticism Schopenhauer sometimes receives for it, he is 
actually following Aristotle‟s direction to the letter.353  That is, given Hegel‟s suggestion 
that the starting point of dialectic can both be and not be, Schopenhauer is within 
traditional standard bounds when he provides an ad hominem description
354
 of Hegel‟s 
                                               
353 Cf. Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. “Aristotle, Hegel, and Argumentum Ad Hominem,” Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly, 15.75, (1985), 135 & 140-143. 
354 “There is a principle in things, about which we cannot be deceived, but must always, on the contrary, 
recognize the truth,  – viz. that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be, or admit of 
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philosophy as “empty bombast” and of Hegel as a “repulsive philosophaster.” (WWII 84) 
Hence, Hegel‟s mistake is not dialectical method itself – as is sometimes suggested – but 
its misapplication, i.e. mistaking the experiential standpoint for the conceptual.  
What is important to recognize in Schopenhauer‟s repulsion is that it is possible to 
make Hegel‟s move – perform his trick –, consider it merely in thought – such as Kant 
(above) in his discussion of the “concepts of reflection” –, and stop short of claiming all 
non-discursivity to have been demolished.  In fact, this is precisely the strategy 
Schopenhauer suggested, “matter never appears otherwise than with the visible, that is to 
say, under the veil of form and quality [Schopenhauer‟s emphasis]”; as such, “it is never 
immediately apprehended, but is always only added in thought as that which is identical 
in all things under every variety of quality.” (WWII 311)  This as part of Schopenhauer‟s 
strategy is why these last two quotes from Schopenhauer make him sound like he is in 
complete agreement with Kant regarding the experiential standpoint – he, of course, is 
not.  Yet, within the pure understanding, i.e. from the conceptual standpoint, both Hegel 
and Schopenhauer are pushing Kant‟s, i.e. Aristotle‟s, logic.  The problem Schopenhauer 
takes with Hegel here is that it is as if Hegel‟s Grundkraft is the pure understanding.  
And, as such the circularity of Hegel‟s logic collapses the experiential into the conceptual 
standpoint.   
Neither Hegel‟s commentators nor Hegel himself seem interested in denying the 
circularity of his logic or his equating of the experiential with the conceptual.  Joseph C. 
Flay attempts to defend Hegel‟s decision to provide such a reading of Kant by quoting 
Kant himself.  Flay conjectures, “As Kant had also said, but Hegel now gives its strongest 
                                                                                                                                            
any other similar pair of opposites.  About such matters there is no proof in the full sense, though there is 
proof ad hominem.” (Meta 1995,1062a19-22) 
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interpretation: „What the things-in-themselves may be I do not know, nor do I need to 
know, since a thing can never come before me except in appearance.‟”355  Hence, Flay‟s 
contorting of Kant is as myopic as Hegel‟s “strong” interpretation is amphibolous.  
Another Hegel commentator Richard D. Winfield lists six general features of “The 
Method of Hegel‟s Science of Logic.” Of the six general features of Hegel‟s method, the 
following three are sufficient to support a reading of Hegel as solely working within the 
confines of the conceptual standpoint: “the form of logical development is in unity with 
its content,” “the movement of categories is circular, such that the advance from the 
starting point is equally a regress,” and “the development has its own method as its final 
result.”356   
To cite just enough of the examples from Hegel‟s work for a reader to recognize 
Hegel‟s exclusive embrace of the pure understanding; “the object is revealed to it by 
something alien … it does not recognize itself.” (PS 466, §771)  Further, “The 
understanding [my emphasis] does not, however, realize that all these dissolving 
distinctions are merely the internal maneuvers of its own self-consciousness.” (PS 518, 
fn. §771)  “Reason conceals the inner necessity of its own proceedings, and locates it in 
the objects that it is studying. [Yet] … there is a distinction which is really no distinction: 
teleology is in the organism, and Reason in the thing studied [my emphasis].” (PS 351, 
fn. §259)  Lastly, “The „beautiful soul‟ is its own knowledge of itself in its pure, 
transparent unity – the self-consciousness that knows this pure knowledge of pure 
inwardness as Spirit.  It is not only the intuition of the Divine but the Divine‟s intuition of 
itself.” (PS 483, fn. §795)      
                                               
355 Joseph C. Flay, “Hegel‟s „Inverted World‟,” The Review of Metaphysics, 23.4, (1970), 676. 
356 Richard Dien Winfield, “The Method of Hegel‟s Science of Logic,” Essays on Hegel’s Logic, George di 
Giovanni, ed. (New York: SUNY Press, 1990), 45.  
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The problem with all this is that, as I have repeatedly stressed about the non-
discursive, there is an excessivity that conceptuality cannot capture or contain.  In regard 
to experience, the concept of totality requires that a limiting must have already taken 
place, and this limiting must be non-conceptual.  This can be illustrated by combining 
two negatives which do not make a positive, i.e. the fallacy of amphiboly plus the fallacy 
of slippery slope: If I were to tell you that I was going to eat every slice of bread in a 
whole loaf, you might think me gluttonous or underfed.  If I were to tell you I was going 
to eat every slice of bread in a bread store, you might think me misguided or upset with 
the bread store personnel.  If I were to tell you I was going to eat every slice of bread on 
the planet, you might think me jesting.  If I were to tell you I was going to eat every slice 
of bread ever created from the dawn of bread slices, you might think me a fool.  If I, then, 
explained to you that as sublated spirit I am the eternal bread eating force in the world, 
and therefore not only have I, as such, already eaten every slice of bread since the dawn 
of bread slices; but also that you are me and each slice of bread you eat is truly being 
eaten by me too, then you might think I had been reading Hegel.  Yet, if I actually 
believed this, I would starve to death; though, of course, this death would be a death that 
is not really death at all, since it is both life and death, etc.  Hence, the point of my 
illustration: even in a simple slice of bread, there is more than can be grasped by the 
mind, no matter how long you contemplate it.    
So, in regard to non-being Hegel has returned to the first impasse since negation 
in Hegel‟s system is only logical, i.e. discursive negation.  This is why Adorno claims, 
“The structure of his [Hegel‟s] system would unquestionably fall without the principle 
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that to negate negation is positive.”357  When you deny the difference between the – 
plurality of – the two concepts derived from analysis, then Hegel has it that you arrive 
back at the one concept from whose analysis the two derived.  There is no – what Kant 
called – real negation.  Hegel takes negation to be qualitative and retrospection or 
sublation to be determinative ostensively, not heuristically.  Further, notice how this goes 
toward the closure of discursivity.  The first moment of Quantity, as =x, may seem other 
than discursive because it is not yet specified.  However, the retroactive motion derived 
from the negation of negation, i.e. the movement from Quality back to Quantity, unifies 
the product of analysis, i.e. conceptual specification, so as to suggest the origin was 
always already this unification. See Figure 2.3.  On the one hand, support for this 
conclusion regarding the origin derives from the following notion: Had the origin not 
been this unification prior to specification, then the specification would not have been 
such as to lead back to it.  On the other hand, notice how Hegel‟s movement here is air 
tight, and the reason the movement is air tight is because it is purely logical.  Here, then, 
is another telltale sign that he has embraced the conceptual standpoint at the cost of the 
experiential standpoint.   
Any lingering obscurity can be further cleared up by discussing the juxtaposition 
of the following two paradoxical passages.  Hegel declares,  
The beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing from 
which something is to proceed; therefore being, too, is 
already contained in the beginning.  The beginning, 
therefore, contains both, being and nothing, is the unity of 
being and nothing; or is non-being which is at the same 
time being, and being which is at the same time non-being. 
(SL 199)  
                                               
357 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 160. 
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Now, this can seem quite perplexing until you decode it by applying the movement of the 
so-called closure of discursivity to it.  As such, you see that the first moment is not 
identified until the third moment or retrospection.  According to the logic of 
specification, then, Hegel is justified in his paradoxical remarks about the 
undifferentiated origin (first moment) in so far as the analysis of the origin in yielding 
(second moment) being and its negation, i.e. not-being, must have been both contained in 
the first moment revealed through retrospection (third moment) by way of the logic of 
specification.  With this in mind listen to what Hegel says next:  
[I]n the beginning, being and nothing are present as 
distinguished [Hegel‟s emphasis] from each other; for the 
beginning points to something else – it is a non-being 
which carries a reference to being [my emphasis] as to an 
other; that which begins, as yet is not [Hegel‟s emphasis], it 
is only on the way to being.  The being contained in the 
beginning is, therefore, a being which removes itself from 
non-being or sublates it as something opposed to it. (SL 73-
74) 
Here, Hegel is pointing out that the “world” of everyday dwelling is qualitative.  Hence, 
the “beginning” takes place – in accord with Kant‟s Categories – regarding the 
Categories of Quality.  This is already – using the above language – at the second 
moment of explication.  That is, the being of your dwelling is specific being – Heidegger 
might call it “inauthentic” –, and in negating the negation from which your specific 
dwelling comes forth, you return to the undifferentiated – “authentic” – being which as 
retrospective third moment is the origin of such grandeur as to contain both being and 
non-being.  Remember, this all works out logically.  It is as if Hegel is constructing a map 
for the fruit to retrace its steps back to the bud.  Yet, as the adage goes, the map is not the 
territory.  This non-being “located” – in a loose sense – as always already coupled with 
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being in the origin, and to which the logical retrospection provides a clearing, remains 
merely the thought of non-being.  
To provide an everyday example, then, suppose you are standing in the rain.  Now 
suppose further we start our experiential series at the point of impact between a drop of 
rain and your skin.  The initial impact registers a magnitude =x, a quantity of – Je ne sais 
pas – call it =x.  Moving up the series you identify it as wet (it is not dry), cold (it is not 
warm), and so on in identifying it as rain.  Tracing this thought so as to sketch it with the 
rhetoric of science, I might say – recalling the Adorno description above – you observe 
the moving concept of quantity specifying-ly split into binary opposites and identify 
itself.  Hegel’s trick here is like a metaphysical shell game.   
Here, then, is a schematic rendition of Hegel‟s metaphysical shell game: Hegel 
suggests Quantity is the unnoticed – because unidentified and undifferentiated – 
beginning.  And, he uses this suggestion to support his claim that the noticed – because 
identified and differentiated – beginning is Quality, not Quantity.  If you cannot see this 
yet, you will see it in the way Hegel finishes the passage.  Hegel concludes, “that which 
begins already is, but is also just as much not yet.  The opposites, being and non-being, 
are therefore in immediate union in it; or the beginning is their undifferentiated unity 
[Hegel‟s emphasis].”358  “It,” of course, refers to “that which begins” unnoticed in the 
previous quote.  So you see this is what is meant by “the identity of identity and non-
identity.”  Hence, here is Hegel‟s trick again, “unity,” is logically correct – despite un-
differentiated-ness – since the retrospective move is one of convergence from binary 
opposites to their origin – playing the logic of the ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon 
                                               
358 G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, George di Giovanni, tr. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 51. 
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backward.  In this way, Hegel supports the claim that the origin is discursive.  So, 
omniscience – absolute knowledge – is a possibility within the confines of this veritable 
“intellectual system of the world,” (CPR A 270/B 326) which Kant rejected.   
In fact, Hegel‟s trick can be applied to characterize Hegel‟s reading of Kant to 
suggest that what Hegel hopes to accomplish is to sublate Kant‟s structure of experience.  
If Hegel can treat the two stems of sensibility and understanding as opposed because they 
are in the second moment of an analytic movement, then Hegel will be able to justify a 
claim that the further specification of the sensible stem never leaves the purview of that 
to which the stems are sublated.  By way of the “identity of identity and non-identity” 
Hegel can justify that despite the fact that he is working in conceptual isolation, for him 
the conceptual standpoint is identical with the experiential standpoint.  It is merely at the 
qualitative level in which the opposition between sensibility and understanding emerge 
from the quantitative level of absolute Being (the Parmenidean One-being), and hence, 
why in the qualitative level “it does not recognize itself.” (PS 103)  Strange, who would 
have thought beatific vision to require so much logical inference?   
Before drawing a conclusion and moving on to discuss how pure difference fits 
into Hegel‟s system, I apply the work spent decoding and critiquing Hegel‟s system 
above to a celebrated passage from Hegel‟s Phenomenology of Spirit quoted here at 
length.  
[T]he Understanding experiences only itself.  Raised above 
perception, consciousness exhibits itself closed in a unity 
with the supersensible world through the mediating term of 
appearance, through which it gazes into this background.  
The two extremes, the one, of the pure inner world, the 
other, that of the inner being gazing into this pure inner 
world, have now coincided, an just as they, qua extremes, 
have vanished, so too the middle term, as something other 
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than these extremes, has also vanished.  This curtain 
hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn away, 
and we have the inner being gazing into the inner world … 
self-consciousness.  It is manifest that behind the so-called 
curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there 
is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves. (PS 
103) 
I will comment on this quote while also summing my above comments on Hegel.  Putting 
Hegel‟s quote another way, the above indicates a number of the points I have already 
made about Hegel.  First, if the understanding experiences only itself, then in Kantian 
terms, this is not really “experience” at all, rather it is understanding.  Perhaps Hegel‟s 
analytic should be characterized as “understanding understanding understanding.”359   As 
I suggested above, this is due to leveling the discursive/non-discursive distinction and 
with it the experiential standpoint.  In other words, Hegel‟s metaphysical shell game, i.e. 
Hegel‟s trick, transforms Kantian humility into Kantian (put favorably) confusion, but at 
the cost of the experiential standpoint.  Second, the “curtain” in the Hegel quote is to be 
equated with “appearance” in Kant.  As such, we experience both the curtain and 
appearance first in both Kant and Hegel.  Whereas, however, with Kant the thing-in-itself 
is said to be behind (the curtain of) appearance, Hegel – taking appearance as the level of 
quality in a series to be extended toward further and further clarity – has it that this 
“stepping back” behind the curtain, as it were, leads to a fully intelligible, i.e. discursive 
destination.   
Third, since this fully intelligible destination is always being identified 
retrospectively, as it were, the retrospective determination is a type of contamination.  
That is, prior to the retrospection this destination enjoys – as Hegel might say – the purity 
of being undifferentiated.  In the process, then, of retrospective differentiation, i.e. 
                                               
359 I mean this primarily as mnemonic reference to comments concerning Aristotle and Kant. 
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returning from the land of identity (on the other side of the curtain), the purity of the 
undifferentiated gets contaminated by whatever qualities were encountered in the land of 
identity.  Lastly, in regard to the problem of non-being, Hegel‟s strategy is to retreat to 
the first perplexity of the problem of non-being, and – donning purely logical plumes – 
claim to have solved Plato‟s Puzzle.  Yet, in regard to Plato‟s Puzzle – at best – Hegel has 
a sophisticated version of not-being.  Hence, neither Hegel nor Kant solved Plato‟s 
Puzzle, and I believe Kant was closer than Hegel to a solution – arriving at the second 
perplexity of the problem – because he had gained the ground of the experiential 
standpoint. 
Coming to Grips with Hegel 
 
“But it can hardly be doubted that Hegel found in the Parmenides, and to a less extent in the 
Sophist and Philebus, the basis of his dialectical logic.”360 
~J. Glenn Gray 
 
The section title – coming to grips361 – comes from a statement attributed to 
Heidegger from The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.  There discussing “the „is‟” 
Heidegger calls for a shift from the conceptual to the apperceptive standpoint noting,  
The problem will make no further progress as long as logic 
itself has not been taken back again into ontology, as long 
as Hegel – who, in contrast, dissolved ontology into logic – 
is not comprehended.  And this means always that Hegel 
must be overcome … This overcoming of Hegel is the 
intrinsically necessary step in the development of Western 
philosophy which must be made for it to remain at all 
alive.
362
 
   
                                               
360 J. Glenn Gray, Hegel and Greek Thought, (Evanston: Harper & Row, 1941), 81. 
361 Cf. Tom Rockmore, “Analytic Philosophy and the Hegelian Turn,” The Review of Metaphysics, 55.2, 
(2001), 339. 
362 Heidegger, The Basic Problem, 178. 
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This section of the chapter, then, pertains to the 20
th
 century coming to grips with Hegel 
which will bridge the Kantian thing-in-itself with notions of pure difference.  All that 
remains, then, in regard to establishing the preliminaries is to clarify the notions of 
language, retrospective differentiation, contamination, and pure difference on the way to 
Derrida and Deleuze.  In order to clarify these notions, therefore, I will briefly examine 
Alexandre Kojève (1902-1968) and Jean Hyppolite (1907-1968) here, and examine 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) in the next 
chapter.  I will begin with language.  Describing Alexandre Kojève‟s reading of Hegel, 
Daniel Selcer states,  
It is the very totality of being that is negated by the 
discursive gesture of the understanding.  Language does not 
merely negate singularity; it is the negative in general.  
Thus the labor of the negative is a discursive work; it is 
language that separates and recombines entities in such a 
manner as to annihilate the given [Selcer‟s emphasis].363   
Selcer‟s description further emphasizes and clarifies a number of changes to Kant‟s 
trajectory of experience in the writing of Hegel. First, as indicated in the movement from 
unity (Quantity) to reality and negation (Quality) in the “discursive gesture of the 
understanding,” language – though “the negative” – remains within being.  Selcer‟s 
emphasis of “is” indicates that the negation is not a negation of being.  Second, as the 
labor of the negative is a discursive work, negation cannot access an opening in 
discursivity, i.e. there is no non-discursivity.  Lastly, the discursive gesture of the 
understanding which moves under the sign of “language” is said to annihilate the given.  
The given, of course, in the Kantian structure of experience is all that comes before the 
                                               
363 Daniel J. Selcer, “The Discursivity Of The Negative: Kojève On Language In Hegel,” Animus 5 (2000): 
181-191. 
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understanding, namely the experiential standpoint.  Hence, in the writing of Hegel the 
Kantian experiential standpoint has vanished. 
Originally published in 1952, Jean Hyppolite‟s Logic and Existence [Logique et 
existence] emphasizes Hegel‟s elimination of the experiential standpoint; in so far as 
Hyppolite‟s text seeks to make Hegel‟s text relevant for more than just thinking.  
According to Hyppolite,  
Experience and the Logos are not opposed.  The discourse 
of experience and the discourse of being, the a posteriori 
and the a priori, correspond to one another and mutually 
require one another.  There would be no possible 
experience without the presupposition of absolute 
knowledge, but the path of experience points ahead to 
absolute knowledge.
364
   
Notice, the first sentence by Hyppolite in the above quote announces he will be providing 
a (re)interpretation of Hegel that seems more Kantian than the Hegel I have been 
depicting so far.  In fact, according to Leonard Lawlor, “Hyppolite‟s non-reductionistic 
interpretation of the relation between the phenomenology and the logic effectively ended 
the simple anthropological interpretation of Hegel popularized by Kojève before World 
War II.” (LE viii)  Hyppolite notes, “Speculative knowledge is simultaneously the 
intuitive understanding that Kant attributed to God, and the discursive understanding that 
he reserved for man.  Speculative logic is the dialectical discourse which contains these 
three moments within itself.” (LE 70)  In this way, according to Hyppolite, “Absolute 
thought thinks itself in our thought.  In our thought, being presents itself as thought and 
as sense.” (LE 58)  Now, the three moments to which Hyppolite draws the attention of his 
reader above are: the intuitive, the understanding, and the dialectical discourse.  These 
terms are analogous to other trinities in Hegel‟s Science of Logic.  Notice, in each of the 
                                               
364 Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen, tr. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 
36.  Hereafter cited as LE. 
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following trinities, the third term signifies the difference between the first two.  To name 
just a few of the trinities:  (1) Being, Essence, and Concept; (2) Being, Nothingness, and 
Becoming; (3) Nature, Logos, and Spirit; (4) Identity, Difference, and Contradiction (5) 
Diversity, Essential Difference, and Absolute (pure) Difference.   
According to Hyppolite, “Being, Essence, Concept constitute the three instincts of 
the Logos, the three circles which reproduce at different levels the same fundamental 
theme.” (LE 169)  In this way, the movement of the Logos is the thinking of “absolute 
thought” in “our thought.”  And, before looking at how Hyppolite describes the 
movement in the constitution of Logos, a look at what he says about the second trinity is 
helpful.  Hyppolite says,  
The Absolute is not a form or a content; if this distinction is 
maintained, then it is valid only for empirical 
consciousness which does not grasp each content of 
thought as the differential of its integral.  It is the 
inadequation of the determinate content that turns it into a 
moment.  Because it contradicts itself it becomes [my 
emphasis].” (LE 91) 
So, already here is the movement of determination through the three moments of the 
trinity, which ultimately constitutes the retroactive determination of the (undifferentiated) 
content of the first moment (noted in Hegel above).  Starting at the second moment, then, 
in the first trinity, Essence is the determination of that which distinguishes itself from 
itself.  Retrospectively, that which has distinguished itself from itself gets determined as 
Being, and the movement which retrospectively determines that which ultimately 
distinguished itself from itself by moving into Essence is (the dichastic movement of) 
Concept.  Once a term which connotes mobility is used in the third position of the trinity 
it is, perhaps, easier to decipher.  This will be the case with the next trinity, i.e. Being, 
Nothingness (Non-Being), and Becoming.  Remember, this is supposed to be the 
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description of a beatific vision.  What seems like the spontaneous conceptual analysis is 
supposed to be a vision of the mind of God working.   
Absolute – divine (non-discursive) thinking in Kant‟s language –, then, is 
supposed to be thinking in our thinking.  Yet, as Hyppolite‟s return to the sense of Kant 
would have it, our thinking is the reflection of God‟s thinking as nature.  Notice the 
sudden appropriateness again of quoting William Blake.  I might characterize this by 
saying: what Kant did to Leibniz, Hyppolite and the French are doing to Hegel, and the 
result may be seen by looking at the world as the unfolding of God‟s mind.  As such, I 
would ask: Is there anything sleeping in the abyss?  That is, you have seen what Hegel 
did to the thing-in-itself, how are the French philosophers reading the thing-in-itself at 
this point?  The answers can be found by examining these trinities.   
So, when that which distinguishes itself from itself distinguishes itself as Essence 
it does so by moving into (our) empirical consciousness and back out again.  This into 
and out of our empirical consciousness – according to Hegel and Hyppolite – all takes 
place within Being and is the movement of Logos.  The main difference here between 
Hegel and Hyppolite is that Hyppolite – in attempting to bring Kantian sensibility back 
into the trajectory of experience – has this movement occurring through the sensible 
world on its way to thought.  Tracing this movement backward, it is as if one moves out 
of, i.e. beyond, phenomenology and into the thinking of divine mind – Logos – which is 
thinking the world of which you are experiencing.  Oddly, Plato has returned with a 
vengeance.  The forms in the mind are now thrice removed from the forms in the mind of 
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God.  In fact, Hyppolite‟s rendition here is beginning to seem like a materialist rendition 
of Aristotle‟s God, i.e. thinking thinking thinking through matter.365   
Consider how Hyppolite describes the Logos,  
The seed, the initial cell is being, nothingness, becoming.  
Being is determined only by nothingness.  It is itself the 
nothingness of itself, as that will appear at the level of 
essence, because essence is the internal negation of the 
whole sphere of being. (LE 169)  
In plugging this trinity into my explication above: Being distinguishes itself from itself 
by moving into an empirical consciousness, but in doing so it contradicts itself by moving 
from divine to empirical consciousness.  Therefore it appears determined as the 
nothingness – its contradiction – which initiates the trajectory of experience.  This is like 
beginning the dialectical movement of the mind – stated in my Introduction – with an 
outside of the forms (located in individual mind).  Hence, this is a version of the 
dialectical option I entertained in the Introduction of considering the forms to be non-
being, i.e. “Nothingness,” in the language of this chapter.   
According to Hyppolite, “essence is appearance.  Essence is posited in 
appearance, that is, negated being, and there alone.” (LE 170)  Traversing appearance, 
Human thought grasps the essence completing this movement of Logos, and again, in 
order to think the undifferentiated we need to follow the movement which has 
differentiated it.  In doing this, we retrospectively determine the undifferentiated as 
Being.  The nothingness which initiated the trajectory is now being, and as Rockmore 
(above) put it from a Hegelian perspective, the two – being and nothingness – are 
“exactly the same.”  This divine movement, then, from undifferentiated to differentiated 
and back is the movement of becoming within being.  Notice the trinity here: being, 
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nothingness, becoming.  According to Hyppolite, “Nothingness is an immediate just as 
being is; the transition from being to nothingness, likewise from nothingness to being, is 
only a passage, becoming.” (LE 170)  The movement from material God through sense in 
experience into conceptual reflection moves by way of a series of negations.  Quoting 
Hyppolite‟s potent passage at length, 
Nothingness is an immediate just as being is; the transition 
from being to nothingness, likewise from nothingness to 
being, is only a passage, becoming … The sphere of 
essence, which is the first negation of being – then the 
negation of itself – is the field of reflection, of diremption.  
Being opposes itself to itself; it negates itself as being and 
it posits itself as essence. … Essence is the reflection of 
being, its appearance and its intelligibility.  But this 
intelligibility, this conception, is simultaneously separated 
and inseparable from appearance. … This is why reflection 
reestablishes the first immediacy of being, just as this 
immediacy had been reflected into essence.  Immediacy 
itself is conceived [my emphasis]. (LE 170)   
Notice, Hyppolite has re-inscribed Hegel‟s metaphysical shell game into Kant‟s 
trajectory of experience, and now behind appearance there is no longer a thing-in-itself.  
Behind appearance is God. 
Mixing Hegel – retrospectively, as it were – with Kant, Hyppolite reads Logos as 
a logic of sense.
366
  Here is the quote where Hyppolite provides this Kantian reading of 
the Logos.
367
  “Real actuality,” Hyppolite declares, is there in “the immediacy of being,” 
“comprehended by means of its essence, as in essence and reflection” and it “is also itself 
its sense, and this Sense is its being.” (LE 170)    Hyppolite has moved from Quantity to 
Quality and is speaking of the relation of Quality to Quantity from Quality, i.e. without 
                                               
366 Following Kant‟s notion of reason in the Critique of Pure Reason, “This reason that thinks itself and 
contradicts itself is the Logos.” Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen, tr., 76. 
367 Cf. Hyppolite, “Logos emerges from itself by remaining itself … It thinks sense.” (LE 102)  
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retrospectively determining Quantity –yet.  And what Hyppolite says next will echo in 
Deleuze,  
Being is reflected in itself, and, in this reflection, it is as 
sense.  The subjective logic, or the logic of the concept, is 
the logic of sense, but this sense is not a subject opposed to 
the object.  It is the being which is its self-consciousness, 
its sense, and this self-consciousness, in turn, is being itself, 
the absolute Idea scattered into nature and into history.  In 
the Logos, being is thought. (LE 170)  
Transposing the above language of actuality into the language of (divine) expression: that 
which is intuited immediately (à la Kant) through sense is the expression of the divine. It 
is firstly intuited by empirical consciousness – i.e. human being – which as sense 
indicates the inversion, i.e. displacement into representation, and secondly, conceived as 
the virtual representation in the understanding of the actual divine structure.  Hence, this 
divine thinking’s return into itself after thinking itself as sense is the rhythm of possible 
experience as you stand on the perimeter of the mind of God and the Logos passes 
through you.  Note that, despite these innovations and a return to Kantian sensibility, the 
assumption of a Hegelian closure of discursivity remains in Hyppolite as the categories 
represent the self-consciousness of God blossoming through the speculative thought of 
human understanding.
368
 
It is in this way that Hyppolite‟s reading of absolute difference in Hegel becomes 
the pure difference of post-structuralism.  According to Hyppolite,   
Speculative thought thinks difference as reflected 
difference, as essential difference, the difference of itself to 
itself [my emphasis]. … Speculative contradiction is the 
contradiction of the Absolute itself that negates itself by 
                                               
368 Cf. Hyppolite, “Representation, which is characteristic of empirical consciousness as such, is replaced 
by the concept.  There is no longer any substrate.  The speculative proposition then has determination of 
thought – categories – for predicates, categories which are themselves the subject.  The categories become 
dialectically and express the Absolute‟s self-consciousness, and no longer express a human consciousness‟s 
viewpoint on an always alien reality.” (LE 150-151) 
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positing itself; but this meaning of negation, which is not 
only subjective but also inherent to being, is the decisive 
point of the Hegelian dialectic, the characteristic of 
speculative thought in relation to empirical thought.  
Empirical thought becomes speculative thought, when it 
becomes thought of the universal self in every position, and 
remains at the same time dialectical thought, and not 
ineffable intuition. (LE 92)   
There are three aspects of the above Hyppolite quote upon which I will comment.  First, 
essential difference is reflected difference.  What this means is that essential difference is 
difference at the second moment.  Now this essential difference in the second moment is 
different from that which it (contradictorily) reflects.  In this way, by positing itself as 
essential difference, essential difference is the difference of itself – in the second moment 
– to itself – in the first moment.  Second, the movement into essential difference is the 
movement of pure difference.  Invoking a celebrated Deleuze quote, this is like the 
lightning in Difference & Repetition.  There, Deleuze says,  
[I]magine something which distinguishes itself from itself – 
and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not 
distinguish itself from it.  Lightning, for example, 
distinguishes itself from the black sky but must also trail 
behind it, as though it were distinguishing itself from that 
which does not distinguish itself from it.
369
   
Lastly, the moment of essential difference takes place in empirical consciousness which – 
analogously – makes the movement of pure difference the movement associated with 
sense, i.e. intuition in Kant‟s trajectory of experience.   
Now, given that this is a second moment, and the third moment is a return to the 
first, the simultaneous retrospective determination and becoming speculative of empirical 
thought means the realm of intuition is no longer “ineffable.”  Hyppolite has brought 
Hegel back to Kant – Hegel‟s shell game to Kant‟s trajectory of experience – in the hopes 
                                               
369 Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, (New York: Columbia University, 1994), 
28.  Hereafter cited as D&R.  
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of regaining the experiential standpoint without the thing-in-itself.  Yet, notice pure 
difference takes essential difference as a peep hole into the abyss.  It is as if the 
qualitative moment in the movement of dichastasis sets the frame for a tile in Leibniz‟s 
game.  Whereas the qualitative orbit of essential difference passes through a discursively 
closed sensibility, pure difference plunges into the peep hole opening through the depths 
of the mind of God.  And, as you might have anticipated at this point, this peering into 
the abyss exactly coincides with the location of the thing-in-itself in Kant‟s structure of 
experience.  Hence, placing emphasis on the differential converging upon the integer of 
quantity (as Hyppolite indicated above) seeks to avoid hypostasizing a thing-in-itself at 
the cost of concentrating on the finger instead of the moon, i.e. the relational means of 
indicating rather than that which is indicated.    
 In sum, by directing speculative thought into the material world, Hyppolite has 
brought Kantian sensibility back to Hegel‟s systematic logic and combined Kant‟s 
structure of experienced with Hegel‟s trick, i.e. Hegel‟s shell game.  Yet, he has 
maintained the supposed Hegelian closure of discursivity.  As such, the conceptual 
standpoint is still collapsed onto the experiential.  Collapsing the standpoints is 
convenient for circumventing the blindness thesis in Kant, but will produce some 
untenable results.  All this leaves a couple options in regard to the initial point of the 
trajectory of experience, i.e. what was considered the thing-in-itself by Kant.  
Maintaining the first impasse with Hegel you can wield Hegel‟s shell game against all 
who might attempt to say something about that which is not by placing emphasis on the 
qualitative process of identification.  In this way, the quality of identity cannot be 
inscribed upon a quantity of pure difference.  This is precisely Derrida‟s strategy, as I 
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will show in the next chapter.  The other option is to plunge into the second impasse and 
ride the lighting, as it were, into the darkness of pure difference.  This is quite like a 
return to Leibniz through Kant if – following Hyppolite‟s cue – you assume that 
differential calculus can track qualitative change back into the quantitative abyss of pure 
difference.  As I will show, this is precisely Deleuze‟s strategy. 
Hegel‟s Metaphysical Shell Game 
 
“The single occurrence of lightning, e.g., is apprehended as a universal, and this universal is 
enunciated as the law … Thus the difference qua difference of content, of the thing, is also again 
withdrawn.” 
~G.W.F. Hegel (PS 94-95) 
 
In this final section of the chapter I provide a summary overview of the difficulty 
confounding the philosophical problem of determining the origin or beginning of 
experience in post-Hegelian thinking.  This section is helpful in understanding Derrida‟s 
resistance to logocentrism discussed in Chapter 4.  Further, this section is helpful in 
understanding Deleuze‟s concern to circumvent a major obstacle for his project of 
describing pure difference.  The basic faith one must have in order to play Hegel‟s 
metaphysical shell game is certainly related to his so called closure of discursivity, and is 
nicely summed up by Hegel himself in his other logic book, i.e. Logic: Part One of the 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences – The Shorter Logic – (1817), §213:  
The Idea is the Truth: for Truth is the correspondence of 
objectivity with the notion.  By that correspondence, 
however, is not meant the correspondence of external 
things with my conceptions: … In the idea we have nothing 
to do with … external things. And yet, again, everything 
actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea, and has its truth by 
and in virtue of the Idea alone. Every individual being is 
some one aspect of the Idea.
370
   
                                               
370 G.W.F. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, William Wallace, tr., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874), 304-305. 
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The basic faith in the above quote is to eliminate the non-discursive in that the initial 
moment of difference, i.e. the initial undifferentiated/non-identified moment, is taken to 
be exhausted by the retrospective differentiation of conceptual determination.  Yet, it 
seems to me this logical correspondence should be looked upon as modest eyes look upon 
a love letter.
371
   
According to Hegel in the Science of Logic, “[Difference] is the unity of identity 
and difference; its moments are different in one identity and thus are opposites.  Identity 
and difference are the moments of difference held within itself; they are the reflected 
moments of its unity [Hegel‟s emphases].” (SL 424)  Granting Hegel, for now, the 
mirror-correspondence imagery conjured up by the use of “reflection,” so as to show how 
the shell game works, notice the determination of retrospective differentiation is at work 
here again.  Yet, because the Quantity which will be revealed at the moment of Quality is 
difference, we now have the unique opportunity to – in thinking Quantity‟s opposite – 
perhaps think the opposite of being, i.e. non-being.  However, Hegel is already there 
waiting to disappoint any attempt to get outside of discursivity.   
In other words, according to Hegel, “The positedness of the sides of the external 
reflection is accordingly a being, just as their non-positedness is a non-being.” (SL 424)  
So, the moment of Quality indicates being displaced as with all appearances.  In other 
words, in determining whatever is determined we can say at least these two things about 
the determination a priori: first, as soon as there is an identity, then there is the moment 
or level of Quality – identity being determined by the split of the first moment or level of 
Quantity into binary opposites.  Second, if there is an identity, then there is being – at 
least in that an identity is being identified.  Hence, Hegel is ready to grant that the 
                                               
371 Reference to J.G. Hamann‟s quote from the previous chapter. 
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opposite of being is non-being, but the opposition takes place in the position of Quality.  
And, therefore, as Quantity it already possesses being.  So, any hopes at arriving at non-
being have been foiled in advance as if in a metaphysical shell game – which one has 
non-being under it?  The answer, of course: None of them! 
 Admittedly, this is all quite dense.  So, I would like to pass back over this for 
clarity sake, and then to draw one final analogy.  I have inserted an illustration to discuss.  
 Un-differentiated Moment Differentiated Moment 
 
Level 1 –  
Quantity 
 
 
1 
  
Α 
 
 
   
Ω 
  
4 
 
Level 2 – 
Quality 
 
 
2 
 
ς 
 
θ 
 
ς 
 
θ 
 
3 
     Figure 3.4  
Figure 3.4 is supposed to represent two moments of the same triangle.  As such, “Α” 
stands for the triangle with an undifferentiated moment of Quantity, and “Ω” stands for 
the triangle with a retrospectively differentiated moment of Quantity.  Correspondingly, 
“ς” and “θ” represent the binary opposites which arise upon reaching the level of 
Quality.  “Α” and “Ω,” then, are both the same and different triangles, and this paradox is 
based on the faith in correspondence such that the retrospective differentiation represents 
the Quantity as it was prior to the retrospective determinative contamination.   
Mapping this movement on a cross corresponding to Figure 3.4, you can follow 
the numbers as they move counter clockwise around the two triangles.  In the upper left 
hand corner of the cross you find 1, just below it 2, juxtaposed is 3, and above 3 you find 
4.  In this counter-clockwise movement it would be appropriate to speak of a difference 
between what is in position 1 and what is in position 2.  Hyppolite (above) referred to the 
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first difference as “pure” and the second difference as “essential.”    Remember, I 
mentioned above that Hegel‟s trick is to begin at the level of Quality.  Hyppolite (above) 
noted, “empirical consciousness takes this unity as immediate [my emphasis].”372 (LE 
114)  This is Hyppolite‟s way of saying Hegel starts at the level of Quality because 
though the movement is from 1 to 2, the level of Quantity is undifferentiated and, as 
such, may be initially described as unnoticed, unconscious, or unidentified.   
Now depending upon which of the binary opposites is privileged at the level of 
Quality you may consider yourself at 2 or 3 – say “ς” for 2 and “θ” for 3.  At 4, then, 
retrospectively the level of Quantity can be identified as “Ω.”  So, you have just 
completed a movement of retrospective determination in regard to one triangle.  Yet, 
recall the “Α” represented the undifferentiated Quantity prior to reflective contamination, 
and now Quantity is represented differently by “Ω.”  So, in completing a movement of 
retrospective determination, you have identified a different triangle.  To sum: first, 1 is 
different than 2.  Second, in 2 “ς” and “θ” are different from each other.  Third, as “ς” 
and “θ,” 3 is different than 4.  And, fourth, 4 is different than 1.  If this is still not clear is 
will be after the next paragraph.   
Now, let‟s play the shell game in regard to non-being.  Since 1 has 
undifferentiated and unnoticed being, and you start at 2; you identify being at 2 and non-
being at 1.  Yet, from 3 in lifting the shell to see 4 – or going back behind the curtain if 
you prefer Hegel‟s Phenomenology metaphor – in order to see this non-being that you 
just determined was there, you (retrospectively) differentiate what was undifferentiated.  
Thereby, you do not find non-being.  You find being, and in recognizing you have arrived 
                                               
372 Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen, tr., 114. 
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at what was your true starting point – even though you were initially unaware of it – you 
conclude: being is pure.  All is being.  The movement to arrive at this conclusion: 
becoming.  Hegel has succeeded in combining Parmenides and Heraclitus.   
Hence, this is the shell game in regard to non-being.  Yet, true Hegelians can 
play this game with you – making the weaker argument the stronger and the stronger the 
weaker – so as to have it come out however they like.  This is why when Rockmore says 
that “Being and Nothing are exactly the same” the undifferentiated can turn out to be 
being or non-being.  So, if you tell a Hegelian that the undifferentiated is non-being by 
lifting the shell, they can say: “No, it‟s being.”  And, if you tell a Hegelian that the 
undifferentiated is being, they can say: “No, it‟s non-being.”  Further, if you say it is 
neither, they say it is “both.”  If you say it is both, they say it is neither.  Notice, every 
time they refute you, they are correct.  Yet, it is technically also the case that you are 
never wrong.  But, since they sit in the booth and move the shells: You lose.  
 There are two conclusions I want to draw from the above in order to close this 
section.  First, I want to point out an analogy between Kant‟s space and time and Hegel‟s 
Quantity and Quality.  Second, I want to say how the above analogy will help further 
illustrate the heritage from Kant through Hegel and Hyppolite to Derrida and Deleuze.  
By Lawlor‟s lights were there no Hyppolite (specifically his text Logic and Existence), 
then there would be no pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze. (LE xi)  Though I agree 
with Lawlor‟s historical observation – it would be counterfactual and against the claims 
of Derrida and Deleuze themselves to suggest otherwise – still Hyppolite was able to read 
Hegel as such due to the thinking contained in Hegel‟s texts.  In other words, I will show 
that in the process of rewriting Kant, Hegel incorporated Kant‟s thoughts on space.  Now, 
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space is, of course, on the experiential, i.e. pre-understanding side of the trajectory of 
experience.  So, despite Hegel‟s attempt at the closure of discursivity, his incorporation 
of Kant‟s thoughts on space left an opening to experiential non-discursivity.  It is this 
opening upon which Hyppolite seized providing a more Kantian reading of Hegel.  And, 
it is this more Kantian reading of Hegel that led to pure difference in Derrida and 
Deleuze.   
At the beginning of his text, Hyppolite keenly strikes at the heart of the matter – 
the thing-in-itself.  Hyppolite tells us Hegel‟s “logic extends Kant‟s transcendental logic 
by exorcising the phantom of a thing-in-itself … Absolute knowledge means the in 
principle elimination of this non-knowledge, that is, the elimination of a transcendence 
essentially irreducible to our knowledge.” (LE 3)  Further, Hyppolite wastes no time in 
expressing the meaning of absolute knowledge in the wake of a closure of discursivity.  
Hyppolite says, “Absolute knowledge is not different from the immediate knowledge 
with which the Phenomenology of Spirit starts; it is only its true comprehension.” (LE 4)  
Now I have shown above to what this business of immediate beginning and 
retrospective true comprehension amounts.  Namely, Hegel – with conceptual 
understanding as the threshold of externality – takes Kant‟s concept of quantity as the 
immediate moment of experience to be followed by Kant‟s concept of quality.  What 
Lawlor‟s historical observation regarding textual influence misses is what following out 
this analogy brings to light.  Mapping Kant’s concepts onto Hegel seems correct.  Yet, 
the influence of Hegel on such a mapping means that Quantity – in regard to experience 
– maps onto space in Kant.  Moving through the trajectory of experience: the 
combination of space and time – with and by the imagination – amounts to appearance in 
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Kant.  Mapped analogously on to Hegel, Hegel‟s first moment is analogous to space and 
his second moment to time in the determination of appearance.  Notice how after this 
mapping a celebrated quote from Hegel‟s Phenomenology seems far less cryptic. 
This curtain [of appearance] hanging before the inner world 
is therefore drawn away, and we have the inner being [the 
„I‟] gazing into the inner world – the vision of the 
undifferentiated selfsame being, which repels itself from 
itself, posits itself as an inner being containing different 
moments, but for which equally these moments are 
immediately not different – self-consciousness.  It is 
manifest that behind the so-called curtain which is 
supposed to conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be 
seen unless we go behind it ourselves, as much in order that 
we may see, as that there may be something behind there 
which can be seen [my emphasis]. (PS 103) [A.V. Miller‟s 
insertions] 
With the closure of discursivity, the thing-in-itself has become the eye of God looking 
through the bifocals of space and time.  Since our use of concepts to understand this is 
actually God looking through bifocals into a mirror, what God sees is only one aspect of 
Hegel‟s above double genitive – “vision of the undifferentiated selfsame being.”  For us, 
it is only the vision of God in the sense of (the) power (of vision).  The actual vision – as 
in image – has lost something in passing through bifocals. 
 What is gained by recognizing that Hegel‟s Quantity maps on to Kant‟s space?  
Briefly, the answer: Kant understands space as containing infinity within it.  It is not until 
space-time and the advent of continuity that we can think of a continuous infinity.  Quite 
relevant, then, for Derrida and Deleuze, Hyppolite says, “Time is negativity, the pure 
restlessness of difference.” (LE 188)  Hence, the question of how to think the (non-
continuous) infinite within pure difference is the question of the thing-in-itself.  In trying 
to replace the thing-in-itself Derrida and Deleuze are up against the question of non-
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continuous infinity.  A number of quotes from the Critique of Pure Reason support this 
claim.  Kant says, 
Now the consciousness of the homogeneous manifold in 
intuition in general, insofar as though it the representation 
of an object first becomes possible, is the concept of a 
magnitude (Quanti).  Thus even the perception of an object, 
as appearance, is possible only through the same synthetic 
unity of the manifold of given sensible intuition through 
which the unity of the composition of the homogeneous 
manifold is thought in the concept of a magnitude … they 
must be represented through the same synthesis as that 
through which space and time in general are determined. … 
(CPR 1998, A 162/B 203)   
In fact, according to Kant, the mapping of Quantity on to space is precisely what allows 
for the use of geometry a priori in regard to experience.  For example,    
every appearance as intuition is an extensive magnitude, as 
it can only be cognized through successive synthesis (from 
part to part) in apprehension. All appearances are 
accordingly already intuited as aggregates (multitudes of 
antecedently given parts) … On this successive synthesis of 
the productive imagination, in the generation of shapes, is 
grounded the mathematics of extension (geometry) with its 
axioms, which express the conditions of sensible intuition a 
priori … (CPR 1998, A 163/B 204)  
Congruent, then, with space and time as outer and inner sense, Kant depicts Quantity as 
divided into extensive magnitude and intensive magnitude.  Further, Kant says, “in 
[intensive] magnitudes as such we can recognize a priori only a single Quality, viz. 
continuity, and that in all Quality (the real [component] of appearances) we can cognize a 
priori nothing more than their having an intensive quantity, viz. the fact that they have a 
degree.” (CPR 1996, B 218)  You can now consider the difference between the two 
infinities.       
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Differentiating between the two infinities – infinity in time and infinity in space – 
Kant launches what also functions as a justification for non-discursivity.  According to 
Kant,  
Time is not a discursive [concept] … it is a pure form of 
sensible intuition. … To say that time is infinite means 
nothing more than that any determinate magnitude of time 
is possible only through limitations [put] on a single 
underlying time.  Hence the original representation time 
[Kant‟s emphasis added in 1787] must be given as 
unlimited. … any such representation must be based on 
direct intuition. (CPR 1996, A 31-32/B 47) 
Recall, limit – according to Kant‟s Table of Concepts – is an aspect of Quality not 
Quantity.  This accounts for the (above) splitting of Quantity because with time we can 
think continuity, and this limit is infinite.  Compare this now with what Kant says about 
space.   
Space is not a discursive or, as we say, universal concept of things as such; rather 
it is a pure intuition.” (CPR 1996, A24-25/B 39)  And, here is Kant‟s justification: “Space 
is represented as an infinite given magnitude. (CPR 2003, A24-25/B 39)  Kant clarifies 
that he does not mean space may be represented in an infinite number of possible 
representations.  Rather, Kant says,  
[N]o concept, as such, can be thought as containing an 
infinite multitude of representations within itself.  Yet, that 
is how we think space (for all parts of space, ad infinitum, 
are simultaneous) [Kant‟s emphasis]. (CPR 2003, A 25/B 
40)   
How to think this infinity (which as infinite lacks finite being) in conjunction with the 
Hegelian version of dialectic will be the task which goes under the name of: describing 
pure difference – Derrida and Deleuze will have different descriptions.  Within the 
framework of the Kantian system, it is as if Hegel puts being in the place of space.  In 
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doing so, he accomplishes the destruction of the discursive/non-discursive distinction but 
at the cost of retreating to the first moment in the problem of non-being.   
In other words, despite Kant‟s specific warning in the last block quote above – 
“no concept can be thought [my emphasis] as containing an infinite multitude of 
representations within itself [Kant‟s emphasis] – Hegel has it that this infinite multitude 
may be thought as (Parmenidean) being.  Again, Hegel‟s attempt is amphibolous.  
Further, notice from Kant‟s emphasis that he evidently had Leibniz‟s metaphor of the tile 
game in mind.  That is, in denying that the mortal mind can think the infinity within a tile 
that itself is a limiting of the mind of God, Kant is further justifying that though Quantity 
is involved in thinking both the object in experience and reflection, these Quantities 
cannot be the same.  Kant‟s modesty keeps him from faith in Hegel‟s correspondence.  
The sensible Quantity contains an infinity which cannot be thought.  Notice what has 
been reworded and stated again?  The infinite Quantity in sensibility exceeds our ability 
to think it – voilà the value of the notion of non-discursivity again.   
 At this point all the general preliminaries are in place to bridge Kant to Derrida 
and Deleuze.  To sum, I have shown that I non-being cannot be stated symbolically, and I 
have shown Kant was well aware of this limitation by discussing his Table of Nothing in 
the Critique of Pure Reason.  I showed Hegel‟s reading of Kant‟s thing-in-itself so as to 
show Hegel‟s position in regard to the problem of non-being and Kant‟s Table of 
Nothing.  Generally speaking, I argued for a reading of Hegel in relation to Kant such 
that Hegel collapses the multiple standpoints of Kant‟s system to the conceptual 
standpoint.  I included Schopenhauer‟s criticisms of Hegel to show an alternative to 
Hegel‟s treatment of Kant.  Specifically, Schopenhauer‟s work in regard to the problem 
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of non-being connects Kant with Plato and provides a (non-Hegelian) critique of the 
thing-in-itself without collapsing Kant‟s standpoints.   
I then provided a summary of Hyppolite‟s Kantian rendition of Hegel such that 
Kantian sensibility was given a prominent role in Hegel‟s system via materialistic 
speculative thought.  In doing this, I highlighted the fact that Hyppolite did not resuscitate 
Kantian non-discursivity.  Hyppolite‟s rendition of Hegel is the last of the general 
influences bridging Kant to Derrida and Deleuze, i.e. the remaining influences are more 
thinker-specific.  Hyppolite provides a view of the altered Kantian conceptual and 
experiential standpoints which Derrida and Deleuze, respectively, take as points of 
departure in articulating the ground of experience.  In this way, Derrida and Deleuze are 
working – with an altered framework – on the same problem which Kant sought to solve 
by positing the thing-in-itself.  Hence, at this point you have seen enough of the historical 
work on the problem of non-being to understand the efforts of Derrida and Deleuze in its 
regard.  Further, you have now seen a further explication of the logical options involved 
in attempting to solve the problem of non-being.  As early as the Introduction I indicated 
the option which must be taken à la Plato and Gorgias to solve this problem, i.e. looking 
to experience.  As you have seen then, and as you will see, this problem remained 
unsolved until I pursued the Ancient option differently.     
Finally, in Aristotelian language, regarding their strategies for solving the 
problem of non-being: Kant‟s focus pertains to priority of being; Derrida‟s focus pertains 
to priority of account; and, Deleuze‟s focus pertains to priority of time.  As I will 
continue to indicate, and as the terms used to describe the priority also indicate, Kant‟s 
focus came closest thus far to solving the problem of non-being.  Yet, the innovations 
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Derrida and Deleuze provide – which I will show as already inherent in Kant‟s account – 
provide an elaboration of Kant‟s thought which Kant did not live long enough to perform.  
Hence, after discussing Derrida and Deleuze, you will see my reading of a return to the 
Kantian experiential standpoint for the sake of solving the problem of non-being.      
“I am ultra-Kantian.  I am Kantian, but I am more than Kantian.”373  
~Jacques Derrida 
 
“And contrary to what phenomenology – which is always phenomenology of perception – has tried to make 
us believe, contrary to what our desire cannot fail to be tempted into believing, the thing itself always 
escapes.”374 
~Jacques Derrida 
 
“Différance, which (is) nothing … (is) the thing itself.”375 
~Jacques Derrida 
Chapter Four: Pure Difference in Derrida – Recognizing Différance 
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 4 Sections and Objectives 
In this chapter I explicate Derrida‟s understanding of pure difference.  I have already 
begun this explication in the previous chapter.  The first three sections of this chapter are 
primarily expository.  That is, my objective for these sections is the not without difficulty 
task of presenting a coherent view of Derrida‟s discussion of pure difference and the idea 
into which it evolves – Différance.  The remaining sections of the chapter contain my 
arguments concerning Derrida‟s pure difference in relation to Kant‟s thing-in-itself and 
Derrida‟s pure difference in relation to the problem of non-being.  Hence, in this chapter, 
then, I focus on Derrida‟s comments concerning pure difference.   
In so doing, one immediately sees that shortly after initially discussing pure 
difference in relation to Husserl, Derrida – realizing the paradoxical nature of referring to 
                                               
373 Jacques Derrida, “On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida,” Questioning God, 
John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley, Michael J. Scanlon, ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 66. 
374 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, David B. Allison, tr., (Evanston: Northwestern University, 
1973), 104.  Hereafter cited as SP. 
375 Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, Peggy Kamuf, tr., (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1992), 40. 
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pure difference as such – shifted to writing about Différance.  I will argue that this is 
tantamount to Derrida‟s attempt to solve the problem of non-being by making a 
philosophical position of the problem‟s second impasse.  Remember, for Derrida, being 
in Hyppolite‟s wake means both returning to Kantian sensibility and maintaining Hegel‟s 
closure of discursivity.  Further recall, pure difference is thought as the first moment of 
undifferentiated Quantity in Hegel‟s shell game.  In this way, Derrida accepts Hegel‟s 
shell game as an inevitable consequence of attempting to express in language a sensuous 
being that you mean.  Hence, Derrida develops a way of referring to pure difference so as 
to acknowledge the inability to refer to pure difference.   
How might this be seen as a solution to the problem of non-being?  By employing 
the term Différance Derrida seeks (paradoxically) to collapse the second impasse – of the 
problem involved in referring to any thing that lacks a signification – by embracing it.  
Such a strategy may be of great value toward solving the problem of non-being, but it is 
completely misplaced by Derrida.  This strategy works better – as I will employ it in Part 
II of the dissertation – if you also allow for non-discursivity.  Maintaining the closure of 
discursivity Derrida is content to conclude his project by returning to Kantian 
undecidability regarding pure difference.  It is in this way that Derrida failed to solve the 
problem of non-being.  Recall, undecidability for Kant pertained to the thing-in-itself.  In 
this chapter, then, I will further illustrate and expand the above.   
Pure Difference ex Priority of Account: Derrida‟s Stacked Deck 
“Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express)  
is the background against which whatever I could express has meaning.”376 
~Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
                                               
376 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, Peter Winch, tr., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980), 16e. 
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Though Kant is explicit that neither space (CPR A 25-25/B 39) nor time (CPR A 
31-32/B 47) is discursive, Hegel‟s closure of discursivity furthers what may be thought of 
as philosophy‟s self assuring truth of “the now.”  A quote from Hegel‟s Phenomenology 
of Spirit §§97-98 expresses my claim precisely: 
[I]t is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in 
words, a sensuous being that we mean.  The same will be 
the case with the other form of the “This”, with “Here”.  
“Here” is, e.g., the tree.  If I turn round, this truth has 
vanished and is converted into its opposite: “No tree is 
here, but a house instead.”  “Here” itself does not vanish; 
on the contrary, it abides constant in the vanishing of the 
house, the tree, etc., and is indifferently house or tree.  
Again, therefore, the “This” shows itself to be a mediated 
simplicity, or a universality [Hegel‟s emphases]. (PS 60-61)  
Hegel‟s move here is tantamount to making space and time discursive since Hegel‟s 
version of the nunc stans – standing now – as overlay of the senses allows for reference 
to the senses through the frame of space and time, i.e. here and now.  In this way, Hegel 
allows for reference to the undifferentiated moment – through space and time – in the 
explication of experiential meaning without expressing the sensuous being you mean.  I 
do not need to know the name of this pain, so long as I can refer to it as “this pain” “here 
and now.”   
At first this might seem little different from Kant.  However, as Hegel hints in the 
above passage noting, “the truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite,” you 
already know by the Hegel quote at the end of the previous chapter from the “Shorter 
Logic” that – consistent with the shell game – of this truth, “The Idea is the Truth … [&] 
Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea.”377  Hence, on the one hand, a 
return to the senses is a return to the ideas.  And, on the other hand, Hegel seems to take 
                                               
377 Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, 304-305. 
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the language pertaining to the standing now to function discursively in the subject 
position of judgments such as “Here is a tree.”   
Now, Derrida takes the “Here” which “itself does not vanish” to be “presence.” 
Derrida declares, “According to a fundamentally Greek gesture, this Hegelian 
determination of time permits us to think the present, the very form of time, as 
eternity.”378  Further, “Eternity is another name of the presence of the present.” (MOP 46)  
And Derrida explains – as can be seen in the Hegel quote above – “Hegel also 
distinguishes this presence from the present as now.” (MOP 46)  So, coupled together, 
there is a sensuous flowing now and a non-sensuous standing eternal now.  The latter, 
then, acts as an overlay through which you can identify the sensuous.  I will make this 
clear for you in a moment, but first I want to show you how this immediate issue 
connects with non-being.   
Because of what has been said so far regarding time and Hegel, Derrida says, 
“Time is not (among beings).  It is nothingness because it is time, that is a past or future 
now.” (MOP 50)  In other words, “time is not (a being) to the extent that it is not 
(present).” (MOP 50)  Derrida deduces  
The mē on, the no-thingness, therefore, is accessible only 
on the basis of the Being of time.  Time as nothing can be 
thought only according to the modes of time, the past and 
the future.  Being is nontime, time is nonbeing [my 
emphasis] insofar as being already, secretly has been 
determined as present, and Beingness (ousia) as presence. 
(MOP 51) 
Beyond being reminiscent of Hegel‟s shell game, this language should already indicate to 
you that this non-being is internal to understanding.  As such, this is what I refer to as 
not-being, not non-being, i.e. ἐλαληίνλ not ἕηεξνλ.   
                                               
378 Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Grammē,” Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass, tr. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), 45.  Hereafter cited as MOP. 
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Finally, Derrida concludes, “Time is indeed the discursive manifestation of 
negativity.” (MOP 51)  In this way, Derrida has returned to the first line of the large 
Hegel quote which began this section, i.e. from the Phenomenology of Spirit §97, “it is 
just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean.” 
(PS 60)  Recall though Hegel takes the sensuous being as still being a part of the 
Parmenidean One-Being, he will refer to it as “non-being”; yet, this is merely the non-
being which his shell game will reveal as ultimately being.  Derrida, then, in a Kantian 
twist, will treat this matter as undecidable, and as such Derrida offers his solution to the 
problem of non-being, i.e. pure difference which is in-itself undecidable.  That which 
Hegel calls a sensuous being you cannot mean, Derrida takes as the difference which is 
undecidable, i.e. neither sensible nor intelligible, and as undecidable this difference is 
pure difference.  Applying Hegel‟s shell game, Derrida treats this undecidable site 
between the binary opposites of flowing and standing nows like the rendezvous for a 
Bacchanalian revel.   
        Recall the comments from Sextus Empiricus in the chapter on Kant.  According to 
Sextus, “If undecidable, we have it that we must suspend judgment; for it is not possible 
to make assertions about what is subject to undecidable dispute.  But if decidable, we 
shall ask where the decision is to come from [my emphasis].”379  If you ask the question 
of Hegel, where is the decision to come from, regarding the Phenomenology §98, the 
answer is time.  The standing now reveals the presence of Being in time.  Being is 
decidedly constructed upon the opposition between the flowing and non-flowing of time, 
and the non-flowing, i.e. standing now of Being, for Hegel is privileged.  So, Derrida 
seeks to deconstruct the foundation upon which Being is erected.  Now, this is not to be 
                                               
379 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, 41-42. 
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taken as a privileging in turn by Derrida; deconstruction does not need a special target.  
As all Derrida scholars can tell you, no erection is safe with Derrida around.  In order to 
deconstruct the foundation of time, then, upon which Being is erected, Derrida must show 
that the difference between what amounts to Being and non-being does not point to 
Being.  That is, Hegel‟s Parmenidean One-Being has it that the undifferentiated first 
moment, upon retrospective determination is revealed as (having been all along) Being.  
If Derrida can make the first moment undecidable, rather than Being, then he “has it” as 
Sextus might say.  In order to accomplish this, of course, Derrida must work on the 
problem of non-being.         
 Recall from my discussion of priority in account from the Introduction‟s 
discussion of Aristotle that in Metaphysics IX §8 Aristotle argues actuality precedes 
potentiality in account [ιόγῳ] (Meta 1049b12-17), time [ρξόλῳ] (Meta 1049b17-1050a3), 
and being [νὺζίᾳ] (Meta 1050a4-11).  Now, by considering the logos [ιόγνο] as a type of 
potentiality – think of the many possible descriptions of an entity – Derrida is able to 
argue for a non-logo-centric priority.  Any reckoning, i.e. accounting, to be made of this 
priority, of course, must invoke the logos to which it is prior.  Moreover, notice how this 
functions as a sophisticated rendition of the thing-in-itself.  Derrida is positing pure 
difference as the actuality prior to the potential logo-centric descriptions, and then 
claiming that “pure difference” as a description derives from the logos.  Hence, he is 
attempting to further inculcate or enforce Kant‟s idea of the non-discursive thing-in-itself 
by denying non-discursivity, i.e. invoking Hegel‟s closure of discursivity, and by also 
denying priority to the logos.  For ease of communication, Derrida will ultimately 
exchange speaking of pure difference for speaking of this movement to that which though 
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differing from the logos can necessarily only be identified by deferring to the logos – thus 
the movement of Différance.  However, as there is a good deal yet to discuss toward 
recognizing Différance, I will return to Différance below.          
Returning, here, to Derrida‟s reading of presence; notice, Being is nontime, but 
Being is found – recovered or gathered together – in time.  The difference between Being 
and time, then, is the difference between the standing eternal now and the flowing 
sensuous now.  You may recognize the eternal, here, is much like Kant‟s transcendental 
unity of apperception which persists across perceptions.  Yet, here, Derrida is focusing on 
time, rather than perceptions.  So, the form of time, as presence, persists as time flows, 
and this persisting form of time is Being.  It is as if, were there not a standing now, i.e. a 
place to stand, you could not see time flow past; were there not a place to stand, you 
could not recognize change – you would be changing too much to be enough you to 
notice that you are changing.  This is why Derrida above says, “the no-thingness” is 
“only accessible on the basis of the Being of time.” (MOP 51)  By Derrida‟s lights, the 
concept of time may be used within Being to indicate non-being, i.e. that which is not 
(now).  So as you can see this non is supposed to refer to Becoming as not Being, and as 
such this term should be called not-being, rather than non-being.  Further, you can see 
Derrida‟s logic as an exploitation of Aristotle‟s priority of account.  Derrida‟s innovation 
will be to deny a difference in kind between the account which is prior and that to which 
it is prior. 
  Thus far, then, I have shown you Derrida‟s attempt to solve the problem of non-
being with reference to the work of Aristotle and Hegel.  And to use the language of 
Aristotle, what has been said thus far is that Derrida attempts to collapse priority in time 
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to priority in account.  In the background of this move lurks a Hegelian justification, i.e. 
despite following Hyppolite Derrida retains the closure of discursivity.
380
  Yet, there is, of 
course, more to Derrida‟s solution.  In fact, that he pursues this problem, that he is 
concerned with it, more than just dismissing the problem as merely arising from the 
dialectical movement of negativity shows a Kantian influence rustling him in his 
Hegelian slumbers.  Now, perhaps the more standard references to state in regard to 
Derrida‟s innovation here are to the work of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Ferdinand 
de Saussure (1857-1913).  I will use such references, then, to demonstrate the movement 
in Derrida‟s work from pure difference to Différance.   
I will discuss Husserl by way of two related preliminaries to pure difference: first, 
what has come to be referred to as “The Metaphysics of Presence,” thanks to Derrida, and 
second, I will discuss Husserl‟s expression/indication distinction.  As Derrida notes in 
Speech [Voice] and Phenomena [La Voix et le Phénomène] Derrida tells us,   
And here again we find all the incidences of primordial 
nonpresence whose emergence we have already noted on 
several occasions.  Even while repressing difference by 
assigning it to the exteriority of the signifiers, Husserl 
could not fail to recognize its work [difference] at the 
origin of sense and presence. … In this pure difference is 
rooted the possibility of everything we think we can 
exclude from auto-affection: space, the outside, the world, 
the body, etc.  … We come closest to it [pure difference] in 
the movement of différance [my emphasis]. (SP 82) 
It is for this reason that Leonard Lawlor refers to “pure difference” in Derrida‟s early 
work as “the source of the concept of différance.”381  And, as you can see in the above 
quote, Derrida does not locate pure difference as much as he locates “its work” “at the 
                                               
380 Cf. Michael A. Gilbert, “Effing the Ineffable: The Logocentric Fallacy in Argumentation,” 
Argumentation, 16.1, (2002), 21-32.  
381 Leonard Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2003), 103. 
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origin of sense and presence.”  Hence, notice, Derrida locates “pure difference” by 
equating it with “origin.”  Further, the above quote – by referencing “sense and presence” 
– situates this thought precisely within the previous discussion regarding Hegel.382         
According to Husserl, Husserlian phenomenology stands or falls upon the truth of 
one principle.  Husserl – in Ideas I §24 – calls this principle the “principle of all 
principles.”  And, one is thereby forced to decide whether they accept this principle or 
not.  Especially in light of what has been said concerning Hegel in Chapter 2, and as will 
be shown below, neither Derrida nor Deleuze accept this principle.  Here is Husserl on 
the so-called principle of all principles. 
No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the 
principle of all principles: that every originary presentive 
intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that 
everything originarily (so to speak, in its “personal” 
actuality) offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted 
simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within 
the limits in which it is presented there [Husserl‟s 
emphases].
383
  
This amounts to assuming – contra Hegel – that the experiential starting point is the first 
moment – not the second moment – of conceptualization, and further this principle 
assumes nature‟s sincerity.384  As such, intuition as the sincere expression of nature 
outright denies the wisdom of Heraclitus – “Nature loves to hide [θύζηο θξύπηεζζαη 
θηιεῖ].”385  At the origin, so to speak, for both Derrida and Deleuze is pure difference, 
                                               
382 Moreover, what I am about to say will, among other things, make sense of why I think of both Derrida 
and Deleuze as beyond phenomenology or post-phenomenological – at least regarding Husserl‟s idea of 
phenomenology.  
383 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: 
Shorter Logical Investigations, Bk. 1, J.N. Findlay, tr., (Netherlands: Springer, 1983), §24, 44. 
384 Cf. “We shall always presume sincerity.” Edmund Husserl, The Shorter Logical Investigations, J.N. 
Findlay, tr., (New York: Routledge, 2001), §11, 112.  Hereafter cited as Sh Log. 
385 Heraclitus, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An Edition of the Fragments with Translation and 
Commentary, Charles H. Kahn, tr., (New York: Cambridge University, 1981), 33.  
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and pure difference is different from itself.  Hence, for Derrida and Deleuze, it is better to 
speak of irony than sincerity in regard to this “origin.” 
 Yet, Husserl believes nature to be sincere.  What is more, Derrida shows how 
Husserl attempts to immunize himself from Hegel‟s shell game by denying the possibility 
of some other beginning, i.e. an “abysmal alterity.”  In regard to Kant, Derrida‟s critique 
of Husserl suggests: rather than guttural awareness, there is isomorphic harmony with 
nature sincerely revealed at the moment analogous to (the “inner sense” of) time in 
Kant‟s trajectory of experience.  In other words, Husserl is accused of suggesting time 
exhausts space, rather than taking time as a way of thinking space in a continuum – the 
way Kant thought time (see previous chapter).  The following passage, indicated by 
Derrida, makes Husserl‟s position explicit.  I quote it at length, bulleted so as to be able 
to discuss it afterward.  According to Husserl, 
[1] We can now pose the question: What about the 
beginning-phase of an experience that is in the process of 
becoming constituted?  Does it also come to be given only 
on the basis of retention, and would it be “unconscious” if 
no retention were to follow it?  [2] We must say in response 
to this question: The beginning-phase can become an object 
only after it has elapsed in the indicated way by means of 
retention and reflection (or reproduction).  [3] But if it were 
intended only by retention, then what confers on it the label 
“now” would remain incomprehensible.  [4] At most it 
could be distinguished negatively from its modifications as 
that one phase that does not make us retentionally 
conscious of any preceding phase; [5] but the beginning-
phase is by all means characterized in consciousness in 
quite positive fashion.  It is just nonsense to talk about an 
“unconscious” content that would only subsequently 
[nachträglich] become conscious.  Consciousness 
[Bewusstsein] is necessarily consciousness [bewusstsein] in 
each of its phases.  [6] Just as the retentional phase is 
conscious of the preceding phase without making it into an 
object, so too the primal datum is already intended – 
specifically, in the original form of the “now” – without its 
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being something objective.  [7] It is precisely this primal 
consciousness that passes over into retentional modification 
– which is then retention of the primal consciousness itself 
and of the datum originally intended in it, since the two are 
inseparably united.  If the primal consciousness were not on 
hand, no retention would even be conceivable: retention of 
an unconscious content is impossible.
386
 
Husserl here considers the passing from moment to moment of time to be even less 
problematic, i.e. more sincere, than Hegel took it (above).  Recall from above, Derrida, 
operating in the wake of Hegel‟s closure of discursivity will be skeptical of the 
Husserlian claim I labeled “6.”  In other words, Derrida will not allow Husserl to suppose 
a sincere flow of the now as a stable ground of time – this move is ultra-Kantian; and, if 
no longer stable, then Derrida has deconstructed the metaphysics of presence, i.e. with 
Derrida, philosophy loses the sincerity of its self assuring truth of “the now.”   
 In regard to the bullet points in the quote: First, [1] this question is, of course, a 
question about origination, a question of the origin.  I have been discussing this question 
above, especially in regard to Kant and Hegel.  Second, [2] here Husserl stands on the 
shoulders of Kant.  “Reproduction” betrays the Kantian origin of the reproductive 
imagination.  In other words, Husserl can be located, in regard to the question of origin, 
as invoking the Kantian trajectory of experience to support his position.  I point this out 
to further show how Husserl is here participating in the same discussion as the above 
thinkers, i.e. Kant-Hegel-Hyppolite.  Third, [3] here Husserl is arguing against a version 
of my thesis about memory.  Suffice to say at this point, Husserl and I think of memory 
differently (more on this in the Memory chapter).  Fourth, [4] this is the Hegelian thesis – 
negative dialectic, shell game, etc.  Husserl, as will be explicit by the end of his quote, 
rejects this thesis.  Remember, this is the very thesis which allows for a discussion of 
                                               
386 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Josh Barnett Brough, 
tr., (Netherlands: Springer, 1991), 123. 
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pure difference.  Fifth, [5] here Husserl is invoking the principle of all principles, and 
denying the efficacy of Hegelian thesis just mentioned.  Sixth, [6] to further support [5] 
Husserl here appeals to the metaphysics of presence.  Lastly, [7] albeit Husserl and I 
think differently about retention, this claim of his about memory is simply wrong (more 
on this in the following chapters).
387
 
 Now with the above in place, I can discuss Husserl‟s distinction between 
expression and indication.  Derrida‟s Différance can be seen to derive from his critique of 
this Husserlian distinction.  Husserl, in Logical Investigations, explains there is a 
difference between expression and sign.  The meaning of a “sign” is the sense that the 
sign “expresses.” (Sh Log 103)  Moving, then, from thing to indication to meaning – 
think the trajectory of Kant‟s structure of experience: in discussing indication Husserl 
notes, “A thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to indicate 
something to some thinking being.” (Sh Log 104)  Husserl goes on to say, “From 
indicative signs we distinguish meaningful signs, i.e. expressions.” (Sh Log 104)  He 
clarifies,  
We shall lay down, for provisional intelligibility, that each 
instance or part of speech, as also each sign that is 
essentially of the same sort, shall count as an expression, 
whether or not such speech is actually uttered, or addressed 
with communicative intent to any persons or not [Husserl‟s 
emphasis]. (Sh Log 104-105)   
First notice, indicative signs are distinguished from “meaningful” signs.  So, there are 
meaningless signs which express meaningful signs.  Further, in the first of these three 
quotes, Husserl associated a meaningless indicative sign with a “thing.”  Husserl then, 
                                               
387 Albeit Husserl might mean that after the transcendental reduction – epoché – there is no unconscious 
memory, if so then he has reduced the actual origin out of the problematic of experience.  Husserl‟s reading 
of memory is, though sophisticated, fails in so far as it adheres to the phenomenological method, i.e. there 
is more to memory than the phenomena of memory.   
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invoking the sincerity of intuition, suggested the meaning of the expression derives from 
the combination of the thing with the here and now as the “if and where” which intuited 
the thing as an indication serving to express the meaning of something.  Husserl here 
betrays that such speech is suggestive of believing in an eternality, i.e. a “metaphysics of 
presence” – whether gradually or spontaneously revealed – in and through which 
meaning persists.  I suppose this is reminiscent of some Platonic heaven.  Yet, it would 
be as if the sentence: “Deleuze‟s book on expression was not forged in hell” could be 
reduced to one stable meaning that persists beyond the particular phrasing.  So Derrida 
will interrogate Husserl‟s theory of meaning.         
What is left to show before invoking Derrida is Husserl‟s descriptions of talking 
to someone else and talking to yourself.  Invoking a perennial trope – the physical and the 
psychical – Husserl indicates his meaning of the distinction between expression and 
indication.  On the one hand, both literally and figuratively he provides a list of examples 
of “The expression physically regarded,” including “the sensible sign, the articulate 
sound-complex, the written sign on paper etc.” (Sh Log 105)  On the other hand, 
invoking the Kantian rhetoric of the reproductive imagination, Husserl says,  
A certain sequence of mental states, associatively linked 
with the expression, which make it be the expression of 
something.  These mental states are generally called the 
„sense‟ or the „meaning‟ of the expression, this being taken 
to be in accord with what words ordinarily mean. (Sh Log 
105)     
Now, though Husserl‟s list of examples may illustrate his will-to-description, all the 
possible meanings of “expression” which he indicates are beyond the scope of my 
concern.  However, his discussion of how the physical side of speech becomes 
communicative is ideal.  Husserl says,    
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The articulate sound-complex, the written sign, etc., first 
becomes a spoken word or communicative bit of speech, 
when a speaker produces it with the intention of 
„expressing himself about something‟ through its means; he 
must endow it with a sense in certain acts of mind, a sense 
he desires to share with his auditors.  Such sharing becomes 
a possibility if the auditor also understands the speaker‟s 
intention. … What first makes mental commerce possible, 
and turns connected speech into discourse, lies in the 
correlation among the corresponding physical and mental 
experiences of communicating persons which is effected by 
the physical side of speech. (Sh Log 106)   
From Husserl‟s pre-death-of-the-author epoch he sees the cathexis or imbuing of the 
physical with meaning as dependent on the “desire” of the author “to share.”  Hence, it is 
at least clear that for Husserl indication is necessary in the communication of meaning, 
i.e. the “correlation among the corresponding physical and mental experiences” is 
“effected by the physical side of speech.”   
So as to maintain a distinction between physically acting and mentally imagining, 
then, Husserl describes the difference between speaker and listener, i.e. first person 
experience and vicarious experience.   
Speaking and hearing, intimation of mental states through 
speaking and reception thereof in hearing, are mutually 
correlated.  … The hearer perceives the speaker as 
manifesting certain inner experiences, and to that extent he 
also perceives these experiences themselves: he does not, 
however, himself experience them, he has not an „inner‟ 
but an „outer‟ percept of them. (Sh Log 106-107)     
On the one hand, then, this seems an adequate description of the conveyance of meaning 
through speech.  On the other hand, Husserl‟s theory of the conveyance of meaning 
through speech might – as Derrida will point out – come into conflict with his thesis of 
necessary indication in regard to talking to yourself.   
Husserl – in further supporting his thesis of indication – provides a description of 
both communicated and uncommunicated expressions.  Expressions used in 
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communication depend “essentially on the fact that they operate indicatively.” (Sh Log 
107)  Of uncommunicated expressions, Husserl says, they “continue to have meanings as 
they had before, and the same meanings as in dialog.  A word only ceases to be a word 
when our interest stops at its sensory contour, when it becomes a mere sound–pattern.” 
(Sh Log 107)  However, Husserl qualifies, “when we live in the understanding of a word, 
it expresses something and the same thing, whether we address it to anyone or not.” (Sh 
Log 107)  So far no conflict, but next Husserl will describe – what some scholars equate 
with the transcendental reduction
388
 – soliloquy, i.e. when “one speaks to oneself, and 
employs words as signs, i.e. as indications, of one‟s own inner experiences.” (Sh Log 
108)    
Given the structure Husserl has just described, he now has the ontological 
commitment or the phenomenological commitment, or at least the logical commitment to 
a counterintuitive description of hearing yourself speak.  If indications were necessary for 
meaning, it follows then that you need to hear yourself before you know what you mean.  
The other alternative is that you imagine the words in front of you – so as to have an 
indication of your meaning – as you engage in soliloquy.  Husserl decides upon 
imagination to solve his problem. 
In imagination a spoken or printed word floats before us, 
though in reality it has no existence.  We should not, 
however, confuse imaginative presentations, and the image-
contents they rest on, with their imagined objects.  The 
imagined verbal sound, or the imagined printed word, does 
not exist, ony its imagined verbal sound, or the imaginative 
presentation does so.  The difference is the difference 
between imagined centaurs and the imagination of such 
beings. (Sh Log 108)    
                                               
388 Cf. Eugen Fink, “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism,” 
73-147, in The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings, R.O. Elveton, tr., (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1979), 87. 
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What Husserl says here is certainly consistent, i.e. he sticks to what his necessary 
indication thesis committed him, but such a description does not seem to correspond with 
experience.  It is this flaw in Husserl‟s system which Derrida will treat as a rendezvous 
for a Bacchanalian revel.   
To sum, whatever you indicate is what you mean.  Despite what you might think, 
if you do not indicate it, then you do not mean it, nor do you communicate it.  And notice 
that this is like the ribbon cutting ceremony at the grand opening of another site to play 
Hegel‟s shell game.  Given Husserl‟s understanding of physical and psychical, now the 
psychical depends on the physical, and the physical lacks (psychical) identity.  Sound 
familiar?  An undifferentiated, unidentified first moment, which is itself determined as 
such only retrospectively from a second moment.  It is as if, Husserl left an entryway 
unguarded, and in it Derrida has stuck Hegel‟s javelin.  Now, in a way to be (further) 
explained below, Husserl‟s system is infected with pure difference.  As Derrida will 
make all too clear, retrospective identification does not ensure nature‟s sincerity.  In a 
post-Hyppolite ultra-Kantian innovation – the motor force of which being Hegel‟s shell 
game – Derrida will replace Husserl‟s decision regarding nature‟s sincerity with 
undecidability.  And, to do so Derrida will invoke Saussure. 
 Another celebrated influence on Derrida, then, Ferdinand de Saussure‟s seminal 
text Course in General Linguistics [Cours de linguistique générale] (1916) provides a 
description of meaning which can be read as rival to Husserl‟s description.  Recall 
Husserl‟s description of language required one to hold a counterintuitive notion of 
communication in solitude.  Yet, both Husserl and Saussure consider expression 
dependent upon indication; so, what is the difference which makes all the difference for 
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Saussure?  Thought through the vocabulary of Saussure: the material – the physical 
sound patterns or written signs – is prerequisite for the psychical element of meaning.  
Saussure, embracing the dependence of expression upon indication, provided a way to 
think of meaning as itself constituted by indication, rather than by meaning intention, i.e. 
rather than by imbuing the physical with psychical meaning.  According to Saussure, the 
differences between indications – the physical aspects – could account for the production 
of meaning.  For example, regarding the physical construction of the following words, a 
bat is a bat because it is not (it is different from) a cat, or a car, or a bar, etc.
389
  Hence, 
material difference makes all the difference much like a condition for the possibility of 
meaning for Derrida, though it is grounded in priority of account. 
As explained by Saussure, the “First Principle” of General Linguistics amounts 
to: “The bond between signifier and signified is arbitrary.”390  What this means is that 
every sign may be thought of as composed of a physical side and a psychical side.  
Staying with speech for the moment, what Saussure calls the “sound image,” [image-
acoustique] would be the physical side, i.e. the signifier [signifiant].  And, what Saussure 
calls the “concept” would be the psychical side, i.e. the signified [signifié].391  Now, 
Saussure is able to say this and acknowledge that, insofar as meaning is psychical, even 
the “physical” side is recognized by the psychical.  What this means is – as I already 
rehearsed above with Husserl – you cannot mean the matter because what would be “the 
matter” (physical) is external to all meaning (psychical).  This is the reason for speaking 
about the “side” of a sign.  Remember, generally speaking – as exemplified by Hyppolite 
                                               
389 Notice this version immediately solidifies itself against any charge of a Cartesian inspired solipsism. 
390 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, Wade Baskin, tr., (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1959), 67.  Hereafter cited as CGL. 
391 Ferdinand de Saussure. Cours de linguistique générale, (Paris VI: Gran Bibliothèque Payot, 1995), 99. 
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– these French thnkers have employed Kant against Hegel.  In other words, something 
may be functioning like the thing-in-itself, though you – of course – cannot express its 
meaning.  Saussure says, 
The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a 
concept and a sound-image.  The latter is not the material 
sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological 
imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our 
senses.  The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call 
it “material,” it is only in that sense, and by way of 
opposing it to the other term of the association, the concept, 
which is generally more abstract [my emphasis]. (CGL 66) 
Hence, here, Saussure provides a theory of meaning which functions by way of the basic 
pattern outlined by Kant.  Transposing into the Kantian key – it is as if the senses pick up 
the “purely physical thing” without ever being able to mean it.  Further, this sensory 
sound image is conventionally, i.e. arbitrarily, associated with the concept under which it 
is subsumed.  Thing + sense, + concept ≈ Thing + signifier + signified, and, separately, 
both equal the “sign.”      
In this way, every sign is composed of a signifier and a signified to which the 
signifier points. (CGL 67)  Now the importance of what we might call Saussure‟s 
principle of all principles is to recognize that the relation between a signifier and the 
signified to which it points is both arbitrary and fixed.  This requires nuance.  According 
to Saussure,  
The signifier, thought to all appearances freely chosen with 
respect to the idea that it represents, is fixed, not free, with 
respect to the linguistic community that uses it.  The 
masses have no voice in the matter … This fact, which 
seems to embody a contradiction, might be called 
colloquially “the stacked deck.” … No individual, even if 
he willed it, could modify in any way the choice which has 
been made; and, what is more, the community itself … is 
bound to the existing language. (CGL 71)  
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This is why – above – I referred to the conventionality of the association between sensory 
sound image and concept.  Further, Saussure‟s use here of a gaming metaphor – “stacked 
deck” [la carte forcée]392 is significant because the community of Kant scholars at times 
associates the thing-in-itself with the signifier “wild card.”  This seems proper, i.e. I 
would not change this association if I could.  So, the relation between signifier and 
signified is arbitrary – it could have been otherwise – but fixed – it is not otherwise.  
Using a phrase I used with Husserl: you can only express what you indicate.  And, 
physical indication is arbitrarily tied up in conventionality.
393
 
 The last piece to take from Saussure on the way to understanding Derrida‟s pure 
difference involves Saussure‟s second principle.  Whereas the first principle is the 
arbitrary nature of the sign, the second principle is the linear nature of the sign.  Of this 
principle, Saussure says, “The signifier, being auditory, is unfolded solely in time from 
which it gets the following characteristics: (a) it represents a span, and (b) the span is 
measurable in a single dimension; it is a line.” (CGL 71)  Of this linearity Saussure 
suggests, “it is fundamental, and its consequences are incalculable. … the whole 
mechanism of language depends upon it.” (CGL 71)  Beginning with “auditory 
signifiers,” Saussure concludes that these  
signifiers have at their command only the dimension of 
time.  Their elements are presented in succession; they 
form a chain.  This feature becomes readily apparent when 
they are represented in writing and the spatial line of 
graphic marks is substituted for succession in time. (CGL 
71)   
Hence, paraphrasing Saussure here by stringing together the vocabularies of Aristotle, 
Kant, and Derrida I would say: Saussure has located pure difference (Derrida) as the 
                                               
392 Ferdinand de Saussure. Cours de linguistique générale, 99. 
393 Cf. Aristotle‟s priority of account. 
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remote matter (Aristotle) in the intuitive slot designated for space in the (Kantian) 
structure of experience.  In order to better understand this principle, then, think of it as a 
principle of animation or motivation – a motivation indicatively, not expressively 
generated.  To do so, it helps to consider what Saussure says later in the text when, in 
clarifying the first principle, he distinguishes between radical and relative arbitrariness. 
 According to Saussure, “The fundamental principle of the arbitrariness of the sign 
does not prevent our singling out in each language what is radically arbitrary, i.e. 
unmotivated, and what is only relatively arbitrary.” (CGL 131)  Radical and relative 
arbitrariness are distinguished in terms of motivation or animation, there are degrees 
between absolute and relative arbitrariness: “the sign may be relatively motivated.” (CGL 
131)  For example, “The English plural ships suggests through its formation the whole 
series flags, birds, books, etc. while men and sheep suggest nothing.” (CGL 132)  
Saussure means that each sign, dependent upon its degree of arbitrariness, seems to point 
forward – in line – to the next sign.  This internally motivated movement from sign to 
sign may be thought of as a sliding from sign to sign.  And this sliding can be accounted 
for indicatively.  Recall, every sign is composed of different elements, i.e. a signifier and 
a signified.   
Saussure himself refers to these as the acoustic image of the signifier and the 
concept to which is points as the signified.  Image and concept, it should not escape you, 
were the two components which Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction sought to combine via 
the condition for their possible combination, i.e. the =x.  Recall that an image in a 
judgment of perception in Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience was not a fully 
determined object of experience, i.e. it was not an object of a judgment of experience.  In 
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order to be a determined object of experience, the three-fold synthesis was required to 
culminate in the recognition under a concept such that the Square of Opposition, i.e. 
universality, was entered.  Similarly for Saussure, the combination of a sound image with 
a concept is the combination of a noise with the “stacked deck” of meaning agreed upon 
through use by a community of language users.  Yet, just as the image could be 
determined in different ways – limited in different ways –, so too can a signifier be 
combined with different signifieds.  For example, “Hey, that‟s one of the Socrates twins”; 
“Hey, that‟s Socrates”; or “Hey, that‟s my toga!”  Put another way, because of the 
internal difference between image and concept, the coupling of one image and concept 
may slide into a coupling of said image and a different concept or an associated image 
and prior concept, etc. with each coupling constituting a sign.   
Lastly, then, in a phrase which will function as a sign of what is to come in 
Derrida, Saussure, in regard to this sliding makes the following statement.  “This is not 
the place to search for the forces that condition motivation [or animation] in each 
instance,” rather these forces are themselves indicated in the “ease” of sliding and the 
“obviousness” of the meaning of “the subunits.” (CGL 132)  For example, when one 
signifier slides from within one sign to couple into another, Derrida will refer to this 
movement of supplementation as the “logic of supplementarity.”  In other words, notice 
what is being said: all indications seem to suggest ἐλαληίνλ is grounded in ἕηεξνλ; 
however, in so far as ἕηεξνλ is to be meaningful, it must always reduce, “upward,”394 so 
                                               
394 I, of course, mean upward in regard to Kant‟s structure of experience. 
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to speak, to ἐλαληίνλ.  Hence, Derrida will consider pure difference (in-itself) merely “a 
dream.”395  
Derrida‟s Doctrine of the Sign – “The Logic of Supplementarity” 
 
“[A]ppearance draws into the concept of the thing a certain mixture of supplementary representations  
that the understanding knows how to separate from it.”  
~Immanuel Kant (CPR 1996, A 271/B 327)  
 
Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980) in his The Imaginary: A Phenomenological 
Psychology of the Imagination [L’imaginaire: psychologie phénoménologique de 
l’imagination]396 published in 1940 suggests French philosophy by that time had acquired 
the habit of posing “philosophical questions in the Kantian perspective.”397  Beyond even 
Sartre‟s musings, Derrida‟s logic of supplementarity is still haunted by a certain Kantian 
perspective.  In his 1967 publication Of Grammatology [De la grammatologie],
398
 
Derrida declares, “Maintaining it for convenience, let us nevertheless say that the space 
of writing is purely sensible, in the sense that Kant intended.”399  Further, recall Kant‟s 
discussion regarding “amphiboly,” which I discussed in the previous chapter.  Kant 
explains that a “transcendental amphiboly” is “a confusion of a pure object of 
understanding with appearance.” (CPR 1996, A 270/B 326)  Expanding this notion Kant 
explains,  
[T]he principle that realities (as mere affirmations) never 
logically oppose each other is an entirely true proposition 
about the relations of concepts, but signifies nothing at all 
                                               
395 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, Alan Bass, tr., (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978), 151.  
Hereafter cited as W&D. 
396 Jean Paul Sartre, L’imaginaire: psychologie phénoménologique de l’imagination, (Paris: Gallimard, 
1940) 
397 Jean Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, Bernard Frechtman, tr., (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1948), 259. 
398 Jacques Derrida, De la grammatologie, (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967).  
399 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, tr., (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1998), 
289.  Hereafter cited as OG. 
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either in regard to nature nor overall in regard to anything 
in itself (of this we have no concept) [my emphases]. (CPR 
1998, A 273/B 329)       
Now, it might take the remainder of the chapter to illustrate, but this quote from Kant 
explains what Derrida is up to.  First, substitute pure difference for “nature” and any 
“thing in itself.”  Next, since Kant suggests here signification falls short of signifying 
“nature,” take nature to be a regulative idea – not a constitutive idea. (CPR 1998, A 
179/B 221-222)  In other words, the signification “nature” is not meant to constitute a 
truth about things, e.g. that things are “natural,” but rather it is to function so as enable 
discussion of various aspects of experience for which “we have no concept.”  Combining 
this qualification with pure difference, then in regard to Derrida, you may substitute 
Différance instead for nature, i.e. pure difference.   
Notice the similarity between the preceding and the following block quotes: 
according to Derrida, 
The concept of origin or nature is nothing but the myth of 
addition, of supplementarity annulled by being purely 
additive.  It is the myth of the effacement of the trace, that 
is to say of an originary différance that is neither absence 
nor presence, neither negative nor positive [my emphases]. 
(OG 167) 
On the one hand, Derrida embraces Kant‟s warning against amphiboly.  Supplementation 
entails a form of alienation.  On the other hand, Derrida pushes the idea further 
suggesting any reference at all to that from which the understanding alienates must 
employ the understanding, and thereby deserves distrust.  In other words, the “concept” – 
and this is a concept because that is what Kant‟s power of understanding employs – of 
“origin” or “nature” is already not to be believed.  For example, if you believe in these 
concepts, then you might think it correct to refer to the understanding itself as “non-
natural” or unnatural.  Notice how this should be problematic because Kant and Derrida 
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both acknowledge that “we have no concept” and were led to “nature” by invention, i.e. 
“nature” regulative was meant to function like a place holder in the structure of 
experience. 
 This problem points back to Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction and the manner in 
which he considered the structure of experience to include heterogeneous stems 
combinable by imagination in a process of connecting apprehended pure intuitions with 
pure concepts.  In other words, even though you do not have concepts for what you are 
sensing, you are able to refer in time to “This” – here and now – as “a tree.”  Derrida 
addresses the heterogeneity part noting, “The paradox is that one annuls addition by 
considering it a pure addition”, and the temporal part suggesting, “Speech comes to be 
added to intuitive presence.” (OG 167)  On the one hand, Derrida is calling into question 
why the concept “pure” should be allowed to extend into sensibility and remain 
homogeneous to concepts.  On the other hand, Derrida is calling into question why 
discursivity is to be thought of as supplementing something non-discursive when “we 
have no concept” for what is supposedly being supplemented.  Rather, it seems like 
discursivity is supplementing itself.  Whereas, the logic of identity would have a concept 
identify something non-conceptual, the logic of supplementarity would have concepts 
supplement each other without ever leaving the realm of discursivity.   
For these reasons, I refer to Derrida as occupying the conceptual standpoint in 
Kant‟s structure of experience.  Just as concepts relate to other concepts in constellations 
populating the understanding, Derrida will consider all (conceptual) pointing to take 
place within the understanding – it is a myth to think that there is an “outside” of thought 
to think about.  Notice, Derrida thereby is perpetuating Hegel‟s closure of discursivity.  
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In this way, Derrida will not accept that you can get “outside” of the terminological 
constellations, neither to provide identity to a “sensation” nor to solve the problem of 
“non-being.”  Hence, I refer to Derrida as remaining at the second impasse of the 
problem of non-being and failing to solve it.  After discussing Différance in Derrida 
below I devote a section to Derrida and the problem of non-being. So, as you read the rest 
of the chapter, remembering how Derrida relates to the Kant passage above and Hegel‟s 
closure of discursivity will help you navigate his tricky locutions.      
To understand Derrida‟s doctrine of the sign,400 then, think – with Hegel and 
Hyppolite – of Derrida as if he is waiting at the second moment in Kant‟s trajectory of 
experience (after Hegel‟s closure of discursivity) with essential difference to repeatedly 
show the inherent instability of meaning in attempting to refer to pure difference.  
Derrida is able to do this because he plays the Hegelian shell game, and Derrida is a 
thimblerigger
401
 par excellence – Derrida‟s “Hegelianism without reserve.” (MOP 19)  
Remember I suggested above that one way to think of what Hegel was up to, his shell 
game, is to imagine the incoming Absolute as the expression of the Absolute.  If this were 
the Absolute‟s expression, you could only think it by what it indicates, and what it 
indicates is a Quantity of sense.  It is only at the moment of Quality, then, that 
identification takes place, and all determination of identity suffers from this same fate of 
secondariness.   
Since recognition of some possible first moment is always from a second 
moment, it becomes impossible to pin down meaning because the meaning of every 
                                               
400 Cf. Richard Rorty, “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida,” Consequences of 
Pragmatism, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 102. 
401 A thimblerigger is a back alley version of the house in a shell game, i.e. house : casino :: thimblerigger : 
shell game. 
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expression depends on an inexpressible indication.  The indication is inexpressible 
because its relation to the sign which marks it is either arbitrary or dependent upon 
relations of a different kind, i.e. relations of signs not indications.  As such, for example, 
it is impossible to know whether the indication is a component or whole.  One is tempted 
to suppose indications can be compared, but it is rather the case that indications indicate 
due more to human experiential capacity limitations than any hoped for identity of the 
indication(s).  Indeed, the rhetoric of Kantian non-discursivity is being broached here, but 
certainly not to defend the non-discursive excessivity of the thing-in-itself.  Derrida will 
ensure his pronouncements safely pertain to that which is always already supplementary, 
i.e. Derrida will not engage in any attempt to identify an indication as non-sign.  
Describing what animates Derrida‟s words by way of Saussure: All signs are 
composed of a signifier and a signified, signifiers pointing to signifieds, and the 
movement from one sign to then next sign derives from within the sign itself in 
accordance with the rules of the stacked deck.  Since the relation between signifier and 
signified is arbitrary, it is as if – animated from within – signifiers as indications express 
themselves.  Every expression is unstable in so far as, on the one hand, the expression is 
an arbitrary association between indicative signifier and the signified it is taken to mean 
relative to a community of language users.  On the other hand, because the generation of 
the “sliding” from sign to sign is internal to indication, any decision to stop the sliding 
must also be relative to either the indication or the community of language users.  Recall 
Saussure‟s example comparing “sheep” with “ships.”  In both cases, the decision itself is 
ultimately arbitrary – rooted in the degree of arbitrariness found in the sign or the 
community.  The choice of sign derives from the stacked deck, and the sliding is 
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governed by the stacked deck.  This is why paraphrasing Derrida in a discussion of 
Heidegger, Richard Rorty concludes: we do not speak the language, “the language speaks 
us.”402 
Going further by returning to the notion of the Absolute, we can combine a 
Hegel-Hyppolite way of describing Derrida with a Husserl-Saussure way of describing 
him.  As such, the Hegel-Hyppolite discussion illustrated how the Logos was to be 
thought of as a logic of sense.  Including Husserl-Saussure, any attempt to stabilize the 
meaning of what is indicated in sense requires, first and foremost, an ability to stabilize 
meaning. Language cannot be thought to accomplish this feat since the relation of a 
signifier to the sensuous being it is supposed to mean is arbitrary, i.e. sounds refer to 
concepts not “material.”  Moreover, any attempt to pin down the meaning with further 
precision invokes a sliding through the stacked deck which itself was arbitrarily 
established by language users.  As such, indication remains the indicating of a signifier, 
and the possibility of indication itself referring to a transcendental (signified) Logos 
vanishes, absorbed in the fluid undertow of the sliding.  No signifier will be allowed the 
status of a signified which can stand outside signification as a condition for the possibility 
of meaning, i.e. constituting once and for all the relation of a signifier to what it signifies.  
The community of language user, i.e. agreement, and differences internal to the signs, i.e. 
cat is not bat, etc. are the (internal) conditions from which meaning derives – so much for 
Hegel‟s Absolute Idea and Husserl‟s principle of all principles.403,404 
                                               
402 I am thankful for the influence of Michael Byron who was the first to point this out to me.  Richard 
Rorty, Truth and Progress, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 95. 
403 Notice the “strange bed fellows” here with Derrida are the logical positivists.  Ultimately, it is the 
inability to verify any connection of a sign from “inside” understanding with something “outside” 
understanding which motivates Derrida to logically [!] eliminate Hegel‟s retroactive determination.      
404 Cf. Samuel C. Wheeler, III, Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000). 
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For the purpose of either understanding Derrida‟s style of dealing with other 
philosophers or the purpose of understanding his relation to the problem of non-being, it 
is unnecessary to discuss every term Derrida ever employed.  In fact, I have already 
described what he will refer to – following Heidegger‟s notion of destruktion – as 
“deconstruction.”  That is, Derrida‟s version of Hegel‟s shell game, which I will more 
explicitly describe below, amounts to a general formulation of what to expect from 
Derrida‟s encounters with others.  Yet, to enter further into Derrida‟s terminology, 
considering a quote from Derrida‟s “Letter to a Japanese Friend” is quite helpful.   
The word “deconstruction,” like all other words, acquires 
its value only from its inscription in a chain of possible 
substitutions, in what is too blithely called a “context.”  For 
me, for what I have tried and still try to write, the word has 
interest only within a certain context, where it replaces and 
lets itself be determined by such other words as “écriture,” 
“trace,” “différance,” “supplement,” “hymen,” 
“pharmakon,” “marge,” “entame,” “parergon,” etc.  By 
definition, the list can never be closed and I have cited only 
names… What deconstruction is not? Everything of course!  
What is deconstruction? Nothing of course! [my 
emphases]
405
 
To begin with, it is important to understand what Derrida means by “this list can never be 
closed.”  The beginning of his quote echoes the Saussurian principles noted above, i.e. 
the signified is arbitrarily associated with the signifier which, further, points beyond the 
signified to other signifiers in an inherently motivated sliding.  Derrida prefers terms like 
iteration and inscription.  So, the chain of signifiers ensures infinite repeatability or 
iterability at the site where meaning is to be inscribed.  The list of words Derrida provides 
above is supposed to suggest – consistent with what has just been said – that none of 
these words stop the sliding or close off the possible extension of the list.   
                                               
405 Jacques Derrida, “Letter to a Japanese Friend,” Psyche: Inventions of the Other, vol. II, David Wood 
and Andrew Benjamin, tr., (California: Stanford University Press, 2008), 5-6.  Hereafter cited as Psyche.   
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The “list” of signs in the stacked deck “can never be closed” precisely because 
discursivity is already closed, i.e. signs only relate to more signs.  Whereas the logic of 
identification would have it that to an indication which begins an experience in the first 
moment a signifier from the stacked deck of language is applied in the second moment, 
Derrida‟s logic of supplementarity would have it that the first moment is itself already 
derived from the stacked deck.  It is as if Derrida, in denying Kant the subjective side of 
the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, holds that no concept can 
identify the =x.  Recall in the trajectory of experience, the =x exceeds the ability of 
language to mean it; if =x only pertained to one concept, it certainly could not be a 
condition for the possibility of conception.  In other words, the strength of any 
identification, i.e. objective conceptual determination will derive not from a 
correspondence of understanding to the imagination‟s =x, i.e. of sign to the sensible 
indication, but in the network of supplements through which every sign must slide if it is 
to have meaning.   
In other words, Derrida has ratcheted up Hegel‟s shell game, and there is now no 
possible way to even refer to “non-being,” i.e. every shell that is lifted is a shell that is 
shifted.  Recall, this is exactly how I described the second impasse of the problem of non-
being.  There I noted: it is as if the Eleatic visitor is asking: What are we discussing if 
non-being cannot be discussed?  Derrida is pushing the same question and accentuating 
that it is a logic of supplementarity which is invoked, not a logic of identity, when 
attempting to answer the question.  What are we discussing?  We are discussing whatever 
we think we are discussing – discursivity is closed.  You do not get back to and identify 
the first moment, as Hegel would have it, you simply heap supplement upon supplement 
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from the stacked deck, covering the first moment which was itself already indicated 
within the stacked deck.  The first moment is not Hegel‟s pure difference, but a sign 
which contains pure difference.  
 Another way to see how the logic of supplementarity works for Derrida is to 
consider the overlap of space and time with Quantity and Quality which I discussed in 
closing the previous chapter.  Think of an infinite opening in the first moment which 
resembles the infinity of space and allows for the arbitrariness of indication itself.  The 
infinity of the second moment, then, is the infinity of a sliding continuum.  And, you can 
already see the analogies with which I have been working realized in Derrida‟s 
articulation of pure difference.  The first moment, though Hegel‟s, by way of Hyppolite 
has become fused with Kant‟s first moment in the trajectory of experience – space.   
Remember Kant tells us space has its infinity “within it.”  So, in the first moment 
the word, i.e. sign, supposed to correspond to an indication is arbitrary, and in the second 
moment the sign from the first moment slides along an infinite continuous list which can 
“never be closed.”  It is, then, this second moment of Quality – just as it is for both Kant 
and Hegel – which can identify the first moment retroactively.  And, though it is beyond 
sense, it is consistent with Kant‟s trajectory of experience to say that the thing-in-itself 
and pure difference are tied up in the infinity of space, in the first moment.  Derrida‟s 
difference is to have this infinity already enclosed in a sign, as if in a tomb or pyramid.
406
  
Retroactive determination is still required to more fully identify and determine the sense 
of the sign in the first moment, but the (pure) difference internal to every sign always 
remains untouched.  In this way, you can see how pure difference would be Derrida‟s 
                                               
406 Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Speech and Writing according to Hegel,” Alphonso Lingis, tr., Man and World, 
11.1-2, (1978), 107-130. 
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replacement for the thing-in-itself.  Yet, Derrida, taking Hegel seriously indeed, never 
allows for reference outside of discursivity, not even for a (first) moment.    
To sum, then, in regard to Derrida‟s doctrine of the sign, pulling together a 
number of terms, it is as if Différance for Derrida stands for the combination of pure 
difference and the logic of supplementarity.  According to Derrida,  
“presence without difference,” conforms to the logic of 
identity and to the principle of classical ontology (the 
outside is outside, being is, etc.) but not to the logic of 
supplementarity, which would have it that the outside be 
inside, that the other and the lack come to add themselves 
as a plus that replaces a minus, that what adds itself to 
something takes the place of a default in the thing, that the 
default, as the outside of the inside, should be already 
within the inside, etc [my emphasis]. (OG 215)   
You should now be able to recognize that what Derrida means by saying “the outside be 
inside or that lack come to be added”: as significations, i.e. “outside” and “lack,” the 
meanings of these terms derive from and pertain to a network of signs – like the 
constellations of concepts in Kant‟s understanding.  “Lack” cannot mean at all “outside” 
language.  In fact, that it even seems like there can be an “outside” of language is an 
effect of language itself.  Whereas the “default” status for Kant pertains to supposing the 
thing, the default for Derrida pertains to the thing‟s supplementation.  In this way, 
Derrida is ultra-Kantian by attempting to fend off in advance any effect of language 
which would send one looking for the “outside” or “underside” of language.   
Whereas Kant‟s regulative term “nature” regulates positionally, it does not 
regulate interpretationally.  Derrida is attempting to create a sign which both indicates its 
position in the structure of experience and limits the way in which it may be interpreted 
so as to guard against amphiboly or transcendental illusion.  By the time Derrida decides 
to use the term Différance, then, he has already built both Hegel‟s and Saussure‟s 
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movements into the manner in which Kant thought of the thing-in-itself.  On the one 
hand, at the site of Kant‟s infinity of space words differ, i.e. infinite (pure) difference.  On 
the other hand, at the site of Kant‟s infinity of time words defer, i.e. infinite (sliding) 
deference.  As such, Différance is a more sophisticated term than pure difference.  And, 
by more sophisticated I mean Différance participates in Hegel‟s shell game without 
supposing any identification to be – in Kant‟s sense of the term – real, i.e. other than the 
“relationship of mutual and incessant supplementarity or substituion [which] is the order 
of language.” (OG 235)  In Derrida‟s view, pure difference encountered the problem that 
even if different from itself, the difference must always be difference internal to – Kant‟s 
understanding – the stacked deck.  As a result, Derrida coined a term to encompass both 
infinities, i.e. “Différance.”    
Jacques the Fatalist and his Différance 
“Jacques, my friend, you are a philosopher, and I am genuinely sorry for you.”407 
~Denis Diderot 
 
Were I to produce an image of my beginning to this section of the chapter I would 
suggest you imagine the “Exergue,” to Derrida’s Margins of Philosophy as a pond.  
Analogously, the words of the following few paragraphs would be like the skimming of 
the water with a writing stone.  Though, as Derrida would have you believe, the depths of 
the pond are perhaps imponderable, it is my hope to come full circle, as it were, and 
illustrate to you Derrida‟s trick.  Certainly you may test me on this.  If what you read here 
allows you to predict the next turn from up Derrida‟s sleeve, then I will have decoded his 
play, revealed his secret, and refused his gift.  Though I believe his Différance to have 
                                               
407 Denis Diderot, Jacques the Fatalist and his Master, David Coward, tr., (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 63. 
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some efficacy in the structure of experience, it is contra Derrida, not in regard to the 
ground.  To begin, then, a brief reference to Hegel, and to conclude, I will tie my 
discussion in with Hegel‟s shell game.         
Recall the Phenomenology of Spirit §97 quote: “it is just not possible for us ever 
to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean.” (PS 60)  It is possible to use 
Derrida‟s Différance to show his reading of pure difference; Derrida can be seen in 
agreement with Hegel regarding the inability to think undifferentiatedness without 
language.  Hegel, elsewhere, put the matter as such, 
 To want to think without words as Mesmer once attempted 
is, therefore, a manifestly irrational procedure which, as 
Mesmer himself admitted, almost drove him insane.  But it 
is also ridiculous to regard as a defect of thought and 
misfortune, the fact that it is tied to a word; for although the 
common opinion is that it is just the ineffable that is the 
most excellent. Yet this opinion, cherished by conceit, is 
unfounded, since what is ineffable is, in truth, only 
something obscure, fermenting, something which gains 
clarity only when it is able to put itself into words. (PS 60) 
Recall, in terms of language, that which is purely – not merely essentially – different, 
then, differs from whatever signifier is used to indicate it, and defers to an other sign 
sliding along the chain in a “list” which “can never be closed.”  In this way, Derrida is 
not so much attempting to think without words, as he is attempting to show that neither 
words nor thoughts capture the thing.  In terms of experiential appearance what is 
apprehended differs from that which is supposed to be appearing, and defers to an endless 
list of associated appearances.  In this way, you can see Derrida as returning to 
Hyppolite‟s Kant, i.e. taking up Kant‟s structure of experience with the experiential and 
conceptual standpoints collapsed while maintaining Hegel‟s closure of discursivity.408  
                                               
408 Cf. Hager Weslaty, “Aporias of the As If: Derrida‟s Kant and the Question of Experience,” Kant After 
Derrida, Philip Rothfield, ed., (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2003), 18.  
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Taking Phenomenology of Spirit §97, then, as one way to refer to the starting 
point of Hegel‟s shell game, “it is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, 
a sensuous being that we mean.” (PS 60)  Derrida supposes,  
perhaps difference is older than Being itself.  There may be 
a difference still more unthought than the [ontological] 
difference between being and beings.  We certainly can go 
further toward naming it in our language.  Beyond Being 
and beings, this difference, ceaselessly differing from and 
deferring (itself), would trace (itself) (by itself) – this 
différance would be the first or last trace if one still could 
speak, here, of origin and end. (PS 60)  
Derrida asks, “How can we make this sensible except by metaphor? [Derrida‟s 
emphasis]” (MOP 209)  Derrida avers, “Each time that a rhetoric defines metaphor, not 
only is a philosophy implied, but also a conceptual network in which philosophy itself 
has been constituted.” (MOP 230)  As such, for Derrida, “What is defined, therefore, is 
implied in the defining of the definition.” (MOP 231)  Notice Derrida is merely invoking 
the unavoidability of the stacked deck if there is to be meaning at all.  Hence, Derrida 
maintains Hegel‟s closure of discursivity – he is not attempting to think without words; 
yet, he also maintains an opening in the structure of experience at the starting point of the 
dialectic.  Recall for Kant, this is the thing-in-itself.   
Derrida himself makes the connection between his thinking and that of 
Aristotle‟s.  This, then, is consistent with Derrida‟s attack on the signification of the 
ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon.  Since, “There is a code or a program – a rhetoric, if you 
will – for every discourse on metaphor,” Derrida quotes from Aristotle‟s Poetics (Poet 
1457b6-9), “Metaphor (metaphora) consists in giving (epiphora) the thing a name 
(onomatos) that belongs to something else (allotriou).” (MOP 231)  Notice, this 
“belonging” to something else points to the difference in kind between the stacked deck 
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and pure difference.  In regard to the hypokeimenon as purely different, then, Derrida 
wants to establish that whatever term from the stacked deck is used to refer to “pure 
difference” it ultimately functions metaphorically.   
Moving from Aristotle to Pierre Fontanier (1765-1844) Derrida notes, “all kinds 
of words can give rise to metaphors,” following it up with a quote from Fontanier, 
“Tropes by resemblance consist in presenting an idea under the sign of another idea that 
is more striking or better known, and which, moreover, has no other tie to the first idea 
than that of a certain conformity or analogy [Derrida‟s emphasis].” (MOP 235)  Finding 
a way next to discuss resemblance through Aristotle, Derrida notes: “Mimēsis is never 
without theoretical perception of resemblance or similarity, that is, of that which always 
will be posited as the condition for metaphor [Derrida‟s emphasis].” (MOP 237)  And, 
Derrida concludes this metaphorical excursion stating, “The power of truth, as the 
unveiling of nature (physis) by mimēsis, congenitally belongs to the physics of man, to 
anthropophysics. … such is the natural origin of metaphor.” (MOP 237)   
In fact, “metaphor indeed belongs to mimesis, to the fold of physis, to the moment 
when nature, itself veiling itself, has not yet refound itself in its proper nudity.” (MOP 
237)  This last image should bring to mind the Heraclitus mentioned above – “Nature 
loves to hide [θύζηο θξύπηεζζαη θηιεῖ].”409  Again, these Derrida quotes thus far are 
exploring the way in which choosing an initial metaphor from the stacked deck leads to a 
constellation which may be used to explore the first metaphor.  Yet, there are still more 
quotes to examine before grasping what this “difference … older than Being itself” might 
be like.  
                                               
409 Heraclitus, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Charles H. Kahn, tr., 33.  
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 Derrida solidifies the link with my discussion of Aristotle in the Introduction as 
he declares, “Analogy is metaphor par excellence.” (MOP 242)  Noting, however, that as 
“Aristotle remarks, there are cases in which one of the terms [in an analogy] is missing.” 
(MOP 242)  In such cases, “The term has to be invented then” (MOP 242) such that it is 
possible the term “would be metaphorical in all its aspects.” (MOP 243)  In fact, “within 
language the analogy itself is due to a long and hardly visible chain whose first link is 
quite difficult to exhibit, and not only for Aristotle”; (MOP 243) “Which refers, in any 
case, in Aristotle‟s text, to the problem of the proper name or the analogy of Being.” 
(MOP 244)  Hence, Derrida can be seen here emphasizing the assumptive nature of 
discovery or invention; “Like mimēsis, metaphor comes back to physis, to its truth and its 
presence.” (MOP 244)  Derrida is supposing an intrinsic resistance to signification for the 
ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon, as that which is purely different from the stacked deck.  
As such, there can be no correspondence, no mimesis, in regard to this first term.  In 
other words, there is no stable ground for the Law of Identity in regard to pure difference.  
Hoping to avoid refuting himself, Derrida will speak of this intrinsic resistance as 
the movement of Différance.  He again quotes Aristotle, “the greatest thing by far is to be 
a master of metaphor,” so as to “know better than others to perceive resemblances and to 
unveil the truth of nature.” (MOP 244)  Such a “genius of mimēsis, thus, can give rise to a 
language, a code of regulated substitutions, the talent and procedure of rhetoric, the 
imitation of genius, the mastery of the ungraspable.” (MOP 245)  Derrida asks, perhaps 
rhetorically, “Under what conditions would one always have one more trick, one more 
turn, up one‟s sleeve, in one‟s sack?” (MOP 245)  Derrida will revel in these conditions 
so as to undermine any signification of the ὑπνθείκελνλ.  
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 As if answering the question himself, Derrida claims, “Philosophy, as a theory of 
metaphor, first will have been a metaphor of theory.” (MOP 254)  And moving from 
Plato through Kant to Hegel, Derrida maintains, “Doubtless, Hegel‟s Idea, for example, is 
not Plato‟s Idea,” and this is because, “doubtless the effects of the system are irreducible 
[my emphasis] and must be read as such.  But the word Idea is not an arbitrary [=] X, and 
it bears a traditional burden that continues Plato‟s system in Hegel‟s system.” (MOP 254)  
From here Derrida provides an analysis of “catachresis.”  Referring again to Fontanier 
and his text Supplement to the Theory of Tropes, Derrida reports, “The Supplement 
concerns first the violent, forced, abusive inscription of a sign, the imposition of a sign 
upon a meaning which did not yet have its own proper sign in language.” (MOP 255)  
Derrida quotes Fontanier as referring to a supplement as a “secondary origin.” (MOP 
255)  Further, according to Fontanier – as Derrida quotes him – “Catachresis, in general, 
consists in a sign already affected with a first idea also being affected with a new idea, 
which itself had no sign at all.” (MOP 255)  Hence, the supplement is of a code which 
“traverses its own field, endlessly displaces its closure, breaks its line, opens its circle, 
and no ontology will have been able to reduce it [my emphasis].” (MOP 271)  Derrida 
concludes, “Metaphor is less in the philosophical text (and in the rhetorical text 
coordinated with it) than the philosophical text is within metaphor.” (MOP 258)  That is, 
“Henceforth the entire teleology of meaning, which constructs the philosophical concept 
of metaphor, coordinates metaphor with the manifestation of truth, with the production of 
truth as presence without veil.” (MOP 270) 
 It should be remembered that the three-fold synthesis is one synthesis with three 
parts.  So, given Derrida‟s quotes above, it is as if imagination‟s apprehension is the 
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beginning of a threefold process of invention.  The result of this process, i.e. =x, is 
meaningful in its relation to the constellation of concepts which are activated by its 
invention.  I say “activated” here because for both Kant and Derrida imagination‟s act of 
construction by way of the three-fold synthesis results in the experienced first term 
toward identifying experience in a chain of thinking about experience.  What imagination 
produces, then, is a simulacrum – copy without an original.  Though imagination may 
attempt to mimic sensibility given Kant‟s discussion of the excessivity of non-
discursivity, imagination cannot correspond to sensibility.  This is what makes 
imagination‟s product metaphorical and simulacral.  Hence, it is possible to speak of 
genesis perceptually, i.e. of an appearance, and experientially, i.e. of an object of 
experience; yet, these products of imagination are simulacra since there is no original 
which they can be said to mimic.            
Recall Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience first registers sensation on the 
way to appearance, and the product of the productive imagination just prior to conceptual 
and linguistic determination is =x.  As I have already mentioned the conceptual 
standpoint pertains to understanding, judgment, and reason such that (from the 
conceptual standpoint) =x is merely regarded as what these powers can construct with it.  
In other words, these powers cannot see beyond it.  Other views require other vantage 
points such as the apperceptive or experiential.  In so far as meaning derives from 
conceptual and linguistic determination, here is a way to restate the problem of 
retroactive determination within Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience (from the 
conceptual standpoint), i.e. it is just not possible for you to ever say an =x – a sensuous 
being – that you mean.   
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With all I have said thus far, you could, of course, recognize what I am writing 
about here.  However, I will make the analogical relation explicit.  It is the =x which 
animates the self-enclosed writing machine.  For Derrida the =x always already comes 
with a sign – as the difference internal to a sign –, so the animation of the sliding which 
constitutes writing, on the one hand retroactively determines the =x by relating the initial 
sign in the first moment of Quantity to the subsequent writing which emerged from it.  
And, on the other hand, the writing does not retroactively determine the =x because the 
=x is internal to the sign; so the =x, for Derrida, is never touched or seen nude.     
Schematically speaking in regard to Kant‟s structure of experience, being inside 
the writing machine is like being inside the understanding.  On the one hand, you 
encounter the emptiness thesis without the intuitive input of =x.  On the other hand, the 
entire problem of the Transcendental Deduction derives from the change of registers from 
sensibility to understanding.  So, it is possible to think of the concepts or the words being 
used to describe =x as not entirely homogeneous with =x.  As such, =x is different than 
the concepts or words being used to describe it, and the =x as the irreducible difference 
standing in for sensibility on the horizon of the understanding – writing machine.  In fact, 
reading =x as a concept or sign ensures that =x is even different from itself.  This is 
because =x is supposed to be a sign for the product of sensibility which is of a different 
kind than signs.  Hence, whatever sign is used it must be thought to include an irreducible 
difference.  
Further – and here is Derrida‟s point –, if it requires concepts or words to express 
difference, then “pure difference” gets its meaning not from a homogeneity with the 
product of sensibility, i.e. a sensuous being or =x, but from within the writing machine, 
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i.e. by its position in the constellation of concepts or words which are also not 
homogeneous with =x.  Derrida‟s argument would be self-refuting were he to claim =x is 
“pure difference” because he cannot assign a sign to =x.  Therefore, he suggests pure 
difference is “a dream …” (W&D 151)  And, he refers instead to the inability to say the 
=x that you mean by referring to the internally motivated movement of the writing 
machine in its differing and deferring, i.e. Différance.   
Now, at this point, since Derrida and Hegel occupy common ground, Derrida can 
exploit this much of Hegel‟s shell game.  Recall in discussing Hegel above Derrida 
stressed that neither the Platonic nor the Hegelian Idea is an “arbitrary [=] X.”  Here is 
the use value of Derrida‟s discussion of Aristotle and metaphor.  Derrida claims the 
mastery of this – playing on the grasp/concept of the German Begriff – ungraspable = x 
requires metaphor.  Just as the Eleatic visitor from Plato‟s Sophist seems to be asking, 
“What are we discussing if non-being cannot be discussed?”  So, in Derrida‟s question, 
“How can we make this sensible except by metaphor? [Derrida‟s emphasis]” (MOP 421)  
The “this” is supposed to refer to the =x, and the sign “sensible” is to be thought of as the 
metaphor which “consists in giving (epiphora) the thing a name that belongs to 
something else [Aristotle‟s (Poet 1457b6-9)].” (MOP 231)  That is, “presenting an idea 
under the sign of another idea that is more striking or better known, and which, 
moreover, has no other tie to the first idea than that of a certain conformity or analogy 
[Derrida‟s emphasis].” (MOP 235)    
Kant‟s =x is like, or it is as if the = x, is a case where the term in an analogy is 
“missing.”  And, recall that in such cases Derrida claims, “The term has to be invented 
then” (MOP 242) such that it is possible the term “would be metaphorical in all its 
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aspects.” (MOP 243)  As Paul Ricoeur put it, “Henceforth, to revive metaphor is to 
unmask the concept.”410  The metaphor as supplement to the =x resembles a “secondary 
origin.” (MOP 255)  Derrida explains that this refers “in Aristotle‟s text, to the problem 
of the proper name or the analogy of Being.” (MOP 244)  This is precisely how Derrida 
will be critical of Hegel noting, “This is why classical thought concerning structure could 
say that the center is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside it.” (W&D 279)  In 
other words, Derrida is accusing philosophers and philosophy of believing the invented 
metaphor somehow corresponds to the non-metaphorical, i.e. non-linguistic.   
Recall the philosophical notion he discussed above which holds an idea fits an 
analogy because it was invented to resemble – in accordance with the stacked deck – 
what is outside the analogy.  Like “looking through” an Idea, for Derrida you cannot help 
but see, not what is not the Idea, but what the Idea is.  Further, what the Idea is depends 
on its relation to other Ideas – again, ἐλαληίνλ not ἕηεξνλ.  That is, “The center is at the 
center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part 
of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere.  The center is not the center [Le 
centre n’est pas le centre]411.” (W&D 279)  Though this accusation does not work as well 
against Kant, with this accusation Derrida is able to appropriate the mechanism of 
Hegel‟s shell game412 and deny its ability to totalize – all this without affirming non-
discursivity – by positing pure difference as the irreducible difference internal to the 
starting point in Hegel‟s shell game.  Hence, here is where Derrida and Hegel no longer 
occupy a common ground.  Consider Hegel‟s shell game and Figure 4.1. 
                                               
410 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language, Robert Czerny, tr., (New 
York: Routledge, 2003), 337. 
411 Jacques Derrida, L’ecriture et la différence, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967), 410. 
412 Cf. Bruce Baugh, French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism, (New York: Routledge, 2003), 19. 
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Derrida himself precisely places Différance in relation to Hegel‟s shell game.413  
Recall the Hegelian sublation [Aufhebung] is the logical mechanism for retrospectively 
differentiating – (un)covering the first moment – the undifferentiated first moment of 
sense as idea, i.e. at the point when 4 is equated with 1 for Hegel.  Derrida declares,  
If there were a definition of différance, it would be 
precisely the limit, the interruption, the destruction of the 
Hegelian relève wherever it operates.  What is at stake here 
is enormous.  I emphasize the Hegelian Aufhebung, such as 
it is interpreted by a certain Hegelian discourse, for it goes 
without saying that the double meaning of Aufhebung could 
be written otherwise.  Whence its proximity to all the 
operations conducted against Hegel‟s dialectical 
speculation [Derrida‟s emphases].414 
His reference to a “certain Hegelian discourse” signals that the logic of the speculative 
logic is internal to itself.  Derrida seeks to have the sublation written otherwise, then, by 
taking the totalizing closure which Hegel‟s sublation [Aufhebung] performs in the 
recognition of 1 as 4 to indicate 1 as invention and the 1 thru 4 cycle as insufficient to 
bring non-identity into the light of identification.  Remember, it was a negation of 
Quantity which moved to Quality, and a negation of the negation which resulted in the 
                                               
413 Cf. Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, Barbara Johnson, tr., (Chicago: University Press, 1981), 6-7. 
414 Jacques Derrida, Positions, Alan Bass, tr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 40-41.  
Hereafter cited as Pos. 
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positive recognition of Quantity.  Hence, Derrida causes Hegel‟s structure to fall by 
maintaining that to negate negation is negative.
415
   
This realization was not lost on Jürgen Habermas.  According to Habermas, 
Adorno‟s “negative dialectics” and Derrida‟s 
“deconstruction” can be seen as different answers to the 
same problem.  The totalizing self-critique of reason gets 
caught in a performative contradiction since subject-
centered reason can be convicted of being authoritarian in 
nature only by having recourse to its own tools.  The tools 
of thought, which miss the “dimension of nonidentity” and 
are imbued with the “metaphysics of presence,” are 
nevertheless the only available means for uncovering their 
own insufficiency.
416
  
By using the tools of thought and destroying the Hegelian sublation Derrida suggests the 
undifferentiated never was (fully) present in the movement from 1 to 4 in Hegel‟s shell 
game.  As such, all moments of the shell game (1 thru 4) are on equal footing for Derrida.  
This is not because of a Hegelian sublation which reveals 1 as 4 but because 1 was 
always already an invented sign in the analogical chain of signs.  This, according to 
Derrida, is precisely why 4 can be equated with 1, i.e. because the structure of differences 
– what can and cannot relate to this invented metaphor “1” – are disseminated into the 
other terms (2 thru 4) determining whether they appropriately “fit” with the first term or 
not.  “The ineffable” “=x” (of the) “undifferentiated” “first moment” never was 
present/absent.  In other words, conceptual determinations of presence and absence 
pertain to products of the understanding not products of sensibility.     
What Derrida‟s version of Hegel‟s shell game hopes to accomplish is to persuade 
you to think of whatever sign is associated with the =x as already a metaphor.  A 
metaphor for what, you ask?  And, Derrida has it.  He cannot say, of course, or he would 
                                               
415 Cf. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 160. 
416 Jürgen Habermas, “Excursus on Leveling the Genre Distinction between Philosophy and Literature,” 
Philosophical Discourse on Modernity, Frederick G. Lawrence, tr., (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 185. 
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be showing you how to win the shell game, but his references to Aristotle point out 
clearly enough that the “this” which has been “made sensible” by metaphor was the 
missing link in an analogical chain.  Hence, a purely metaphorical term must be 
“invented.”  Derrida‟s invention is Différance.   
Now, Différance, just like all inventions, once invented must suffer the fate of 
“textual drift,”417 i.e. the sliding of meaning along a chain of signifiers befitting all words.  
According to Derrida,  
I would say, first off, that différance … strategically 
seemed to me the most proper,” [and] “by decision and as a 
rule of the game, if you will, turning these propositions 
back on themselves, [moving from 4 to 1 in Figure 4.1] we 
will be introduced to the thought [mirroring Hegel‟s 
movement to idea/thought] of différance … by means of 
this solely strategic justification. (MOP 245)   
Différance is not meant to replace Being.  Rather, Différance is meant to capture the fact 
that a term had to be invented, and whether, as invention, it pertains – it is appropriate – 
to its experiential provocation for invention as adequation or imitation depends not on a 
correspondence between invention and provocation, but on the relation between 
invention and the network of terms from which the invention derives its meaning.  The 
provocation for invention is, of course, heterogeneous to this network.  A sensation only 
makes sense metaphorically, and you still cannot say a sensuous being that you mean.  
Hence, Derrida has made Hegel‟s shell game his own, and these are the conditions with 
which “one always [has] one more trick, one more turn, up one‟s sleeve, in one‟s sack.”  
(MOP 245)   
 Taking a moment, then, to refer directly to Figure 4.1, it is as if, suddenly, Figure 
3.1 takes on the paradoxical nature of Kant‟s Table of Nothing.  Recall Kant‟s Table of 
                                               
417 Jacques Derrida, Khōra, Ian McLeod, tr., On the Name, Thomas Dutoit, ed., (California: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 123.     
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Nothing shows nihil negativum, i.e. non-being; yet, his table is not the solution to the 
problem of non-being because it itself is a representation.  So too, =x was thought to be 
an unrepresented starting point, but Derrida has shown that as unrepresented, neither 
“=x” nor “Being” are appropriate.  What is wickedly wiley418 about Derrida‟s shell game: 
You start playing the game with the idea that you understand the starting point as a point 
which cannot be understood, but if you cannot understand it, then – what are we 
discussing here? – Derrida shows that the triangle of the undifferentiated first moment is 
the triangle of the differentiated moment.  They are the same not because of the sincere 
revelation via retrospective determination à la Hegel, but because the undifferentiated 
first moment with its pure difference “is a dream.” (W&D 151)  What you thought you 
understood as the starting point at 1, in Figure 4.1, you recognize as undecidable at 4.  
Whereas Hegel has you return to affirm your assumed starting point, Derrida has it that 
you negate your starting point to such an extent that you cannot be certain to call it “a 
return.”  For Derrida, the (Kantian) understanding is like a “labyrinth which includes in 
itself its own exits (S&P 104) [le labyrinth qui comprend en lui ses issues],”419 which, of 
course, means “no exit.”  This is why I replaced the “W” from Hegel‟s shell game with 
the universal sign for “chaos” in Derrida‟s shell game.   
Lastly, regarding Figure 4.1, notice that whether the “A” is decidable or not 
presupposes participation in Kant‟s structure of experience.  Despite all this talk about 
rhetoric, this conversation is taking place in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of 
psychology.  Derrida points to Jean Jacques Rousseau‟s (1712-1778) Essay on the Origin 
of Languages (1781) noting as “a general theory of the forms and substances of 
                                               
418 This is not intended ad hominem. 
419 Jacques Derrida, La voix et le phénomène, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), 117. 
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signification[,] [t]his theory is inseparable from a psychology of the passions” – quoting 
Rousseau, “the first invention of speech is due not to need but passion.”420  Further – 
quoting Rousseau –, “As a man‟s first motives for speaking were of the passions, his first 
expressions were tropes.  Figurative language was the first to be born.  Proper meaning 
was discovered last.” (MOP 269)  This suggests that at the level of Quality in Figure 4.1, 
the level of Quantity is revealed as having always already been itself the level of Quality.  
This is not new territory, Nietzsche was already here – Beyond Good and Evil §138 – 
“When we are awake we also do what we do in our dreams: we invent and make up the 
person with whom we associate – and immediately forget it.”421  In fact, Derrida has 
come full circle back to the Copernican revolution with Kant.  Whereas Kant – despite 
undecidability – posited the thing-in-itself at the “bottom” of the structure of experience, 
Derrida is merely accentuating the undecidability (of the thing-in-itself). 
kNOw Irony, kNOw Derrida 
“First of all, I take irony seriously … you can‟t do this without irony.”422 
~Jacques Derrida 
 
Richard Rorty once asked, “How does one decide whether [Derrida] is really a 
much-misunderstood transcendental „philosopher of reflection,‟ a latter-day Hegel, or 
really a much-misunderstood Nominalist, a sort of French Wittgenstein?”423  There are 
three main strategies standardly employed to answer this question regarding Derrida.  
The three strategies involve: (1) a focus on logic; (2) a focus on history; (3) a focus on 
deconstruction.  Notice, Rorty‟s question is calling for a general statement to cover 
                                               
420 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass, tr., 150. 
421 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 88. 
422 Jacques Derrida, “Derrida – Screenplay,” Derrida: Screenplay and Essays on the Film, Kirby Dick, 
Amy Ziering Kofman, ed., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 91. 
423
 Richard Rorty, “Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?” Working Through Derrida, Gary B. 
Madison, ed., (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1993), 145. 
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particular instances of Derrida‟s writing.  In fact, Rorty notes that passages from Derrida 
may be cited to support either of the options – latter-day Hegel or French Wittgenstein.  
Still, Rorty, choosing the latter, argues, “The Idea that there is some neutral ground on 
which to mount an argument against something as big as „logocentrism‟ strikes me as one 
more logocentric hallucination.”424  Rorty, here, employs the first strategy, and by 
employing logic, notice he does not need to look at an abundance of Derrida‟s writings.  
In this way, Rorty suggests perhaps Derrida is something of a “Nominalist” noting, 
“Nominalists like myself – those for whom language is a tool rather than a medium, and 
for whom a concept is just the regular use of a mark or noise.”425  Rorty‟s use of the word 
“regular” like normal, or normative, is another way of saying: however the community of 
language users happens to use the marks or noises in question.  Certainly there is 
something of this to be found in Derrida, but perhaps not enough to equate Derrida and 
Rorty. 
Responding to Rorty, John Caputo employs the second strategy in answering 
Rorty‟s question.  First, Caputo gives his reason for suggesting that the first strategy for 
reading Derrida will not work.  That is, per Caputo‟s description, Derrida supplies “the 
presuppositions for thinking that whatever sense language does make will also be 
unmade, that the things we do with words will come undone [Caputo‟s emphases].”426  
This reason, as I will show below, is not sufficient for denying the application of (the) 
logic (of identity) to Derrida‟s writings, but it is an accurate general statement in regard 
to Derrida‟s writings.  Caputo then suggests a standard reading of Derrida‟s texts in 
                                               
424 Rorty, “Is Derrida?” Working Through, 139. 
425 Rorty, “Is Derrida?” Working Through, 144.  
426 John D. Caputo, “On Not Circumventing the Quasi-Transcendental: The Case of Rorty and Derrida,” 
Working Through Derrida, Gary B. Madison, ed., (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1993), 157. 
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chronological order such that reveal a progression in his thinking from an apocalyptic to 
an ironic tone,
427
 i.e. from a latter-day Hegel to a French Wittgenstein.  According to 
Caputo,  
Still, there is a side of Derrida that Rorty does not admire, 
and that is the side where Derrida gets serious … That is 
the side of Derrida which argues for philosophical ideas 
like différance, archi-écriture, supplement, undecidability, 
etc.  … [I]n his early writings, Derrida even adopted an 
unmistakeably apocalyptic tone about these quasi-entities, 
announcing the end of the age of the book and the 
beginning of writing.  While Derrida has shaken that 
particularly bad habit, he still talks like “metaphysics” is an 
inescapable, encompassing something or other which has a 
hold on us which is deeper than we can say.
428
 
Lastly, then, the third strategy for deciding upon the difference between latter-day Hegel 
and French Wittgenstein is a focus on deconstruction which treats these opposites with 
the logic of supplementarity – emphasizing the difference over the decision.   
A clear example of the third strategy, then, can be seen in Derrida‟s own response 
to John Searle in Limited Inc.  There, Derrida points out that the work which is titled 
“Reply to Derrida” and “signed” by John R. Searle itself admits – in its margins, as it 
were – a debt to a number of others.  Derrida suggests, then, these “authors” should also 
be included in the meaning of the sign “Searle.”  Having indicated two other authors 
already, Derrida proposes “three +n” as the appropriate signature for “Reply to 
Derrida.”429  He, then, says, “Let‟s be serious.”  And, you might think his word “serious” 
should be in quotation marks, not because he is being either serious or non-serious, but 
because Derrida does not trust the word.  He follows it by noting,  
                                               
427 Caputo, “On Not Circumventing,” Working Through, 154. 
428 Caputo, “On Not Circumventing,” Working Through, 154.  
429 Jacques Derrida, “Limited Inc a b c …,” Jeffrey Mehlman and Samuel Weber, tr., Limited Inc., Gerald 
Graff, ed., (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 32.  Hereafter cited as LI. 
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Faced with this speech act (“let‟s be serious”), readers may 
perhaps feel authorized in believing that the presumed 
signatory of this text is only now beginning to be serious, 
only now committing himself to a philosophical discussion 
worthy of the name, and thus admitting that what he has 
previously been engaged in was something entirely 
different. (LI 34) 
Notice what Derrida is attempting to highlight here.  Between the commas, as it were, 
Derrida is playing on “author” in “authorized” which is still in question, questioning the 
synonymy between serious and philosophical – a Nietzschean move –, and suggesting the 
falsity of the retroactive determination of this speech act‟s other as its binary opposite – 
which the speech act itself suggests, i.e. what was previously engaged in was “something 
entirely different [my emphasis].”   
The thread I am treating here as illustrative of the third strategy in this 
deconstructive response which deconstructs “Searle” culminates in Derrida‟s move from 
“Searle” to “three + n” to “Society with Limited Responsibility (or Limited Liability) 
[Société à responsabilité limitée].” (LI 36)  Now, Derrida “justifies” naming this society 
– in this context430 – since, he notes, the other authors indicated by “Searle” have neither 
consented nor are aware of their inclusion in the signature for “Reply to Derrida” – 
hence, the “Limited Liability.” (LI 36)  Noting the excessive length of the sign, Derrida 
abbreviates it to “Sarl,” and voilà.  Derrida, now, can refer to “Sarl” instead of “Searle” 
and intend not only the same meaning which Searle himself is supposed to intend but also 
the supplemental marginalia which the logocentric relation to the sign “Searle” renders 
underprivileged.  Hence, Derrida may be described as arguing with Searle by 
“performing” the logic of supplementarity for which he is advocating.  In other words, 
Derrida is illustrating that even the meaning of the sign “Searle” is unstable and slides 
                                               
430 It is beyond the scope of my concern here to discuss the other possible references involved. 
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through various significations such as “Sarl.”  This is supposed, of course, to call into 
question the ability to make decisions – logical or historical – based on the meaning of 
the signs involved.   
Now, this third (focus on deconstruction) strategy is, as Derrida lamentingly 
admits, inextricably bound to the “context” in which it is employed. (Psyche 5-6)  As 
Claire Colebrook puts it, “certain located speech acts within a context can prompt us to 
think the very emergence or creation of contexts.” (Psyche 5-6)  These “located speech 
acts” are the invented first terms Derrida spoke of above, and different contexts emerge 
from the combination of the context, provided by the sign, and the internal difference of 
the sign which motivates the analogical sliding.  For example, the way in which Derrida 
was able to conjure reference to other contexts while seemingly maintaining a tie to the 
first term by a logical thread.  So, where the third strategy for reading Derrida meets back 
up – retroactively, as it were – with the first strategy, what is at stake is the irony of irony.   
How to think the irony of irony?  Does the negation of a negation equal a 
positive?  Derrida is not coy on the subject: 
First of all, I take irony seriously; I take the problem of 
irony very seriously.  And we need some irony that is 
something which challenges the common sensical concepts, 
and you can‟t do this without some irony.  So there is no 
doubt some irony.431 
The way to think the irony of irony is what links all three of these reading strategies for 
Derrida.  That is, treating the sign “irony” ironically illustrates the logic which Rorty 
hopes to use to ground his reading, and reveals a progress of singularly moving from 
common sensical concept to concept – which Caputo highlighted – in a deconstructive 
movement which requires irony without allowing irony to become a transcendental 
                                               
431 Derrida, “Derrida – Screenplay,” Derrida: Screenplay, 91. 
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signified, i.e. not allowing irony to be present as a context for determining “everything.”  
Given these three strategies for reading Derrida, I will now provide my reading of 
Derrida by affirming all three strategies – a sort of yes, yes, yes. 
 My concern with Derrida in this chapter pertains to his relation to Kant‟s thing-in-
itself and the problem of non-being.  So toward concluding this chapter, as I show my 
reading of Derrida I will do so by further indicating his relation to Kant‟s thing-in-itself 
and the problem of non-being.  Quoting Derrida‟s early work “Structure, Sign and Play in 
the Discourse of the Human Sciences” at length here, you see what Caputo might refer to 
as Derrida‟s attempt to break the habit of an apocalyptic tone, but equally, you see 
Derrida privileging concepts to be later played off against other concepts.  According to 
Derrida,  
We cannot do without the concept of the sign, for we 
cannot give up this metaphysical complicity without also 
giving up the critique we are directing against this 
complicity, or without the risk of erasing the difference in 
the self-identity of a signified reducing its signifier outside 
itself.  For there are two heterogeneous ways of erasing the 
difference between the signifier and the signified: one, the 
classic way, consists in reducing or deriving the signifier 
and signified, that is to say ultimately in submitting the sign 
to thought; the other, the one we are using here against the 
first one, consists in putting into question the system in 
which the preceding reduction functioned: first and 
foremost, the opposition between the sensible and the 
intelligible [My emphases]. (W&D 281) 
Upon reading this quote, one immediately sees at its conclusion a reference to Kant, i.e. 
the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible.  Derrida‟s project, of course, is to 
maintain the irreducibility of the difference between the sensible and the intelligible.  
Such a reduction he notes is a way of “erasing the difference between signifier and 
signified.”  How is that the case?   
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It is the case because “sensible” is a sign just as much as “intelligible” is a sign.  
In this way, the difference between the signs is a product of the difference internal to 
every sign à la Saussure, i.e. the difference between signifier and signified.  It is, of 
course, tempting here to play Derrida against Derrida suggesting, “signifier” and 
“signified” are signs too.  Yet, here is the so-called quasi-transcendental feature of 
Derrida or his “complicity” with which he began the quote above.  He “cannot do without 
the concept of the sign.”  In this way, the concept of the sign is a sign in general, and that 
means the concept of the sign plays the role of the = x, the transcendental object in Kant.  
What Derrida does not say is that in allowing him the sign to play the role of the =x, you 
have also allowed him pure difference and the thing-in-itself by allowing him the 
unrepresentable difference internal to every sign, i.e. the difference between signifier and 
signified.  Hence, this internal difference stands for the contribution from sensibility 
which is irreducibly different in kind from signs – pure difference as the thing-in-itself.   
 Recalling Hyppolite‟s influence on Derrida‟s reading of Kant, sense and 
understanding are collapsed and discursivity is closed.  In this way, the difference 
internal to the transcendental object is the difference which should have been beneath 
imagination as a source separate from the understanding.  As such, the internal difference 
of the =x is the thing-in-itself.  Now, just as all transcendental a prioris must be pure, this 
internal difference is pure difference.  Hence, on the one hand, Derrida‟s dialectic 
privileges the Kantian inheritance from where it derives, revealing pure difference as 
reiterating the thing-in-itself. 
On the other hand, Derrida will treat “pure difference” as a sign, recalling the 
quote above from “Letter to a Japanese Friend” – even though Derrida does not dream of 
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treating “the irreducible difference between signifier and signified” as sign.  Pure 
difference, then, according to Derrida receives the status of a dream, and the difference 
internal to every sign – what would be ἕηεξνλ – is replaced with the combination of 
“undecidability” to capture the differing of internal difference from whatever sign it 
wears as a mask, and the “logic of supplementarity” to capture the deferring which 
motivates the signifiers sliding which invokes other signs connected to the first as a 
supplement. (W&D 151)  This differing and deferring is captured by Derrida‟s famous 
Différance, and ἕηεξνλ is thereby reduced upward in Kant‟s structure of experience to 
ἐλαληίνλ.   
Lest he further his “complicity” with metaphysics, Derrida will “refuse the term,” 
i.e. any term, other than the metaphysical concept of sign.  Indeed, this progression from 
pure difference to Différance indicates the irony which emerges as Derrida 
“deconstructs” all other metaphysical concepts such as the thing-in-itself and non-being.  
Hence, this constitutes my reading of Derrida.  I agree with the readings of Rorty, 
Caputo, and Derrida in regard to Derrida, and I take the inner workings of Derrida‟s 
system to be in dialog with systems outside his system such as Kant, Hegel, Hyppolite, 
Husserl, and Saussure.  After illustrating, explicitly relating, and expanding my reading 
of Derrida in regard to non-being below, I will draw together, support, and conclude my 
claims regarding Derrida, the thing-in-itself, and the problem of non-being. 
Remembering What Virtually Has not Been Said 
 At this point in the chapter there have been four (4) sections.  The first discusses 
pure difference, and in that section I pointed to Derrida‟s Kantian inheritance of the 
thing-in-itself; the second section discusses Derrida‟s application of the logic of 
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supplementarity to pure difference; the third discusses the transformation of pure 
difference into Différance due to Derrida‟s application of the logic of supplementarity to 
pure difference; and, the fourth section showed how Derrida‟s Différance – not pure 
difference – avoids being equated with Kant‟s thing-in-itself.  That is, with Derrida, “The 
thing itself is a sign.” (OG 49)  Across these four sections, then, I have written a vista to 
the first strategy for reading Derrida, i.e. a view to the logic of his textuality – especially 
the first two sections of the chapter.  Next, I engaged the second strategy for reading 
Derrida‟s texts, i.e. taking Derrida‟s writing as a sign of what he meant – especially the 
third section of this chapter.  What remains prior to a concluding section, then, is to 
(further) dispel a reading of Derrida which takes him to be a “realist,” i.e. (in any non-
“private” language version of the term) any reading of Derrida which attempts to position 
him in the experiential standpoint.  As I have repeatedly stressed, Derrida revels in and at 
the conceptual standpoint.  Recall, the negation which pertains to the conceptual 
standpoint, according to Kant, is logical negation, i.e. ἐλαληίνλ, not real negation.  To be 
frank, Derrida is not a realist.         
 The Fallacy of Reductio ad rem 
“[T]he „realist‟ turn … is a further excess of irony.”432  
~ Jacques Derrida, Khōra  
 
As the title of this section of the chapter indicates, I am concerned here to dispel a 
reading a Derrida which suggests deconstruction may be used as a method to “reduce” an 
experience, or an object of experience, to the thing-in-itself.  Notice, not even Kant would 
have held such a position.  Kant followed a “regression” of the trajectory of experience, 
                                               
432 Jacques Derrida, Khōra, Ian McLeod, tr., On the Name, Thomas Dutoit, ed., (California: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 123.     
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not a reduction of the object of experience, positing the thing-in-itself in relation to the 
understanding, as transcendental object =x, and to the imagination as the thing-in-itself.  
In fact, Derrida himself attacks the project of reading deconstruction as a method for 
reducing to the thing.  The target of Derrida‟s criticism was the project described in Jean-
Luc Nancy‟s Corpus.433  Though Nancy did not refer to his project as such, Derrida 
derogatorily deemed such a project a “post-deconstructive realism.”434   
As Derrida points out in On Touching, Jean-Luc Nancy, this “realism” cannot be 
reduced to any of the traditional realisms.  How does Derrida arrive at this name then?  
Of the three words in this phrase, “post-deconstructive realism,” the word internal to the 
phrase is the key, i.e. “deconstructive.”  Nancy‟s project is supposed to be deconstructive 
in that it takes deconstruction as a starting point.  Nancy‟s project is, then, supposed to be 
“post” this deconstructive starting point in that, after applying deconstruction as a 
method, Nancy draws conclusions regarding what is “real,” despite the fact that 
deconstruction does not allow for these conclusions.  From this description alone you 
should recognize Nancy‟s conclusions do not follow from his premises.  In other words, 
Derrida meant the phrase “post-deconstructive realism” ironically.  In fact, Derrida meant 
both parts in the phrase “post-deconstructive” “realism” ironically.  That is, in Derrida‟s 
wake, there can be neither.  Hence, whereas the phrase is ironic, treating this irony as 
ironic is “an excess of irony.”435   
Despite all this, however, there are some theorists who wish to advocate for a 
post-deconstructive realism.  I take the discussion, then, in this section of the chapter to 
                                               
433 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, Richard A. Rand, tr., (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). 
434 Jacques Derrida, On Touching, Jean-Luc Nancy, Christine Irizarry, tr., (California: Stanford University 
Press, 2005), 46.  Hereafter cited at OT. 
435 Derrida, Khōra, 123.     
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be valuable because if it is possible to make Derrida into a realist – unless “realist” is 
meant idiosyncratically, on the verge of a private language –, then my claim that he is 
working from the conceptual standpoint would be wrong.  I claim Derrida first posited 
pure difference to solve the problem of non-being – the equivalent to Kant‟s thing-in-
itself –, but then quickly moved to Différance as the (non)solution to the problem of non-
being.
436
  If it turns out after all that Derrida believed the thing-in-itself to be real, then 
there could be a way – perhaps similar to a negative theology – to reduce to these real 
things.   
In the context of this section, then, my claim is that the reasoning which animates 
the use of deconstruction as a method for reducing to a so called real thing, i.e. post-
deconstructive realism, is fallacious.  I will support my claim by touching on two aspects 
which figure largely in post-deconstructive realism.  First, I argue post-deconstructive 
realism is predicated upon an incorrect reading of deconstruction.  Second, the logic 
involved in formulating post-deconstructive realism is fatally flawed.  I argue the starting 
point of deconstruction itself, i.e. a sign or a concept of a sign, precludes the possibility of 
reducing (a sign or a concept) to a real thing.  There are two fallacies traditionally used to 
refer to such attempts to reduce a sign or a concept to a thing – Austin‟s “descriptive 
fallacy” and Russell‟s “fallacy of verbalism.”  What is more, post-deconstructive realism 
is both amphibolous and a transcendental illusion.  All these fallacies are in play because 
a blatant misreading of Derrida‟s logic produces the illogical position of post-
deconstructive realism.   
                                               
436 Cf. Joshua Kates, Essential History: Jacques Derrida and the development of deconstruction, 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 155. 
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In the preface to Derrida‟s work of Dissemination, Derrida reveals his skeptic 
proclivities.  Derrida explains,  
To put the old names to work, or even just to leave them in 
circulation, will always, of course, involve some risk: the 
risk of settling down … into the system that has been, or is 
in the process of being, deconstructed.
437
   
Recall the comment from Kant‟s preface to the Critique of Pure Reason in which he 
noted the “nomadic” skeptics prefer undecidability to any “permanent cultivation of the 
soil.” (CPR 1998, A ix)  As such, there is a trace of these quotes noticeable in The Work 
of Mourning by Derrida for Gilles Deleuze titled, “I‟m Going to Have to Wander All 
Alone.”438  Notice, of this “wandering” that I am tracing in this paragraph given – that I 
was not (until now) talking of “ships” or “sheep” – the largeness of the topics in play, i.e. 
Kant, Derrida, Deleuze, skepticism, mourning, tracing, linguistics, Saussure, prefacing, 
undecidability, cultivation of soil, etc. you should be able to think of this paragraph as yet 
another indication of what Derrida – quoted above – stated in his description of 
deconstruction in his “Letter to a Japanese Friend.”  According to Derrida, “The word 
„deconstruction,‟ like all other words, acquires its value only from its inscription in a 
chain of possible substitutions” and “By definition, the list can never be closed [my 
emphases].” (Psyche 5-6)  So, where does deconstruction end?  The answer: In the same 
place that it begins.  Where is that?  Welcome to the shell game.   
 To be, a bit more, clear: If you accept the premises of deconstruction, then there 
can be no end to deconstruction.  If there can be no end to deconstruction, then there can 
be no post-deconstruction.  Once inside deconstruction “those who resist it are 
                                               
437 Derrida, Dissemination, 5. 
438 Jacques Derrida, “I‟m Going to Have to Wander All Alone,” Leonard Lawlor, tr., The Work of 
Mourning, Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 189-
196. 
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unwittingly drawn into its tight embrace.”439  Therefore, if you are employing 
deconstruction, then you must adhere to its logic (of supplementarity) which means you 
cannot take any constellation of the remains of deconstruction as a non-deconstructive 
conclusion.  There is a logic (of supplementarity) involved.  If you do not follow 
Derrida‟s logic in employing deconstruction, then of what you are employing – it is not 
deconstruction – Searle‟s complaint is correct.  Searle complains that with deconstructive 
“methods of reasoning one can „prove‟ absolutely anything.”440  Hence, any attempt to 
appropriate the “method” of deconstruction for non-deconstructive or post-deconstructive 
conclusions fails on the grounds of the logic internal to deconstruction.   
 Specifically regarding the starting point of deconstruction, then, recall Derrida‟s 
claim, “We cannot do without the concept of the sign.” (W&D 281)  This, he goes on, 
means the signifier and the signified, along with their difference which is internal to “the 
concept of the sign.”  In this same passage, which I quoted above, Derrida explains there 
are “two ways” of “erasing the difference between the signifier and the signified,” and 
the first, “classic way” of which Derrida is critical, “consists in reducing [à réduire] or 
deriving the signifier and signified, that is to say ultimately in submitting the sign to 
thought [my emphasis].” (W&D 281)  The second – which is accomplished by way of 
deconstruction – “consists in putting into question the system in which the preceding 
reduction [réduction] functioned.” (W&D 281)  There are, of course, multiple kinds of 
reductions in philosophy.  For example, under the genus reduction, there are the species 
of methodological, theoretical, and ontological.  Further, transcendental, 
phenomenological, physical and psychological may, of course, be even further 
                                               
439 Michael Marder, “Différance of the „Real‟,” Parrhesia, 4, (2008), 58. 
440 John R. Searle, “Reply to Mackey,” Working Through Derrida, Gary B. Madison, ed., (Evanston: 
Northwestern University, 1993), 187. 
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specifications of those prior species.  Derrida‟s point is that none of them consist in 
deconstruction.       
What Derrida derogatorily referred to as Nancy‟s realism, Nancy attempts to 
articulate as an “order of touch.”  According to Nancy,  
What touch communicates is not res (or réal) but of the 
order of touch, which itself is real without being réal: it‟s 
an impulsion or a drive, a pressure, an impression or 
expression, an unhinging.  The union is made in the order 
of the movement: it is that in which, or as which, one of the 
soul‟s movements is transmitted to the body, or one of the 
body‟s movements to the soul.441 
To be clear Nancy also suggests, “That the thing itself would be there isn‟t certain.  Here, 
where we are, amounts to nothing more, perhaps, than a reflection…”442  Notice, touch, 
then, is not taken statically here.  Touch is not equated with a moment of touching.  
Rather, the order of touch is to be the accumulation of touchings maintaining a reduction 
across these touchings.  Suppose each first moment of Hegel‟s dialectical movement, i.e. 
the moment of the “sensuous being,” to be a touch.  Then, instead of going through the 
movement, connect the first moment of this movement, i.e. this touch, with the first 
moment of the next touch, i.e. the beginning of the next movement.  The idea is to stay at 
the level of impression and attempt to derive a haptic reading through the connection of 
the touches without conceptuality.  The post-deconstructive realist project, then, supposes 
the connection across the touches to be more real than the connection of the touches plus 
conceptuality.  In other words, the touching with conceptuality is reduced to mere 
touching.   
 The sentiment of Nancy‟s project works toward inverting Husserl‟s 
phenomenological reduction.  As Derrida put it, “the phenomenological epochē is a 
                                               
441 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, Richard A. Rand, tr., (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 141.  
442  Nancy, Corpus, 5.  
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reduction that pushes us back toward meaning.” (W&D 281)  And, one way of describing 
Nancy‟s reduction is “of the frame, or of the layers of sense enframing things [my 
emphasis].”443  So, if a repetitive reduction were needed with each touch, you might say 
the real resides in the remains of the reducing.  When this “reduction stumbles upon 
something irreducible”444 this is the touching that bringing forth the thing.  Further, 
“enframing” is a Heidegger derived term which is absolutely appropriate here because the 
concern is not to frame one touch, but to have a frame which remains open so as to 
gradually reveal what one might say is brought-forth and seen in this dynamic framing.  
Also, enframing is intended to communicate that this moving is sub-essential, i.e. sub the 
(second) level of the dialectal movement which is associated with essence.  The thing is 
supposed to be associated with touching, then, because touching has a sort of blind-sight.  
Like the old fable of a bunch of men groping an elephant and taking pleasure in guessing 
what it is they are touching, in the “sight” of this “touching,” and in the site/sight of the  
remains of this touching, touching remains blind.  In other words, you do not know what 
it is you are touching upon. 
 The way this is supposed to be deconstructive, then, is by considering that which 
is moving through the frame as the connections of internal differences between and in the 
sliding of signs in a deconstruction.  In other words, in the sliding of signs – concerning 
just the internal differences from sign to sign – the movement of Différance is described 
as movement along the traces from internal difference to internal difference.  At this 
point, the post-deconstructive realism project still seems plausible, but this is as far as it 
will get.  The problem occurs as soon as this touching is considered “real.”   
                                               
443 Michael Marder, The Event of the Thing, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 87. 
444 Marder, The Event of the Thing, 137. 
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I have already established that the traces are between signs.  And, here is where – 
invoking the Derrida quotes above in regard to reduction – the post-deconstructive 
realists submit “the sign to thought” (W&D 281) which is indicative of the “classical 
way” Derrida noted above, and precisely deemed a non-deconstructive activity.  In other 
words, it is logocentric to non-ironically think of the “trace” as a “material trace [my 
emphasis].”445  Moreover, to non-ironically say “the „product‟ of this reduction leads a 
life of its own”446 is a dream.  On a much simpler note, consider how this realist trace 
also gets described: “As a trace of psychic animation trapped in the impenetrable 
materiality of the body.”447  If the “materiality” is “impenetrable,” then how did anything 
get “trapped in”?   
Within Nancy‟s sense of touch, if there is not an assumption of sincerity à la 
Husserl, then you cannot “submit it to thought,” e.g. how is one to know whether what 
you are touching is not changing faster than your touch can register?  And, if there is an 
assumption of sincerity, then the project is not deconstructive.  Either what is enframed is 
on the “linguistic side” of experience, in which case it is neither thing nor real, or if it is 
“outside” language, i.e. discursivity, it certainly cannot be associated with Derrida.  Kant 
would call such an inference a transcendental illusion of the cosmological kind.  The best 
such a project should be able to hope for is the identification of touching without 
interpreting the touching.  Nancy‟s project follows the wisdom of taking one obscurity 
and associating it with another.  The order of touch is real.  To the lady on the street this 
should seem too obvious to state.  To a philosopher Nancy‟s project is philosophically 
                                               
445 Marder, The Event of the Thing, 137. 
446 Marder, The Event of the Thing, 120. 
447 Marder, The Event of the Thing, 42. 
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interesting, but it does not resonate with Derrida‟s deconstruction – no matter how much 
terminology is used to mask its fallacies.      
The Derrida of Dissemination might suggest that what the post-deconstructive 
project is actually touching is the “excrement of philosophical essentiality.”448 As I noted 
above, the essential excrement is not so much in the touching, as it is in the interpreting 
of the touching which renders it the touching of the “thing” and “post-deconstructive.”  
As Derrida explained, 
The gossipy small talk of history reduces the thing itself … 
to the form of a particular, finite object, the sort of object 
that determinate modes of knowledge – empirical 
descriptions or mathematical sciences – are incapable of 
producing spontaneously through their own workings and 
must therefore, for their part, introduce [invent] from the 
outside and define as a given.
449
  
Notice, the first target in Derrida‟s list is the “form” of a particular.  If enframing in this 
context constitutes the form of the post-deconstructive thing itself, then Derrida already 
deemed it non-deconstructive.  Moreover, it is as if Derrida is, in the above quote, 
sketching a view of the realist position in question as a sensual embrace of Kant‟s 
blindness thesis – an exchange of “haptic” for “speculative” in Hegel‟s logic.  Further, it 
is not clear that such a realist position is not a transcendental amphiboly, i.e. mistaking a 
haptic appearance for a pure object of the understanding.  For example, if a reduction is 
necessary along each “touch,” then perhaps it is the very entrance into the understanding 
which combines sensibility with understanding to identify the sense as “touch” dragging 
a trace of the understanding along in the reduction.  After all Derrida thought that 
                                               
448 Derrida, Dissemination, 11. 
449 Derrida, Dissemination, 10. 
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recognition “gives back, in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic 
equivalent.”450   
Lastly, reductio ad rem, i.e. reduction to the thing from the starting point of a 
sign, i.e. a deconstructive starting point, is always already fallacious in itself.  Recall that 
in his 1923 paper on “Vagueness,” Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) referred to “the fallacy 
that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things” as the 
fallacy of verbalism.
451,452
  Moreover, in J.L. Austin‟s (1911-1960) How to do things with 
words (1955) he described the “descriptive fallacy” as “the mistake of taking as 
straightforward statements of fact,” i.e. as real, “utterances” that are either “nonsensical” 
or “intended as something quite different,” i.e. ironic.453 
I will now address the putative “reality” of the post-deconstructive thing.  In order 
to think of deconstruction as performing a reduction to the thing, then, one should ask: Is 
this “thing” real or merely relational?  If the former, then Derrida looks like John Locke, 
and if the latter, Derrida looks like Kant.  I have extensively discussed Kant above, so I 
will briefly mention John Locke.  According to Locke, 
Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the 
immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, 
that I call “idea;” and the power to produce any idea in our 
mind, I call “quality” of the subject wherein that power is. 
… “ideas,” if I speak of them sometimes as in the things 
themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities 
in the objects which produce them [ideas] in us.
454
 (Bk I, 
§8) 
                                               
450 Derrida, Given Time: I , 13. 
451 Bertrand Russell, “Vagueness,” Vagueness: A Reader, R. Keefe and P. Smith, ed., (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1996), 62.  
452 Bertrand Russell, “Vagueness,” The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 9: Essays on Language, 
Mind and Matter, 1919-26, (New York: Routledge, 1988). 
453 John L. Austin, How to do things with words, J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà, ed., (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1975),3.  
454 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Alexander Campbell Fraser, ed., 76.  
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Locke goes on to make his famous distinction between primary and secondary qualities.  
“Primary” qualities are “utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate soever it be; 
such as in all alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it 
constantly keeps;” these, then are “original or primary qualities [Locke‟s emphases].”455  
Secondary qualities “are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various 
sensations in us by their primary qualities.”456  Lastly, Locke notes,  
Ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of 
them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies 
themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these 
secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all.  
There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies 
themselves [my emphasis].
457
  
So, for Locke qualitative inscriptions of the secondary kind can be reduced away so as to 
get at the thing-in-itself which – for Locke – exists independently of the mind.  Put 
another way, the thing-in-itself may be described – in a kind of negative theology – by 
way of negatively judging its mind dependent secondary qualities.  The thing-in-itself is 
not (the secondary quality) blue, etc.   
It might be tempting, then, to associate the “second origin” from Derrida, noted 
above, with Locke‟s secondary qualities, since Derrida‟s second origin is an “origin” 
metaphorically.  On the one hand this works if we agree the signs, as secondary, pertain 
to the thing as primary, but the latter part is problematic.  On the other hand, the negative 
theology present in Locke does not seem to be able to work in Derrida.  So, here are two 
significant problems already if one is to suggest the infinite play of signification can be 
reduced to something real.  If a thing is to be taken as real, perhaps not exactly like John 
Locke‟s thing-in-itself but in a related way, then Derrida‟s thing should have either 
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existence or mind independence.  We could muddy the water by deconstructing “mind,” 
and try to make what remains real.  Yet, this does not seem to help; Derrida says, “The 
thing itself is a sign.” (OG 49)  And, “To exist is to be, to be an entity, a being-present.” 
(OG 167)  So, it seems rather like I noted above, there are no remains from 
deconstruction which remain.
458
  Ultimately, for Derrida, no term can remain un-turned – 
not even “event” or “time,” etc.  Moreover, an event internal to the discourse is only 
ironically real.459  Recall how Derrida boasts,  
I would say that the difficulty of defining and therefore also 
of translating the word “deconstruction” stems from the 
fact that all the predicates, all the defining concepts, all the 
lexical significations, and even the syntactic articulations, 
which seem at one moment to lend themselves to this 
definition or to that translation, are also deconstructed or 
deconstructible, directly or otherwise, etc.  And that goes 
for the word, the very unity of the word deconstruction, as 
for every word. (Psyche 5) 
Ultimately, then, there will not be a “touch” or a “thing” or a “real” – for Derrida – 
beyond the infinite play of signification.  “[C]onstantly” “moving”; “If words and 
concepts receive meaning only in sequences of differences, one can justify one‟s 
langauage, and one‟s choice of terms, only within a topic and an historical strategy.” (OG 
70)  It is fantasy to privilege a realm of “anonymous” things left over after deconstructing 
– as if these things are “underneath” their logocentric identification.   
Take for example Simon Critchley‟s claim: “Wherever Derrida is read, he is not 
dead. … Here and now, in the present that holds within itself the promise of the future, 
the dead live.”460  Of course, Critchley is not speaking realistically; he is speaking 
metaphorically.  For Derrida, the thing – like pure difference – is a “dream of a purely 
                                               
458 Cf. Marder, The Event of the Thing, 137. 
459 Cf. Derrida, Khōra, 123.     
460 Simon Critchley, “Derrida: The Reader,” Cardozo Law Review, 27.2, (2005), 565. 
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heterological thought” at the “source” of empiricism. (W&D 151)  When post-
deconstructive realists make claims like “in the act of reading, the text reads us before 
and while we face it,”461  certainly they do not mean that a text really reads us.  Hence, 
reductio ad rem is fallacious if you attempt to apply it to anything which is not ideal or 
mind dependent.  Moreover, reducing to the thing, what you have is another sign whose 
deconstruction is yet to come. 
 Lastly, the logic invoked to support post-deconstructive realism is fatally flawed.  
The logic of the thing in post-deconstructive realism depends upon what is posed as 
“Derrida‟s logic that opposes opposition.”   As such this logic is based on four (4) 
sentences from the entire oeuvre of Derrida.  What is more, these four sentences are 
misrepresented.  In the way in which these four sentences are advertised, you can see 
what is attempting to be accomplished: “The annulment of opposition between the thing 
and its other.” (W&D 151)  Before showing what is supposed to be “Derrida‟s logic that 
opposes opposition, consider the following from Derrida in regard to this language of 
“the thing and its other.”   
Derrida asks, “But how can the „Other‟ be thought or said without reference – we 
do not say reduction – to the alterity” in a binary opposition? (W&D 127)  So, before 
even looking at the logic behind post-deconstructive realism, notice, the problem is not so 
much the use of “thing,” i.e. the content, the problem is the form of the relation.  If this 
opposition is “annulled” due to the “logic that opposes opposition,” then why not use this 
on all of the opposites Derrida considers?  Suddenly, despite the disclaimer that “it does 
not amount to the disappearance of difference,” not only does it amount to the 
disappearance of difference but negation goes out the window too.  By saying that some 
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thing is not A, I have expressed opposition, and therefore, by post-deconstructive logic 
not A is A.  (Huh?)  Such wrongheadedness can be resolved quite easily.  The fact of the 
matter is, there is no such thing as “Derrida‟s logic that opposes opposition.”  The logic is 
supposed to come from the Politics of Friendship; and, I will now show this to you.  
The four sentences come from Derrida‟s Chapter 5, “On Absolute Hostility: The 
Cause of Philosophy and the Spectre of the Political.”  The question Derrida has posed 
just prior to the section under discussion: “What is said here of the enemy cannot be 
indifferent to what is said of the friend, since these two concepts co-determine one 
another.  But the correlation can formally follow three logical chains: [Derrida‟s 
emphasis].”462  So, the determination of the enemy is under discussion, and Derrida 
invokes the binary opposite of the enemy, i.e. the friend, noting that “these two concepts 
co-determine one another.”  As you should be able to predict, this scenario will not turn 
out differently than the other binary oppositions Derrida faced.   
In the attempt to work out the determination of the enemy/friend, then, Derrida 
says “the correlation can formally follow three logical chains.”  He intends to work 
through all three, and then draw a conclusion.  Not to pick the second of the three out and 
represent it in isolation as a logic-in-itself which annuls opposition.  As predicted, the 
first “logical chain” treats enemy and friend as “symmetrical,” the second opposes the 
opposition of the first, i.e. the opposition being opposed is not opposition in general or 
opposition in regard to the thing-in-itself, it is the opposition just posed in the first option 
of three possible options for determining the concepts enemy and friend.  The third 
option, then, points to some third which “endlessly binds or opposes [Derrida‟s 
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emphases]” – Derrida‟s predictable solution – in this case it is “the political,” and such 
“metonymization of the political”463 is considered as a third option.  Therefore, Derrida, 
of course, declares in the light of all three of these options that “we must be patient at the 
crossroads and endure this undecidable [Derrida‟s emphasis].” (PF 123)  Hence, Derrida 
does not deem the second option to have “annulled opposition.” 
So, as you can see, despite so called post-deconstructive realism, logical negation 
was not “annulled” in 2007.  The misquoted, taken out of context, four sentences which 
allow for post-deconstructive realism to consider the thing real is a misreading.  As such, 
post-deconstructive realism is fallacious on multiple counts, and, furthermore, represents 
a blatant and severe misreading of “deconstruction.”  Rather, it is the case, as I have 
differently and repeatedly expressed above, Derrida treats the thing as a sign, and 
deconstruction treats of signs.  Derrida is operating within a closure of discursivity and at 
the conceptual standpoint in Kant‟s structure of experience.  For Derrida, there is no post-
deconstruction, and the thing is not real, it is a sign. 
Derrida‟s Response to the Problem of Non-being: The Conceptus Logico-Discursivus 
Standpoint 
 
To the conditioned reader Derrida‟s Différance and deconstruction read like 
melodrama.  Derrida‟s formulaic is always already on the verge of being a one trick 
pony.  His wild lust to beat Hegel at his own game can be stopped by not starting.  Just 
refuse to play Derrida‟s shell game.  On the one hand, I would say there certainly is 
something brilliant about such a rigorous commitment to circuitous logic.  On the other 
hand, the deep problem with Derrida‟s philosophy is the shift from a merit based logic to 
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a logic of cronyism.  Since there is no real criteria for determining which terms should 
avoid deconstruction in Derrida‟s wake, philosophy becomes politics.  Yet, philosophy as 
politics is not real politics because there is far less money and power involved.  The 
metaphorical politics of philosophy is the politics of vanity.  Even if Derrida‟s use of the 
logic of cronyism may be shown to be “fair,” the shift itself is regrettable in the extension 
of its sovereignty because ultimately it depends upon the hospitality of the tyrant.  This is 
a truth of finitude, whether you can sign it or not.   
Or, perhaps Derrida is attempting to illustrate this very issue.  As such, Derrida‟s 
formulaic should be lauded and applied so as to unmask the logic of identity as always 
already a logic of cronyism.  In this way, Derrida‟s philosophy looks like a therapeutic 
for each singular agent.  The question is meant to ask: You – who is now in the “world” 
of mere “signs” – how will you be just?  How will you conduct yourself in accordance 
with Justice?  Suddenly, an overcoming of Platonism this is not – not that there ever was 
a “Platonism.”  You are situated squarely and perpetually at the beginning the Republic, 
and Derrida refuses to allow you to defer to the authority of a text as he interrogates you.  
You are here.  You are in the world.  What is justice? 
Of course, to be frank, this is a reading of Derrida.  Must I really say it at this 
point?  The matter for Derrida must remain “undecidable.”  However, not to spite but 
despite Derrida; his position within a network of philosophical discussion can be 
identified.  As such, Derrida clearly has a Kantian (and Hegelian) heritage.  And such a 
trace should not be overlooked for the identity of something which goes under the sign of 
“Derrida‟s philosophy.”  In this way, Derrida does have a response to traditional 
philosophical problems.  What I have been working toward, which should be able to be 
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seen at this point, is that Derrida has replaced Kant‟s thing-in-itself with pure difference.  
Further, Derrida has a response to the problem of non-being, and it is not novel.  It is 
precisely the response of the Eleatic “visitor” in Plato‟s Sophist.  I have already discussed 
Derrida‟s reading of the “thing” as a sign.  So, as I conclude this chapter I will point to 
Derrida‟s comments on non-being.  Derrida, predictably, treats “non-being” the same as 
every other term he considers a “sign.”464  Yet, so as to “show the work,” so to speak, I 
conclude this chapter as such.           
 In showing Derrida‟s comments on non-being, I will be summarizing this 
chapter.  I will show you three instances where Derrida is providing a response to the 
problem of non-being.  And, the conclusion – when non-being proper is treated, i.e. 
supposed as non-sign – is that Derrida posits Différance as the undecidable solution to the 
problem of non-being.  Otherwise, Derrida treats non-being as a sign, reserving the most 
non-sign for the irreducible difference contained within every sign.  The irreducible 
difference of the thing-in-itself or non-being is the irreducible difference of pure 
difference which Derrida locates internal to every sign.  As such, pure difference may be 
seen as Derrida‟s replacement for the thing-in-itself, and his solution to the problem of 
non-being.  However, quite early in his life of letters, Derrida thereafter moves away 
from writing about pure difference, shifting the focus to Différance, and more tightly 
closing discursivity by suggesting his only “metaphysical complicity” to be the concept 
of “sign.”  So, Différance is as close to a decision that the later Derrida will provide 
regarding a response to the problem of non-being.  As I indicated both in the Introduction 
and in Chapter 2, this focus on always already being within language as the inability to 
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solve the problem of non-being is a further embrace of the second impasse to the 
problem.
465
 
It should be clear, then, that there is no negative theology with Derrida.  As 
Derrida put it, “No, what I write is not „negative theology.‟”466  Yet, Derrida, and 
especially Derrideans, seem at times to entertain various other terms, as if these terms 
refer to the internal difference which for deconstruction to work must be located within 
signs.  One such term revolves around negative theology, and invokes a notion of non-
being.  So, it is worth considering this term “khōra.”  Attempting to supplant Différance 
with “khōra,” Derrideans befittingly beg the question declaring, “Neither being nor 
nonbeing, the khōra involves a negativity that escapes both the positive and negative 
theological register.”467  Notice, it behooves them, of course, to not consider non-khōra 
or the difference which magically appears between these two binary opposites when they 
do.  After all, khōra is good and non-word, and binary opposites are bad, right?  In this 
example, then, notice being and non-being – as words, i.e. signs – have been relegated to 
the Qualitative level of binary opposition, and it is here that the (Hegelian) negativity 
which points “back” to – what in this case gets called – khōra is supposed to be 
something philosophers have yet to set their eyes or fingers upon.  And, this is precisely 
the question.  On the one hand, in the context of negative theology khōra gets discussed 
as void which could not be seen or touched.  On the other hand, the khōra of negative 
theology is supposed to be located deconstructively. 
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If negative theology is to be thought within deconstruction, then it must take place 
at the Qualitative level between binary opposites so that the term with the “non” in front 
of it could be privatively identified from the other term.  Why is it not possible to locate 
negative theology within deconstruction such that the negation or remotion moves from 
the Qualitative to the Quantitative?  Such a placement would seem more consistent with 
Derrida‟s predecessors.  The answer: It is because, we are told, “This form of negation, 
according to Derrida, is a (quoting Derrida here) „negativity without negativity.‟”468  
Now, such an equation of the non-word khōra, which is suddenly older than both being 
and non-being, should be problematic in light of Derrida‟s declaration of “everything” as 
“discourse.”  I quote him here to contextualize this notion.  According to Derrida,  
Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there 
was no center, that the center could not be thought in the 
form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site, 
that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of 
nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign substitutions 
came into play.  This was the moment when … everything 
became discourse – provided we can agree on this word – 
… The absence of a transcendental signified extends the 
domain and the play of signification infinitely [my 
emphasis]. (W&D 280) 
I am here stating, then, the questions which I will pursue to show you what Derrida is 
doing in the previous quotes.  First, how can there be negativity without negativity?  
Second, what sort of “necessity” is involved in thinking that “the center” has no “natural 
site?”  Third, how does Derrida arrive at “an infinite number of sign substitutions,” why 
not 9 or 42?  Lastly, why does Derrida qualify his claim that “everything became 
discourse” with “provided we can agree on this word?” 
 All of these questions have actually already been answered.  If you recall Kant‟s 
Table of Judgments, “Universal, Particular, and Singular” judgments pertain to Quantity, 
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and “Affirmative, Negative, and Infinite” judgments pertain to Quality.  So, the =x, 
internal difference, pure difference, or in this case, khōra pertain to the Quantitative level.  
Now if either a Universal or a Particular judgment is made, then the Square of Opposition 
is entered.  Therefore, the judgment regarding this Quantitative level must be Singular.  
Similarly, then, at the Qualitative level, the Quality of this Singular judgment is Infinite.  
Such a judgment is supposed to sound like “This is =x” or “Wow, this is khōra.”  The 
“Wow” is appropriate because it expresses a sense of wonder, not affirmation or 
negation.  Expressing affirmation or negation requires identifying the Quantity within a 
logic, i.e. perceptual judgments need not identify “that” which is judged.  Hence, 
whichever term can be entertained here – and this is the very question under 
consideration – it must pertain to a singular infinite judgment.  (This answers the first and 
third questions I asked above.)  And, this is exactly the type of judgment which contained 
non-discursivity for Kant.  Whereas the infinity of space exceeds even a limiting into the 
infinite chain-like continuity of time, each of these infinities was apprehended 
sequentially by imagination.  And the regression back down the series though leading to 
an unimaginable vastness (for Kant) is a form of negation.  Therefore, what Derrida must 
mean by negation without negativity is negation without logical negativity.  As such, this 
is Kant‟s real negation which pertains to the experiential and points to what he refers to 
as the thing-in-itself.   
Put another way, the block quote above from “Structure, Sign, and Play,” is 
Derrida‟s quick version of Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction.469  Instead of attempting to 
solve the heterogeneity problem, Derrida retreats to the “function” of combination.  This 
is tantamount to siding with Kant‟s second edition Transcendental Deduction over his 
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first edition Deduction.  The “necessity” of thinking “the center” has no “natural site” is a 
restatement of the unknowable nature of the thing-in-itself.  Either you determine its 
nature – eliminating the need to speak of the thing-in-itself – like Hegel by “going behind 
the curtain” to see yourself, or you point to something you are not supposed to be able to 
even say, i.e. the thing-in-itself.  Derrida is adding a third option by focusing on the 
unknowable nature of the first moment of Quantity.  Since repetitive experience amounts 
to singularly experiencing infinity – due to the limiting of human experiential apparatus –
, and no signification is sufficient – sufficiency pertaining to relations higher up in the 
structure of experience –, then no amount of sign substitutions will ever arrive at a 
correspondence.   
Elsewhere Derrida referred to this process noting: “To comprehend [Derrida‟s 
emphasis] the structure of becoming, the form of a force, is to lose meaning by finding it.  
The meaning of becoming and of force, by virtue of their pure [and different], intrinsic 
characteristics, is the repose of the beginning and end.” (W&D 26)  Derrida cannot speak 
of this “pure” difference without invoking its other, i.e. meaning, so he asks the 
community of language users if they will allow him his use of the Saussurian stacked 
deck in such a way as to refer to the sign substitutions as “discourse.”  This is the second 
of the four questions I am pursuing in regard to Derrida‟s Transcendental Deduction.  If, 
they – you, i.e. the community of language users – consent, to this initial term, a slew of 
terms will follow, but the network connections amongst the terms to come will never 
correspond to the infinite connections (in perception) “under” or “outside” of experience 
– as if the mind could mirror the “universe” – because the connections can never be taken 
up all at once into the human experiential apparatus.  Even Leibniz‟s assumption of 
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mathematics – God as divine geometer – as a Universal judgment must remain an 
assumption.  Signaling his shift from the “mineness”470 of a Heideggerian focus on the 
apperceptive standpoint to Hegel‟s speculative and parasitic logic of the conceptual 
standpoint, in Monolingualism of the Other, Derrida notes, “I have only one language; it 
is not mine.”471  In other words, because Derrida‟s perspective originates on the 
conceptual logico-discursive side of Kant‟s structure of experience, it is within the 
understanding – and constantly thwarted in – attempting to look “out.”  
So, it is not Kant who has not escaped Derrida; it is Derrida who has not escaped 
Kant.  The difference between Derrida and Kant here: Kant posits a solution to the 
problem of not being able to look “out,” which is the problem of non-being, and Derrida 
is content to merely return to the second impasse of the problem, after having escaped 
Hegel‟s dialectical grasp, at the first impasse.  Derrida‟s irony here pertains to either the 
insincerity of accepting a first term or the sophistry of applying a “method” that you 
know ahead of time produces results just as metaphorical as the stacked deck you 
ingeniously exposed as metaphorical.  Perhaps David Farell Krell‟s text on Derrida The 
Purest of Bastards is on to something.
472
  Returning, then, to the term under discussion 
currently, “khōra,” and the topic of negative theology, it seems as though khōra just 
happened to be the word that the community of language users gathered at the time of 
Derrida‟s writing in the above quotes agreed upon to apply to the Quantitative level of 
experience.   
                                               
470 Heidegger, Being and Time, 68. 
471 Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, Patrick Mensah, tr., (California: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), 1, 5, 21 & 25. 
472 Cf. David Farrell Krell, The Purest of Bastards: Works of Mourning, Art, and Affirmation in the 
Thought of Jacques Derrida, (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 2000). 
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Just as Derrida requires your agreement as to what counts as a word; he requires 
your agreement as to what does not count as a word.  (This answers the fourth question I 
asked above in regard to Derrida‟s Transcendental Deduction.)  The sliding along the 
chain of signification never stops, Derrida‟s liberal difference is that he asks you to vote 
on which term should be privileged, but, make no mistake, the term of the term, as it 
were, is always a singular event.  When the conference is over, the term is no longer 
privileged.  Imagine that: it’s different every time.  I am reminded of a story Thomas 
Szasz is fond of telling about Voltaire (1694-1778): “Asked by his secretary what he 
would have done had he lived in Spain under the Inquisition”; Voltaire is said to have 
replied, “I would have worn a big rosary, and gone to mass every day and kissed all 
monks‟ sleeves, and tried to set fire to all their monasteries.”473  There are no remains 
from deconstruction which remain.  Deconstruction is one of those sophistical “games” 
which you can play reminiscent of the skeptic Carneades (c. 219- c. 129 BC)
474
 who gave 
public lectures in Rome in 155 BC and “argued for and against justice on successive 
days, stunning audiences and incurring the displeasure of Cato the Elder, who convinced 
the Senate to throw the philosophers, for a time, out of the city.”475  In other words, 
neither negative theology in its relaxed form nor in its most rigorous sense
476
 can stop the 
thimblerigger “genius of metaphor” Derrida from having one more signification from the 
stacked deck up his sleeve. 
                                               
473 Thomas S. Szasz, Words to the wise: A medical-philosophical dictionary, (New Jersey: Transaction 
Publishers, 2004), 83.  Quoted in Jean Orieux, Voltaire, Barbara Bray and Helen R. Lane, tr., (New York: 
Doubleday, 1979), 284. 
474 Cf. R.J. Hankinson, The Sceptics, (New York: Routledge, 1995), 86.  
475 Adrian Kuzminski, Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism, (New York: Lexington 
Books, 2008), 10. 
476 Marder, The Event of the Thing, 43. 
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In sum, this chapter began by showing Derrida identify non-being with time.  This 
is why Derrida above says, “the no-thingness” is “only accessible on the basis of the 
Being of time.” (MOP 51)  What is not the standing now of Presence, is not.  In other 
words, though Derrida is critical of the “Metaphysics of Presence,” his solution to the 
problem of non-being is the same as those in Hegel‟s wake.  Just as non-being is internal 
to being, for Hegel, non-being is internal to language for Derrida.  Moreover, if you 
switch registers or modes from the logic of identity to deconstructive logic of 
supplementarity, then irreducible difference is internal to signs and sign use.  Derrida 
revels in the circuitous logic indicating every attempt to identity the difference internal to 
a sign as the sliding movement into another sign.  Non-being as that which is supposed to 
be “outside” any system is the difference irreducible to that system.  When it is called 
“non-being” Hegel reads it as within being, and when it is called “non-being” Derrida 
reads it as within language.  The repetition is there in both the previous sentence and the 
thought of Hegel and Derrida.  Kant truly attempts to think non-being by positing the 
thing-in-itself outside the structure of experience.  Yet, both Hegel and Derrida are quick 
to make hay with the discursive nature of such a positing.  As Plato‟s Eleatic visitor 
might put it, when you say non-being, non-being is being said.  But of course, Kant is not 
ignorant to the discursive nature of his positing.  Hence, Kant discursively articulated this 
“non-being” in multiple ways such as nihil negativum in his Table of Nothing. 
In shifting to Différance, then, Derrida does not sever his Kantian heritage.  If as 
Sartre noted, “Kant had already shown the irreducible difference between sensation and 
thought,”477 then Derrida sought to fortify Kant‟s language so no one would ever attempt 
to reduce the difference again.  To fortify this pure difference, Derrida, then, discusses 
                                               
477 Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, 93. 
 327 
 
Différance.  In other words, by maintaining that pure difference is internal to signs such 
that a sign may be different from itself in that its meaning is arbitrary, Derrida 
preemptively denies that a relation of difference pertains to any non-signs.   
Recall, it was the Hegelian reading of Kant which rendered the difference 
between sensation and thought as the pure difference internal to the concept of 
experience.  It was the retroactive determination which revealed the pure difference as 
conceptual.  So, I am supporting my claim by a sort of genealogy.  Yet, at the same time, 
it is only a merely genealogical support, if you side with Derrida.  If you do not support 
Derrida‟s reading of pure difference, then the question becomes what is the irreducible 
difference that Derrida appropriated?  And the answer, as Sartre noted above, is Kant‟s 
difference between sensation and thought.  Derrida is functioning at the conceptual 
standpoint, and this is what accounts for his “contextuality.”  Deconstruction works on 
texts “from within.”  Recall it was the submitting of “the sign to thought” above that 
allowed for the philosophical tradition‟s hierarchical structure which occluded the self-
writing of Différance.  On the contrary, then, deconstruction accentuates the irreducible 
and undecidable difference already at work in the work due to the very nature of the 
sign(s). 
In a celebrated quote worth rendering at length, Derrida famously explained: 
The very condition of a deconstruction may be at work, 
within the system to be deconstructed; it may already be 
located there, already at work, not at the centre but in an 
excentric centre, in a corner whose eccentricity assures the 
solid concentration of the system, participating in the 
construction of what at the same time threatens to 
deconstruct.  One might then be inclined to reach this 
conclusion: deconstruction is not an operation that 
supervenes afterwards, from the outside, one fine day; it is 
always already at work in the work; one must just know 
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how to identify the right or wrong element, the right or 
wrong stone – the right one, of course, always proves to be, 
precisely, the wrong one.  Since the disruptive force of 
deconstruction is always already contained within the 
architecture of the work, all one would finally have to do to 
be able to deconstruct, given this always already, is to do 
memory work.  Since I want neither to accept or to reject a 
conclusion formulated in these terms, let us leave this 
question hanging for a while [Derrida‟s emphasis].478  
I am fond of this statement of deconstruction by Derrida precisely because he not only 
describes deconstruction, but he denies, for the sake of maintaining undecidability, that 
memory is somehow outside sign systems.  As you should be able to see by this 
conclusion, Derrida treats “memory” as a sign, and as such, he wants “neither to accept or 
to reject a conclusion formulated” in terms of memory.  Decidedly, the matter is 
undecidable for Derrida.  Just as the =x was required to be added to the understanding for 
an experience, yet the =x was from an origin other than the understanding, so too, Derrida 
– maintaining his position at the conceptual standpoint and the closure of discursivity – 
requires an encounter which changes the signs with which he is presented.  On the one 
hand, this change, for Derrida, can never be identified because he is always already 
within a sign system.  On the other hand, by acknowledging “signs” as such, from his 
perspective it is the difference internal to the signs themselves which animate a 
movement and meaning throughout a system of signs.   
   It should be clear, then, that Derrida has taken a discursive standpoint.  Further, 
in so far as non-discursivity would be tantamount to “outside” of language, Derrida 
denies that non-discursivity, the thing-in-itself, pure difference, or non-being, can be 
outside of language.   He accomplishes this by considering each of the terms to be always 
already a sign.  In this way, Derrida has a tautologically grounded argument.  If you are 
                                               
478 Derrida, Jacques. Memoires for Paul De Man, tr. Lindsay, Cecile, et al. New York: Columbia University 
Press, p. 73. 
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using language, then you are already “within” language.  As such, any attempt to express 
something “outside” of language with language remains inside language.  As John 
Caputo puts it, “In Derrida‟s terms, it is always too late to assert our superiority over, our 
transcendental mastery of, language, for we are always already speaking and drawing on 
its resources.”479   
Caputo‟s quotation should remind you of Hegel‟s closure of discursivity: any 
attempt to think what is outside of thought must remain inside thought.  Now, Hegel 
wanted to allow for an undifferentiated or first moment of pure difference to capture 
Kant‟s non-conceptual =x which initiates reflective thought or does the work of 
combining sensibility and understanding in completing an experience.  However, so as to 
remain consistent with his own closure of discursivity, Hegel had this first moment of 
pure difference be revealed by a retroactive determination of sublation as itself 
discursive, i.e. the idea.  Embracing Saussure Derrida takes the initial pure difference of 
Hegel‟s system and locates it in the difference between a signifier and a signified internal 
to every sign.  In this way, there can be no retroactive determination, and no non-
linguistic way to refer to this difference.   
 Ultimately, then, this will be Derrida‟s strategy for denying any outside of 
language – outside of sign systems.  There a number of places where Derrida mentions 
non-being, and in each case non-being is taken to be internal to language, and the identity 
of internal difference as not non-being but undecidable.  And of this undecidability, 
Derrida notes, “undecidability is not indeterminacy.  Undecidability is the competition 
                                               
479 Caputo, “On Not Circumventing ,” Working Through, 158. 
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between two determined possibilities or options.”480  As I showed by way of Sextus 
Empiricus in Chapter 2, when the Pyrrhonian skeptics arrived at undecidability, there was 
something about which judgment was to be suspended.  The agreement between the 
skeptics and the stoics extended far enough for reference to that thing about which there 
is dispute.  Highlighting the second impasse of the problem of non-being, Derrida would 
have it that non-being derives its meaning just as being derives its meaning, i.e. from the 
network of supplementation – not from any outside-text; (OG 158) or, as Derrida puts it 
in Dissemination, “There is nothing before the text: there is no pretext that is not already 
a text,”481  As such, there is no “undecidable” that does not derive its undecidability from 
the text, not whatever we might dream to be undecidable “outside” the text.  Tracing this 
undecidability throughout a text is the work of deconstruction. 
 In Acts of Literature Derrida ventriloquizes Plato‟s Sophist. As such, you find 
more of the same looking different from Derrida.  According to Derrida, “It is impossible 
to pin mimesis down to a binary classification.”  Suddenly “Sophist” seems like it is 
standing in for Différance in this context, Derrida unsurprisingly concludes that in the 
hunt for the Sophist, it is the “organized manner” itself which bars Theaetetus from 
finding the sophist‟s secret hide-out.  The covering cannot be rolled aside for Derrida 
because the “Sophist is capable of „producing‟ „likeness and homonym‟ of everything 
that exists.”482  Describing this “logic” of the Sophist Derrida suggests,  
Mimēsis produces a thing‟s double.  If the double is faithful 
and perfectly like, no qualitative difference separates it 
                                               
480 Jacques Derrida, “Hospitality, Justice, and Responsibility,” in Questioning Ethics: Contemporary 
Debates in Philosophy, Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley, (New York: Routledge, 1999), 79. 
481 Derrida, Dissemination, 328. Cf. “There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n’y a 
pas de hors-texte].” 
482 Jacques Derrida, “The First Session,” Acts of Literature, Derek Attridge, (New York: Routledge, 1992), 
134. 
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from the model.  Three consequences of this: (a) The 
double … is worth nothing in itself. (b) Since the imitator‟s 
value comes only from its model, it is good when the model 
is good [and vice versa] … (c) If mimēsis is nothing and is 
worth nothing in itself, then it is nothing in value and being 
– it is in itself nothing, and is worth the nothing in itself, 
then it is nothing in value and being – it is in itself 
negative.
483
 
This description is exactly like the description of the rhetorical invention of metaphor for 
the missing link in an analogically connected chain of terms from Margins of Philosophy 
quoted in the second section of this chapter.  In other words, the question of metaphor in 
philosophy is answered with philosophy as metaphor.  This supposed to lend support to 
the gesture which regards all philosophical concepts as signs.  That is, exempting the 
metaphysical concept of sign-in-itself.  It is as if Derrida‟s system is the double of the 
philosophical system.  You should be tempted to treat “Derrida‟s system” as a sign which 
is the negation of the sign “philosophical or metaphysical system.”  And, in the 
retrospection to the first moment determine the thing-in-itself from Kant‟s system as the 
“in-itself” of Derrida‟s system which is in itself (as) language. 
  Hence, after examining Derrida‟s multiple iterations of non-being it is clear that 
he treats the logic of supplementarity as primary.  That is, the attempt to derive pure 
difference, the thing-in-itself or non-being from any system derives from the construction 
of the system itself.  And, since – according to Derrida – these systems are weaved 
together by the logic of supplementarity, every system and its determination of the 
ground can be deconstructed.  Put another way, by reveling in these conditions Derrida 
seeks to undermine any signification of the ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon.  As such, 
Derrida treats non-being as yet another sign whose meaning – as a problem or otherwise 
                                               
483 Derrida, “The First Session,” Acts of Literature, 134. 
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– is propped up on a system.  What such a reading of non-being shows, then: Derrida 
failed to solve the problem of non-being.  
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“[O]f the professed Heracliteans, such as was held by Cratylus, who finally did not think it right to say 
anything but only moved his finger, and criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to step twice 
into the same river; for he thought one could not do it even once.  But we shall say in answer to this 
argument also, that there is some real sense in their thinking that the changing, when it is changing, does 
not exist.  Yet, it is after all disputable;  
for that which is losing a quality has something of that which is being lost, and of that which is coming to 
be, something must already be.  And in general if a thing is perishing, will be present something that exists; 
and 
if a thing is coming to be, there must be something from which it comes to be and something by which it is 
generated, and this process cannot go on ad infinitum.”  
~Aristotle (Meta 1995, 1010a11-1010a23) 
 
“One thunderbolt strikes root through everything.”484 
 ~Heraclitus  
 
 “[T]his world … pre-exists its expressions.  It is nevertheless true that it does not exist  
apart from that which expresses it.”485 
~Gilles Deleuze  
Chapter Five: Pure Difference in Deleuze – Expressing Difference Differently 
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 5 Sections and Objectives 
 
In regard to the organization of this chapter, though each of the sections has the potential 
to express more than this introductory “justification” can say, I have three objectives for 
this chapter.  First, I seek to I explicate Deleuze‟s idea of pure difference.  Of course, I 
will accomplish this by referring to that which has been produced thus far in the other 
chapters.  Second, I discuss Deleuze‟s justification for his reading of pure difference and 
examine the ontological commitments of his account.  Lastly, I provide Deleuze‟s 
solution to the problem of non-being emphasizing how and why it fails to solve the 
problem of non-being.  The first two objectives, then, provide support for my conclusions 
regarding Deleuze and his attempt to solve the problem of non-being.  What is more, the 
first two objectives will also contribute to ideas yet to come, i.e. ideas discussed in Part 
II.   
                                               
484 Heraclitus, Fragments, James Hillman and Brooks Haxton, tr. (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 19. 
485 Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, Paul Patton, tr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 
47.  Hereafter cited as D&R.    
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Recall that I consider the first three chapters preparatory to both the Derrida and 
Deleuze chapters.  The focus of this chapter, then, is really Deleuze‟s Difference & 
Repetition [Différence et répétition] (1968).  Yet, a famous quote by Alain Badiou 
regarding Deleuze‟s overall style of thinking is appropriate here: 
It is therefore perfectly coherent that, in starting from 
innumerable and seemingly disparate cases, in exposing 
himself to the impulsion organized by Spinoza and Sacher-
Masoch, Carmelo Bene and Whitehead, Melville and Jean-
Luc Godard, Francis Bacon and Nietzsche, Deleuze arrives 
at conceptual productions that I would unhesitatingly 
qualify as monotonous, composing a very particular regime 
of emphasis or almost infinite repetition of a limited 
repertoire of concepts, as well as a virtuosic variation of 
names, under which what is thought remains essentially 
identical.
486
  
Though I would have preferred Badiou‟s quote to conclude with reference to the 
repetition of a structure, rather than invoke essence and identity, as an appropriate 
paraphrase: it is possible to read Deleuze as if each of his books on other thinkers were an 
attempt to ventriloquize the thinker in question so as to express a repetition of Deleuze‟s 
structure or system by using the other thinker‟s vocabulary.  This is perhaps the most 
rewarding and frustrating aspect of Deleuze‟s style.  And, this is another reason I favor 
Difference & Repetition, because I take it to verge upon the key with which to decode 
Deleuze‟s other books.487 
Despite the complexity of Deleuze‟s thought, then, each repetition of his thought 
encompassed in a different book may be taken as so many signs with univocal reference 
to this structure as key.  So, the focus of this chapter is, of course, Deleuze and Difference 
& Repetition.  However, the breadth of Deleuze‟s thought forces me – to at least once 
                                               
486 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, Louise Burchill, tr. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000), 15. 
487 Cf. “All that I have done since is connected to this book.” (D&R xv)   
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each – refer to Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Marcel 
Proust (1871-1922), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), and Francis Bacon (1909-1992) which 
means briefly engaging the relevant texts as needed.  For example, these figures help 
illuminate the ways in which Deleuze‟s thought both follows and differs from the thought 
of Aristotle.  And, it is the ways in which Deleuze differs from Aristotle and Hegel
488
 that 
provide the novelty to his otherwise Kantian solution to the problem of non-being. 
The purpose for writing this chapter, then, is to provide Deleuze‟s reading of pure 
difference, and provide support for my claim that Deleuze indirectly attempts to solve the 
problem of non-being with his new concept of difference as pure difference.  You will 
understand why I use the word “indirectly” here by the end of the chapter.  In sum, on the 
one hand, Deleuze – following Bergson – wants to treat non-being as a “pseudo-
problem.”  On the other hand, Deleuze re-writes the problem and offers “?-being” as its 
solution.  In regard to Deleuze‟s new concept of difference as pure difference, it should 
be noted that this new concept is actually an Idea in Kant‟s sense of the term.  Yet, as 
Kant also holds, these ideas, as problematic, are unhinged concepts. (CPR 1998, A 508/B 
536)
489
    Consider how Kant refers to the unconditioned – thing-in-itself – in discussing 
pure concepts.   
Now since the unconditioned alone makes possible the 
totality of conditions, and conversely the totality of 
conditions is always itself unconditioned, a pure concept of 
reason in general can be explained through the concept of 
the unconditioned, insofar as it contains a ground of 
synthesis for what is conditioned. (CPR 1998, A 322/B 
379) 
                                               
488 Cf. Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, J.M. Harding, tr. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 136. 
489 Cf. CPJ 128. 
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Deleuze acknowledges he is aware of Kant‟s distinctions in both his commentary on 
Kant
490
 and his article on Kant‟s Third Critique.491  Hence, providing Deleuze‟s reading 
of difference will ultimately entail comparing his structure of experience with that of 
Kant‟s.   
First, a judgment of the sublime is tantamount to the unhinging of a concept of the 
understanding because the sublime exceeds our ability to recognize it with a concept of 
the understanding. (CPJ 128)  The sublime is thereby made sense of in relation to an idea 
– as an unhinged concept –, rather than a concept with which it is supposed to be equal 
(=x).  As you know, this unhinging is signaled by the “free play” of imagination. (Cf. 
CPJ 192-195)  Second, a judgment of the beautiful provides a different conception of 
harmony. (Cf. CPJ 198)  Whereas harmony can be, and perhaps usually is, thought of as 
synonymous with equality, Kant‟s Third Critique provides a more musical version of the 
soul.  In other words, harmony is determined by the resonance of the faculties – the soul 
as aesthetic tuning fork.  As aesthetic this harmony is not derived from engaging identical 
concepts of the understanding.  Rather, it is the harmony between sensibility and the 
understanding broadly designated.  Hence, from Kant‟s Third Critique Deleuze is able to 
think a concept – a regulative Idea in the language of Kant‟s First Critique – of 
difference other than the perhaps more traditional identical concept of difference.  In this 
way, the identical concept of difference may be called “identical” because it derives from 
relations grounded in – invoking Plato – the Idea of the Same, i.e. =x.  As such an 
identical concept of difference functions as a constitutive Idea in the language of Kant‟s 
                                               
490 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, tr. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).  Hereafter cited KCP.  
491 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, “The Idea of Genesis in Kant‟s Aesthetics,” Daniel W. Smith, tr., Angelaki: Journal 
of the Theoretical Humanities, 5.3, (2000), 57-70. 
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First Critique, and is determined by negation – ἐλαληίνλ à place de ἕηεξνλ.  Deleuze then 
is able to justify this concept of pure difference, despite what I refer to as its “fractal 
simulacral” character,492 by looking to the difference of which pure difference is 
supposed to be a concept as if it were the power of the psychic tuning fork‟s resonating. 
The claim which Deleuze wrote Difference & Repetition to support: there is a 
different concept of difference, and this concept is of “pure difference,” i.e. the unhinged 
Idea of Difference in itself.  This, of course, reaches all the way back to Plato‟s Sophist.  
Deleuze is attempting to realize Plato‟s project of thinking Difference in itself, i.e. 
ἕηεξνλ.  The value of this project, as Plato‟s dependence of reckoning thesis (discussed in 
the Introduction) emphasized, derives from the difficulty of thinking being in itself.  On 
the one hand, recall that providing an account of being depends upon providing an 
account of non-being.  On the other hand, recall that the Sophist concludes by – ironically 
in my opinion – equating non-being with Difference in itself, i.e. ἕηεξνλ.  Hence, what 
hangs in the balance of Deleuze‟s advocacy for the concept of pure difference is both 
being and non-being.  Deleuze‟s concern – as established by Plato – is with being.  In 
other words, Deleuze is attempting to think nothing less than being in itself by thinking 
difference in itself. 
I have already made my position on this clear.  I believe there is enormous value 
in Deleuze‟s ontology; however, I believe it is ultimately flawed in its account of non-
being.  Therefore, in concluding this chapter I will address Deleuze‟s account of non-
                                               
492 For an in depth discussion of simulacra see: Jean Baudrillard, “The Precession of Simulacra,” Simulacra 
and Simulation, Sheila Faria Glaser, tr. (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 1-42. 
 338 
 
being directly.  Elsewhere I address the area where the flaw in Deleuze‟s ontology 
appears most prominently, i.e. in his ethical theory.
493
   
I begin to address Deleuze‟s ontology, then, by directly discussing Deleuze‟s 
concept of pure difference.  I, next, discuss Deleuze‟s pure difference as it relates to 
Kant‟s structure of experience, and this discussion includes Deleuze‟s famous “syntheses 
of time.”  Moving in the following section to a higher level of generality, I will discuss 
Deleuze‟s notion of “Transcendental Empiricism” as it relates to what has already been 
stated.  In the final sections of the chapter I address what I see as the flaw in Deleuze‟s 
ontology, and I directly address Deleuze‟s comments regarding non-being from 
Difference & Repetition. 
The Recursive Fractal Character of Pure Difference 
 
“Whereas pure difference in Derrida thinks recursion as the „recursive discursive,‟  
pure difference in Deleuze thinks non-discursive recursion „fractal-like.‟” 
~Frank Scalambrino, Non-Being & Memory, I.5 
 
“Everything starts out in the abyss,”494 declaimed Deleuze.  Yet, what does 
“abyss” [l’abîme] mean here?  On the one hand, this is a question regarding how to 
identify the abyss.  On the other hand, this is also a question regarding method in relation 
to identifying the abyss.  To start with the former, in the Logic of Sense (1969) [Logique 
du sens] Deleuze makes a distinction between an abyss with differences and an abyss 
without differences.  In fact, he makes this distinction while denouncing the alternatives 
                                               
493 Consider Daniel W Smith‟s comments on the link between Deleuze‟s ontology and ethics: Daniel W. 
Smith, “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent French Thought,” 
Between Deleuze and Derrida, Paul Patton and John Protevi, ed. (New York: Continuum, 2003), 63. 
494 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, tr. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), 188.  Hereafter cited as LOS.  Cf. “Tout commence par l’abîme.” Gilles Deleuze, 
Logique du sens, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969), 219.   
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to his penchant for a valorized chaos.
495
   These alternatives are “common to metaphysics 
and transcendental philosophy.” (LOS 106)  They are:  
either an undifferentiated ground, a groundlessness, 
formless nonbeing [non-être], or an abyss without 
differences [“abîme sans différences,” my emphasis] and 
without properties, or a supremely individuated Being and 
an intensely personalized Form.  Without this Being or this 
Form, you will have only chaos [le chaos]. (LOS 106) 
So this quote is supposed to address the foundational Aristotelian
496
 and self-referential 
Kantian alternatives to what Deleuze refers to as “Nietzsche‟s discovery.”  According to 
Deleuze, Nietzsche “explored a world of impersonal and pre-individual singularities, a 
world he then called Dionysian or of the will to power, a free and unbound energy.” 
(LOS 106)  Deleuze‟s further description is more salient, as he notes: 
This is something neither individual nor personal, but 
rather singular. [Quelque chose qui n’est ni individuel ni 
personnel, et pourtant qui est singulier]  Being is not an 
undifferentiated abyss, it leaps from one singularity to 
another, casting always the dice belonging to the same cast, 
always fragmented and formed again in each throw.  It is a 
Dionysian sense-producing machine, in which nonsense 
and sense are no longer found in simple opposition [my 
emphases]. (LOS 107)    
Discussing the juxtaposition of these two block quotes, then, will help to explicate the 
different abysses and indicate Deleuze‟s method involved in doing so.  The quotes 
themselves show the movement from Aristotle to Kant to Deleuze in regard to 
beginnings. 
 So the abyss in which everything starts out is – for Deleuze – an abyss with 
differences.  In other words, here is Deleuze‟s version of what I refer to as the 
                                               
495 Cf. Fred Evans, The Multivoiced Body: Society and Communication in the Age of Diversity, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2009), 24. 
496 Recall the discussion from the Introduction regarding the inability to determine “Plato‟s position,” 
otherwise I would put Plato‟s name here with Aristotle.  Certainly Deleuze writes as though Plato‟s name 
should be placed here given his references to the “overturning of Platonism.”  More importantly, however, 
Deleuze is denouncing the responses of his predecessors as possible, but mistaken, alternatives to chaos.  
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contemporary French critique of Hegel‟s dialectic.497  There is already difference internal 
to the starting point – an abyss with differences in this case.  Recall that so far this is also 
Derrida‟s strategy for critiquing Hegel‟s dialectic.  However, whereas Derrida thinks of 
the difference internal to the starting point as recursively warding off all attempts to “see” 
“outside” discursivity, i.e. the non-discursive, when Deleuze looks into the abyss he sees 
overflowing non-discursive joy and dancing abundance.
498
  This is, of course, a question 
of how to characterize the ground.  Deleuze in the above first block quote accuses 
Aristotle and Hegel
499
 of “starting” with an undifferentiated ground.  Kant‟s ground 
gained over the strategies of Aristotle and Hegel derives from his ability to think of the 
ground as difference, not quite difference in itself but the thing-in-itself as different.  
Though Kant thinks difference differently (than Aristotle and later Hegel) via self-
reference to his structure of experience, Deleuze thinks Kant still falls short of thinking 
difference in itself.
500
  Hence, of the two questions with which I began this section, the 
above goes as far toward identifying the abyss – the first question: as possible without 
addressing the latter of the two questions – what is the method involved in identifying the 
abyss? 
 To start answering the second question then, consider two more aspects of the 
above two block quotes.  Deleuze uses the term non-being, i.e. non-être.  To what is he 
referring here?  Deleuze is referring to Aristotle‟s arsenal of logical distinctions, the same 
logical distinctions with which Aristotle put forth his response to the problem of non-
                                               
497 Cf. Lutz Ellrich, “Negativity and Difference: On Gilles Deleuze‟s Criticism of Dialectics,” MLN, 111.3, 
(1996), 463-487. 
498 Cf. James Brusseau, “Decadent Philosophy is Truth Sacrificed for Thinking,” Decadence of the French 
Nietzsche, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 73. 
499 Cf. Chapter 3 above, and D&R 7 and 10.   
500 Cf. Christian Kerslake, Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy: From Kant to Deleuze, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 49-50. 
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being.  In other words, this non-being – which is really not-being – pertains to ἐλαληίνλ.  
The piece to highlight in juxtaposition here from the second block quote is Deleuze‟s 
comment, “Being is not an undifferentiated abyss.”  Notice, on the one hand, Deleuze‟s 
concern is different than Aristotle‟s, i.e. Deleuze is interested in ἕηεξνλ.  Yet, on the other 
hand, Deleuze is talking about being.  Why is he not talking about non-being?  The 
answer is because Deleuze treats Plato‟s dependency of reckoning thesis from the Sophist 
quite seriously.  Whereas Kant seems to be treating difference as pointing to non-being, 
Deleuze – by way of Plato‟s thesis – treats difference as pointing to being.  And, this 
speaks directly to method. 
What is at stake here should remind you of the constitutive regulative distinction 
in Kant and the demonstration dialectic, or justification discovery, distinction in Aristotle.  
In discussing this distinction in Aristotle recall that I used the locution to “look through” 
in the attempt to describe thinking the Idea of Difference in itself, i.e. ἕηεξνλ, as 
contrasted with difference in relation to others, i.e. ἐλαληίνλ.  The suggestion by the end 
of the Introduction was that Aristotle mistakenly subsumed Plato‟s ἕηεξνλ as a question 
of ἐλαληίνλ.  Whereas Kant‟s structure of experience, with its account of non-
discursivity, points to ἕηεξνλ from an ἐλαληίνλ governed ground, Deleuze seeks to return 
to ἕηεξνλ as Difference in itself.  Now, recall further that this looking through was 
supposed to be a way to see outside the forms.  So here is the point of intersection, then, 
where the first question which began this section (how to identify the abyss) can be fully 
answered by fully answering the second question (what is the method involved in 
identifying the abyss).  It is clear thus far that Deleuze takes the starting point of dialectic 
to be a differentiated abyss – a starting point with internal difference.  Throughout the 
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dissertation you have seen that there are two ways to start the dialectic.  The dialectic 
begins with either experience or with thought, with perceptions or with ideas.  With Kant 
to thank, pure difference is supposed to be the non-discursive which exceeds – overflows 
– its process of becoming discursive, whether it be through perception or conception.501  
Finally, then, regarding Difference in itself as the differentiated abyss by way of the two 
starting points of dialectic, when Deleuze looks into this abyss, what does he “see”?   
 Answering this question of the abyss speaks directly to the relation between pure 
difference, Kant‟s thing-in-itself, and the beginning of Hegel‟s dialectical movement.  
Recall Aristotle in regard to the hypokeimenon and especially Chapter 3 regarding 
dialectic, the opposition found in the second moment points back to the underlying first 
moment which the (Nietzschean) criticizers of Hegel (and Aristotle by proxy) consider 
already to include an internal difference.  So, the second moment occurring in thought 
produces the opposition between difference and identity, i.e. ἐλαληίνλ.  Yet, Deleuze is 
concerned to emphasize the first moment – like an abyss with differences – as already 
containing a difference more profound than that identified in the second moment, and that 
difference is pure difference, i.e. ἕηεξνλ.  If you consider the difference between 
moments, the first moment pertains to a Quantity of pure difference and the second 
moment pertains to its identity through Qualification.  Since the non-discursivity of pure 
difference eludes discursive (identical) difference thought through opposition in the 
second moment of dialectical movement, Deleuze hopes to show the second moment as a 
repetition of the first when regarded from the point of view of Difference in itself.  In this 
way, Deleuze is like the true apologist for Kant in Hegel‟s wake.  Whereas Hegel‟s 
                                               
501 Sometimes I metaphorically describe this overflowing as extra-dimensional by referencing Edwin 
Abbott Abbott‟s (1838-1926) 1884 classic Flatland. 
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dialectic accomplished the closure of discursivity, and thereby excluded both non-
discursivity and Kant‟s thing-in-itself from the dialectical movement, Deleuze has 
recovered non-discursivity as pure difference and hopes to show it permeating the 
dialectical movement by way of repetition.    
Hegel held that “Difference in itself is self-related difference; as such, it is the 
negativity of itself, the difference not of an other, but of itself from itself; it is not itself 
but its other,” and as such concluded, “Difference is therefore itself and identity.” (SL 
417)  Recall this is also how Hegel – as indicated by Tom Rockmore in Chapter 3 above 
– argues for the equation of being and non-being in the first moment of the dialectic.  
According to Hegel difference “is mediated with itself by the non-being of its other … 
Difference as such is already implicitly contradiction [Hegel‟s emphasis].” (SL 431)  In 
the context of the language I have been using, ultimately Deleuze accuses Hegel of 
following Aristotle in reducing Plato‟s ἕηεξνλ to ἐλαληίνλ.  Whereas Hegel uses 
difference as the negativity, the op-positivity, consistent with ἐλαληίνλ to connect the first 
and second moments of dialectic, Deleuze will use the positive difference of ἕηεξνλ to 
connect the first and second moments.
502
  Further, whereas for Hegel difference leads to 
equating being and non-being, for Deleuze the being of pure difference as positivity will 
be the motor force of the dialectic hoping to arrive at an Idea of itself.
503
  The question 
for Deleuze becomes how to indicate the positivity of difference in itself. 
 In order to approach an idea of positive difference in itself, consider the 
following: 
                                               
502 Note that the Hegel quote which begins this paragraph refers to difference as “the negativity of itself 
[my emphasis].”  It is as if Deleuze is concerned with difference as the positivity of itself.  
503 A good deal of discussion will occur by the end of the chapter to explain Deleuze‟s rendition of non-
being, but suffice to say the immediate previous statement in regard to Deleuze and non-being is 
analogously accurate with Hegel‟s use of the term non-being 
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What is different from difference can be difference in itself, 
since difference in itself is different from itself. 
According to Deleuze, “Difference must be shown differing [Deleuze‟s emphasis].” 
(D&R 56)  So, what does Deleuze see when he looks into the abyss?  He sees that which 
is different than what he sees.
504
  And, what is this that is different from itself?  It is 
difference.  What is this difference?   Difference is that which is different from itself.  
Since this movement in the abstract could continue indefinitely: first, notice that this is 
ἕηεξνλ without the oppositional thinking of ἐλαληίνλ.  Next, notice that this movement is 
more than circular.  This is the recursive fractal character of pure difference.  It does not 
run in a circle; the dialectic runs in a circle. (Cf. D&R 273)  As Deleuze would have it 
then, the dialectic produces an Idea to match the starting point of the dialectic, and both 
are the Idea of Difference in itself.  Each completed movement of the dialectic produces 
the Idea of Difference.   
The circular movement which brings about the Same, again and again, traces the 
trajectory of something other.  Since with each return of the dialectic the movement is the 
same, there can be uniformity in this thinking.  Yet, precisely the reason why you cannot 
determine if the end corresponds or exhausts the start is that the Idea of Difference in 
itself contains an internal difference – it is different than itself.505  As the return of the 
Same is driven and dragged along the trajectory of pure difference, the trajectory takes on 
the character of a recursive fractal.  Fractal-like because each movement of the dialectic 
is the same as the next and recursive because the dialectic procedure is applied repeatedly 
so long as the power of pure difference allows for it.  In this way, “Difference is the 
                                               
504 I use the word “than” here, instead of “from,” because than is supposed to invoke a notion of Quantity 
and dynamize the – otherwise static seeming – difference. 
505 Though perhaps only marginally correct English to use the word “than” instead of “from” with different, 
I prefer the use of “than” in this context as it seems to invoke the grammar of “more than.”  Such is 
appropriate for  the excessivity of non-discursivity and the positivity of difference. 
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genuine beginning,”506 and so it is that the abyss with which everything begins is 
differentiated.
507
  
 Recall, again from Chapter 3, Hegel‟s overly narrow consideration of difference 
as ἐλαληίνλ was not the only problem with his dialectic.  The other problem pertained to 
Kant‟s discussion of amphiboly.  The question Deleuze must answer then, if he is to 
avoid this second problem: how might pure difference as positivity appear in experience?  
This question, of course, pertains to the experiential component of Kant‟s structure of 
experience.  What is more, as I will show below, it is in this way that pure difference 
functions to replace the thing-in-itself as difference-in-itself.  Recall from Aristotle‟s 
discussion of dialectic: the way in which individuals process experience is precisely the 
way in which they begin the dialectic perceptually.  Again, I will discuss the way 
Deleuze thinks through Kant‟s structure of experience in depth below.  Suffice to say for 
now, Deleuze distinguishes between “the original and the copy” and “the model and the 
simulacrum,”508 so as to characterize two different types of relations in regard to the 
perceptual catalyst of the dialectic.   
Recall from the Introduction, in discussing Aristotle I concluded that both 
demonstration and dialectic begin with assumptions.  Yet, the assumptions which begin a 
demonstration are supposed to be on more solid ground.  As a result, the relation between 
the assumptions and what follows from those assumptions in a demonstration is thought 
                                               
506 Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson‟s Conception of Difference,” Michael Taormina, tr. Desert Islands and other 
texts 1953-1974, David Lapoujade, ed. (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), 50.  Hereafter cited as DI. 
507 Here is an experiment you can perform: Put your face up to a mirror but not too close that you cannot 
see your own eyes.  Now, look into your own eyes and see the reflection of your own face on the pupils of 
your eyes.  If it helps, just look into one eye.  So, at this point, you have the physical eye, the image of the 
eye on the mirror, and the image of your face in the image of the pupil of the eye on the mirror – three eyes.  
Now, think how this recurrence could recur out far beyond your ability to physically see it recurring – in 
every eye you look to the pupil to see another eye… 
508 Gilles Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” Rosalind Krauss, tr. October, 27, (1983), 45. 
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to be different from the relation between the assumptions and what follows from those 
assumptions in a dialectic.  Whereas the copy is, thereby, supposed to be demonstratively 
the Same, the simulacrum is avowedly Different.  Hence, the connection between 
Deleuze‟s two types of relations and dialectic.  The original copy relation allows for a 
relatively straightforward puzzle which excludes non-discursivity; with this relation you 
can support the claim that the starting point of dialectic has an identity.  This is the case 
even if you follow Hegel and postpone identification until the third moment of the 
dialectic, i.e. the dialectical ubiquity of ἐλαληίνλ allows for the identification of the 
starting point of dialectic as a copy of the (original) Idea which identifies it.  The more 
difficult puzzle figures discursivity as enveloping the non-discursive positive difference; 
with this relation you can support the claim that the discursive (envelope) repeats, and 
thereby evidences, non-discursive difference.  Therfore, not to follow what he implicitly 
accuses the history of Western philosophy as thinking of being the Same, Deleuze 
pursues the simulacral – à la recherche of the perceptual catalyst.   
  What is more, notice that both of these types of relation pertain to thought.  The 
solidity of the ground between assumptions and what follows in a demonstration is a 
ground of thought, not experience.
509
  That there is experience with which to compare 
thought accentuates the very necessity of assumption, whether beginning demonstration 
or dialectic.  This does not mean that demonstrations are necessarily wrong.  Rather, it 
means that whatever we take as a starting point in experience, you can speak of the 
strength of its product‟s relation to it; though it would be further assumptive to think a 
correspondence between what is producing or causing perception and what is perceived.  
So this is the long hand version with which Deleuze avows his debt to Kant.  What 
                                               
509 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” 48. 
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Deleuze is thinking through here is the excessivity of the non-discursive as it moves 
along the limiting trajectory of the structure of experience on its way into the dialectic.     
Having stated the above, then, you should be able to recognize that despite the 
image with which the perceptually originated dialectic begins, the image is different from 
that which produced it.  So, which of the two types of relation noted above better 
describes the relation between image and that which produced it in experience prior to 
the image‟s ascent onto the organizing (reflective) thought ground of dialectic?  The 
relation, of the two noted above, which applies here is the simulacral.  This is not to claim 
that the image‟s relation to that which produced it cannot be organized into a relation of 
original and copy.  Nor is it to claim that the image is not an image.  Rather, it is to claim 
that prior to the dialectical organization, the image‟s relation to that which produced it is 
simulacral.  This is of the utmost importance if you are examining the beginning and not 
what it becomes.   
Without relying upon what Aristotle called priority in being or Saussure‟s stacked 
deck, the image is at best the copy of a copy in a limitless line of copies.  Yet, “If we say 
of the simulacrum that it is a copy of a copy, an endlessly degraded icon, an infinitely 
slackened resemblance, we miss the essential point: the difference in nature between 
simulacrum and copy.”510  It concerns Deleuze that you not miss “the difference in 
nature” because,   
The simulacrum implies great dimensions, depths, and 
distances which the observer cannot dominate.  It is 
because he cannot master them that he has an impression of 
resemblance.  The simulacrum includes within itself the 
differential point of view … In short, folded within the 
simulacrum there is a process of going mad, a process of 
                                               
510 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” 48. 
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limitlessness … always simultaneously more and less, but 
never equal [my emphasis].
511
 
According to Deleuze “the depths” which “the observer cannot dominate,” speak to the 
“aggressiveness of the simulacra,” (Cf. D&R xx) their “phantasmatic power,”512 and as 
they barge their way into Kant‟s understanding broadly designated, the power upon 
which these images ride reaches all the way into the dimension of Ideas.
513
  For these 
simulacra “it is not a matter of reproducing or inventing forms, but of capturing 
forces.”514  Hence, Deleuze speaks of “the coupling of forces, the perceptible force of the 
scream and the imperceptible force that makes one scream.” (FB 52)  In other words, the 
imperceptible force is the internal difference of the perceptible force, and their coupling 
is the simulacrum that is different than itself, i.e. an image with internal difference.   
As Deleuze would have it, then, the image which perceptually, i.e. experientially, 
starts the dialectic is also different than itself, since it is the power of pure difference 
itself through which the image initiates the dialectic.  Put in more Kantian language, “The 
violence of that which forces thought develops from the sentiendum to the cogitandum.” 
(D&R 141)  Since the perceptual catalyst of the dialectic is simulacral, the structural 
syntheses receive their descriptions from the vocabulary of the hermeneutic of suspicion.  
The descriptors which now apply to descending Kant‟s three-fold synthesis: the 
recognition that hides, the reproduction that masks, and the apprehension which 
repeats.
515
  Descending further you arrive at the thing-in-itself which has become pure 
difference.  What is more, the sense of pure difference which I am attempting to capture 
                                               
511 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” 49. 
512 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” 51. 
513 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” 52. 
514 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, Daniel W. Smith, tr. (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1993), 48.  Hereafter cited as FB. 
515 Cf. Keith W. Faulkner, Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time, (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 3.  I 
discovered this language in my years of studying Freud, i.e. independently of Faulkner.  However, I am 
aware of and affirm Faulkner‟s descriptions.  
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is, in many ways, dispersed throughout the early works in Deleuze‟s corpus.  Given the 
complexity, then, and the decisive – for the overall dissertation – nature of the following 
discussion, I devote an entire section for its sake.  However, for the sake of 
comprehensibility, i.e. so as to make the comparison between Kant and Deleuze 
understandable, I devote the next section to a more general discussion.  The more general 
discussion, regarding what Deleuze referred to as his “transcendental empiricism” should 
help contextualize the sustained comparison which follows it between Deleuze‟s structure 
of experience and Kant‟s.   
Transcendental Empiricism: The Pure Difference that Makes a Difference 
 
[I]magine something which distinguishes itself from itself – and yet that from which it distinguishes itself 
does not distinguish itself from it.  Lightning, for example…”   
~Gilles Deleuze (D&R 28) 
 
Given the work of the preceding chapters, there are two ways to express how 
Deleuze overcomes Hegel‟s closure of discursivity.  On the one hand, it can be expressed 
through Aristotle‟s four causes.  On the other hand, it can be expressed through Kant‟s 
distinction between constitutive and regulative ideas.  In regard to Aristotle‟s four causes 
[ἄηηηα].  Recall, the four causes: (1) the agent or initiator of change [ἀξρὴ], i.e. the 
efficient cause; (2) the essence, “the whole or synthesis or form” [ὅινλ θαὶ ἡ ζύλζεζηο 
θαὶ ηὸ εἶδνο], i.e. the formal cause; (3) “the for the sake of which” [ηέινο], i.e. the final 
cause; and, (4) the “substratum” [ὑπνθείκελνλ], i.e. the material cause.  One way I could 
succinctly express Deleuze‟s overcoming of Hegel‟s closure of discursivity is to 
distinguish between two different ways of viewing Aristotle‟s four causes.  These two 
ways would pertain to viewing the causes as though they correspond to two of Plato‟s 
“five great kinds” from the Sophist (251a5-259d8): Sameness [ηαὐηόλ] and Difference 
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[ἕηεξνλ].  Suppose Aristotle‟s notion of the causes in so far as it pertains to discursivity to 
thereby pertain to the form of the Same, and in so far as it pertains to non-discursivity to 
thereby pertain to the form of Difference.  What changes?   
Most importantly, the “for the sake of which” becomes “for the sake of itself.”  If 
the ηέινο cannot be justified by reference to any discursive features of an object, then the 
ηέινο of an object refers to the very power which is causing the unfolding of the object.  
The formal cause, in so far as formality itself is discursivity can only be thought of as de-
formed, and as de-formed points to, on the one hand, the material cause – the 
ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. the hypokeimenon; and, on the other hand, the excessivity of all the 
potential objects which could become actual objects through the matter form 
combination.  Without recourse to discursivity, i.e. without engaging Aristotle‟s logical 
apparatus, this ὑπνθείκελνλ of an object – just like the ηέινο –  refers to the object‟s 
power to appear prior to identification in the form.  Moreover, since the ὑπνθείκελνλ as 
non-discursive is both excessive and not yet an identified unit, it is consistent to think of 
the ὑπνθείκελνλ as a cluster of (object) fragments.  Further, the power involved here 
should be thought of as intensity, not extensity, since extensity alreadys entails a matter 
form combination.  To grant Aristotle his further distinction in regard to matter would be 
to posit a virtual realm as proximate matter prior to actualization by discursive in-
formation, and to posit the underlying power, i.e. intensity, as remote matter.  Lastly, as 
the non-discursive initiator of change, the efficient cause, cannot refer to the form, and 
thereby – nothing remains – it must refer to this remote matter, i.e. intensity.  In fact, the 
difference in kind between the particular constraints on an expression and the power of 
expression itself accounts for the difference between the virtual dimension, and intensity 
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though neither are discursive.  Hence, thinking Aristotle‟s causes through Plato‟s 
distinction between the Same and the Different reveals a set of causes different from 
Aristotle‟s, and the non-discursive of these causes all refer to power.  Lo and behold: a 
swarm of power – an abyss – with differences. (Cf. D&R 277)  See Figure 5.1 (the “E” 
stands for extensity – by way of Sameness – and the “I” stands for Intensity – by way of 
Difference). 
       Aristotle‟s Four Causes 
E Efficient Cause Remote Matter Proximate Matter (In)Form(ation) Final Cause 
I Discharge of 
Power 
Power as 
Intensity 
Virtual 
Dimension 
Actualization Discharge of 
Power 
Figure 5.1 
 Before discussing Deleuze‟s overcoming of Hegel‟s closure of discursivity 
through the vocabulary of Kant‟s constitutive regulative distinction, I would like to 
briefly draw your attention to a subtle distinction which Deleuze – it may turn out – 
misses.  Notice, in constructing the above chart: rather than negate Aristotle‟s causes in 
order to arrive at the non-discursive, I triangulated the causes, so to speak, through 
Plato‟s “great kinds.”  On the one hand, the difference between the forms is the 
difference which allows for participation in the forms, i.e. ἐλαληίνλ.  On the other hand, I 
did not derive the non-discursive causes by suggesting that they participate in the 
discursive form of Difference.  What am I saying?  Whether this is an instance of 
“looking through” the form of Difference, i.e. ἕηεξνλ, or not matters less than the fact that 
I did not derive the “non” of non-discursivity from ἐλαληίνλ, i.e. any opposition or 
negation of Aristotle‟s causes.  This will be most relevant at the end of the chapter where 
I provide Deleuze‟s discussion of the non of non-being.  However, since I will reference 
the above as support for my claim against Deleuze below regarding the non in non-being, 
it is relevant to point it out to you now.           
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In regard to Kant‟s vocabulary, Deleuze‟s innovation is not to suggest that 
thought occurs without concepts;
516
 rather his innovation is to think of discursive 
experiential concepts as referring to the non-discursive forces which express them, i.e. of 
which they are expressions.  The way he overcomes the Hegel-Derrida claim that a 
concept as such only derives its meaning from its participation in a constellation of 
concepts – Saussure‟s stacked deck – is to distinguish between open ended and closed 
concepts.  Now then, this distinction was already made by Kant, i.e. the distinction 
between constitutive and regulative, in regard to concepts.  Whereas a constitutive idea is 
taken to constitute an object through its recognition in the = x, a regulative idea, as 
indicated above, is not thought to state the whole of that to which it refers.  The 
examples, of course, being God, the soul, and freedom announced in Kant‟s Critique of 
Pure Reason. (Cf. CPR A 509-510 /B 537-538 and A 684-687/B 712-715)  Since I will 
focus in the next section explicitly on the relation between Kant and Deleuze, suffice to 
say for now: Deleuze employs Kant‟s notion of a regulative idea in regard to practical 
experience.  In other words, Deleuze overcomes the difficulty which holds that as 
discursive the concept cannot express the non-discursive by holding that an open ended 
concept is able to delimit without attempting to exhaust the non-discursive forces which 
express it.  Because Deleuze is thinking about experience he is able to suggest that the 
experiential forces involved are themselves expressing that which only an open ended 
idea can discursively do justice.  Hence, the condition for the idea is itself within 
experience – transcendental empiricism.          
Identifying himself with traditional philosophical terms, in the Preface to the 
English edition of Dialogues II, Deleuze declares, “I have always felt that I am an 
                                               
516 Contra: Edouard Machery, Doing without Concepts, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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empiricist, that is, a pluralist.”517  Explaining further, of empiricism Deleuze notes, 
“[T]he aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions 
under which something new is produced (creativeness).”518  Accordingly, Deleuze‟s 
Empiricism starts with a completely different evaluation: 
analyzing the states of things, in such a way that non-pre-
existent concepts can be extracted from them.  States of 
things are neither unities nor totalities, but multiplicities.  
The abstract does not explain, but must itself be 
explained.
519
   
Notice, Deleuze prefers to think of Kantian sensibility – the states of “things” – using a 
notion of plurality, i.e. “multiplicity,” rather than concepts such as unity or totality.  This, 
of course, speaks to Kant‟s Table of Concepts of the Understanding according to 
Quantity.  On the one hand, Deleuze‟s decision here pertains to the “Empiricism” piece 
of transcendental empiricism.  On the other hand, notice Deleuze above announces his 
concern to “find the conditions under which something new is produced.”  This concern 
refers to the “Transcendental” piece of transcendental empiricism.  Hence, transcendental 
empiricism for Deleuze locates the conditions for production of the new within the 
elements of experience themselves.  In this way, as Deleuze declares in Difference & 
Repetition, he shifts the eminent concern – from that which he sees in Kant as the 
“domain of representation” – “to become „experience‟, transcendental empiricism or 
science of the sensible.” (D&R 56)  Lastly, as “non-pre-existent” indicates, Deleuze 
holds that concepts and ideas themselves may be open ended and created anew.  That is, 
the generation of newness pertains to the conceptual as well as the experiential for 
Deleuze. 
                                               
517 Gilles Deleuze, “Preface to the English Edition,” Dialogues II, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam, tr., (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), vii.  
518 Deleuze, “Preface to the English Edition,” Dialogues II, vii.  
519 Deleuze, “Preface to the English Edition,” Dialogues II, vii.  
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 Precisely indicating his reading of “things,” Deleuze further ties the notions of 
transcendental and empirical together in this quote,   
It is not just that there are several states of things (each one 
of which would be yet another); nor that each state of 
things is itself multiple (which would simply be to indicate 
its resistance to unification).  The essential thing, from the 
point of view of empiricism, is the noun multiplicity, which 
designates a set of lines or dimensions which are 
irreducible to one another.  Every „thing‟ is made up in this 
way.
520
   
By suggesting each thing is made of “irreducible” lines or dimensions, and multiplicity as 
referring to a block or a set of these lines, Deleuze indicates that from which these lines 
derive as the ultimate conditions for the production of novelty, i.e. the new.  Moreover, 
the possibility of a one-to-one correspondence between concepts and experience must be 
excluded since the experiential features of things are so many “multiple” lines.  Even if a 
one-to-one rendering of language and things were possible – which it is not –, there can 
be no correspondence between things and the multiplicity expressed as things.  What is 
more, since Deleuze‟s transcendental empiricism entails such a multiplicity of lines or 
forces expressing things, once expressed no signification can ever exhaustively identify 
the thing.  In other words, Deleuze has renamed Kantian non-discursivity as multiple 
lines or dimensions.  Recall that this renaming is consistent with both the thinking of 
Leibniz and of Kant on the matter.  It is as if these lines or dimensions expressing things 
may be placed first in – what I refer to as – a limiting trajectory toward the identification 
of the things as such.
521
      
                                               
520 Deleuze, “Preface to the English Edition,” Dialogues II, vii.  
521 Cf. Chapter 1, esp. regarding non-discursivity. 
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Discussing David Hume‟s “empiricism,” Deleuze suggests the “history of 
philosophy has more or less absorbed, more or less digested, empiricism.”522  By this 
Deleuze suggests the history of philosophy overlooks the “secrets” empiricism “harbors.” 
(PI 35)  Deleuze further suggests it is the secrets of empiricism that Hume “pushes the 
furthest and fully illuminates,” accordingly,  
His empiricism is a sort of science-fiction universe avant la 
lettre.  As in science fiction, one has the impression of a 
fictive, foreign world, seen by other creatures, but also the 
presentiment that this world is already ours, and those 
creatures, ourselves.  A parallel conversion of science or 
theory follows: theory becomes an inquiry. (PI 35) 
Notice this empiricism, for Deleuze, describes a “seemingly fictive world.”  This should 
remind you of comments made by both Aristotle and Kant.  As Aristotle clearly points 
out, an assumption is not synonymous with a “lie.”  Whereas “lie” tends to indicate the 
failure of an assumption, thinking about experience nonetheless requires assumptions.  
Hence, on the one hand, the failure of an assumption means the shift to a different 
assumption.  On the other hand, the assumptive nature of dialectical and demonstrative 
beginning for Aristotle allows Deleuze to refer to the experiential “world” as fictional.  
Kant‟s way of suggesting as much was to refer to the non-discursive as excessive in 
relation to the conceptual apparatuses which attempt to identify it.    
Recalling my comments, then, in the “Copernican Revolution” section from 
Chapter 2, Deleuze, of this empiricism, concludes, “The result is a great conversion of 
theory to practice.” (PI 36)  Following Hume and functioning as a sort of mid-wife 
Deleuze asks the following questions: 
To establish possession of an abandoned city, does a javelin 
thrown against the door suffice, or must the door be 
                                               
522 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on a life, Anne Boyman, tr., (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 
35.  Hereafter cited as PI. 
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touched by a finger?  To what extent can we be owners of 
the seas?  Why is the ground more important than the 
surface in a juridical system, whereas in painting, the paint 
is more important than the canvas? (PI 36) 
Deleuze concludes, “It is only then that the problem of the association of ideas discovers 
its meaning.” (PI 36)  And, for Deleuze, “What is called the theory of association finds its 
direction and its truth in a casuistry of relations.” (PI 36)  This charge of a “casuistry of 
relations” – like agreement among language users which establishes Saussure‟s “stacked 
deck” – points back to the identity of the world as “fictive.”  Pointing to the 
anthropomorphic determination of relations, which subsequently gets considered 
“natural” through a process of association, Deleuze highlights the excessivity of 
experience.  In other words, multiplicity should be thought over “natural” unity in regard 
to experience since the determination of things and of relations among things is never the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth.     
 As such a description of the experiential world emphasizes, one cannot expect to 
refer to experience, i.e. provide a description of “the world,” in an exhaustive way.523  
The principle to be drawn here is that what is at work in “experience” produces the things 
and relations which conceptual identification further limits.  Deleuze‟s emphasis on the 
assumptive fictive nature of conceptuality is an attempt to highlight conceptual 
identification as necessarily open ended.  This insight finds its metaphysical expression in 
Deleuze‟s idea of an abyss with differences noted above.  This is different than Derrida‟s 
account because Deleuze – as affirming Kantian non-discursivity – is able to think of an 
experiential abyss as excessively overflowing, and thereby as positive.  The difference 
                                               
523 I return to and focus on this issue by the end of the dissertation.  Suffice to say for now that I am not 
making an absurd claim like water is not water, etc.  Rather, I am rehearsing Deleuze‟s version of Kant‟s 
reading of non-discursivity. 
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being that, despite the fictive character, Deleuze is able to further describe the 
multiplicity involved in his transcendental empiricism noting,  
There is something wild and powerful in this transcendental 
empiricism that is of course not the element of sensation 
(simple empiricism), for sensation is only a break within 
the flow of absolute consciousness.  It is, rather, however 
close two sensations may be, the passage from one to the 
other as becoming, as increase or decrease in power (virtual 
quantity). (PI 25) 
It would be as if to view such wild multiplicity stereoscopic mind with its discursive 
categories should become kaleidoscopic mind so as to not privilege the fiction over the 
very force which it seeks to describe.  Perhaps such a becoming in the mind might verge 
upon a correspondence to the ontogenesis, i.e. experiential becoming, upon which 
conceptuality rides.  In lieu of such a kaleidoscopic conversion, Deleuze – as indicated by 
the last two words of the above quote – resorts to the term “virtual.”  Since one cannot 
expect to refer to experience or the world in an exhaustive way, virtual is both the 
qualifier describing these powers devoid of discursive domestication, and the term for 
Deleuze‟s anticipatory mental mechanism regulating the identification of things.        
A conversion of theory into practice, then, for Deleuze treats the two terms 
“theory” and “practice” as always already mutually informing one another.  In the course 
of explication the relation between Deleuze‟s thought and Kant‟s three-fold synthesis of 
imagination becomes clear.  At this point, notice for Deleuze: judgments made about the 
world entail making judgments about judgments already made.  It is as if experience has 
judged, conceptuality has judged, and Deleuze is advocating not so much for a different 
judgment as he is for the fact that you have the capacity to judge differently.  Recall Kant 
does not deny a subliminal, i.e. prior to conceptual, limiting process of experience.  
Rather, Kant further acknowledges it by calling it “blind” – think of the “blindness 
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thesis” from the Critique of Pure Reason.  With Sigmund Freud in the interim, Deleuze 
refers to such a process as “unconscious.”  And, as it is unconscious, as we are blind to it, 
each thing has already been determined through what retrospectively – given Deleuze‟s 
emphasis on the excessivity of non-discursive experience – must be a casuistical 
categorical judgment.  What is supposed to be all of x such that x is defined by some 
function f(x), necessarily limits x in ways which not logic, but blind minds determine – in 
other words: blind, unconscious, or habitual processes.  Hence, consistent with Kant‟s 
structure of experience, logic works out the relations upon the culmination (=x) of a blind 
limiting process which leads to identification.    
Attempting to reference things as dynamic, i.e. without a static identity, Deleuze 
describes a “Harlequin world” of experience through disjunctive judgments.  Though 
inclusive – this or this or this – disjunctive judgments are also limiting because they take 
associations to be determined relations.  In other words, whatever you determine x to be, 
in the determination you must limit the potentiality of x, so attempting to explain the 
dynamic state of x prior to identification, you cannot access the potentiality by thinking 
the relation between x and the potential to be x through the idea of privation.  Privation 
merely directs you back “down” the categorical judgment which determined x.  It does 
not access the potentiality as potentiality.  It is casuistical reasoning that thinks the 
potential which was limited in deriving x may be accessed by a return from x.  Whereas 
Deleuze‟s disjunctive judgments function as corrective by reminding you that categorical 
judgments contingently – if it helps, think contingent because contextual – limit 
potentiality, forming a disjunctive set of judgments does not solve the problem of how to 
translate the potentiality involved in the genesis of x into discursivity.  One way to make 
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the attempt is to note that the difference between “this is x” and “this can be x or y or z,” 
is not the most original designation of difference in the disjunctive series attempting to 
describe the potentiality generating – and passing through – x or y or z, etc.  
   Notice this is Deleuze‟s re-writing of Kant‟s avowal of the inability to use 
discursivity to describe the non-discursive.  Judging a perception, the appearance may be 
determined as different objects of experience, e.g. “this is Socrates” or “this is the gadfly 
of Athens” or “this is Plato‟s teacher,” or “this is the torpedo fish/midwife,” etc.524  
Hence, reflecting upon the “this” regressively from what I might call the disjunctivity of 
appearance produces ideas – in the (broadly designated) understanding – which in turn 
fall short of exhausting the “this,” i.e. the harlequin world of experience.  You might like 
to think the “this” is “Socrates,” but “Socrates” is merely one determination of the “this.”  
So regressing back to the “this-in-itself,” so to speak, one must regress back from all the 
determinations, not just one.  Whereas the determinations are disjunctive, the ideas 
produced from such a regression are conjunctive.  Suddenly the “this” is pronounced 
multiple: “this” is “Socrates” and “the gadfly of Athens,” and, etc.  Notice, still the ideas 
must fall short of telling the whole story of the “this-in-itself.”  Further, this mimics 
Kant‟s rendition of non-discursivity.  What is more, as indicated at the beginning of the 
current section, this is Deleuze‟s re-opening of discursivity in Hegel‟s wake.   
In fact, this is what Deleuze means in making a technical matter of “learning.”  
According to Deleuze, you non-discursively encounter problems in the context, i.e. 
environment.  For example, consider the problem of the motion of the ocean as you learn 
how to swim in it. (Cf. D&R 165 and 192)  Different Ideas result from the non-discursive 
                                               
524 Though for simplicity sake in this example I allow the determination of at least “Socrates” out of the 
environment in which he is experienced, I could, of course, include various aspects of the environment as 
well – all toward indicating your capacity to judge differently. 
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intense encounters in the water.  Hence, it is as if the forces involved in the learning 
process developed the idea you now have of how to swim in the ocean.  This links with 
the above paragraph by noting: you develop an Idea of “Socrates” through your 
encounter(s).  Moreover, the fact that these Ideas can evolve indicates their open-
endedness. 
Though Deleuze‟s explanation of the process involved in identifying an 
experience regrettably invokes a notion of “consciousness,” the logic of his argument is 
still quite tenable.  Hence, the terminology Deleuze invokes to formulate his argument 
fits into a dialectical movement.  Deleuze contends “relations are external and 
heterogeneous to their terms” whether these terms be “impressions or ideas.” (PI 37-38)  
As such the “real empiricist world” “is a world of exteriority, a world in which thought 
itself exists in a fundamental relationship with the Outside.” (PI 38)  Considering the 
relation, then, between the world exterior to consciousness and the world interior to 
consciousness, Deleuze explains exteriority as “a world in which the conjunction „and‟ 
dethrones the verb „is‟; a harlequin world of multicolored patterns and non-totalizable 
fragments.” (PI 38)  Notice, Deleuze is not suggesting he can exhaustively describe 
intensity – the discursive and the non-discursive remain heterogeneous.  The Deleuzian 
starting point to dialectic will affirm the difference in a fundamental relationship with 
exteriority by allowing an open ended discursive concept as regulative to affirm the 
“Outside” as initiating the dialectic.  Recall that transcendental empiricism holds the 
conditions for the generation of the non-discursive force to originate in experience.  
Deleuzian dialectic will affirm the link between first and last moments, between 
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experience and ideas, but Deleuze does not want a discursive last moment to eliminate 
the non-discursivity of the other (à la Hegel). 
The discussion of transcendental empiricism in this section, then, should provide 
the wider context in which to understand the following section which explicitly compares 
Deleuze with Kant.  Further, you should now understand the general mechanism involved 
in Deleuze‟s enunciation of pure difference.  For example, you should understand 
Deleuze‟s inclusive “or” between “the pure concept [le concept pur de la différence]” of 
difference and the “Idea [l’Idee]” of difference.  The pure concept of difference is the 
Idea of difference, i.e. ἕηεξνλ; it is not functioning to determine the difference between 
forms – ἐλαληίνλ.  Now then, since “looking through” such an idea for Deleuze reveals 
the very fractal simulacral character of pure difference recurring through experience, the 
pure concept of pure difference as a regulative idea is supposed to refer to the expressive 
ontogenetic surge of intensity flowing in experience.  This intensity is, of course, non-
discursive.  Hence, that to which this pure concept of difference is supposed to refer, as 
purely different, is pure difference. (Cf. D&R 222)    
Deleuze‟s Structure and Trajectory of Experience  
“In Oklahoma, 
Bonnie and Josie, 
Dressed in calico, 
Danced around a stump. 
They cried,  
„Ohoyaho, Ohoo‟ … 
Celebrating the marriage 
Of flesh and air.”525 
~Wallace Stevens, Life Is Motion 
 
The purpose for this section of the chapter is to show Deleuze‟s structure and 
trajectory of experience.  This is valuable because moving from a schematic 
                                               
525 Wallace Stevens, “Life Is Motion,” The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens, (New York: Vintage, 
1990), 83. 
 362 
 
representation of Deleuze‟s structure and trajectory of experience I am able to 
regressively focus in, as it were, on Deleuze‟s discussion of the ground of experience.  
So, though it is not as simple as merely replacing Kant‟s name with that of Deleuze‟s, 
noting the structural similarities between Kant and Deleuze has become a hallmark of 
Deleuze scholarship.
526
  To begin, then, recalling the constitutive regulative distinction 
noted above,   
As early as his first book, Empiricism and Subjectivity, 
Deleuze rejects the idea of total unities, and works to 
analyze how things which are practically speaking unified – 
like human being, societies and ideas of God and the world 
– come to be so.527 
So, where in Kant‟s structure of experience has Deleuze discovered an opening for pure 
difference?  Pure difference as a pure concept of difference is open as a regulative idea, 
and pure difference as the non-discursive fractal simulacral power seen by “looking 
through” pure difference as a concept is pure difference as an open version of the thing-
in-itself. (D&R 222)  Hence, whereas Daniel W. Smith‟s celebrated claim “From the 
viewpoint of the theory of Ideas, Difference and Repetition can be read as Deleuze‟s 
Critique of Pure Reason,”528 speaks to the first opening, I will examine the second 
opening in this section of the chapter. 
                                               
526 To name just a few: Cf. Anne Sauvagnargues, Deleuze. De l’animal à l’art, La Philosophie de Deleuze, 
Paola Marrati, ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004), 126; Cf. Joe Hughes, Deleuze and the 
Genesis of Representation, (New York: Continuum Press, 2008); Cf. Levi R. Bryant, Difference and 
Givenness: Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence, (Evanston: 
Northwestern University, 2008); Cf. Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and 
Aesthetics, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009); Cf. Edward Willatt and Matt Lee, ed. Thinking Between 
Deleuze and Kant, (New York: Continuum Press, 2009); Cf. Edward Willatt, Kant, Deleuze, and 
Architectonics, (New York: Continuum Press, 2010).  
527 Jonathan Roffe, “Whole,” The Deleuze Dictionary, Adrian Parr, ed. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005), 299. 
528 Daniel W. Smith, “Deleuze, Kant, and the Theory of Immanent Ideas,” Deleuze and Philosophy, 
Constantin V. Boundas, ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 44-45. 
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Whereas Kant‟s Category of Quantity regards plurality, i.e. “magnitude,” (CPR 
1998, A 166/B 207) as pertaining to extensive quantity, Deleuze is concerned to discuss 
plurality as intensive quantity.  The question to ask, then, is: What might such plurality as 
intensive quantity look like in Kant‟s structure of experience?  Since Kant‟s system does 
not have a concept of intensive quantity, Deleuze must create a concept for it.  This 
concept is the concept of pure difference.  In order to learn Deleuze‟s concept, it is 
important to discuss Kant‟s structure of experience from Deleuze‟s point of view.  
Fortunately, and perhaps surprisingly, Kant had already gestured toward the project.  
According to Kant, “In all appearances the real that is an object of sensation has 
intensive magnitude, i.e. a degree [Kant‟s emphases]. [In allen Erscheinungen hat das 
Reale, was ein Gegenstand der Empfindung ist, intensive Grösse, d.i. einen Grad.]”529 
(CPR A 166/B 207)  Strikingly, in Prolegomena §24, Kant refers to this very intensity as 
“a difference [ein Unterschied] that has a magnitude.” (Proleg 58)  In fact, it is clear that 
Kant contrasts intensive with extensive magnitudes: “the real does have a magnitude, but 
not an extensive one.” (CPR 1996, A 168/ B 210)  What is more, Kant suggests intensive 
“magnitudes may also be called flowing [fliessende] magnitudes [Kant‟s emphasis].” 
(CPR 1996, A 170/B 211)
 
It is in Kant‟s discussion, then, of freedom and the individual being as free that he 
makes a connection between intensive being and the thing-in-itself.  According to Kant, 
“Only two kinds of causality can be conceived in regard to what occurs, viz. either a 
                                               
529 Cf. J.A. Smith, “Is There a  Mathematics of Intensity? Multum non multa,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 18, (1917), 121-137; I believe I am the first person to discuss this in the literature, i.e. I 
have yet to find anyone else who discusses this aspect of the relation between the Critique of Pure Reason 
and Difference & Repetition.  Hence, we must fault Faulkner for suggesting Kant “overlooks” intensive 
magnitude.  Cf. Keith W. Faulkner, Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time, (New York: Peter Lang, 
2006), 15. 
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causality according to nature or one from freedom”; and, Kant clarifies that by “freedom” 
“in the cosmological sense of the term, I mean the power to begin a state on one’s own 
[Kant‟s emphases].” (CPR 1996, A 533/B 561)  Further, “regarding such a subject‟s 
power we would frame an empirical as well as an intellectual concept of its causality, 
these concepts occurring together in one and the same effect.” (CPR 1996, A 538/B 566)  
Hence, Kant makes the same claims that Deleuze will later make in regard to what is 
dynamic in experience and found along with appearances.   
That is, the extensive pertains to the faculty of understanding, and the intensive 
pertains to reason. (Cf. CPR 1996, A 531/B 559)  Hearkening back to Aristotle Kant 
suggests “Any efficient cause” will have a “character,” and “in a subject of the world of 
sense [Subjekte der Sinnenwelt] we would have, first an empirical character [empirischen 
Charakter] … [second] an intelligible character [intelligibelen Charakter; Kant‟s 
emphases].” (CPR 1996, A 539/B 567)  In regard to this “subject of the world of sense,” 
whereas the first character is to be associated with intensity, the second character is to be 
associated with extensity.
530
  Finally, Kant makes clear that in regard to the world of 
sense, “The first character could also be called the character of such a thing in 
appearance, the second the character of the thing-in-itself [den Charakter des Dinges an 
sich selbst].” (CPR 1996, A 539/B 567)  Hence, since Kant holds that “if appearances are 
things in themselves, then freedom cannot be saved” (CPR 1996, A 536/ B 564), a three 
term relation emerges: the thing-in-itself, intensity, and freedom at once both dynamic 
and pertaining to the “subject of the world of sense.” (Cf. CPR 1996, B xxvii-xxviii)  
Synonymous with this statement Deleuze maintains that “Difference is not phenomenon 
                                               
530 Don‟t forget we are post Kant‟s Copernican revolution here. 
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but the noumenon closest to the phenomenon.” (D&R 222)  The above comments should 
prove helpful as you move through Deleuze‟s structure of experience. 
The Table of Contents from Difference & Repetition is a good place to start this 
comparison, then, between Kant‟s and Deleuze‟s structure of experience.  Consider 
Figure 5.2. 
Table of Contents for Difference & Repetition 
Introduction Repetition and Difference Répétition et difference 
Chapter 1 Difference in Itself La différence en elle-même 
Chapter 2 Repetition for Itself La répétition pour elle-même 
Chapter 3 The Image of Thought L’image de la pensée  
Chapter 4 Ideal Synthesis of Difference Synthèse idéelle de la différence  
Chapter 5 Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible Synthèse asymétrique du sensible 
Conclusion Difference and Repetition Différence et répétition  
Figure 5.2 
Notice the TOC begins and ends with repetition.  Considering the endpoints of the TOC – 
the Introduction and the Conclusion – illustrates the change which traversing the structure 
is supposed to perform – from repetition and difference to difference and repetition.  Yet, 
the structure itself begins with difference (-) in (-) itself.  Recall the thing-in-itself begins 
Kant‟s structure of experience, and yet, you are not to think the structure as such – you do 
not notice the thing-in-itself – until you are able to (regressively) look back across the 
structure.  So, the treatise starts with repetition, the structure starts with difference, and by 
the end of the treatise you can think of difference as antecedent to repetition.  This is 
further supported by noticing the place of imagination in the TOC.   
Given the place at which the “Image” of thought appears, continuing the 
comparison with Kant‟s structure of experience, you might assume difference in itself 
and repetition for itself respectively indicate the intuitions of space and time.  However, 
this is not the case.  Rather, the relation between difference in itself and repetition in itself 
follows Aristotle‟s apparatus for indicating the hypokeimenon (ὑπνθείκελνλ).  To be 
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clear, what I am suggesting is that the logic, i.e. the method, for deriving difference in 
itself follows that employed by Aristotle.  Consider the explanation Deleuze offers prior 
to beginning his treatise, 
Two lines of research lie at the origin [l’origine] of this 
book: one concerns a concept of difference without 
negation [un concept la différence sans négation] … the 
other concerns a concept of repetition in which physical, 
mechanical or naked [nues] repetitions (repetition of the 
Same) would find their raison d’être in the more profound 
structures of a hidden repetition in which a „differential‟ is 
disguised and displaced.  These two lines of research 
spontaneously came together, because on every occasion 
these concepts of a pure difference and a complex 
repetition [ces concepts d‟une différence pure et d‟une 
répétition complexe] seemed to connect and coalesce 
[Deleuze‟s emphasis].531  (D&R xix-xx)  
Note that this is the first of five (5) times the term “pure difference” (D&R xx, 42, 60, 
125, and 144) appears in Difference & Repetition – it occurs only once in The Logic of 
Sense. (LOS 289)  The double entendre involved here, of course, is that Deleuze is 
already implementing his thought regarding divergent series – “two lines … which 
spontaneously came together” – in regard to origination.  As I have already discussed 
pure difference as a pure concept above, I will continue to focus on pure difference as an 
open dynamic version of the thing-in-itself.  Now then, the revelation of this other 
difference – pure difference – is tied up with repetition.  As Deleuze noted, this repetition 
is “complex.”  What he means by this is that the repetition is twofold, and these two 
repetitions are opposed to one another.  Hence, from two opposed terms, so to speak, 
Deleuze derives the underlying subject of “pure difference.”  “Difference lies between 
two repetitions [Deleuze‟s emphasis].” (Cf. D&R 76)  This is the difference which – 
                                               
531 Translation modified, i.e. I substituted “naked” for “nues.”     
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though disguised by repetition – initiates Deleuze‟s structure of experience.  Pure 
difference is (the) difference (-) in (-) itself. (Cf. D&R 125 and 144)
532
 
 Pure difference is the “hidden differential;” it is “disguised and displaced;” (D&R 
xx) and, it is located prior to imagination in Deleuze‟s structure of experience.  In this 
way Deleuze indicates the difference internal to the images which appear to be perceptual 
catalysts for the dialectic.  “All identities are only simulated, produced as an optical 
„effect‟ by the more profound game of difference and repetition.” (D&R xix)  As regards 
these “simulated identities,” “In simulacra, repetition already plays upon repetitions, and 
difference already plays upon differences.” (D&R xix)  This “play” which is located in 
the ground of experience, accounts for the flowing intensity of animation.   
Now, it seems to me there are two ways that Deleuze can justify such a structure 
in which non-discursivity is supposed to inhere, and he need not distinguish between 
them.  On the one hand, he could consider the first difference as the third in a descending 
line of four terms and suppose the fourth term to refer to the non-discursive “term” pure 
difference.  To do so would be like Aristotle‟s use of analogy, but in regard to the 
intensive.  On the other hand, he could just arrive at Difference in itself by thinking of it 
as indicated by the (disguised) repetition of the complex repetition thought as Repetition 
for itself.  In either case you get Difference in itself by itself, as it were, and the 
                                               
532 Cf. Michel Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” Donald F. Bouchard, Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault (1954-1984) Vol. II, James D. Faubion, ed. (New York: The 
New Press, 1998), 352; Cf. Rodolphe Gasché, The Honor of Thinking: critique, theory, philosophy, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 261; Cf. Constantin V. Boundas, “Deleuze-Bergson: an 
Ontology of the Virtual,” Deleuze: A Critical Reader, Paul Patton, ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
1996), 101; Cf. Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze: Routledge Critical Thinkers, (New York: Routledge, 
2002), 126; Cf. Oliver Davies, “Thinking Difference: A comparative study of Gilles Deleuze, Plotinus, and 
Meister Eckhart,” Deleuze and Religion, Mary Bryden, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2001), 84; Cf. Michael 
Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An apprenticeship in philosophy, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1993), 62; Cf. Todd May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 21; Cf. James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and 
Guide, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 7; 84; 94; 104.     
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unraveling of the simulacrum – discussed in the first section of this chapter – can be 
considered to indicate the sensational power flowing through perception.  In this way, 
rejecting the idea of total unities, an open idea of flowing pure difference replaces the 
thing-in-itself.   
Consider that, according to Deleuze, “The privilege of sensibility as origin 
appears in the fact that, in an encounter, what forces sensation and that which can only be 
sensed are one and the same thing, whereas in other cases the two instances are distinct.” 
(D&R 145)  This distinction is precisely the difference between the starting points of 
dialectic.  So, despite the non-discursivity of the force of pure difference, Deleuze takes 
phase changes in experience to be so much supportive evidence for the persistence of 
force – signs of a flowing path of force, i.e. along the trajectory of experience.  The 
sensational force of pure difference is the perceptual catalyst, i.e. the experiential starting 
point, to the dialectic.  As experiential, this relates to Deleuze‟s discussion of Kant‟s 
threefold synthesis of imagination – the trajectory of experience from the thing-in-itself 
through sensibility and imagination en route to the understanding.   
To finish with the discussion of Deleuze‟s TOC: Chapters 1 and 2 of Difference & 
Repetition pertain to Kant‟s discussion of apprehension; Chapter 3 pertains to Kant‟s 
discussion of – the second fold of imagination‟s threefold synthesis – reproduction in 
imagination; Chapter 4 – with its “Ideal synthesis” pertains to recognition in a concept; 
and, lastly, Chapter 5 points to an asymmetrical synthesis that pertains in general to 
Kant‟s distinction between constitutive and regulative ideas in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, and in particular to reflective judgment in the Critique of the Power of Judgment.  
The movement in Kant‟s case goes from the repeated application of the structure of 
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experience to the thing-in-itself, and thereby producing different objects of experience.  
The movement in Deleuze‟s case considers non-discursive pure difference to be prior to 
the structure which repeatedly marks its movement – the difference between the 
Introduction and the Conclusion of Difference & Repetition. 
I begin here a consideration of what may be called: Deleuze and the Standpoints 
of Architectonic.  Now then, Deleuze following Leibniz‟s influence on Kant also thinks 
of various standpoints – points of view with different perspectives – along the trajectory 
of experience.  Recall that in my chapter on Kant I indicated three standpoints in regard 
to Kant‟s structure of experience: the experiential, the apperceptive, and the conceptual.  
In so far as the conceptual pertained to what Kant calls “the understanding broadly 
designated,” Deleuze maintains each of the standpoints I already enumerated and 
includes another.  Deleuze‟s fourth standpoint is that of Reason, in particular the Ideas of 
Reason. (Cf. KCP 51)  So, as you can see, this fourth standpoint may be arrived at by 
merely considering Kant‟s third conceptual standpoint as pertaining to the understanding 
not broadly, i.e. narrowly, designated and adding a standpoint to account for that which 
the narrowing subtracted out.  This distinction between the third and fourth standpoints, 
then, is analogous to the distinction between constitutive and regulative Ideas in Kant. 
Deleuze following Spinoza thinks of these standpoints along an expressive 
continuum.  In other words, the trajectory of experience traverses the standpoints of the 
structure of experience dependent upon the intensity of power or the force in question.  
As univocal expressions of being, these forces indicate the power of which they are an 
expression dependent upon the standpoint they are capable of reaching.  In this way, pure 
difference as the force animating the structure of experience may find its idea in the 
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fourth standpoint if it is capable of surpassing the other standpoints.  In surpassing the 
other standpoints, the force awakens the standpoint of regulative ideas, and sees itself in 
the concept it created.  As Deleuze puts it, “We become completely expressive [Deleuze‟s 
emphases].”533  In order to accomplish this, the second and third standpoints must both be 
overcome.  Overcoming these standpoints respectively amounts to overcoming both the 
“death of man” and the “death of God.”  I will pick this thread back up below in 
discussing Deleuze‟s reading of the Eternal Return.534    
This is why Deleuze, in Difference & Repetition, says, “There is a beatitude 
associated with passive synthesis, and we are all Narcissus.” (D&R 74)  Recall passive 
synthesis in Kant‟s structure of experience pertains to the synthesis of apprehension.  
Recall further, the thing-in-itself is prior to the synthesis of apprehension in Kant‟s 
structure of experience.  Thinking of the thing-in-itself as productive, Deleuze has 
replaced the thing-in-itself with pure difference.  This pure difference is the intensive 
force located in the ground of each individual being.  Deleuze‟s construction here runs 
parallel with Aristotle by thinking individual beings as related univocally, (Cf. EP 37) i.e. 
related by way of focal meaning, to being.  Deleuze, then, thinks of the Idea of 
Difference, ἕηεξνλ, as the pure concept of pure difference, and pure difference as the 
intense being of individual beings expressing being as expressions of being.  Notice, this 
is Deleuze‟s version of “looking through” an Idea.  Moreover, you further see the 
relevance of the fractal simulacral character of pure difference now: as a singularity, its 
trail connects each individual being with being.  It traverses the heterogeneity otherwise 
found in the problem of ontological difference.  Hence, looking to the passive synthesis 
                                               
533 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, Martin Joughin, tr. (New York: Zone Books, 
1990), 315.  Hereafter cited as EP. 
534 Cf. Linda Williams, Nietzsche’s Mirror, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 123. 
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of apprehension by looking though the regulative Idea pertaining to beyond apprehension 
“we are all Narcissus” gazing at ourselves and over the fractal simulacral bridge of 
ontological difference – beatitude.      
Despite four standpoints, Deleuze will speak of – what amounts to – three phases 
in the traversing of the structure of experience.  These three phases correspond to activity 
along the trajectory of experience, i.e. to the three active syntheses, of the imagination, 
understanding, and reason.  Put another way, Deleuze takes the overcoming of each of 
the original powers to extensively be productive of a mode of representation or 
knowledge and intensively to be productive of a mode of existing.  Recall Kant‟s three 
original powers (transcendental faculties).  According to Kant there are 
three original sources (capacities or faculties [or powers] of 
the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of 
all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any 
other faculty [or power] of the mind, namely sense, 
imagination, and apperception [Kant‟s emphasis]. (CPR 
1996, A 94/B 127)   
First, at the level of apprehension Deleuze encounters sense to be productive of affects.  
Second, traversing Kant‟s threefold synthesis of imagination, the product of imagination 
is the =x.  Recall, the =x, whether subjective or objective, marks the spot of the narrowly 
designated understanding in Kant‟s structure of experience.  So, Deleuze‟s third phase 
pertains to the overcoming of the narrowly designated understanding – movement from 
the third standpoint to the fourth.  Overcoming the standpoint of the narrowly designated 
understanding, then, the animating force creates the concept – as regulative Idea – of 
itself and enters into the third phase of the Eternal Return.  This may be pictured in the 
imagery of overcoming life so as to eat from the tree of eternal life.
535
  Hence, the 
                                               
535 There is life in each phase.  Yet, pushing beyond all these phases of life, you yourself become the 
fountain of life – the abyss is staring into itself. 
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epigenesis of knowledge and existence may be parsed into parallel phases of ontogenesis.  
Overcoming the standpoint of the understanding in the ontogenesis and the form of the 
Same in the epigenesis, the becoming being – the being which is becoming – enters into a 
relation of (eternal) recurrence with itself.     
In order to make sense of this recurrence: along the trajectory of Kant‟s structure 
of experience, Deleuze assigns “different kinds of knowledge,” “different ways of living, 
different modes of existing” (EP 289) to each of these phases of ontogenesis.  In a 
passage worth quoting at length, Deleuze declares: 
The first kind of knowledge has as its object only 
encounters between parts of bodies, seen in terms of their 
extrinsic determinations.  The second kind rises to the 
compositions of characteristic relations.  But the third kind 
alone relates to eternal essences: the knowledge of God‟s 
essence, of particular essences as they are in God, and as 
conceived by God.  (We thus rediscover in the three kinds 
of knowledge the three aspects of the order of nature: [1] 
the order of passions, [2] that of the composition of 
relations and [3] that of essences themselves. (EP 303) 
Deleuze indicates the first kind pertains to “imagination” and “passive affections.” (EP 
289)  The second kind pertains to a “constitutive state” of reason or “of understanding.” 
(EP 290-291 and cf. EP 296)  Finally, the third pertains to the next state of reason where 
“God‟s existence is thus known to him through itself.” (EP 301)  As I noted above, 
difference bridges any heterogeneity in the ontological difference by being the bridge of 
heterogeneity.  This is the pure concept of pure difference; this is Difference in itself; this 
is “looking through” ἕηεξνλ or gazing into an abyss with differences.  Hence, “in the third 
kind of knowledge the idea of God is, in its turn, the material cause of all ideas.” (EP 
305)  Recall Figure 5.1, in regard to intensity and the form of the Different the final cause 
and the material cause enter into a loop with one another.  This is the major difference 
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between Kant and Deleuze, Deleuze shifts the placement of the alêtheatic (cf. αιήεηα),536 
operator in of the structure of experience from apperception (in Kant) to the becoming 
active being‟s intensive loop. 
Put into more Kantian language: Though you cannot understand the thing-in-
itself, you can think it with a regulative Idea.  In this same way, moving through the 
phases you do not return to the ground of the force expressing the phases along the 
trajectory until you arrive at the third phase and think the groundlessness of the ground.  
This return is the Eternal Return, and it is not the “mythic circle” of the return of the 
Same.  The Eternal Return is the return of the different as the (regulative) Idea of (the) 
Difference (-) in (-) itself.  This is supposed to be the height of a looping trajectory.  Now 
you might want to object that the Idea is different from the force of difference of which it 
is supposed to be an Idea.  Yet, by pertaining to the form of the Different and not the 
form of the Same – ἕηεξνλ not ἐλαληίνλ –, the difference between the Idea of difference 
and the force of difference is a productive bridging heterogeneity.  It is not an identical 
difference derived from negation.  In regard to the fractal simulacral,  
What is different from difference can be difference in itself, 
since difference in itself is different from itself. 
So, the Idea of Difference in itself is different from difference; and, Deleuze‟s thing-in-
itself, according to the form of the Different, enters into a recursive loop with itself.  This 
will have interesting ramifications for the thing-in-itself as a solution to the problem of 
non-being. 
Deleuze retains within his philosophy my favorite concept from psychoanalysis, 
and this concept will help bridge the final gap needed before comparing Kant‟s and 
Deleuze‟s structure of experience.  That concept is the concept of “cathexis.”  Cathexis 
                                               
536 Apparently, the term “Alethic” has already been appropriated into a linguistic context. 
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was birthed into philosophical vocabulary by James Strachey (1887-1967), whom you 
should recall as providing the English speaking world with Sigmund Freud‟s work in 
translation.  In order to translate Freud‟s use of the German word “Besetzung,” Strachey 
used the Ancient Greek θάζεμηο, i.e. cathexis, meaning to “hold,” “restrain,” or “retain,” 
as in the sense of “holding your bladder.” 537  Here is Freud‟s German: 
Wir bilden so die Vorstellung einer urspünglichen 
Libidobesetzung des Ichs, von der später an die Objekte 
abgegeben wird, die aber, im Grunde genommen, verbleibt 
und sich zu den Objekt-besetzungen verhält wie der Körper 
eines Protoplasmatierchens zu den von ihm augesichickten 
Pseudopodien [my emphases].
538
      
And here is Strachey‟s translation: 
Thus we form the idea of there being an original libindinal 
cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to 
objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to 
the object-cathexis much as the body of an amoeba is 
related to the pseudopodia which puts it out [my 
emphases].
539
 
The value of this concept in the context of Deleuze‟s philosophy regards the pseudo-
podic movement by way of contraction and extension.  Yet, all you really need to know 
about “pseudopodia” in this context is that it refers to the contraction-extension 
movement mechanism of an amoeba.  Pseudopodia, meaning “false feet,” is used here to 
capture the fact that the contracting and expanding moves the amoeba as though it 
reached out with feet and walked – though more like a rhythmic pulling itself along than 
a scuttling.  
                                               
537 Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 852; Strachey should be commended because his choice of 
Greek nicely links with Aristotle‟s notion of incontinence from the Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII. 
538 Sigmund Freud, “Zur Einführung des Narzissmus,” Gesammelte Werke, (Frankfut am Main: S. Fischer 
Verlag, 1967), 140-141.  
539 Sigmund Freud, “On Narcissism: An Introduction,” James Strachey, tr. The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Vol. XIV (1914-1916), (London: Hogarth Press, 1957), 
75. 
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You can think of this rhythmic movement of contraction and extension physically, 
virtually, i.e. mathematically, or metaphysically.
540
  Interestingly these ways of thinking 
about the movements coincide with ways of reading Freud‟s noun form die Besetzung or 
the verb form besetzen.  Physically the verb besetzen means “to occupy” physical space; 
virtually it means “to fill” a virtual structure, and metaphysically it means to psychically 
charge a territory with intensity.  If it helps you to recognize the difference between the 
physical and the metaphysical, think of the duo as analogous to the literal metaphorical 
distinction here.  Given that the ontogenetic movement of intensity passes through these 
points on its way to discovering its Idea of itself, it is possible to construct a graphic 
illustration.  To create the following series of figures, I combined three of Deleuze‟s 
graphics together with one from Henri Bergson for the sake of illustrating a direct 
comparison with Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience.  I begin the series with 
Figure 5.3. 
Bergson‟s Memory Cone (turned on its side) 
 
Figure 5.3 
                                               
540 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, Tom Conley, tr., (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993), 23. 
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As you can see, Figure 5.3 provides an illustration of Henri Bergson‟s “memory 
cone” turned on its side.  The labels being as follows: P stands for the plane of action; S 
stands for the contraction of singularities; the various AB combinations as virtual levels 
along a trajectory of actualization.
541
  As Bergson put it, 
between the sensori-motor mechanisms figured by the point 
S and the totality of the memories disposed in AB there is 
room … for a thousand repetitions of our psychical life, 
figured by as many sections A'B',A''B'', etc., of the same 
cone.  We tend to scatter ourselves over AB in the measure 
that we detach ourselves from our sensory and motor state 
to live in the life of dreams; we tend to concentrate 
ourselves in S in the measure that we attach ourselves more 
firmly to the present reality.
542
 
Given Bergson‟s description, you can see why the graphic is referred to as Bergson‟s 
“memory cone.”  That is, the cone illustrates the presence of memory, and as memory, it 
is the presence of the past.  To consider these various AB plateaus of actualization, then, 
and S as the point of sensory motor contraction, is to notice the relation between 
Bergson‟s memory cone and Kant‟s structure of experience.  Such is my general strategy 
for moving through the series of illustrations.  At this point, I would like to use Figure 5.3 
to discuss Deleuze‟s distinction between extensity and intensity. 
According to Deleuze, “intensity is an implicated, enveloped or „embryonized‟ 
quantity.” (D&R 237)  “Within intensity, we call that which is really implicated and 
enveloping difference; and we call that which is really implicated or enveloped distance 
[Deleuze‟s emphases].” (D&R 237)  This distance, then, can be illustrated as distance 
from S in Bergson‟s memory cone to the AB plateau.  Now, since an “intensive quantity 
                                               
541 Cf. Deleuze, The Fold:, 105. 
542 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, Nancy Margaret Paul and W Scott Palmer, tr., 211.  Hereafter cited 
M&M. 
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may be divided, but not without changing its nature,” “the acceleration or deceleration of 
[forced] movement defines within it intensive parts.” (D&R 237)  Hence,  
difference in depth is composed of distances, „distance‟ 
being not an extensive quantity but an indivisible 
asymmetrical relation, ordinal and intensive in character, 
which is established between series of heterogeneous terms 
and expresses at each moment the nature of that which does 
not divide without changing its nature. (D&R 237-238) 
How might this be a description of Figure 5.3?  The terms AB indicate extensities along 
an intensive trajectory; each section (moving left to right in Figure 5.3) between plateaus, 
for example the distance between A''B'' and A'B', may be thought of as an intensive part 
of the trajectory.  The distinction between extensity and intensity is the distinction 
between, on the one hand, up and down and, on the other hand, left to right in Figure 5.3. 
 Notice, then, the memory cone illustrates a contraction (S) expansion which 
draws intensity into the structure of experience where it derives its explicit identity 
through an association with extensity.  This is quite similar to the notion of cathexis, i.e. 
intensity and extensity are coupled together along a trajectory which traverses the 
structure of experience in a manner dependent upon the power of the involved intensity.  
“[E]xtension being precisely the process by which intensive difference is turned inside 
out and distributed in such a way to be dispelled, compensated, equalized and suppressed 
in the extensity which it creates.” (D&R 233)  In fact, I think of the three levels – the 
three repetitions – shown on the memory cone as the levels of Quantity, Quality, and 
Idea. (D&R 239)  In this way Bergson‟s memory cone and Deleuze‟s structure of 
experience provide a mechanism to compare Deleuze‟s intensive dialectic of pure 
difference with the graphic I originated regarding Hegel‟s shell game.  Hence, what was 
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the undifferentiated starting point in Hegel is now the differentiated as intensive abyss of 
Difference starting point in Deleuze.   
 
       Abyss with Differences Idea of Pure Difference 
 
Level 1 –  
Quantity 
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Level 2 – 
Quality 
 
 
2 
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θ 
 
ς 
 
θ 
 
3 
     Figure 5.4 
On the one hand, the entire next section of the chapter may be read as expounding 
upon Figure 5.4.  On the other hand, and what is sufficient for you to grasp at this point: 
whereas Hegel‟s dialectic illustrates a version of what Deleuze might call an extensive 
version of dialectic,
543
 Deleuze‟s dialectic illustrates an intensive version. (D&R 232)  
The major claim illustrated by Figure 5.4 being that the difference supposed to be internal 
to the first moment of dialectic – the contemporary French critique of Hegel‟s dialectic – 
traverses the dialectic and returns to itself.  It is as if Deleuze accuses Hegel of conflating 
the dialectic of Sameness – of extensity – with the dialectic of Difference – of intensity – 
upon which it is actually parasitic.  Recall from the Deleuze quote in the above 
paragraph, intensity creates extensity.  Hence, Deleuze‟s dialectic begins with non-
discursivity, as intensity, i.e. non-discursive intensity, and culminates in an open Idea of 
Difference; ἕηεξνλ instead of ἐλαληίνλ, it is as if Deleuze has reverse engineered “looking 
through” the Idea of Difference.  This difference which permeates the intensive dialectic 
is pure difference.  
                                               
543 Cf. Chapter 3. 
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Consider Deleuze‟s distinction between differentiation and differenciation or 
different/ciation with regard to Figure 5.3. (Cf. D&R 279)
,544
  Whereas differentiation 
pertains to the difference between each A and B, the difference of distance from S 
through the AB levels to the top of the cone (far right in Figure 5.3) is differenciation.  In 
fact different/ciation links with the virtual actual distinction: “Virtuality exists in such a 
way that it actualizes itself as it dissociates itself; it must dissociate itself to actualize 
itself.  Differentiation is the movement of a virtuality actualizing itself.” (DI 40)  Further 
in “Bergson‟s Conception of Difference,” Deleuze notes, “Differentiation certainly 
comes from the resistance life encounters from matter, but it comes first and foremost 
from the explosive internal force which life carries within itself [my emphases].” (DI 40)  
In order to help illustrate this point, I have added the labels of Bergson‟s memory cone to 
Deleuze‟s “Diagram of Differentiation.”  In this way, think of Deleuze‟s summary 
diagram as embedded within the above cone.  Hence, the combination should capture the 
embedded branching aspect of Deleuze‟s structure and trajectory of experience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
544 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, tr., 96-98.  Hereafter cited as 
Berg.  
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Deleuze‟s Summary Diagram of Differentiation 
 
                          Matter 
                (relaxation/expansion)      
                                                                             Fixation of carbon 
   Memory-                                                                                   
   Duration      (S)                       Plant:            (A' B')      
                                                                            Fixation of nitrogen 
                                         
                            Life           (A'' B'')                
                     (contraction)                                                    
                                                                            Decentralized 
                                               Animal:                nervous system                    
                                                                      (A' B')                                 Exteriorization and  
                                                                            Centralized                    dominance of matter 
                                                                             nervous system             (A B)      
                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                   Conversion and 
                                                                                                                   understanding of life 
                                                                                                                            (intuition) 
 
Figure 5.5 
Figure 5.5, then, provides a good illustration of the development of an 
“embryonized” or “enveloped” difference of intensity as it actualizes itself along a 
trajectory.  Also Figure 5.5 provides textual evidence for the dialectical movement 
linking first and last moments into a loop – as seen in Figure 5.4.  For example, notice 
that the bottom right hand corner (also consistent with the left to right movement of 
Figure 5.3) of Figure 5.5 indicates the “understanding of life,” and it is “Life” which – 
just beyond the S – indicates the beginning of a line which ends with an Idea of itself.  
Finally, Figures 5.3 through 5.5 should help you understand Figure 5.6 as a direct 
comparison between Kant‟s and Deleuze‟s structure of experience. 
Recall the words of the late President of the French Society for Philosophy Jean 
Wahl (1888-1974) announcing the beginning of the question answer section of Deleuze‟s 
“Method of Dramatization” presentation: “I‟m not going to say system, but an attempt to 
peer through the lens of differentiation, understood as twofold, giving us a world 
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understood perhaps as fourfold [my emphasis].”545  I created Figure 5.5, then, by 
combining (Figure 5.3) Bergson‟s memory cone (M&M 211) (Cf. Berg 60) with 
Deleuze‟s “Summary Diagram of Differentiation” (Berg 102) found in his book on 
Bergson.  In fact, it is with such an upward – as opposed to the downward movement of 
genus and species – branching movement which Deleuze will use as support for his 
solution to the problem of non-being.  Of course, the branching Deleuze‟s graphic 
illustrates begin with intuition.  This claim finds its support in Deleuze‟s discussion of 
intuition as method for Bergson.  According to Deleuze, “Thus intuition does form a 
method with its three (or five) rules.  This is an essentially problematizing method (a 
critique of false problems and the invention of genuine ones), differentiating (carvings 
out and intersections), temporalizing (thinking in terms of duration) [Deleuze‟s 
emphases].” (Berg 35)  Lastly, in noting the “two fundamental characteristics of duration; 
continuity and heterogeneity,” Deleuze further supports the reading I gave above 
regarding difference as bridging the ontological difference, i.e. duration as the continuity 
of heterogeneity.  The last section of this chapter will address Deleuze and the problem of 
non-being directly.  Here, then, I will culminate a comparison between Kant‟s and 
Deleuze‟s structure of experience with Figure 5.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
545 Gilles Deleuze, “The Method of Dramatization,” Desert Islands and other texts 1953-1974, Michael 
Taormina, tr., (Los Angeles, Semiotext(e), 2004), 103. 
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Deleuze‟s Structure of Experience 
 
 Figure 5.6 
As you can see, I took Deleuze‟s graphic of the “Baroque House”546 and turned it 
on its side – just as I did Bergson‟s memory cone in Figure 5.3. (Cf. Berg 35)547  The 
following, then, is the key for Figure 5.6: (1) Differential elements within the Idea of 
Difference, i.e. singular points, which coupling and resonating force singular movements 
upward along the trajectory of Kant‟s structure of experience (Cf. FB 60-61) (Cf. D&R 
117) – this corresponds with Kant‟s synopsis.  Section 1, of course, is non-discursive.  
This is why I am fond of saying: were Deleuze to move back “down” the trajectory in the 
structure of experience, upon “breaking the being barrier,” the sonic boom would be non-
discursive.  Now, as “Matter” in Figure 5.5 shows, “m” stands for those forces which do 
not participate in differentiation.
548
  (2) “S,” as a contraction, is the contraction of 
                                               
546 Gilles Deleuze, Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque, (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1988), 7; Deleuze, The 
Fold, 5.  
547 It is worth noting, that in reading the primary and secondary sources, I have never encountered anyone 
who has attempted such a reading of Deleuze‟s graphics.  However, I am aware of and affirm Fred Evans‟ 
multiple graphics related to Difference & Repetition and A Thousand Plateaus.  In general – as you may 
have noticed by this point in the dissertation – I believe graphics can function as excellent teaching tools. 
548 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, tr., (London: The 
Athlone Press, 2000), 295. 
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apprehension
549
 – this corresponds to Kant‟s first fold of the three fold synthesis of 
imagination; (3) the expansion of this contraction expresses in the upward direction of 
Kant‟s trajectory a “memory immediately consecutive to perception”550 – this pertains to 
the second fold of Kant‟s threefold synthesis of imagination.  (4) This further 
differentiated phase corresponds with Kant‟s third fold of the threefold synthesis, i.e. the 
=x of (both or either) recognition or apperception.  Finally, (5) pertains to the bottom 
right hand corner of Figure 5.5, and the “4” in the upper right hand corner of Figure 5.4.  
Notice, then, if the trajectory of the intensity involved (the soul power for it)
551
 is 
sufficient, the intensity will climb further, “upward,” along the trajectory of Kant‟s 
structure of experience, and in expressing the Idea of itself, (5) enters into a non-
discursive loop with itself – this corresponds to the thing-in-itself initiating an experience 
which culminates in thinking of the cosmological Idea of the thing-in-itself.  In this way, 
(5) may also, recursively as it were, correspond with Figure 5.6 as an expression of the 
Idea containing the singular points which correspond to the singularities forced out of the 
Baroque House.  Hence, “The violence of that which forces thought develops from the 
sentiendum to the cogitandum.” (D&R 141) 
 It is as if “S” represents the attempt to step once in the proverbial river of flux.  
Just before the initial bracket of (2) you find an abyss with differences – this 
“groundlessness” “swarms” with “differences.” (D&R 277)  In fact, the hypokeimenal 
derivation of pure difference can be seen by considering the S as complex.  The S as 
blind apprehension of perception – like lightning – distinguishes itself from pure 
difference.  It does this not by making pure difference discursive but by indicating the 
                                               
549 Cf. Deleuze, The Fold, 97.   
550 Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image, 289. 
551 Cf. My discussion of Socrates‟ art of midwifery from the Introduction.  
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movement of non-discursive (intense and pure) difference.  Apprehension has the 
capacity to perform such a function because it is actually difference which is forcing, i.e. 
performing, apprehension.  Recall the distance traversed of the structure of experience is 
directly (and positively) correlated with the intensity creating extensity by actualizing 
itself.  Hence, you should be able to see now the manner in which Deleuze has 
appropriated Kant‟s structure of experience.   
Deleuze has taken Hyppolite‟s cue – noted in Chapter 3 – to the extreme, i.e. 
Deleuze has returned to Kant in order to rework Hegel‟s dialectic.  As such, Deleuze has 
replaced Kant‟s thing-in-itself with pure difference by – following Kant – focusing on 
intensive magnitude over extensive magnitude.  Associating extensity with the Platonic 
form of the Same and intensity with the form of Difference, by way of Plato‟s 
dependency of reckoning thesis Deleuze is working toward a solution of the problem of 
non-being by working toward an account of being.  I will continue referencing Figure 5.6 
in the next section.    
Pure Difference ex Priority of Time: Deleuze‟s Paradoxes of Time or The Epiphenomenal 
Emergence of the Idea of Persistence 
 
 “[B]y comparing a quality common to two sensations,  
we succeed in extracting their common essence  
and in reuniting them to each other…”552 
~Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time 
 
In this section I will provide further support for my claim regarding the overlap between 
Kant‟s and Deleuze‟s structures of experience.   I illustrated this claim with Figure 5.6 
above.  I will provide further support by showing you how my reading of Deleuze‟s 
structure of experience accurately describes his “Three Syntheses of Time.”  In order to 
                                               
552 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, Vol. VI: Time Regained, C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin, tr., D.J. Enright, rev., (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), 290.  
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accomplish this task I will discuss the syntheses and discuss the series of figures above.  I 
will then use this discussion as support for my further claim regarding persistence.  My 
claim regarding persistence is important because I will rely upon it to criticize Deleuze in 
the following chapters and support my ultimate claim regarding non-being.  My claim 
regarding persistence: persistence must always only be an assumption regarding intensity 
in Deleuze‟s structure of experience.  The assumption emerges with the idea of pure 
difference due to the “repetitions” which indicate its trajectory. (Cf. D&R 1)553  Deleuze 
expresses the persistent aspect of pure difference with notions such as “the chain of force 
[chaîne de force].” (D&R 140)  However, these repetitions as discursive indications of 
non-discursive difference depend upon discursivity to support a claim of persistence. 
 From a merely argumentative perspective, you might suggest that all claims 
regarding the non-discursivity of difference must depend in some way upon discursivity.  
Therefore, if this is a problem for Deleuze it will be a problem for everyone.  Yet, and 
here is the importance of my upcoming conclusion to the dissertation, the specific 
discursivity in question is such that it covers over its own gaps in processing.  It is not 
mere discursivity in general, but the generation of discursivity through experience which 
is at stake.  Hence, the non-discursive power pulses its discursive indications which 
discursively span the trajectory – from discursive indication to discursive indication.  On 
the one hand, Deleuze can still have his overall claim regarding intensity and being, 
despite my argument which undermines his claim of persistence.  On the other hand, the 
ramifications of this change to his structure and trajectory of experience are tremendous 
                                               
553 Notice what he says about “festivals.”  Also, cf. Jay Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of 
History, (New York: Continuum, 2006), 14.     
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regarding how to think about being.  I will culminate this thread below by culminating 
the dissertation. 
 To begin then, I will prove my depiction of Deleuze‟s structure and trajectory of 
experience by showing how it accurately describes what he refers to as the three 
syntheses of time.  Put generally – and recalling the Introduction which explains the title 
of this section – these syntheses of time are taking place within Aristotle‟s discussion of 
the priority of time with which he attacked Zeno.  Recall from Chapter 4, in my 
discussion of Derrida regarding time I used the following language: coupled together, 
there is a sensuous flowing now and a non-sensuous standing eternal now.  Further I 
showed you Derrida considers that this standing “Eternity is another name of the 
presence of the present.” (MOP 46)  As such it is possible to distinguish “this presence 
from the present as now.”554  This is reminiscent of Husserl‟s Kantian inspired555 
distinction between transcendent and immanent time, and as such the time of the 
transcendent is time of the “pure hyletic [my emphasis].”556  Recall Derrida concluded, 
“Time is not (among beings).  It is nothingness because it is time, that is a past or future 
now.”557  In other words, “time is not (a being) to the extent that it is not (present).”558  
Now, since Derrida refused to acknowledge non-discursivity, by acknowledging non-
discursivity Deleuze will be able to affirm the above Derridean conclusion while also 
affirming the non-discursive force of intensity expressing this “not” of time.  Perhaps, 
                                               
554 Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Grammē,” Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass, tr., 46. 
555 Cf. Tom Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), Ch. 4. 
556 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy, (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 207 and 210.  Notice also the Aristotelian 
overtones of hylē as matter which point to the hypokeimenon. 
557 Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Grammē,” Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass, tr., 50. 
558 Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Grammē,” Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass, tr., 50. 
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then, non-discursivity is what Deleuze had in mind when he noted: “I think Husserl has 
let something slip away.”559 
 In regard to Figure 5.6, then, I am looking at the section I labeled “2.”  The 
contraction S indicates the inception of immanent time or, what Derrida would call, the 
presence of presence.  Therefore, to the left of S – just prior to S – is the thing-in-itself, 
hypokeimenonal remote matter, or pure difference.  Both Derrida and Deleuze would 
agree with locating pure difference as such.  However, recall Derrida rejects any use of a 
sign to signify that which would be left of the S in Figure 5.6.  Derrida justifies this 
rejection be pointing out that discursivity takes place in the sections I labeled “3-5.”  
Now, Deleuze can be seen agreeing thus far with Derrida‟s reading of Figure 5.6.  Yet, 
think back to what I said above regarding Figures 5.3 through 5.5.  Hence, Deleuze 
affirms what is to the left of S as the non-discursive pure difference traversing the 
sections of the structure of experience I labeled 1 to 5.  So discursivity is needed to 
identify the work of the non-discursive, and just as moment 1 links with moment 4 in 
Figure 5.4, what is left of S – for Deleuze – can be identified as pure difference. 
 So, the question becomes: how does Deleuze think of this non-discursive pure 
difference as traversing the structure of experience?  Notice that once you are able to ask 
this question, then you immediately see why I constructed this section as such.  That is, 
the three syntheses of time are the discursive indicators along the trajectory of experience 
– up/across the differentiating cone – which indicate the persistence of pure difference, 
i.e. “Difference inhabits repetition.” (D&R 76)  What is more, Deleuze is able to think 
pure difference as such, despite Derrida, not due to the assumption of persistence but due 
                                               
559 Gilles Deleuze, “Kant (Lecture delivered: April 4 1978),” Les Cours de Gilles Deleuze, Melissa 
McMahon, tr., www.webdeleuze.com, (Lecture transcript retrieved 04/25/2007), 5.  
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to the assumption of difference as expressive.  It is the thought of difference as expressive 
which accounts for the forced movement out of the Baroque House chimney and into the 
Bergson cone.  Hence, difference as expressive need not entail an isomorphism between 
non-discursive force and discursive indicator.  For example, even Gabriel de Tarde‟s 
(1843-1904), “Imitation is generation at a distance”560 can be thought of without a filled 
duration of the same, so to speak, across the distance.  In fact, the movement could work 
more like a sign signal telegraph system than a pony express delivery system.
561
    
The answer to the question, then, thinks of the chain of force as an unfolding 
which forces the syntheses of time.  Consider what Deleuze says in Proust & Signs:  
What forces us to think is the sign. The sign is the object of 
an encounter …There are only meanings implicated in 
signs; and if thought has the power to explicate the sign, to 
develop it in an Idea, this is because the Idea is already 
there in the sign, in the enveloped and involuted state, in 
the obscure state of what forces us to think [my 
emphases].
562
 
This quote not only repeats – in Deleuze‟s words – what I have already stated above in 
regard to the movement from left to right in Figure 5.6, but it also links to the conclusion 
of Difference & Repetition in a way which refers to the five (5) sections of Figure 5.6.  
That is, Deleuze refers to the states of the unfolding with the following “pli” related 
terms: (1) perplication, (2) complication, (3) implication,
563
 (Cf. D&R 168) (4) 
explication, and (5) replication. (D&R 280-281)  Moreover, since according to Deleuze, 
                                               
560 Gabriel de Tarde, The Laws of Imitation, Elsie Clews Parsons, tr. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1903), 34. 
561 What I hope to capture with this analogy is that in a pony express system, the force of the traveling and 
the message being carried are constantly coupled.  In a sign signal system the force sending the message 
can actually be broken without interrupting the message.  Hence, in regard to the latter, the assumption of 
persistence would be justified in regard to the message but not the force upon which the message is 
supposed to be riding. 
562 Gilles Deleuze, Proust & Signs: The Complete Text, Richard Howard, tr. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 2000), 97.  Hereafter cited as P&S.  Also, cf. Jacques Barzun, From Dawn to Decadence: 500 
Years of Western Cultural Life, (New York: Harper Collins: 2000), xiv.  
563 Recall implication‟s function in the discussion of simulacra noted above. 
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“Kant never ceased to remind us that Ideas are essentially „problematic‟.  Conversely, 
problems are Ideas.” (D&R 168)  These Ideas “are Deleuze‟s equivalent of „regulative 
ideas‟ in Kant. … the regulative idea works problematically, to establish the condition 
out of which solutions, or „decisions,‟ can emerge.”564  Hence, replication of the 
perplication expresses the explication of the Idea implied in the problem-Idea complex.   
In regard to differentiation, then, the developing of extensity is the enveloping of 
intensity – consider Figure 5.5.  This is important to notice because this is how – contra 
Derrida – Deleuze is able to think non-discursivity alongside with discursivity in phases 
of the structure of experience which should be merely discursive, e.g. the understanding 
broadly designated.  Moreover, the distance traversed across the structure of experience is 
what determines the intensity expressed as envelope; so, Deleuze is able to think of 
various determinations as blocking intensity from entering into a circuit with itself.  
Ultimately these are determinations which associate being with extensity or attempt to 
think of being with, i.e. by looking through, the Idea of the Same.  Rather, for Deleuze – 
notice the nearly exact position here in regard to Plato‟s Sophist – it is through the Idea of 
Difference that you are able to think being.  Hence, this being is the being of intensity, 
not extensity. (D&R 229)  This is why, for Deleuze, “it is being which is Difference.” 
(D&R 39)  And, be sure not to forget my claim that pure difference is Deleuze‟s 
replacement for Kant‟s thing-in-itself: “Being is the difference itself of the thing.” (DI 
25) 
                                               
564 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze and Aesthetics, (Mass: MIT Press, 2009), 
32.  Also, cf. Gianni Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference, Cyprian Blamires, tr. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1993), 65.  
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 Lastly then, before discussing the three syntheses of time, notice that taking 
section 1 of Figure 5.6 as the physicality
565
 (D&R 76-77) of which the mind necessarily 
must be – to use Kant‟s terminology – blind, makes section 2 refer to the complex 
repetition which hypokeimenally reveals section 1. (Cf. NP 5)  Deleuze points this out 
with what he refers to as “Hume‟s famous thesis”: “Repetition changes nothing in the 
object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it.” (D&R 
70)  In order to see how this indicates the initial upward movement of difference in 
regard to the structure of experience, consider Kant‟s description of the thing-in-itself.  
“For, of course, it is understood that a thing-in-itself is of a different nature from the 
determinations that make up merely its state.” (CPR 1996, A 360)  In fact, Deleuze 
describes the movement precisely as Kant would – noting the place of imagination – in 
regard to the structure of experience: “Between a repetition which never ceases to unravel 
itself and a repetition which is deployed and conserved for us in the space of 
representation there was difference, the for-itself of repetition, the imaginary.” (Cf. D&R 
76)  Hence, “The movement that changes the nature of things must be founded in things 
themselves” (DI 23)  Moreover, recall this “repetition which never ceases to unravel” 
points to the recurring fractal simulacral character of pure difference, i.e. the pure 
difference hypokeimenonally (DI 24) revealed as – regarding Figure 5.6 – in section 1 
from section 2. 
 In sum, Deleuze is working with Kant‟s structure of experience.  Yet, he is 
concerned with intensive, not extensive, quantity.  However, Deleuze also recognizes that 
one comes with the other, i.e. intensity is the force that animates extensity.  This is how 
Deleuze replaces Kant‟s thing-in-itself with pure difference.  In other words, Deleuze 
                                               
565 Deleuze states it negatively: “not physically…”   
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thinks “the thing itself, according to what it is, in its difference from everything it is not, 
in other words, in its internal difference.” (DI 32)  Notice already the distinction between 
discursive and non-discursive at work here.  The difference that makes all the difference 
for Deleuze being the non-discursive which traverses the trajectory and the entirety of the 
structure of experience.  Hence, Deleuze is able to consider the two different, though 
coupled, trajectories of intensity and extensity, and the trajectory of intensity as the 
trajectory of pure difference.  Now, since Deleuze takes Plato‟s dependency of reckoning 
thesis seriously, he thinks difference is being.  And – you anticipated it – extensity will 
end up as a type of not-being.  Though before discussing non-being below, it is important 
to understand how Deleuze thinks of the selection involved such that ontogenesis may 
either enter into a non-discursive loop
566
 with itself in the Eternal Return or lose itself in 
extensity. 
 Recall according to Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989), “Looking for the principle of 
individuation in a reality that precedes individuation itself means considering the 
individuation as merely ontogenesis [Simondon‟s emphasis].”567  The principle of 
individuation, then, for Deleuze is difference, and it is through the selection of difference 
that the being as intensity of ontogenesis is realized – think Plato‟s dependency of 
reckoning thesis here.  In other words, if you understand my summation just above, then 
in regard to Deleuze‟s consideration of the Eternal Return, you understand, for example: 
The eternal return does not bring back „the same‟, but 
returning constitutes the only Same [le seul Même] of that 
which becomes.  Returning is the becoming-identical of 
becoming itself.  Returning is thus the only identity, but 
                                               
566 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990, Martin Joughin, tr. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995), 139. 
567 Gilbert Simondon, “The Position of the Problem of Ontogenesis,” Parrhesia, 7, (2009), 4-5. 
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identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference, 
the identical which belongs to the different. (D&R 41) 
Notice Deleuze‟s capitalization of the Same recalls Plato‟s Sophist, i.e. the form of the 
Same.  Whereas becoming identical is “of becoming itself,” identity “belongs” to the 
different.  So, you see that “It is no longer a question of selective thought but of selective 
being; for the eternal return is being and being is selection.” (NP 71)  Selecting the 
Eternal Return, then, amounts to looking through Difference – and seeing the fractal 
simulacral trail – as the beatitude of being, i.e. the beatific vision.  See that which you are 
– the being of being-in-the-world – as the epression of the power of the supreme being, 
God. (EP 309-310)     
According to Deleuze, “It is not being that returns but rather the returning itself 
that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming and of that which passes.” (NP 
48)  In the epigenesis, then, of intensity and extensity, affirmation of Difference – not 
affirmation of the Same – affirms intensity in a process of ontogenetic selection.  
Consider Nietzsche‟s warning from the Cheerful Science to describe the outcome of 
selecting the Same:   
Sigh. – I caught this insight on the way and quickly seized 
the rather poor words that were closest to hand to pin it 
down lest it fly away again.  And now it has died of these 
arid words and shakes and flaps in them – and I hardly 
know any more when I look at it how I could ever have felt 
so happy when I caught this bird.
568
 (§298) 
It is through affirming extensity that intensity is pinned down, and through affirming 
Difference that the Eternal Return of intensity is selected; via this recurrence, i.e. non-
discursive loop, the being of ontogenesis emerges selected through affirming Difference. 
(NP 9)  Understandably, you might want to attribute the “sort of boldness which animal 
                                               
568 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Walter Kaufmann, tr. (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 239. 
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tamers show, or people who live with a madman and are not afraid of provoking him”569 
to extensity; yet, it is rather the case that extensity must borrow its power from intensity – 
the courage of provocation as itself a type of unraveling, i.e. fractal simulacral, madness.  
Affirmation as selection, then, leads directly into a discussion of the syntheses of time, 
since “the eternal return must be thought of as a synthesis.” (NP 94) 
 To affirm difference, then, the (will-to-) power (Cf. NP 49) of difference must 
overcome the third synthesis in Kant‟s structure of experience, if it is to enter into a 
recurring circuitous loop with itself – replicating the explosive perplicating.  As such, 
entering this loop entails overcoming both the death of (the identity of, the extensity of, 
the Same of the becoming of) God and the death of man, and recall this loop is non-
discursive.  In this way you can understand the, perhaps, otherwise difficult to understand 
locutions of Deleuze reminiscent of Proust‟s, “Very well: had I been obliged, the next 
moment, to hurl myself out of the window, I should still have preferred such a fate [my 
emphasis].”570  The exemplary quote I have in mind by Deleuze: “Intensity is suspect 
only because it seems to rush headlong into suicide [my emphasis].” (D&R 224)  Given 
Deleuze‟s philosophy, suicide seems to refer to becoming extensity, i.e. the death of man 
as extensity, and extensity as “a force separated from what it can do.” (Cf. NP 123)  In 
fact, as extensive these are “repetitions that have become mechanical because they are 
external, frozen differences that revert to a substance that they can no longer make light 
and spiritual.” (P&S 49-50)  Hence, by thinking through the syntheses of time you see 
                                               
569 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, Vol. III: The Guermantes Way, C.K. Scott Moncrieff and 
Terence Kilmartin, tr., D.J. Enright, rev., (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), 695.  
570 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, Vol. I: Swann’s Way, C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin, tr., D.J. Enright, rev., (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), 44.  
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that even suicide can be overcome through the Eternal Return.  The end of the Same is 
not the same as being‟s ceasing to express itself as Difference.   
Lastly, then, consider Deleuze’s description of the three syntheses of time, and the 
corresponding four paradoxes as evidence for my interpretation of his structure of 
experience.  The first synthesis (of habit): “Although it is originary, the first synthesis of 
time is no less intratemporal. It constitutes time as a present, but a present which passes.” 
(D&R 79)  This synthesis is “the foundation of time.” (D&R 79)  Regarding both Figure 
5.3 and Figure 5.6 this synthesis pertains to apprehension as the “S” contraction, i.e. 
section 2 in Figure 5.6.  In Difference & Repetition Deleuze refers to the corresponding 
first paradox as the paradox of the “contemporaneity of the past with the present that it 
was.” (D&R 81)  In Bergsonism Deleuze refers to the first paradox as the “paradox of the 
leap” (Berg 61): “to constitute time while passing in the time constituted.” (Berg 61)  
Hence, the contemporaneity pertains to the manner in which the contraction at “S” 
hypokeimenally reveals the combination of sections 1 and 2 from Figure 5.6; and, the leap 
pertains to the leap from section 1 into section 2.  This is also a rehearsal of transendent 
time as contemporaneous with immanent time at the “S” with which I began this section 
of the chapter, i.e. referring to Husserl and Derrida.  As noted above in discussing Figure 
5.6 this corresponds to apprehension in Kant‟s structure of experience. 
The second synthesis (of memory): “Memory is the fundamental synthesis of time 
which constitutes the being of the past.” (D&R 80)  And, “It is memory that grounds 
time.” (D&R 80)571  In both Difference & Repetition and Bergsonism Deleuze refers to 
the second paradox as the paradox of coexistence (Berg 61): “all of the past coexists with 
                                               
571 For an interesting relevant discussion of grounding memory and Bergson see: Bertrand Russell, Analysis 
of Mind, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921),  94. 
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the new present in relation to which it is now past.” (D&R 81-82)  Notice, at this point in 
the trajectory traversing Deleuze‟s structure of experience – as illustrated in Figure 5.6 – 
the virtuality of the cone has been entered.  So, “all of the past” coexists with the new 
present virtually.  It should be of no surprise, then, that Deleuze calls this synthesis, what 
is section 3 in Figure 5.6, “memory.”  This is also how I referred to section 3 of the 
illustration above, and in regard to Kant, the synthesis is the second of the threefold, i.e. 
reproductive imagination or memory.   
The third synthesis, then, is “the empty form of time” (D&R 88): “The form of 
time is there only for the revelation of the formless in the eternal return.  The extreme 
formality is there only for an excessive formlessness.” (D&R 91)  In Difference & 
Repetition Deleuze refers to the third paradox as the paradox of “pre-existence”: “the 
pure element of the past in general pre-exists the passing present [my emphasis].” (D&R 
82)  In Bergsonism Deleuze refers to this (third) paradox as the “paradox of Being” (Berg 
61): “There is a difference in kind between the present and the past.” (Berg 61)  On the 
one hand, my emphasis of the term general [l’élément pur du passé en général], on the 
other hand the difference between the present as sensibility and the past as understanding, 
should indicate to you Kant‟s synthesis of recognition.  The pure form is the =x, i.e. the 
object in general.  The third synthesis is the understanding – which as I noted for Deleuze 
is – narrowly designated.  Hence, this is what I referred to in Kant‟s structure of 
experience as the conceptual standpoint.  In Figure 5.3 this would be the A'B' plane; in 
Figure 5.6 this is section 4.    
The fourth paradox, then, is called the paradox of “repetition within a life” (D&R 
83) in Difference & Repetition and the paradox of “psychic repetition” (Berg 61) in 
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Bergsonism.  You should already know from what I stated prior to explicitly examining 
these syntheses that this pertains to the Eternal Return, the AB plane in Figure 5.3, and 
section 5 in Figure 5.6.  Hence, in regard to Kant‟s structure of experience the Ideas of 
reason have been reached.  I referred to this as Deleuze‟s fourth standpoint.  Here is 
where you can learn the Idea of pure difference from experience, and as the process of 
ontogenesis enters here into a non-discursive loop, intensive being as pure difference is 
revealed.  Just as the “present is always contracted difference,” (D&R 84) the Idea 
envelops this pure difference so as to – replicate the perplication – reveal its recursive 
fractal character.  This is the Idea of Difference which conditioned the ontogenesis – 
notice the loop – just as Kant‟s thing-in-itself can be thought of as a cosmological Idea.  
To sum the syntheses, then, the first synthesis pertains to the living present as foundation; 
the second synthesis pertains to the pure past – “the past which was never present,” as 
ground; and, the third synthesis pertains to the future, i.e. the eternal return, as 
groundlessness – the intensity of an abyss with difference looking into itself. 
In concluding this section of the chapter, I will address Deleuze‟s assumption of 
persistence.  Notice, despite Deleuze‟s trajectory of experience, no aspect of it 
necessitates a “filled” persistence.  As you recall my comments above about the pony 
express you also notice that the importance of my use of the metaphor above has 
persisted – you are further along in this text, and it has meaning here too.  Its meaning is 
repeated here in difference words.  Yet, if you look on each of the pages between the 
iteration just above of pony express and the iteration further above, you will notice the 
word does not appear on each page between here and there.  This is a good example of a 
non-filled duration.  In other words, because the context (on this page) called for you to 
 397 
 
recall the meaning, you did so.  It is perfectly consistent with the meaning of persistent to 
suggest, then, that the meaning persisted; however, the evidence cannot support 
stretching the claim so as to suggest the meaning was present throughout the interim or 
that its presence persisted.
572
  Hence, persistence must remain merely an assumption for 
Deleuze, though the idea of it certainly may emerge with extensive phenomena along the 
trajectory across repetitions.   
Though I could have – as Deleuze does in Difference & Repetition – dwelled 
longer in discussing the three syntheses of time and the four paradoxes, I believe the 
above is sufficient evidence to conclude the accuracy of my interpretation of Deleuze‟s 
structure of experience.  Moreover, in considering my multiple comparisons between 
Kant and Deleuze throughout this chapter, I believe I have sufficiently established that 
pure difference is Deleuze‟s intensive replacement of Kant‟s extensive thing-in-itself.573  
All that remains is to provide Deleuze‟s reading of and attempt to solve the problem of 
non-being.  On the one hand, I have already indicated Deleuze considers the problem of 
non-being a “pseudo-problem.”  Yet, it does not stop him from attempting to solve this so 
called pseudo-problem.  On the other hand, I have already provided above for you 
Deleuze‟s strategy for solving the problem.  That is, Deleuze associated intensity with 
being and extensity with non-being; however, a number of subtleties need worked 
through in order to provide Deleuze‟s solution to the problem, i.e. ?-being.    
 
                                               
572 I could, but need not invoke Derrida here – at least not any further than I just did (There is even un-filled 
duration in the obvious persistence of this point I am making – this time regarding the persistence of 
“Derrida.”).  
573 I realize using “extensive” here with thing-in-itself is contradictory.  I state it this way to draw a succinct 
conclusion for you. 
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Deleuze‟s Response to the Problem of Non-Being: ?-being 
“Being is the difference itself of the thing.” 
~Gilles Deleuze (DI 25) 
 
In this final section of the chapter I pick back up the thread I was discussing at the 
end of the above section.  Put another way, I examine the manner in which Deleuze 
considered the intensive being of the eternal return to be free.  This – again – directly 
links Deleuze with Kant.  This free intense being emerges when the intensity of the force 
that animates you becomes sublime, i.e. when its intensity is of sufficient power, 
becoming enters the phase of eternal return – the becoming active of being.  This being 
will contrast with different types of becoming – including the fractal-like becoming upon 
which it rides –, so as to reveal by contrast Deleuze‟s response to the problem of non-
being. 
In 1963 after publishing the short book titled Kant’s Critical Philosophy [La 
philosophie critique de Kant], Deleuze published an article in Revue d’Esthétique titled 
“The Idea of Genesis in Kant‟s Aesthetics” [“L’idée de genèse dans l’esthétique de 
Kant”].  A brief examination of Deleuze‟s reading of Kant‟s critical philosophy here will 
provide a point of departure for grasping the relations amongst extensity, non-being, and 
?-being.  As I mentioned in Chapter 1, it is possible to specify the different types of 
judgment in Kant by thinking through his Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, i.e. by considering the possible outcomes of the process which combines 
sensibility to understanding.  First, the intuitive product of sensibility may be determined 
in general with merely subjective validity.  This is what Kant refers to as a judgment of 
perception in the Prolegomena. (Proleg 130)  Second, the intuitive product of the 
sensibility may be determined in such a way as to yield objective validity.  This is what 
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Kant refers to in the second edition Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR 1998, B 
11-12) and in the Prolegomena (Proleg 130) as a judgment of experience.  Lastly, the 
intuitive product of the sensibility, if the understanding “has no concept ready for the 
given intuition,” (CPJ 26) may be paused in its relation to the concept of an object in 
general, i.e. without being determined by it.  This is what Kant refers to in the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment as a reflecting judgment or a judgment of reflection. (CPJ 26)  
The “the power of judgment,” according to Kant, “holds the imagination (merely in the 
apprehension of the object) together with the understanding (in the presentation of a 
concept in general) [my emphasis].” (CPJ 26)   
Now Kant further specifies reflective judgments as either aesthetic or teleological.  
To see how these reflective judgments differ from determinative judgments notice 
reflective judgments treat “nature as art,” which “does not, any more than logic, contain 
cognition of objects and their constitution [my emphasis].” (CPJ 10)  Rather, reflective 
judgments provide a means for “the investigation of nature” with which “to observe 
nature and hold its forms together.” (CPJ 10)  As such, the appearance of “lawfulness” is 
“contingent;” meaning the lawfulness which “the power of judgment presumes of nature 
and presupposes in it (only for its own advantage), is a formal [my emphasis] 
purposiveness of nature, which we simply assume in it [Kant‟s emphasis].” (CPJ 10)  In 
other words, because the understanding only has the concept of “an object in general” to 
contribute to identifying the experience of nature, a regulative idea of reason must be 
applied heuristically in the identification of nature.  Hence, reason steps in while the 
understanding is perplexed and thereby satisfies the power of judgment merely by 
providing the ideas with which to complete (the form of) a judgment about nature.   
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These judgments are problematic, of course, because what you suppose is 
intimately related to what you experience.  This is a sensitive matter which I think 
requires nuance.  There are three points, then, which I hope to stress about reflective 
judgments in general before further discussing the difference between the kinds of 
reflective judgment.  First, a strict division must be maintained, following Kant, between 
determinative and reflective judgments.  Lest you find yourself arguing that the human 
ability to make a computer has some apodictic claim to the meaning of life or nature.  
Second, it is a mistake to think that reflective judgments pertain merely to the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment and have no place in the Critique of Reason.  In fact, as I 
discussed in Chapter 2 and mentioned again in Chapter 4, regulative ideas function 
heuristically.  So, to take the application of a regulative idea as identifying something 
beyond experience is to embrace a transcendental illusion – such as thinking you can 
know God.  Lastly, combining the previous two points, in your struggle – if that is how 
you like to think of it – with non-discursivity, what takes center stage is not non-
discursivity but your capacity to create concepts.  Nietzsche is the champion of this 
Kantian view, but Deleuze systematizes this point and follows suit. 
Kant stresses that whereas determinative judgments function “schematically” and 
“mechanically;” reflective judgments function “technically” and “artistically.” (CPJ 17)  
So when Deleuze, following Nietzsche,
574
 suggests philosophy is the creation of 
concepts,
575
 this is neither an attempt to debunk logic nor an attempt to deny the products 
of physical science such as digital cameras.  Concepts and ideas in the latter cases pertain 
                                               
574 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, tr. (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1968), 409. 
575 Passim. Esp., cf. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? Hugh Tomlinson and Graham 
Burchell, tr., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 78. 
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to determinative judgments, and philosophical concepts pertain to reflective judgments.  
In other words, philosophy teaches how to think about the world and objects in it.  This is 
why ethics is always already within the purview of philosophy, i.e. you must think to do 
ethics.  A machine can make more machines, but the technique and artistry involved in 
making concepts of the world and others which the world and others will live into and 
through requires thought in its freedom.   
One of Kant‟s many achievements, then, with his concept of reflective judgments 
was to show, i.e., determine, the non-discursivity of “nature” as a field of infinite 
freedom – the abyss where some potential always remains asleep.576  Looking into such 
an abyss, it is your “presuppositions” which both create and guide you in what Kant 
referred to as the “labyrinth of the multiplicity.” (CPJ 17)  This is why Nietzsche‟s 
insight “when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you”577 provides a 
Kantian foil to the Hegelian dialectic.  Certainly when you go behind the curtain you may 
see yourself behind the curtain.  Yet, thinking that this constitutes the ultimate ground 
either mistakes a regulative idea for a constitutive one, or lacks in creativity.  As Kant put 
it, the necessary and heuristic presupposing of concepts in reflective judgments “is 
appropriate to the experience of the causality of our own capacity.” (CPJ 35)  It seems to 
me, those who argue against the efficacy of philosophy either overestimate the power of 
determinative judgments or lack the ability to recognize they are always already 
operating within a reality constellated by regulative ideas.  Hence, Deleuze‟s use of ideas 
of intensity and power to communicate what Kant – just above – referred to as the 
“causality of our own capacity.” 
                                               
576 Cf. Leibniz, “Studies in Physics and the Nature of Body, 1671” Philosophical Papers and Letters, 491. 
577 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 89. 
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Neither reflective judgments nor regulative ideas are merely some eccentric 
extravagance of the aging Kant to be found merely in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment.  On the contrary, both reflective judgments and regulative ideas appear in the 
Critique of Pure Reason.  Of course, Kant does not overly dwell on these topics because, 
there, he is not providing a critique of the power of judgment.  For example, in the 
Critique of Pure Reason Kant explains,  
Reflection (reflexio) does not have to do with objects 
themselves, in order to acquire concepts directly from 
them, but is rather the state of mind in which we first 
prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions 
under which we can arrive at concepts. (CPR 1998, A 
261/B 317) 
There is, at least, no deviation in the Critique of the Power of Judgment regarding 
reflective judgments from this statement in the Critique of Pure Reason.  The “subjective 
conditions” reference queries from where the determination hails, i.e. the understanding 
(narrowly designated) or reason.   Kant contends that though “all comparisons, require a 
reflection, i.e. a distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong,” 
often “Many a judgment is accepted out of habit, or connected through inclination.” 
(CPR 1998, A 261/B 317)  In other words, often life is lived unreflectively, and you do 
not consider whether what you take to be real is logically determined or the outcome of 
presumption.  Thus Nietzsche declares, “Cynicism is the only form in which base souls 
approach honesty.”578  It is as if a significant amount of life is make-believe.  In fact, for 
Kant “nature” functions much like “thing-in-itself” in that the term derives its referring 
power relationally in regard to the structure of experience.  That is, there can be no nature 
in itself.  Kant does not belabor this point in the Critique of Pure Reason, but he clearly 
holds such a position already as can be seen in his discussion of the soul and regulative 
                                               
578 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 89. 
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ideas.  Here you hear an echo of Aristotle on assumptive beginnings for both 
demonstration and dialectic.  
A phrase perhaps rarely quoted from the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims, 
“For in that which we call the soul, everything is in continual flux.” (CPR 1998, A 381)  
As if anticipating so called psycho-analysis, Kant‟s 1781 discussion of the soul pre-
figures Freud as a “clown without shame”579 by invoking the critical insight derived from 
the power of reflective judgment.  According to Kant,  
But if a psychologist takes up appearances for things in 
themselves, then as a materialist he may take up matter into 
his doctrine, or as a spiritualist he may take up merely 
thinking beings (namely, according to the form of our inner 
sense) as the single and sole thing existing in itself, or as a 
dualist he may take up both; yet through misunderstanding 
he will always be confined to sophistical reasonings about 
the way in which that which is no thing-in-itself, but only 
the appearance of a thing in general, might exist in itself. 
(CPR 1998, A 380) 
Why must such a thinker be confined to “sophistical reasonings”?  Because – like trying 
to say non-being from within being – he takes the relations his reason works through to 
necessarily pertain to the thing-in-itself, i.e. he “hypostasizes what exists merely in 
thoughts.” (CPR 1998, A 384)  Kant invokes the same language in the Third Critique 
noting one can “use the concept of a natural end in an objective sense;” yet, “whatever 
may be found in experience to belong to teleology contains merely the relation of its 
objects to the power of judgment,” and such a use is “already sophistical” because any 
principle derived from such concepts “is legislative for itself (not nature), namely as a 
reflecting power of judgment.” (CPJ 35)  Compare also Kant‟s description in Sections: 
§61; §84; §91 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment.   
                                               
579 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 89; cf. Edmund Husserl, Phantasy, Image, Consciousness, and 
Memory (1898-1925), John B. Brough, tr. (Netherlands: Springer, 2005), 227. 
 404 
 
Put in the language of Kant‟s regulative/constitutive distinction among Ideas of 
reason it is worth quoting at length,  
I assert: the transcendental ideas are never of constitutive 
use, so that the concepts of certain objects would thereby 
be given, and in case one so understands them, they are 
merely sophistical ... however, they have an excellent and 
indispensably necessary regulative use, namely that of 
directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting 
which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one 
point, which, although it is only an idea (focus imaginarius) 
– i.e., a point from which the concepts of the understanding 
do not really proceed, since it lies entirely outside the 
bounds of possible experience… (CPR 1998, A 644/B 672) 
Recall, as beyond possible experience the transcendental ideas relate to cosmology, 
psychology, or theology.  So, the concept of nature, like the thing-in-itself, is a 
transcendental idea regarding cosmology.  Concepts of the understanding determine 
objects of experience; ideas of reason function regulatively in relation to what is always 
already a “fictive” “harlequin” “exteriority.”  Hence, in their regulative use reflective 
judgments treat determined relations sophistically for Kant and such judgments point to a 
“casuistry of relations” (PI 36) for Deleuze.   
Now then, how is Deleuze‟s idea of ?-being to be thought of as a solution to the 
problem of non-being, given what has been said above?  It is as if this chapter itself 
enters into a loop with itself.  Recall I began this chapter by claiming a judgment of the 
sublime is tantamount to the unhinging of a concept of the understanding because the 
sublime exceeds our ability to recognize it with a concept of the understanding. (CPJ 
128)  It was this unhinging which signaled the “free play” of imagination. (Cf. CPJ 192-
195)  I also pointed out that a judgment of the beautiful provides a different conception of 
harmony (Cf. CPJ 198) – a more musical version of the soul, i.e. the soul as aesthetic 
tuning fork.  Hence, the value of discussing Kant‟s Critique of the Power of Judgment 
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pertains to the vision it provides of a – sublime – power which produces Ideas by 
resonating with itself – entering into a loop with itself.   
Thinking this power through the Idea of Difference as intense difference reveals 
the resonating “soul” itself as the powerful intense individuated (as expressed) being of 
difference.  Suddenly thinking itself belongs to this intense power of difference revealed 
through the Idea of Difference.  Thinking through the Idea of the Same, then, provides a 
vision of extensity – the so called Other structure.  Hence, on the one hand, Deleuze 
thinks the intense being as more primordial, and thereby it participates in being itself.  On 
the other hand, extensity participates in the form of the Same, and as a reactive 
displacement of the intense power of difference extensity is associated with non-being.  
All that remains to be seen, then, is how Deleuze figures non-being as ?-being.                
  To conclude this section on non-being and Deleuze, then, consider a perennial 
joke regarding mathematics from a source which – as the reference indicates – is 
unknown.  I quote the joke in its entirety here not for any mathematical significance; 
rather, I quote it in full for its ability to illustrate a (metaphysical) point. 
An engineer, a physicist, and a mathematician are shown a 
pasture with a herd of sheep, and told to put them inside the 
smallest possible amount of fence.  The engineer is first.  
He herds the sheep into a circle and then puts the fence 
around them, declaring, “A circle will use the least fence 
for a given area, so this is the best solution.”  
The physicist is next.  She creates a circular fence of 
infinite radius around the sheep, and then draws the fence 
tight around the herd, declaring, “This will give the 
smallest circular fence around the herd.” 
The mathematician is last.  After giving the problem a little 
thought, he puts a small fence around himself and then 
declares, “I define myself to be on the outside!580 
                                               
580 Carl C. Gaither, Alma E. Cavazos-Gaither, Mathematically Speaking: A Dictionary of Quotations, 
(London: Institute of Physics Publishing, 1998), 172.  
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In so far as I am identified by extension as the (apperceptive) I which I think I am, then in 
regard to the forces upon which this I is posed, I am on the outside – the Same is on the 
outside.  Recall, “We do not contemplate ourselves, but we exist only in contemplating – 
that is to say, in contracting that from which we come.” (D&R 74)  Hence, Difference as 
the form of the (non-discursive) inside becomes less associated with the mind as a 
privileged inside than with the intense creative forces to which I am blind, i.e. 
unconscious.  These non-discursive forces refuse to bear the mark of identity.
581
  As 
Deleuze would have it, to affirm that the discursive apperceptive I is a momentary 
expression of the creative non-discursive me (moi) is to affirm, and thereby not to 
impede, the flow of intensity which is most me.  Though I stand outside – as an extension 
– of this flow, I become aware of it through disguised affects – the sublime surges of 
intense power of each is me, and me is always a prerequisite for I, i.e. I is on the outside.   
By considering non-being a pseudo-problem (Berg 17), then, Deleuze not only 
aligns himself with Bergson,
582
 but also with Derrida.  It is as if Deleuze is suggesting 
that from the perspective of non-discursive intensity, “non-being” must be discursive to 
have meaning.  In this way, Deleuze is emphasizing the second impasse of the problem of 
non-being.  Yet, this is Deleuze‟s mistake.  Reading the problem as such, Deleuze 
embraces Aristotle‟s paradigm shift by returning to a priority of account perspective.  
Consider Deleuze‟s comments, “Being or nothing, being or non-being, are equally 
undifferentiated: the two conceptions [my emphasis] come together in the idea of 
becoming having a final state, „In metaphysical terms, if becoming could end in being or 
nothing …‟ [Etre ou néant, être ou non-être également indifférenciés: les deux 
                                               
581 Cf. Carl Olson, Zen and the Art of Postmodern Philosophy: Two paths of liberation from the 
representational mode of thinking, (Albany: State University of New York, 2000), 216. 
582 Deleuze, Le bergsonisme, 6. 
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conceptions se rejoignent dans l’idée d’un devenir ayant un étant final. «En termes 
métaphysiques, si le devenir pouvait aboutir à l’être ou au néant…»583]” (NP 46)  This is 
a mistake because Deleuze had already enunciated non-discursive being.  What I would 
rhetorically ask Deleuze, were he alive today: if being can be non-discursive, why can‟t 
non-being pertain to non-discursivity?   
My hope in asking Deleuze such a question would be to highlight his assumption 
of persistence in regard to this intense non-discursive being he has enunciated.  Notice – 
though Deleuze failed to solve the problem of non-being –, all he had to do was articulate 
a way to highlight a break in the intense flow of being.  As such the break in the flow 
would indicate non-being.  What is more, the whole business of debating whether this 
break in the flow of being is a logical or non-logical negation would be a sham.  There 
need be no discussion of “negation” in regard to a break in the intensity.  Hence, I believe 
Deleuze progressed further toward solving the problem of non-being than Derrida by 
highlighting non-discursivity; however, ultimately, his innovations to Kant‟s structure of 
experience failed to reveal sensibility‟s secret origin.  As such, notice how Deleuze 
lapsed into a rejection of the problem of non-being by overly focusing on negation. 
In a way Deleuze did, in fact, articulate a break in the flow of being.  Deleuze 
articulates extensity as a break in the flow of intense being, i.e. in the epigenesis of 
extensity and intensity.  As can be seen in my quotation above from his Nietzsche & 
Philosophy, Deleuze thinks of non-being as the “terminal state” of ontogenesis.  Eternal 
return is being, falling into representation, etc. is non-being.  However, as such when the 
ontogenesis breaks it falls into becoming, and when its flow loops it is.  Notice, like 
Aristotle, Deleuze has reduced Plato‟s trinity of Being, Becoming, Non-Being to Being 
                                               
583 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2010), 52. 
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and Becoming.  This is another way to recognize Deleuze failed to solve the problem.  
And, whereas in regard to Derrida – noted in the above paragraph – Deleuze progressed 
further toward solving the problem, this reduction of Plato‟s trinity proves Deleuze did 
not advance as far as Kant toward solving the problem. 
So, what is Deleuze‟s justification for shifting from non-being to ?-being ?  Given 
the passage‟s relevance, I quote at length.  According to Deleuze,  
we must consider whether or not the celebrated thesis of the 
Sophist, despite certain ambiguities, should be understood 
as follows: „non‟ in the expression „non-being‟ expresses 
something other than the negative.  On this point, the 
mistake of the traditional accounts is to impose upon us a 
dubious alternative: in seeking to dispel the negative, we 
declare ourselves satisfied if we show that being is full 
positive reality which admits no non-being; conversely, in 
seeking to ground negation, we are satisfied if we manage 
to posit, in being itself or in relation to being, some sort of 
non-being (it seems to us that this non-being is necessarily 
the being of the negative or the ground of negation). (D&R 
63) 
Since you are reading this in Chapter 5, Deleuze has stated nothing new, i.e. nothing that 
you cannot recollect from above.  The quote goes toward justifying my reading of 
Deleuze‟s reading of the problem of non-being as I have been articulating it throughout 
this chapter.  Yet, what he states parenthetically in the above quote is important.  With 
parentheses, as it were, Deleuze expresses his reduction of Plato‟s trinity.  Deleuze is 
entangled and forced to produce such a reduction because he attempts to solve the very 
aspect of the problem which he considers “pseudo,” i.e. how can “non” be a form of 
negation? 
 Notice Deleuze‟s retreat to Aristotle‟s heavy logical hand as he sums the passage 
I quoted above:  
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The alternative is thus the following: either there is no non-
being and negation is illusory and ungrounded, or there is 
non-being, which puts the negative in being and grounds 
negation.  Perhaps, however, we have reasons to say both 
that there is non-being and that the negative is illusory. 
(D&R 63) 
With Deleuze‟s summation he has bolted the question of negation to the problem of non-
being.  And, such an extensive explication should be counter to Deleuzian intuition, i.e. 
counter-intuitive given Deleuze‟s “system.”  Hence, it is not wrong for Deleuze to invoke 
ἕηεξνλ and ἐλαληίνλ in concluding the above; however, he should recall Kant‟s real 
negation as pertaining to what is accessed by looking through ἕηεξνλ, instead of 
considering ἕηεξνλ as real negation. 
 It is by invoking ἕηεξνλ and ἐλαληίνλ, then, that Deleuze makes sense of his use 
of “( )” and “?” in regard to non-being. 
Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being of 
the negative; rather, it is the being of the problematic, the 
being of problem and question.  Difference is not the 
negative; on the contrary, non-being is Difference: heteron, 
not enantion.  For this reason non-being should rather be 
written (non)-being or, better still, ?-being [Deleuze‟s 
emphases]. (D&R 64)  
Strangely gesturing toward Rockmore‟s comment in Chapter 3 regarding Hegel, Deleuze 
sounds as though he is equating being and non-being.
584
  Yet, Deleuze here, of course, 
thinks being as embedded within its own internal difference, i.e. as fractal simulacral, and 
thereby Deleuze is still anti-Hegelian with this “Being is also non-being.”  Hence, 
Deleuze claims “non-being” without the parentheses stands for contradictory negation, 
(D&R 68) and ?-being or (non)-being, stating the “non” parenthetically, stands for  “the 
                                               
584 This is what Slavoj Zizek attempts to use as evidence for claiming Deleuze is ultimately Hegelian.  
However, as is characteristic of Zizek‟s fool-hardy claims propped up on sparse evidence, his wrongheaded 
claim(s) about Deleuze truly should be disregarded and dismissed.  Cf. Slavoj Zizek, Organs without 
Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences, (London: Routledge, 2004).  
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differential element in which affirmation, as multiple affirmation, finds the principle of 
its genesis.” (D&R 64) 
I will conclude this chapter, then, by discussing two last Deleuze quotes.  First, on 
the one hand, Deleuze holds, “the two forms of negative non-being [le deux formes du 
non-être négatif],” are: “a non-being of logical limitation [un non-être de limitation 
logique]” and “a non-being of real opposition [un non-être d’opposition réelle].” (D&R 
108)  Deleuze‟s position here is, of course, ultra-Kantian.  Yet, he considers the real 
opposition to necessarily mean opposition between two beings.  Rather, here in the 
structure of experience is precisely where he should have located the break in being.  On 
the other hand, Deleuze holds, 
As for negation, this is only the shadow of the highest 
principle, the shadow of the difference alongside the 
affirmation produced.  Once we confuse (non)-being with 
the negative, contradiction is inevitably carried into being; 
but contradiction is only the appearance or the 
epiphenomenon, the illusion projected by the problem, the 
shadow of a question which remains open and of a being 
which corresponds as such to that question. (D&R 64) 
In order to draw a conclusion, then, regarding what has been said thus far, it is possible to 
speak of three terms here: (1) pure becoming, (2) pure being as pure difference, i.e. the 
becoming active of being or the intense being of the eternal return, and (3) ?-being as 
(non)-being, i.e. becoming reactive.  Whereas 1 is associated with ontogenesis, 2 and 3 
are associated with the epigenesis of ontogenesis.  Further, 1 is associated with non-
discursivity prior to apprehension, 2 is associated with non-discursivity and intensity, and 
3 is associated with discursivity and extensity.  Hence, 3, i.e. ?-being is Deleuze‟s 
response to the problem of non-being. 
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 The problem with Deleuze‟s response: on the one hand, you might like to 
associate the three terms with Becoming, Being, and Non-Being.  However, despite the 
fact that the terms are three in number, Deleuze is only discussing Becoming and Being.  
This is why in Nietzsche & Philosophy he can consider 2 and 3 becoming active and 
becoming reactive, respectively; “The eternal return teaches us that becoming-reactive 
has no being.” (NP 72)  Recalling Figures 5.3 and 5.6    This in itself is sufficient to prove 
Deleuze has failed to solve the problem of non-being.  On the other hand, notice Deleuze 
thinks “problems and questions in their difference in kind from answers-solutions: the 
(non)-being of the problematic which rejects equally the two forms of negative non-
being.” (D&R 108)  Now here, you might like to question why and how ?-being can refer 
to both 1 and 3.  This is because Deleuze is associating the ?-being with becoming, and as 
such ?-being in 1 is pure becoming, in 2 it is becoming active being and of Difference, in 
3 it is becoming reactive and of the Same.  Hence, Deleuze‟s Hegelian sounding 
association of being and non-being refer to 3.  In sum, Deleuze’s non-being, i.e. (non)-
being or ?-being, is – as you should see by its association with becoming – a type of not-
being.   
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“[Kant] simultaneously gave us a history of our subject, fixed its problematic, and professionalized it  
(if only by making it impossible to be taken seriously as a „philosopher‟  
without having mastered the first Critique).”585 
~Richard Rorty 
 
“Seeing into darkness is clarity; knowing how to yield is strength;  
use your own light and return to the source of light;  
this is called practicing eternity.” ).”586 
~Laozi 
 
Chapter Six: Part I Summary  
In order to provide a concise summary of Part I, I will indicate what I believe to be some 
of the main ideas in each of the chapters.  This summary is not intended to be an 
exhaustive list of every claim made in Part I.  Rather, this summary is intended to remind 
you of some of the more salient aspects of Part I prior to entering Part II.  Recall I began 
the Introduction by claiming that the topic of this dissertation is the problem of non-
being, and announcing I would address this topic in order to criticize the contemporary 
readings of “pure difference” put forth by Derrida and Deleuze.  Since I indicated the 
method for addressing this topic could be divided into two treatments, this summary 
indicates the culmination of what I referred to as the first “negative” treatment.  Of 
course, then, Part II will indicate the culmination of the positive treatment, and provide 
my solution to the problem of non-being.   
 In the Introduction, then, I introduced you to the problem of non-being by 
teaching you the criteria Plato enunciated for its solution in the Parmenides and the 
Sophist.  I also discussed the value of solving the problem of non-being.  According to 
Plato, the problem needs to be solved to determine the relations amongst Being, 
Becoming, and Non-Being.  In other words, Plato‟s dependency of reckoning thesis 
                                               
585 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, 149. 
586 Laozi, Tao Te Ching, Ellen M. Chen, tr., (New York: Paragon House, 1989), §40, 153.   
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holds: you cannot recognize being until you recognize non-being.  I, then, pursued Plato‟s 
distinction between “ἐλαληίνλ” (enantion) and “ἕηεξνλ” (heteron).  The value of the 
distinction can be found in Plato‟s discussion of ἕηεξνλ as Difference-in-Itself, or the 
form, i.e. Idea, of Difference itself.  Further, I discussed the manner in which “looking 
through” the Platonic Idea of ἕηεξνλ was supposed to provide a solution to the problem of 
non-being.  Hence, the discussion spoke directly to both establishing the criteria and 
context for the problem and establishing the origin of the attempt to solve the problem of 
non-being by using the Idea of Difference.   
The lineage here, of course, being from Plato‟s Idea of Difference to Derrida and 
Deleuze.  However, recall, just as I consider the suggestion of Difference as merely an 
ironic solution to the problem of non-being in the Sophist, neither Derrida‟s nor 
Deleuze‟s revaluation of Difference solves the problem.  As I also highlighted above, this 
does not mean the strategy in regard to dialectic is untenable.  Rather, the Idea of 
Difference can be used to point outside the dialectic.  Though ultimately what is being 
pointed to, as such, is the experiential standpoint of Kant‟s structure of experience.  
Recall that there were a number of ways to posit a version of not-being beyond the 
experiential standpoint; however, they generally fit into one of two categories 
corresponding to Kant‟s justifications for the thing-in-itself. 
Warranting the claim of beyond the experiential standpoint, philosophers either 
appeal to logic or some peculiarity of the power, i.e. faculty, of the mind functioning at 
the level of the structure of experience in question.  Though Kant employs both means for 
justifying the thing-in-itself, Aristotle stands as the champion of appeal to logic.  In other 
words, recall what I referred to as Aristotle‟s arsenal with which he accounted for 
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opposition and change within being.  With his matrix of opposition and the logic of the 
ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon, Aristotle also provided a method for arriving at remote 
matter which would be equivalent to an outside of dialectic, and perhaps even – regarding 
Kant‟s structure of experience – what may be referred to as Aristotle‟s thing-in-itself.  
Yet, as I stressed multiple times: given that the employment of logic depends upon the 
activity of the mind, i.e. a fortiori being, such justifications for claiming a beyond fail to 
solve the problem of non-being.  It is not that they are illogical, they may be perfectly 
logical.  Rather, they fail to overcome the first impasse of the problem – “you may not 
and ought not to attribute being to not-being … it is unthinkable.”587 
The regulative idea of Kant‟s Copernican revolution, then, functions in place of 
Aristotle‟s hypokeimenal logic – the specific indication of the ὑπνθείκελνλ derived by 
regressing from the object of experience.  So regression from the object of experience to 
the thing-in-itself counts as a method for logical, i.e. structural, indication.  Most 
importantly, again, as logic driven, it fails to solve the problem of non-being.  Negating 
that which is indicated – as all the above thinkers were quite eager to point out – itself 
indicates more logic, i.e. not-being.  Hence, Derrida‟s logic of supplementarity holds in 
regard to such a method for solving the problem of non-being.  That is, whatever the 
solution appears to be, it is always a supplement to the non-being for which it was 
posited.     
Derrida‟s logic of supplementarity, i.e. the movement of  Différance, is – I think – 
best explained by discussing discursivity.  Derrida, of course, would not have approached 
the issue as such, since he does not affirm the meaningful use of “non” in regard to non-
discursivity.  In this way, a tangent can be seen running from a merely logical reading of 
                                               
587 Plato, Sophist, Benjamin Jowett, tr., The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. IV, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1895), 452. 
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Plato‟s Sophist to Aristotle through the higher faculties in Kant‟s structure of experience 
through Hegel to Derrida.  Hence, this tangent connects any number of articulations, 
then, which fail to overcome the first perplexity or impasse of the problem of non-being.  
On the one hand, like Theaetetus, these thinkers either fail to remember the criteria of 
ineffability, or they deny it.  On the other hand, as Chapter 3 illustrated, logic as a method 
cannot overcome the first perplexity or impasse of the problem. 
The second method, then, for solving the problem reveals a different tangent line.  
This tangent line would run from reading the solution to the problem of non-being in 
Plato‟s Sophist as ironic to Gorgias‟ distinction between conceptual and perceptual 
negation through the lower faculties of Kant‟s structure of experience to Deleuze‟s 
reading of pure difference as a quantity of intensity in an eternal non-discursive loop with 
itself.  Hence, the second method is precisely the second justification Kant provides for 
positing the thing-in-itself, i.e regarding the faculties or powers functioning along the 
trajectory traversing the structure of experience.  In other words, negating not the place or 
location within the structure of experience, rather negating the power functioning at the 
ground of experience.   
Hearkening back to my discussion of what I refer to as the Socratic schools, i.e. 
stoicism, skepticism, hedonism, and cynicism, a defining difference between the two 
methods I am discussing can be seen in the prolêptic which emerges from applying each 
of the methods.  Recall in Chapter 2 I referred to the two different kinds of prolêptic as 
conceptual and perceptual, respectively.  Whereas the first method leaves its practitioner 
looking in thought, the second method leaves its practitioner looking for evidence of a 
flicker in the power at the ground of experience.  Hence, not only is the second method 
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the better method for solving the problem of non-being, it also provides the most 
appropriate anticipations for its practitioner.  Of course the solution to the problem of 
non-being will not be “in” the writing.  The writing – this writing you are reading – as 
clearly being writing must function as prolêptic in regard to the power functioning at the 
ground of experience.  This is precisely the thinking at work in Part II below.      
Differences along the tangent line, then, are differences regarding the power 
functioning at the ground of experience.  These differences may be large in scope, such 
as disagreeing which power is functioning at the ground of experience, or these 
differences may be more narrow in regard to specific aspects of the grounding power.  In 
either case, being in Kant‟s wake means this ground is the elusive kaleidoscopic (so 
called) “latch” of being.  From Aristotle onward philosophers have regarded the power 
functioning at the ground of experience to be imagination.  Even those who take the 
second fold of Kant‟s threefold synthesis of the imagination as forming the foundation (I 
mean “foundation” here technically, as Deleuze thinks it) of experience, believe 
imagination prerequiste lest you be snagged on Kant‟s blindness thesis.  Hence, the 
brilliance of Wurzer‟s notion of filming.  Lifting the veil means imagination‟s opening on 
to itself – its memory – developing, i.e. gaining, sight.  On the one hand, a notion with 
which Hegel was happy to make hay: the ground acts like a chameleon in regard to 
retrospective thought.  On the other hand, thinking imagination as power of the ground, 
from the second perplexity of the problem of non-being, the ground dances like an 
abyssmal kaleidoscope – filming‟s filming functions by un-realing.       
As a large in scope difference, then, and, by allowing hypokeimenonal logic to 
regress to the ground, Deleuze thinks the power of the ground of experience as sense.  In 
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this way he follows Kant by choosing the first of Kant‟s three original faculties of 
experience, and by allowing the hypokeimenal logic to fully regress into what he sees as 
the fractal simulacral character of the ground.  Notice this is a peculiar mixture of 
Aristotle with Kant.  Deleuze‟s assumption of a seamless phase change from becoming to 
being through a logic of sense follows Aristotle through Hyppolite‟s Hegel so as to 
overcome Kant‟s blindness thesis.  Hence, Deleuze applies the second method and arrives 
at the ground as multiplicity.  Think of the resonating differential elements on the ground 
floor of the Baroque House illustration.        
Now here is the final distinction I wish to draw in regard to Part I.  I draw this 
distinction to support my claim that Kant advanced further than any of the prior thinkers 
– Plato excluded for reasons noted above – toward solving the problem of non-being.  I 
might paraphrase this distinction by suggesting: whereas Kant remains skeptical in regard 
to the thing-in-itself, Deleuze takes a more stoic stance in regard to pure difference.  Put 
another way, just as in Chapter 2 I discussed the reconciling of “the metaphysics of 
metaphysics” with “the end of metaphysics,” it would be incorrect to posit the thing-in-
itself as either being or becoming.  However, Deleuze is comfortable positing pure 
difference upon which the structure of experience is riding, i.e. structurally prior to 
repetition or contraction, as becoming.            
If it helps here, think of Kant‟s Table of Nothing.  On the one hand, Kant 
recognizes the “Tableness” as discursively barring a recognition of non-discursivity – 
filming‟s filming functions by un-realing.  Kant‟s strategy for post-sense pre-
apprehension, i.e. blind synopsis, is  to think of non-discursivity – à la Leibniz – as 
excessive.  Another way to put the point: Kant showed the appropriate relation to 
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Aristotle‟s priority of being.  The value of pointing to this excessivity is not that it itself 
solves the problem of non-being.  Rather, on the other hand, the value of locating non-
discursivity functions along with the value of the Table of Nothing.  That is, both provide 
a subtle discursive way to paradoxically discuss the ground of experience and its 
negation, i.e. the nihil negativum of non-being, as sub-discursive.  These depictions of the 
ground of experience remain true to the tangent line of the second strategy and to Plato‟s 
puzzle, i.e. the problem of non-being. 
I, too, follow the second strategy for solving the problem of non-being.  Recall 
Kant believed “affinity” to govern the multiplicity of non-discursive sense.  Kant was 
more correct than he was even able to see.  Affinity does, in fact, govern sense, and, what 
is more, affinity is itself a product of the power of memory – the memory of the real.588  
As such, memory – to use Kant‟s language – is “the secret of our sensibility’s origin.” 
(CPR 1996, A 279/B 335)    So, following the second strategy I differ from Kant and 
Deleuze because I think the ground of experience as the power of memory.  Part II of the 
dissertation will provide support for this claim by looking at contemporary memory 
research.   
Here, then, is how I refer, in an abbreviated fashion, to the power grounding 
experience: memory as play-ground and memory as psychic circuit breaker.  Especially 
for those who are not familiar with the research, it will require Part II below to flesh out 
what I mean here.  On the one hand, by mapping the above visions of pure difference 
from Derrida and Deleuze onto the structure of experience, in light of contemporary 
memory research, I culminate the negative part of my critique of pure difference.  In this 
way, I am granting Derrida and Deleuze their theses; however, I argue their theses are 
                                               
588 I am grateful to Dr. Selcer for encouraging me to maintain this phrasing. 
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misplaced in regard to the structure of experience and fail to meet Plato‟s criteria for the 
solving the problem of non-being.  On the other hand, with the support of contemporary 
memory research in regard to the structure of experience I solve the problem of non-
being.  In this way, I will discuss what contemporary memory research has uncovered 
regarding what Kant called “affinity.”  Because the ground of experience is non-
discursive, it is better to refer to “play” than “truth” regarding this ground – hence, play-
ground.  And, because I take exception to Deleuze‟s assumption of persistence, I will 
argue against persistence of being – hence, psychic circuit breaker.  In other words, Part 
II will demonstrate that your being does not persist, it pulses; and, since memory 
accounts for what is standardly considered the persistence of being, non-discursive breaks 
in the play-ground reveal non-being.  Hence, I critique pure difference with Non-Being & 
Memory by solving Plato‟s puzzle, i.e. the puzzle pure difference was supposed to solve. 
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“Habit is a second nature that destroys the first.  But what is nature?  Why is habit not natural?   
I am very much afraid that nature itself is only a first habit, just as habit is a second nature.”589 
~Pascal, Pensées §126 
 
“Suppose someone were to ask:  
„Is it really right for us to rely on the evidence of our memory  
(or our senses) as we do?”590  
~ Wittgenstein, On Certainty §201 
 
“A parting word? 
The melting snow 
Is odorless.”591 
~ Bokusui Wakayama,  
Japanese Death Poems 
Chapter Seven: Part II – Introduction: Memory, Propaedeutic to a Solution 
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 7 Sections and Objectives 
Here is a succinct statement of the manner in which I am going to conclude this 
dissertation: I will show you that Kant‟s standpoints of the structure of experience pertain 
precisely to the standpoints adopted as memory loci in contemporary memory research.  
By re-articulating, so to speak, Kant‟s structure of experience in light of contemporary 
memory research, I am able to help Kant overcome Aristotle‟s paradigm shift in the 
problem of non-being.  Put another way, using contemporary memory research to support 
my claims regarding the structure of experience, I will solve the problem of non-being. 
 The three standpoints of Kant‟s structure of experience should be thought of as 
standpoints of memory.  As such, Kant‟s sensibility pertains to the experiential standpoint 
of contemporary memory research; Deleuze‟s pure difference as it enters into a circuitous 
loop of the Eternal Return pertains to the performative standpoint of contemporary 
                                               
589 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, A.J. Krailsheimer, tr. (London: Penguin Classics, 1995), 33. 
590 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, tr., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1969), 27e. 
591 Yoel Hoffman, ed. Japanese Death Poems: Written by Zen Monks and Haiku Poets on the Verge of 
Death, (Boston: Charles E. Tuttle Publishing Co, 1986), 146.  If you‟re ever interested, feel free to ask me 
about: how I collected what I took to be all the best death poems I could find in a given period of time, and 
then shared them with Dr. Wurzer.  After he read them we briefly discussed them together.  I would be 
grateful to relive those moments so as to tell you such stories. 
 421 
 
memory research; Derrida‟s logic of supplementarity – his doctrine of the sign – pertains 
to recollective memory, i.e. the contemporary memory research‟s idea of the movement 
of working memory forcing recollections upon entering the conceptual standpoint from 
“beneath.”  Hence, my innovation is to think through the consequences of rethinking 
memory in Kant – particularly sensibility and what he referred to as “affinity” in the 
Critique of Pure Reason – in light of contemporary memory research. 
This chapter, then, briefly examines Plato to situate a discussion propaedeutic to 
19
th
, 20
th
, and 21
st 
century thinkers regarding memory.  In this way, recalling Kant‟s 
structure of experience, I am able to show continuity from Plato through Kant to 
contemporary memory research.  On the one hand, then, in this chapter I trace the 
philosophical roots of the contemporary memory discoveries with which I solve the 
problem of non-being.  On the other hand, I provide a historical reading of the research 
most salient for the sake of solving the problem of non-being.   
Anamnēsis: Dismembering and Remembering … Memory 
 
“It is quite true what philosophy says, that life must be understood backwards.   
But that makes one forget the other saying, that it must be lived – forwards.   
The more one ponders this, the more it comes to mean that life in time is never properly intelligible,  
for the very reason that at no point can I find complete repose in which to take up the position – 
backwards.”592 
~Søren Kierkegaard, The Diary of Søren Kierkegaard 
 
§1 Mnemosyne – “Mnemosyne,” names “a power” which can “decipher the 
invisible.”593  And, of origins, Hesiod (circa 8th century BCE) recalls in Theogony, 
Mnemosyne was the mother of the nine Muses.
594
  Plato reiterates the genealogy in his 
                                               
592 Søren Kierkegaard, The Diary of Søren Kierkegaard, Peter Rohde, tr. (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1960), 111.   
593 Charles E. Scott. The Time of Memory, (New York: SUNY Press, 2001), 32; Cf. Jocelyn Penny Small. 
Wax Tablets of the Mind: Cognitive studies of memory and literacy in classical antiquity, (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 64. 
594 Hesiod. Theogony and Works and Days, trans. M.L. West, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 4. 
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Theaetetus (191d), and for reasons which I shall make clear shortly, this passage amongst 
others regarding memory from Plato are worth considering.  I.M. Crombie suggests, 
“Everybody who has heard of Plato has heard of the doctrine of anamnēsis (ἀλάκλεζίο) 
or recollection.  It is indeed an essential part of Plato‟s philosophical outlook.  It is 
however not quite so easy to say what precisely the doctrine is.”595  Fortunately, I am not 
concerned to precisely state Plato‟s doctrine of anamnēsis here.  Rather, I am concerned 
to make one simple claim about memory as it appears in Plato and to provide textual 
support for my claim.  My claim is that whatever Plato thought of memory, his texts 
discuss multiple processes which function similarly enough to all be referred to as 
processes of memory.  In other words, Plato discusses memory as multiple.  Just as 
something of Mnemosyne resides in the Muses in accord with which we may call her 
their mother – call it, reminiscent of Wittgenstein, a family resemblance.  So to, the 
multiple processes and functions dispersed throughout experience may be referred to as 
the work of the power of memory.  The passages I have picked come from the following 
dialogs: Theaetetus, Phaedrus, Phaedo, Republic, and Meno.    
 §2 Plato’s Three Metaphors for Memory – Contemporary memory researchers 
seem quite concerned to identify which thinker(s) was the first to conceive of a particular 
model or conception regarding memory.  I am reminded of Alfred North Whitehead, 
“The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it 
consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”596  When I articulate what I will refer to as the 
“Contemporary Memory Canon” below, I will indicate the widely accepted first thinkers 
and their corresponding texts.  However, a brief consideration here of the possibility that 
                                               
595 I.M. Crombie. An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines, vol. II: “Plato on Knowledge and Reality,” (New 
York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1979), 135. 
596 Alfred North Whitehead. Process and Reality, (New York: Free Press, 1979), 39. 
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Plato may have thought of memory as multiple will be fruitful.  Plato‟s Theaetetus 
provides two highly celebrated metaphors for memory.  The first of which is the “block 
of wax.”  According to Socrates,  
I want you to suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we 
have in our souls a block of wax, larger in one person, 
smaller in another, and of purer wax in one case, dirtier in 
another; in some men rather hard, in others rather soft, 
while in some it is of the proper consistency. … We may 
look upon it, then, as a gift of Memory, the mother of the 
Muses.  We make impressions upon this of everything we 
wish to remember among the things we have seen or heard 
or thought of ourselves; we hold the wax under our 
perceptions and thoughts and take a stamp from them, in 
the way in which we take the imprints of signet rings.  
Whatever is impressed upon the wax we remember and 
know so long as the image remains in the wax; whatever is 
obliterated or cannot be impressed, we forget and do not 
know. (Theaet 191c-191e) 
The second celebrated image of memory from the Theaetetus is that of the “aviary.”  
According to Socrates,  
Suppose a man were to hunt wild birds, pigeons or 
something, and make an aviary for them at his house and 
look after them there; then, in a sense, I suppose, we might 
say he „has‟ them all the time, because of course he 
possesses them. … But in another sense he „has‟ none of 
them; it is only that he has acquired a certain power in 
respect of them… Then using our image of possessing and 
hunting for the pigeons, we shall say that there are two 
phases of hunting; one before you have possession in order 
to get possession, and another when you already possess in 
order to catch and have in your hands what you previously 
acquired.
 
(Theaet 197c-198d) 
That Plato has Socrates reject both of these accounts does not change the fact that these 
metaphors continue to be celebrated in the contemporary literature.  The metaphors are 
similar in that they both account for the banal memory activities of encoding, storing, and 
retrieving.  Yet, the significant difference between these two accounts, regarding 
memory, highlights the aviary‟s improvement over the block of wax.  Whereas, the wax 
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accounts only for the process of memory known as association, the aviary accounts for 
the process of association and recollection.         
So far, then, Plato has considered two different memory models – a wax model 
with one memory process and an aviary model with two memory processes – and rejected 
them both.  I will now examine the celebrated metaphor of the chariot driver from the 
Phaedrus.  Plato has Socrates explain the following: 
But since we have found that a self-mover is immortal, we 
should have no qualms about declaring that this is the very 
essence and principle of a soul, for every bodily object that 
is moved from outside has no soul, while a body whose 
motion comes from within, from itself, does have a soul, 
that being the nature of a soul; and if this is so – that 
whatever moves itself is essentially a soul – then it follows 
necessarily that soul should have neither birth nor death.  
That, then, is enough about the soul‟s immortality.  Now 
here is what we must say about its structure. … Let us then 
liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged 
horses and their charioteer. … To begin with, our driver is 
in charge of a pair of horses; second, one of his horses is 
beautiful and good and from stock of the same sort, while 
the other is the opposite and has the opposite sort of 
bloodline. (Phaedr 245e-246b) 
At this point we have an immortal soul which acts upon itself, and an image to describe 
the soul as a chariot driver and two horses of hierarchically different natures, i.e. one is 
more pure than the other.  As the parable goes, the soul with the most god-like, i.e. 
disciplined, horses is able to rise high enough after separating from its earthly body, i.e. 
physical death, to glimpse “Reality” or what is really real.  The undisciplined horse, of 
course, pulls the charioteer back toward the earthly, spoiling the view.  Once 
reincarnated, i.e. returned into an earthly body, an (immortal) soul is capable of 
recollecting the heavens of which it caught a glimpse.  The goal here being to live a life 
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good enough to escape the cycle of birth and rebirth – reincarnation.  Hence, Socrates 
explains,  
For just this reason it is fair that only a philosopher‟s mind 
grows wings, since its memory always keeps it as close as 
possible to those realities… A man who uses reminders of 
these things correctly is always at the highest, most perfect 
level of initiation … He stands outside human concerns… 
(Phaedr 249c&d) 
Differing from the wax or the aviary metaphors, then, the charioteer brings forth another 
difference.        
 What is the same across the three metaphors is that all three of them discuss 
memory.  Unquestioningly each metaphor accounts for encoding, storing, and retrieving 
information.  Yet, whereas the relationship between impressions and the wax in the wax 
example seem to flatten the distinctions between encoding, storing, and retrieving, i.e. if 
the impression is in the wax – so long as you have the wax – then you have all three of 
the memory aspects, the aviary example seems to accentuate the distinctions amongst the 
three aspects of memory – the aviary requires an agent and clearly separates between 
encoding and storage (catching the birds and storing them in the aviary).  What is more, 
the charioteer example suggests these aspects of memory function in a way not discussed 
in the other two examples.  In other words, this third metaphor is introducing a third 
process of memory.  This process of memory “keeps the mind as close as possible to 
those [most real] realities.”  In the order in which I have examined them, then, the wax 
metaphor is most dependent upon the earthly physical realm, the aviary metaphor 
acknowledges a non-physical or less earthly realm, and the charioteer metaphor 
acknowledges the least earthly, i.e. non-physical, realm.  Though each of these realms 
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calls for encoding, storing, and retrieving information, clearly memory is different in 
each of the realms.  Hence, Plato discusses memory as multiple. 
 Before briefly examining examples across three other Platonic dialogs, I want to 
stress a few aspects of the hierarchical description which can be seen across the above 
examples.  First, recall how the wax example discussed the relationship between memory 
and other psychic functions.  Socrates described the wax as other than our “perceptions 
and thoughts” and as taking “a stamp from them.”  On the one hand, the physicality of an 
impression in wax scarcely requires an agent to perform the act.  What the wax comes 
into contact with leaves an impression on the wax.  On the other hand, Socrates gives no 
justification of differences amongst the wax tablets across souls.  It is as if the wax tablets 
were just doled out, reminiscent of a lottery.  Second, the aviary example seems to 
require more agency than the wax example.  More reminiscent of disciplining the horses 
from the charioteer example than the passivity of the wax example, recall that the aviary 
requires the man to “look after” the birds.  He has “acquired a certain power” in relation 
to the birds due to his care for the aviary – no aviary no power over the birds.  Here, then, 
a degree of separation between memory and that within which a memory is stored has 
been achieved.  Third, and lastly, another degree of separation has been achieved with the 
charioteer.  The concern has shifted to the proper organization, i.e. relations amongst, the 
encoding, storing, and retrieving of perceptions and thoughts.  And, whereas concern in 
the aviary example provided for an awareness of agency, concern in the charioteer 
example, beyond awareness, provides a benefit for the agent.  Looking at the examples 
from the other Platonic dialogs provides a clearer example of how memory accompanies 
psychic activity, and memory processes appear almost like rungs on a ladder. 
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§3 Plato’s Theory of Recollection – In regard to the following, the passage from 
the Phaedo is relevant because it speaks of recollection and principles of organization 
both of which point to passages in the Meno and Republic (Cf. Phaedo 70a-71a).  
Socrates, delivering his swan song (Cf. Phaedo 84e) as it were, is awaiting the death to 
which he has been sentenced.  Discussing death with Cebes and Simmias, Socrates 
touches upon the immortality of the soul and what Crombie has called the doctrine of 
anamnēsis.  Socrates ties these two topics together with a discussion of opposites, i.e. 
opposing processes and the general form of the principle(s) with which to identify the 
opposites as a unity. 
I pick the passage up where Cebes is lamenting the difficulty involved in 
believing “the soul still exists after a man has died and that it still possesses some 
capability and intelligence.”  As a result, Socrates agrees to examine the question: 
“whether the souls of men who have died exist in the underworld or not.”  Taking the 
wheel of birth and re-birth as his point of departure, Socrates begins by noting,  
We recall [my emphasis] an ancient theory that souls 
arriving there come from here, and then again that they 
arrive here and are born here from the dead.  If that is true, 
that the living come back from the dead, then surely our 
souls must exist there… (Phaedo 70b&c)  
After articulating this theory of the immortality of the soul, Socrates – examining the 
reincarnation component of the theory – asks, “if something worse comes to be, does it 
not come from the better, and the juster from the more unjust?” (Phaedo 71a)  Along this 
line of questioning Socrates concludes “all things come to be in this way, opposites from 
opposites.” (Phaedo 71a)  Socrates further explicates his theory of opposites noting that if 
living and being dead “are opposites, they come to be from one another, and there are two 
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processes of generation between the two.” (Phaedo 71c)  The two processes, then, are 
dying and being alive.   
This discussion culminates in the following two points: first, “coming to life again 
in truth exists, the living come to be from the dead, and the souls of the dead exist,” and, 
second, “such is also the case if that theory is true that you [Socrates] are accustomed to 
mention frequently, that for us learning is no other than recollection.” (Phaedo 72d&e)  
For a proof of recollection readers are pointed to Meno (81e), and provided an example of 
what – over 2000 years later – is often called “declarative memory,” or more specifically 
a “cue dependent” “episodic memory.”  Experiencing an object tends to remind, or bring 
forth, information which may otherwise seem non sequitur.  Socrates‟ example is akin to 
the following: when you experience an object that reminds you of someone for whom 
you care, you may experience thoughts and feelings associated with that person.  In this 
respect the object acts as a cue from which further information is declared (to you).  
Since this information explicitly involves episodes from your   life, the memory is 
referred to as “episodic.”  Had the information been of a less personal form, e.g. the 
chemical composition of the object you are experiencing, the memory would have been 
referred to as “semantic,” rather than episodic.  Further, since a significant amount of 
time may have passed from the time of the episode from which information was brought 
forth, the activity in question is considered a function of the memory process called 
“Long-term Memory.”597   
An example pushed further should tie all the above on Plato together.  Suppose 
you were to go to the grocer‟s to acquire ingredients with which to prepare a meal.  While 
                                               
597 Cf. Yadin Dudai, Memory From A to Z: Keywords, Concepts, and Beyond, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
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at the grocer‟s you see someone who reminds you of the person for whom you are 
preparing dinner, and you leave the grocer‟s following that person without acquiring any 
food or returning home.
598
  In some ways this example is absurd, but why?  First, notice 
there is a difference between the cue and that which it recalls.  Though cues need not be 
physical, in this case the cue is physical and what is recalled is not.  Second, memories – 
and memory cues – may be multiply instantiated.  It seems correct to say that in some 
ways we are reminded of what may be called “universals” across physical change.  For 
example, though your friend ages, and, accordingly, you perceive your friend differently, 
you still recognize your friend.  In this way, memory provides access to that which 
persists despite physical change.  Moreover, your friend‟s arm or a sporting event not 
attended by your friend may both bring forth the same memory.  Third, and lastly, Plato‟s 
example of the charioteer – whatever else it may recall – seems to express an important 
idea about memory.  Namely, memory organizes, and experience is somehow structured 
by this organization. 
Were the unruly horse to pounce on every physical instance recalling the beloved, 
the charioteer would be dragged into being more intimate with the multiple and physical 
which changes than that which is recalled by the physical instances.  Such would be the 
absurd result, noted above, of wandering out of the grocer‟s.  In fact, it is congruent with 
the Long-term Memory (LTM) forgetting curves constructed by Hermann Ebbinghaus
599
 
to suggest that the reinforcing feedback loop created from the unruly horse‟s repeated 
physical pouncing diminishes the reality of that which was previously remembered.  In 
                                               
598 This example is reminiscent of Socrates‟ recounting of the “Diotima discourse” in the Symposium 
(201d-212c), specifically the Scala Amoris – “Stairway of Love” – at 210a6. 
599 Cf. Hermann Ebbinghaus, Über das Gedächtnis, (Amsterdam: E.J. Bonset, 1966).  Hereafter cited as 
UG. 
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other words, taking the cue for that which is recalled diminishes the potency of intricate 
recall because associations with the cue are replacing what the cue previously recalled 
before such repeated exposure to the cue(s).  To put it in a phrasing reminiscent of the 
Euthyphro – Do I like this scent because it reminds me of her, or do I remember her 
because I like this scent?  By siding with the disciplined horse the charioteer obtains a 
degree of freedom in relation to the flux of cues passing through experience. (Cf. Rep 
479c & 485b)  And, in the language of hierarchical organization – supported by the 
experience of persistence across change, rather than being pulled toward constant change 
and becoming – the charioteer seems now to be associated with a level higher up in the 
organization of memory. (Cf. Phaedr 249c)  
Though, of course, not made explicit by Plato, perhaps what anamnēsis might 
ultimately reveal is merely the structure of being.  In this way, anamnēsis might be 
thought of as further using the structural revelation to move up the organization, as it 
were.  “And is not finding knowledge within oneself recollection?” (Meno 85d)600  Recall 
this question from Plato‟s the Meno (85d).  Whereas it is tempting to cite mathematics – 
geometry, i.e. moving up a triangle or logic tree division, i.e. 4 to 2 to 1 – recall that this 
trajectory is nowhere other than in memory.  Hence, already anamnēsis speaks to the 
importance of discerning memory in the relations amidst Being, Becoming, and Non-
Being.  “Let us not then enroll a forgetful soul among those adequate to pursue 
philosophy.  Let us require a good memory.” (Rep 2006, 486d) 
In sum, I take my work on Plato in Part II to show, at least, the following: (1) 
Plato discussed memory as multiple.  In fact, Plato‟s dialogs nicely illustrate how 
memory processes working in different realms and resulting in different products may be 
                                               
600 This passage translated by G.M.A. Grube. 
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thought of as united – in a single power of memory.  (2) Plato‟s discussion of memory 
provides an example of how to think of memory as organized, and how to think of that 
organization as intimately structuring experience throughout.  (3) Plato‟s charioteer 
example, at least, foreshadows – if not, to put it more strongly, indicates – the standpoints 
from which modern and contemporary investigations of memory ensue.  In Kant‟s 
language, the unruly horse caricatures sensibility, the disciplined horse represents 
understanding, and the charioteer illustrates the apperceptive I.  (4) Ultimately I take 
Kant‟s work on the sensibility standpoint and poststructuralism‟s work on the standpoint 
of the apperceptive I to be not only improvements but necessary improvements for 
recognizing the role of memory in experience, and the extent to which these 
improvements deviate from Plato‟s position – given his dialogic style – is undecidable.   
Inception of the Contemporary Memory Canon 
“[H]ow odd are the connections; of human thoughts, which jostle in their flight!”601 
~Lord Byron 
 
§4 Punctuating Plato/Recollecting Footnotes – Looking at contemporary memory 
research, one immediately senses its immensity.  Imagine entering the term “memory” 
into a search engine with access to every contemporary academically minded journal.  
Yet, despite this immensity there are two aspects of memory about which after 1970 the 
research would be in unanimous agreement.  The first is that memory is multiple.  The 
second is reminiscent of Ludwig Wittgenstein‟s celebrated quote, “It is there – like our 
life.”602  That is, memory, in one process or another, seems to be perpetually laboring, or 
                                               
601 George Gordon (“Lord”) Byron, Don Juan, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1875), 216. 
602 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §559, 73. 
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– in more Nietzschean rhetoric – celebrating, along the trajectory of the structure of 
experience.603   
There are many ways to parse memory, as evidenced by the vast vocabulary 
disseminated in contemporary memory research.  Though some aspects of memory are 
less relevant depending upon the focus of the research, organizing aspects of memory in 
relation to the three main standpoints from which memory researchers tend to ground 
their examinations is sufficient to exhaust the vast vocabulary involved across the 
research.  The three standpoints are (1) Experiential, (2) Recollective, and (3) 
Performative.
604
  Indeed, there are ways in which these standpoints overlap.  For 
example, it is possible to think of (1) and (2) as a kind of (3) or (3) as a kind of (1) or (2), 
etc.  However, as I will show, from the perspective of (1) there are aspects of (2) and (3) 
which generally do not get discussed, etc. mutatis mutandis, despite the fact that all of 
these aspects are of memory.  Hence, in this way, the common understanding of memory 
seems far too narrow.
605
 
The following table, then, represents the continuity of philosophical organization 
from Plato to Kant with which I organize memory research.  The table represents the tri-
partite idea with which I organize various historical discoveries and taxonomies 
pertaining to memory.  Notice, in this way, you can see how I have maintained Kant‟s 
                                               
603 Alan Baddeley, “Working Memory,” Science, New Series, Vol. 255, No. 5044, (1992), 556-559; Cf. 
Daniel B. Willingham and Kelly Goedert, “The role of taxonomies in the study of human memory,” 
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 1.3, (2001), 250-265; Cf. Trevor W. Robbins, “Refining 
the Taxonomy of Memory,” Science, 273.5280, (1996), 1353-1354; Cf. Daniel L. Schacter, Anthony D. 
Wagner, and Randy L. Buckner, “Memory Systems of 1999,” The Oxford Handbook of Memory, E. 
Tulving and Fergus I.M. Craik, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 627-643;   
604 Cf. Daniel B. Willingham and Kelly Goedert, “The role of taxonomies in the study of human memory,” 
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 1.3, (2001), 250-265; Cf. Daniel L. Schacter and Endel 
Tulving. “What are the Memory Systems of 1994?,” Memory Systems 1994, D.L. Schacter and E. Tulving, 
eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 1-38; Cf. Endel Tulving, “How Many Memory System are There?,” 
American Psychologist, 40.4, (1985), 385-398. 
605 Cf. Willingham and Goedert, “The role of taxonomies,”  Cognitive, Affective, 250-265. 
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idea of the structure of experience throughout, and in this part, i.e. Part II, of the 
dissertation I will use contemporary memory research to correct Kant‟s structure of 
experience by correcting his understanding of memory. 
 Platonic Kantian Contemporary 
I Dark (unruly) Horse Sensibility (Experiential) Experiential 
II Charioteer Apperceptive “I” Performative 
III Light (disciplined) Horse Understanding (Conceptual) Recollective 
Figure 7.1 
The value of following the above tri-partite idea, in large part, goes to maintaining 
a dialog between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology (including neuroscience).  
Memory research hangs together, of course, because memory is being researched.  
However, there is often a distinction to be made by the types of journals which publish 
the research, rather than the research‟s avowed link to an aspect, i.e. standpoint, of 
experience.  For example, journals dealing with “psychophysics” tend to address memory 
at the experiential standpoint, and journals dealing with “cognition” tend to address the 
recollective standpoint.  In other words, as can be seen by examining the specializations 
of a number of contemporary journals, memory research implicitly adheres to its 
philosophical roots.  Therefore, as I address the list of discoveries in memory research, 
both leading up to and composing the “Contemporary Memory Canon,” I will seek to 
remind you of the standpoint of experience to which each discovery pertains.   
Lastly, an exhaustive treatment of the history of memory is, of course, beyond the 
scope of my project.  For an excellent account leading up to the 20
th
 century, I 
recommend W.H. Burnham‟s “Memory, Historically and Experimentally Considered” 
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published in two parts by The American Journal of Psychology in 1888.
606
   Therefore, in 
regard to my project, I have limited the historical treatment to texts which by way of their 
introduction of a distinction regarding memory are relevant to my re-reading of Kant‟s 
structure of experience.  And, this is, of course, for the sake of solving the problem of 
non-being and critiquing the solutions put forward by Kant, Derrida, and Deleuze. 
§5 The claim that memory spans the trajectory of experience – François Maine de 
Biran (1766-1824) is widely credited by contemporary memory theorists as the first 
thinker to discuss memory as multiple.
607
  Often referred to merely as Maine de Biran, he 
was awarded a prize by the “Class of Moral and Political Sciences in the National 
Institute” for his book titled: Influence de l’Habitude, published in Paris in 1803.608  The 
question which Maine de Biran‟s book was written to answer – and for which the prize 
was offered – was: What is the influence of habit on the faculty of thinking?  Further, 
describing the philosophical climate within which Maine de Biran was writing, French 
historian George Boas states, “The feeling that somehow or other the Idéalogues had 
reduced man to a state of utter passivity was fairly widespread in France after Napoleon 
had made it fashionable to ridicule them.”609  Boas quotes Maine de Biran as saying in 
1794, “I should like, if ever I were capable of undertaking anything continuous, to see 
how far the soul is active, how far it can modify external impressions, augment or 
                                               
606 Burnham, “Memory, Historically and Experimentally,” The American Journal, (1888), 39-90; W.H. 
Burnham, “Memory, Historically and Experimentally Considered. II.,” The American Journal of 
Psychology, vol. 2, no. 2, (1888), 225-270. 
607 Cf. Daniel L. Schacter, Anthony D. Wagner, and Randy L. Buckner, “Memory Systems of 1999,” The 
Oxford Handbook of Memory, E. Tulving and Fergus I.M. Craik, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 627-643; Cf. Howard Eichenbaum, “Conscious awareness, memory and the hippocampus,” Nature 
Neuroscience, 2.9 (1999), 775-776; This may be due in large part to psychology‟s failure to seriously read 
Plato. 
608 Ralph Griffiths and G.E. Griffiths. The Monthly Review, or, Literary Journal, vol. 41, (London: A. 
Straban, 1803), 453. 
609 George Boas, “Maine de Biran,” The Philosophical Review, 34.5, (1925), 477. 
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diminish their intensity by attention it gives them, examine to what extent it is master of 
attention.”610   
Maine de Biran is known, then, as a French philosopher of the will, and historians 
situate him given his criticisms of Descartes, Étienne de Condillac (1715-1780), Pierre 
Jean Cabanis (1757-1808), and Thomas Reid (1710-1796).
611,612 
 Whereas Descartes said, 
“Je pense, donc je suis,” Maine de Biran said, “Je veux, donc je suis,” quips the historian 
Benjamin Burt.
613
  Championing the will against such reduction to “utter passivity,” 
Maine de Biran promotes a model of experience divided into both active and passive 
features dependent upon the involvement of the will, with memory spanning the model – 
passive and active habitudes.
614
  He is credited with the following innovations: (1) He 
considers memory – habits – to span the entirety of the model, and (2) he takes the 
understanding to be an effect of habitude, i.e. the process of forming habits produces the 
further capacity to understand.
615
  Lastly, Maine de Biran‟s emphasis, in particular, on the 
will and the emergence of understanding from out of the power of memory nicely 
illustrates – well before poststructural accounts of experience or identity – how both the 
understanding and the even the “I” itself may emerge in such a way so as to make their 
origin completely opaque to phenomenology. 
§6 Canonical Prelude – At this point, then, I want to show a cluster of 
reciprocally related texts by citing title, author, and year of publication.  I take all of these 
                                               
610 George Boas, “Maine de Biran,” The Philosophical Review, 34.5, (1925), 477. 
611 Cf. Benjamin Chapman Burt. A History of Modern Philosophy, (Chicago: A.C. McClurg, 1892), 294. 
612 Cf. Burt. A History of Modern Philosophy, 294. 
613 “I think, therefore I am” v. “I will, therefore I am.” Burt. A History of Modern Philosophy, 295.  
614 François Maine de Biran, Influence de l’Habitude sur la faculté de penser, (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1954), §1. 
615 Burt, A History of Modern Philosophy, 294; Daniel L. Schacter and E. Tulving. “What are the Memory 
Systems of 1994,” Memory Systems 1994, Daniel L. Schacter and E. Tulving, ed., (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1994), 4; Daniel L. Schacter, Anthony D. Wagner, and Randy L. Buckner, “Memory Systems of 1999,” 
The Oxford Handbook of Memory, E. Tulving and Fergus I.M. Craik, eds., 627. 
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texts to be precursors, in one way or another, to what I will refer to as the “Contemporary 
Memory Canon.”  What do I take to be the value of such a cluster of texts?  I have 
already shown a number of possibilities, considered historically, across the standpoints to 
be that which unifies the standpoints.  For example, I have considered the possibility of 
the will, the apperceptive I, a.k.a. the transcendental ego, or a conceptual movement of 
the understanding.  Notice, each of these candidates champions the experiential, 
performative, and recollective standpoints respectively. With the perhaps most obscure of 
these standpoints being the experiential, a number of candidates other than the “will” 
have also been historically considered.  The value, then, of the following cluster of texts 
is primarily to show the different candidates for unifying all of the standpoints by 
pointing to the texts which champion the candidates.  And, again, given the obscurity and 
complexity of the experiential standpoint, I attend more to the experiential standpoint 
than the other two.  Lastly, the value of considering these different candidates can be seen 
in the fact that depending upon that which performs the unifying, the question of the 
thing-in-itself “beyond” or “outside” the standpoints is at stake.  
As I mentioned above, memory researchers are quite concerned to note who was 
the first individual to make a particular distinction, in what text, and when, regarding 
memory.  Therefore, the documentation is available, and I am able to indicate the major 
memory distinctions, discoveries, etc. which contribute to the “Memory Canon.”  Further, 
I am able to organize the distinctions of the Memory Canon by way of the standpoints, 
and thus constitute a taxonomy of memory.  Recalling the Kantian standpoints of Chapter 
2, for example, I might say Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Wilhelm 
Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), and G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831): Fichte with his 
 437 
 
Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge – Grundlage der gesamten 
Wissenschaftslehre (1794/5), Schelling with his System of Transcendental Idealism – 
System des transcendentalen Idealismus (1800), and Hegel with his Phenomenology of 
Mind/Spirit
616
 – Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) champion the performative, 
experiential, and recollective memory standpoints respectively. 
I begin here, then, with the experiential standpoint – the standpoint I will here 
dwell upon most due to its obscurity.  According to historian Mark Altschule, “It is 
difficult – or perhaps impossible – to find a nineteenth-century psychologist or 
psychiatrist who did not recognize unconscious cerebration as not only real but of the 
highest importance.”617  Following the use of the unfortunate term “unconscious,” that 
which is unconscious in experience may be thought of in many ways.  Cerebral, i.e. 
neuronal activity is certainly – to some degree – active without conscious awareness of 
the activity as such.
618
  Other suggestions include the will, biological factors, hereditary 
factors, or physiological factors.  In fact, all of these other factors may be unconsciously 
involved in an experience.  Perhaps as exemplified by Caspar David Friedrich‟s (1774-
1840) The Monk by the Sea – Der Mönch am Meer (1809) – or his Wanderer Above the 
Mist – Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer (1818) – the nineteenth-century saw an 
explosion of publications both regarding the obscurity of – and attempting to dispel the 
obscurity from – the experiential standpoint.  
                                               
616 Rather than alienate any group by choosing the term “Mind” over “Spirit,” here, I have included them 
both along with the original German title. 
617 Mark Altschule, Origins of Concepts in Human Behavior, (New York: Wiley, 1977), 199. 
618 Even granting an “eliminative materialist” vocabulary like the project suggested by the Churchlands, 
there is still obscure neuronal activity known as the “Dark Energy” of the mind for which we have yet to 
account. 
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Providing witness to unconscious influence variously described the following 
authors and texts populate what I referred to above as the “explosion” of publications in 
the nineteenth-century.  Under the standpoint heading with Schelling, then, may be 
found, published in 1818, Arthur Schopenhauer‟s (1788-1860) World as Will and 
Representation – Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.  In 1831 Carl Gustav Carus (1789-
1869) published his Lectures on Psychology – Vorlesungen über Psychologie.  In 1859 
Charles Darwin (1809-1882) published On the Origin of Species.  In 1860 Gustav 
Theodor Fechner (1801-1887) published Elements of Psychophysics – Elemente der 
Psychophysik.  In 1863 Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) published On the 
Sensations of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music – Die Lehre von den 
Tonempfindungen als physiologische Grundlage für die Theorie der Musik.  Also in 1863 
Pierre Paul Broca (1824-1880) presented his findings regarding the left hemisphere of the 
brain.  In 1869 Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) published The Philosophy of the 
Unconscious – Philosophie des Unbewussten.  In 1874 Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) 
published Principles of Physiological Psychology – Grudzüge der physiologischen 
Psychologie.  And, Carl Wernicke (1848-1905) published The Aphasic Symptom-
Complex – Der Aphasische Symptomencomplex – in 1874.  In 1881 Théodule-Armand 
Ribot (1839-1916) published The Diseases [Maladies] of Memory – Les Maladies de la 
Mémoire.
619    
It was in such a textual climate that Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850-1909) – who is 
considered the father of experimental memory research – published his On Memory – 
Über das Gedächtnis in 1885.  Around this time – between 1870 and 1906 – Karl Ewald 
                                               
619 Théodule Ribot, Le Maladies de la Mémoire, (Paris: J.B. Ballière, 1881). 
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Hering (1834-1918) delivered his lectures compiled and titled in English as Memory: 
Lectures on the Specific Energies of the Nervous System.  The first chapter and lecture of 
which was titled, “Memory as a general function of organized matter” – Über das 
Gedächtnis als eine allgemeine Funktion der organisierten Materie.  It was in 1880, then, 
that Samuel Butler (1835-1902) published Unconscious Memory in which he compared 
Hering‟s writings on memory with that of von Hartmann‟s.  Studying unconscious 
perception, philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and the psychologist 
credited with the “Duck-Rabbit Illusion” Joseph Jastrow (1863-1944) published “On 
small differences in Sensation” in 1884.  It is perhaps too often overlooked that in the 
midst of these publications Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) published The Cheerful 
Science – Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882) – and Beyond Good and Evil – Jenseits von 
Gut und Böse (1886).  In 1887 Francis Galton (1822-1911) and Joseph Jacobs (1854-
1916) published their respective works on “Prehension,” i.e. short term memory span.  
Further, in 1890 William James (1842-1910) published his two volume: Principles of 
Psychology where he discussed, inter alia, primary and secondary memory, i.e. short and 
long term memory.  In 1891 Jean-Marie Guyau (1854-1888) published Education and 
Heredity – Education et Heredite.  Also in 1891 Pierre Janet (1859-1947) published 
“Study of a Case of Fixed Ideas and Aboulia” – “Etude sur un cas d'aboulie et d'idees 
fixes.”  He followed this in 1892 with The Mental State of Hysterics – L'état mental des 
hystériques – where he discussed unconscious fixed ideas, and in the same year Jean-
Martin Charcot (1825-1893) presented the notion of unconscious fixed ideas in his 
theatre at the Pitié-Salpêtière Hospital in Paris.   
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In 1896 Henri Bergson (1859-1941) published Matter and Memory: Essay on the 
relation of the body to the mind – Matière et mémoire: essai sur la relation du corps à 
l’esprit.  Though first published in 1950 Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) is credited with 
writing Project for a Scientific Psychology in 1895 as a collection of correspondences 
with Wilhelm Fliess, and in 1899 Freud published The Interpretation of Dreams – Die 
Traumdeutung.  In that same year – 1899 – Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) published 
Psychiatry: A Textbook for Students and Physicians – Psychiatrie: Ein Lehrbuch fur 
Studirende und Aerzte.  Reporting on retroactive effects within memory, Georg Elias 
Müller and Alfons Pilzecker published Experimental Contributions to the Science of 
Memory – Experimentelle Beiträge zur Lehre vom Gedächtnis – in 1900.  I. P. Pavlov 
reported his experimental work with dogs in 1903 which were subsequently published as 
Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral 
Cortex.  Lastly, in 1906 Alois Alzheimer (1864-1915) first presented the results of his 
research concerning the malady which would eventually carry his name. 
 The following publications should also be noted.  However, I see them as 
championing a different standpoint than the experiential.  In 1874 Franz Brentano (1838-
1917) published Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint – Psychologie vom 
Empirischen Standpunkte.  In 1892 Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) published “On Sense and 
Reference” – “Über Sinn und Bedeutung.”  In 1910 Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) 
published “The Association Method.”  Lastly, Edmund Husserl‟s (1859-1938) lectures 
and sketches from 1898-1925 have been published posthumously as Phantasy, Image 
Consciousness, and Memory.  Hence, in one way or another, all the above publications 
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speak to a concern perhaps best exemplified by Maine de Biran‟s words: “to see how 
far”620 memory extends.   
Before proceeding to the twentieth-century texts, and the “Contemporary Memory 
Canon” in the next chapter, it is useful to make a few comments about the above.  
Depending upon which standpoint privileged, a different approach to describing 
experience ensues.  Four approaches may be developed from the standpoints.  Coinciding 
with the recollective and experiential standpoints the approaches of structuralism and 
poststructuralism may be developed.  Further, if you think of agency along what may be 
described as a continuum of will spanning from the experiential standpoint to the 
apperceptive I, then broadly two approaches result.  Following Wundt‟s Outlines of 
Psychology – Grundriss der Pscyhologie – published in 1896, on the one hand, 
“voluntarism” describes an approach which treats the will as spanning from apprehension 
– which can be, at least, studied experimentally – through various depictions of ego “up,” 
as it were, to apperception, i.e. the transcendental ego.  This approach favors acts of will 
in “decision” and “choice.”  On the other hand, if you think of the will variously as 
“down” the continuum, then the approach becomes that of a more involuntary nature akin 
to that of Schopenhauer‟s will or Freud‟s unconscious.  Yet, of these approaches, in my 
opinion, it is poststructuralist thought that has best handled, and I might add taken 
seriously, the un-graspable nature of the thing-in-itself.      
Notice the unconscious, the will, physiological, biological, and hereditary factors 
fit under the experiential standpoint since each is an attempt to explain aspects of 
experience – of which you are aware – from aspects of experience of which you are not 
aware.  Further, these attempts share a concern to describe experience as unified by 
                                               
620 Boas, “Maine de Biran,” The Philosophical Review, 477.  I noted this locution above. 
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neither transcendental ego nor logical necessity.  So, the work of Maine de Biran has 
already shown the way to indicate, at least, the recollective standpoint as an effect of or 
dependent upon the experiential standpoint.  What is more, Kant himself – as emphasized 
by the poststructuralists – has shown the way to indicate the transcendental ego as the 
result of a performance or as an effect.  With the concerns of the nineteenth-century, 
then, the experiential standpoint can be thought of as permeated with memory – including 
what aspects of the standpoint may be “unconscious.”  Hence, in what follows, the 
contemporary memory research will show the power of memory permeates the 
standpoints to such an extent as to exhaustively account for the question of the thing-in-
itself “beyond” or “outside” all standpoints.  Summing these insights, as it were, I will 
critique pure difference, i.e. there is no longer a need to posit – affirmatively or 
negatively – a thing-in-itself or pure difference. 
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“Memory is the thing you forget with.”621 
~Alexander Chase 
 
“[M]emory is not an instrument for exploring the past but its theatre.”622 
~Walter Benjamin 
 
“[W]hat Plato dreams of is a memory with no sign [Derrida‟s emphasis].”623 
~Jacques Derrida 
Chapter Eight: Memory as Play-Ground – Contemporary Memory Research  
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 8 Sections and Objectives 
This is the chapter in which I solve the problem of non-being.  The previous chapter 
provided the historical background to the memory research with which I solve the 
problem, and the following chapter contemplates the value of the solution.  This chapter 
contains two sections.  Further, each of the sections is divided in accordance to the theses 
put forth.  In other words, the first section of this chapter puts forth 20 theses derived 
from contemporary memory research.  The second section, then, shows how I apply 
contemporary memory research to Kant‟s structure of experience and, thereby solve, the 
problem of non-being. 
I chose the theses in the second section of this chapter to make my solution to the 
problem of non-being explicit.  Put generally, Kant‟s structure of experience from the 
Critique of Pure Reason required two corrections from the perspective of contemporary 
memory research.  The first correction involves the second of Kant‟s justifications for 
positing the thing-in-itself.  Because Kant believed sensibility‟s origin to be a “secret,” he 
considered the grounding power available for negation to be imagination.  This was a 
focus of the Kant chapter above.  Whereas Kant thought of productive imagination as an 
                                               
621 Alexander Chase. The Harper Book of Quotations, Robert I. Fitzhenry, ed. (New York: Harper-Collins 
Reference, 1993), 291. 
622 Walter Benjamin. “Berlin Chronicle,” One Way Street and Other Writings, Edmond Jephcott and 
Kingsley Shorter, (London: Verso, 1979), 314. 
623 Jacques Derrida. “The Pharmakon,” Dissemination, Barbara Johnson, tr. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981), 109. 
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original source of the mind, contemporary memory research reveals productive 
imagination as rooted in memory.  Hence, the primacy of imagination regarding 
experience in Kant should be replaced with memory. 
The second correction to Kant‟s structure of experience pertains directly to the 
ground of experience.  For Kant, the ground of the structure of experience pertains to 
sense, i.e. sensation grounds experience.  Just as imagination is the second of Kant‟s three 
original powers of the mind, “sense” is the first (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127).  However, 
because intuitions are blind prior to the application of concepts higher in the structure, 
despite deeming the power “sense,” Kant cannot reveal the structure of experience‟s 
secret origin.  Yet, he was able to discern that the power is governed by “affinity.”  Re-
reading affinity, then, by way of contemporary memory research discoveries such as 
“priming,” provides evidence with which to reveal sensibility‟s secret origin.  Hence, the 
ground of the structure of experience is not “sense” but “sensory memory.” 
First and foremost, this is the solution to the problem of non-being precisely 
because it meets Plato‟s criteria for solving the problem.  Secondly, this eliminates two 
assumptions built into Kant‟s structure of experience – assumptions pertaining to aspects 
which, for Kant, were avowedly “blind” and “secret.”624  And if we take what I refer to as 
Plato‟s “dependency of reckoning with being upon reckoning with non-being” thesis 
seriously, these assumptions, then, should be eliminated from our understanding of being. 
The first assumption is that a thing-in-itself needs to be posited from the 
experiential standpoint of the structure of experience when performing an ontological 
negation.  This pertains to his second justification for positing the thing-in-itself, i.e. his 
mistake pertaining to imagination.  At times above I stated this generally saying: Kant 
                                               
624 Kant‟s structure of experience, of course, had been the best solution/status quo prior to my solution. 
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considered imagination more powerful than memory.  By way of contemporary memory 
research I argue you should think of it this way: We can say that what we experience is of 
an “external world.”  Yet, following the Kantian division of the structure of experience 
into sensibility and understanding, we must remember that what we have of this external 
world is either an idea from or the content of experience.  And, in the experiencing itself, 
the power which must be present to experience is ultimately memory, before, during, and 
after imagination.  
The second assumption is the assumption of ontological persistence.  In other 
words, the ground of experience as memory reveals ontological filled duration as illusory.  
That is, sensory memory as the power at the ground – instead of sense – indicates a 
cycling of memory as the structure of experience functions along a structurally ascending 
trajectory of object formation.  Hence, because the ground is memory, therefore cycling 
(second correction to Kant noted above); notice memory‟s cycling functions tantamount 
to Kant‟s negating of imagination (first correction to Kant noted above); because cycling, 
therefore gaps in being; because gaps in being, therefore non-being. 
Mnemo-Psychography: 20 Theses toward Sensibility‟s Secret Origin 
Juxtaposing
625
 the two following quotes, one from 1792 and one from 2009, 
provides a good point of departure for examining the major and lasting changes in the 
study of memory across the 19
th
, 20
th
, and 21
st
 centuries.  In 1792 Dugald Stewart (1753-
1828) wrote: 
Memory itself is an ultimate and inexplicable fact. 
[Stewart‟s emphasis] – It is hardly necessary for me to add, 
that when we have proceeded so far in our inquiries 
concerning Memory, as to obtain an analysis of that power, 
                                               
625 The section title is an intended reference to: (CPR 1996, A278/B 334).  
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and to ascertain the relation in which it stands to the other 
principles of our constitution, we have advanced as far 
toward an explanation of it as the nature of the subject 
permits. … Such, indeed, is the poverty of language that we 
cannot speak on the subject without employing expressions 
which suggest one theory or another…626 
Now, published in 2009, Jonathan K. Foster in a chapter titled “You are your memory,” 
from Memory: A Very Short Introduction quotes celebrated memory researcher and 
neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga stating, “Everything in life is memory, save for the thin 
edge of the present.”627  Have memory researchers in 2009 overcome the “poverty of 
language” of which Stewart speaks?  In what follows I hope to show the significant 
innovations relevant to my project from the “analysis of that power” which the past two 
centuries of memory researchers have been able to produce. 
I will apologize at the outset for the list/textbook-like presentation of the 
following material.  This choice of stylistic approach seems justified in that when you 
understand the following, you will understand my position, and the following is highly 
technical.  “In the twenty-first century, we know more about memory than ever 
before.”628  And, my choice of stylistic approach squares the two needs of presenting a 
large amount of technical information and structuring my argument for an audience 
relatively unfamiliar with the contemporary memory research.  Compounding the 
difficulty, as three contemporary theorists put it, “Memory is a single term, but refers to a 
multitude of human capacities … a universally accepted categorization scheme does not 
exist.  There is no periodic table for types of memory.”629  The purpose for this section of 
                                               
626 Dugald Stewart. Philosophy of the Human Mind, (Boston: William H. Dennet, 1866), 261. 
627 Jonathan K. Foster. Memory: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1. 
628 Patrick H. Hutton. Memory, New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. 4, Maryanne Cline Horowitz, 
ed. (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2005), 1419. 
629 Henry L. Roediger III, Elizabeth J. Marsh, and Stephanie C. Lee. “Kinds of Memory,” Steven’s 
Handbook of Experimental Psychology, Memory, and Cognitive Processes, Hal Pashler and Douglas L. 
Medin, ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), 1. 
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the dissertation, then, is to show the major memory distinctions, features, and insights 
which should be considered by, at least, philosophers concerned with issues in the 
philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and experience in general.  Since a 
number of the following features of memory are, perhaps, best understood through a 
relation or juxtaposition with other features of memory, I set out to be as reader friendly 
as possible, i.e. clear without presenting too much or too little information.   
Hence, I have organized this section in the following way: (1) and (2) describe the 
major paradigms through which memory research was conducted post 1960 into the 
1990s.
630
  I treat the current memory paradigm in the penultimate position (19).  Next, (3) 
through (16) are significant distinctions and discoveries widely acknowledged as major 
contributions to the study of memory in the 20
th
 century,
631
 (17) and (18) provide two 
distinctions, not discussed above, from  20
th
 century philosophy which will help me 
articulate my thesis more concisely.  Further, (19) indicates the widely acknowledged 
current paradigm in regard to memory research.  Lastly, (20) represents a phrasing of my 
thesis in the wake of these above innovations.  The contemporary paradigms of the 60‟s 
and 70‟s are: (1) the Modal Model/Memory Stages Paradigm and (2) the Levels of 
Processing Paradigm.  The contemporary distinctions and features of memory include the 
following: (3) Implicit v. Explicit Memory, (4) Verbal v. Nonverbal Memory, (5) 
Episodic v. Semantic Memory, (6) Procedural v. Declarative Memory, (7) Chunking, (8) 
Working Memory, (9) Context Dependence, (10) Mood and State Memory Dependence, 
(11) Saccadic Memory, (12) Multiple Object Tracking, (13) Priming, (14) Automaticity, 
                                               
630 Friedhart Klix. “On Paradigm Shifts in Memory Research,” Human Memory and Cognitive Capabilities, 
F. Klix and H. Hagendorf, eds. (Amsterdam: North-Holland: 1986), 45-51.  
631 Furthermore, the texts from which these distinctions derive may be thought of collectively as the 
“Contemporary Memory Canon.” 
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(15) Retroactively Effective Memory, and (16) Attention/Intention as a Process of 
Working Memory.  The contemporary philosophical innovations include the following: 
(17) Qualia and (18) Satisficing and Bounded Rationality.  The current contemporary 
memory paradigm is referred to as (19) the Parallel Distributed Processing Paradigm.  
Within the context of these innovations, then, my thesis may be described as (20) Being 
Memory Bound. 
§1 Modal Model/Memory Stages Paradigm (SM, STM, LTM) – I begin by 
showing a shift across paradigms beginning in the 1960s.  From the perspective of the 
memory standpoints, the shift illustrates the trend toward diminishing agency and 
increased automaticity.  In other words, the shift indicates a poststructural coupling of the 
will and the experiential standpoint.  In fact this shift informed my discussion of the 
performative standpoint.  In 1968 Richard C. Atkinson and Richard M. Shiffrin published 
“Human Memory: A proposed system and its control processes”632 conceiving the 
relation amongst sensory (SM), short-term (STM), and long-term memory (LTM) like 
that amongst consecutive stages in the processing information.  The shift from the 1960s 
to the 1970s is characteristic of the shift in thinking about memory less narrowly, i.e. a 
shift from thinking of memory solely as storehouse or for storage to memory as 
processing and storage.    
 
 
 
 
                                               
632 R.C. Atkinson and R.M. Shiffrin. “Human Memory: A proposed system and its control processes,” The 
Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory, vol. 2, K.W. Spence and J.T. 
Spence, ed., (New York: Academic Press,1968), 89-195. 
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Figure 8.1
633
 
As an improvement over simply thinking of memory as a storehouse, Figure 8.1 
illustrates a model of memory which spans the structure of experience.  In addition, 
Figure 5.2 illustrates an early version of the memory standpoints.  As such, “sensory 
registers” which include, of course, the five senses points to the experiential standpoint 
and Kant‟s sensibility.  The short term memory store (STS) functions as an early version 
of working memory, and, thereby, indicates a version of the performative standpoint.  
The more advanced version of the performative standpoint will think of the performative 
as itself spanning the structure of experience – more on this below.  The long term store 
(LTS), then, points to the recollective standpoint and Kant‟s understanding broadly 
designated.  Notice – as the names “registers” and “store” indicate – the Modal 
                                               
633 Retrieved from: http://suppes-corpus.stanford.edu/techreports/IMSSS_173.pdf 09-09-09. 
R.C. Atkinson and R.M. Shiffrin. “The Control Processes of Short-term Memory,” Technical Report 173, 
(1971), 1-23 (the above graphic comes from page “3b”). 
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Model/Memory Stages Paradigm still emphasizes the storage and encoding aspects of 
memory over the manner in which retrieval is tied up with performance.       
§2 Levels of Processing Paradigm – With the 1970s, the “Memory Stages 
Paradigm” shifted into the “Levels of Processing Paradigm” (LOP) when in 1972 Fergus 
I.M. Craik and Robert Lockhart published “Levels of Processing: A framework for 
memory research.”634  Alan D. Baddeley puts the matter well. 
Although the modal model [Memory Stages Figure above] 
faded away largely through neglect, there was one major 
precipitating factor, namely the development of what 
appeared to be a very promising alternative framework, that 
of Levels of Processing.  The modal model was essentially 
structural in nature; it did have functional aspects such as 
control processes and encoding activities, but these were 
conceptually subsidiary to the underlying structural 
distinctions.  Craik and Lockhart reversed this emphasis by 
de-emphasizing structure and stressing processing, 
suggesting that trace durability was a direct consequence of 
the processes of encoding, with deeper and more elaborate 
encoding leading to more durable memory traces.
635
 
With the paradigm shift came a shift in focus from storage to processing.  Though 
processing was involved in the early stage model, LOP thinks of memory along a 
continuum of processing.  In other words, LOP accounts for a memory‟s “location” in 
SM, STM, or LTM depending upon the amount of processing the memory has 
undergone, i.e. from maintenance to elaboration.  In fact, consistent with my discussion 
of memory as a “power,” the term “store” is often substituted in the research for the term 
“memory” resulting in a different phrasing, e.g. discussion of the short-term store of 
memory.  Moreover, it should not escape the reader who has a good memory that the LOP 
                                               
634 Fergus I.M. Craik and Robert Lockhart. “Levels of Processing: A framework for memory research,” 
Journal of Verbal Thinking and Verbal Behavior, 11, (1972), 671-684. 
635 Alan D. Baddeley. Working Memory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 22.  
 451 
 
continuum of memory is thoroughly Kantian.
636
  Specifically, the trajectory of this 
continuum of processing in memory moves from structural cognizance to term of store 
(short or long) to semantic cognizance.  This is accomplished across two stages – looking 
conspicuously like sensibility and understanding – the processing from structure to store 
is referred to as “maintenance rehearsal” and the processing from store to semantic 
“level” is referred to as “elaboration rehearsal.”637  The extent to which some memory 
has been processed may be referred to as the extent of elaboration.  As noted above, each 
of these shifts further illustrates the trend toward diminishing agency and increased 
automaticity, and with the LOP Paradigm theorists arrived at a way to describe some of 
the control processes – intentional, voluntary, enactments of will – as automatic.  See 
Figure 8.2.             
 
        Figure 8.2
638
 
                                               
636 Fergus I.M. Craik and Robert Lockhart. “Levels of Processing: A framework for memory research,” 
Journal of Verbal Thinking and Verbal Behavior, 11, (1972), passim. 
637 Craik and Lockhart. “Levels of Processing” Journal of Verbal Thinking, 680. 
638 The above is an adaptation of (1) Michael Roberl William Dawson. Understanding Cognitive Science, 
(London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998), 113. And, (2) E. Bruce Goldstein. Cognitive Psychology: Connecting 
Mind, Ressearch, and Everyday Experience, (New York: Wadsworth Publishing, 2007), 138-140. 
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 An improvement over the Memory Stages Model above, Figure 5.3 – as an 
illustration of Levels of Processing Paradigm – better captures the connectedness of 
memory spanning the structure of experience.  On the one hand, the “processing” piece of 
this paradigm is further acknowledging the performative power of memory.  On the other 
hand, the “forgetting” piece of this paradigm indicates the manner in which the organized 
power traversing the structure can fall out, so to speak, at various points along the 
trajectory.  The “rehearsal” components indicate the manner in which – think of Kant and 
Deleuze here – the sensory information is being (actively) elaborated into conceptual 
content.  In other words, Figure 5.3 matches the other figures regarding the structure of 
experience above, i.e. from left to right sensibility to understanding. 
The primary shortcoming with this model – in regard to what the current 
contemporary model corrects – may be found by looking at the “retrieval” arrow.  The 
Levels of Processing Paradigm has yet to think the fullness of the power of memory 
associated with sensibility, i.e. the experiential standpoint.  Daniel Dennett in his 
Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, notes “Any psychology 
with undischarged homunculi is doomed to circularity or infinite regress.”639  Though the 
term “homunculi” tends to be pejorative, for sake of staying with his terminology, it is as 
if – within the Levels of Processing Paradigm – the discharge of the homunculus takes 
place from Short-term memory “up.”  As such the model is consistent with Kant‟s 
blindness thesis.  It does not attempt to look into the abyss of sensibility.  Locating 
retrieval as it does indicates the possibility of backward “looking” to the point of Short-
                                               
639 Danniel C. Dennett. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, (Oxford: MIT Press, 
1981), 101. 
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term memory.  That is, from the conceptual and apperceptive standpoints to as far as the 
un-realing of imagination‟s filming can provide.       
§3 Implicit v. Explicit – The distinction between implicit and explicit memory 
speaks to a cluster of ideas about memory such as habit, habituation, and de-sensitization.  
And, as I will use the implicit/explicit distinction as heuristic in what follows, I have 
decided to begin with it.  Now the progenitor of what was to be further specified in 20
th
 
century memory investigations as habituation and de-sensitization was Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz (1646-1716).  In §33 of his Discourse on Metaphysics – Discours de 
Metaphysique – published in 1686 Leibniz notes,  
It is almost like the confused murmuring heard by those 
who approach the seashore, which is the combined effect of 
innumerable waves.  Now if many perceptions fail to merge 
into one, yet no one of them rises above the others and they 
all make impressions about equally strong or equally 
capable of holding the attention of the soul, they can be 
perceived only confusedly.
640
 
Leibniz, here, provides an image of someone submerged in sensation – surrounded by a 
constant and large amount of stimulation.  Yet, these sensations are perceived confusedly.  
Put another way, the sensations are not perceived as the “innumerable waves” which 
Leibniz suggests they are.  Using the term “liminal” in the sense of “threshold,” given 
Leibniz‟s comment that no one of the perceptions rises above the others to become clear, 
Leibniz may be interpreted as having provided a theory of subliminal perception.  The 
information in these subliminal perceptions is only implicit (confused) unless it rises 
above the threshold and becomes explicit (clear).   
What is more, despite the constancy of the subliminal confused perceiving, it does 
not follow that the perceiver must be either constantly in a state of full confusion or 
                                               
640 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology, 
George R. Montgomery, tr. (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1918), 56-57. 
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unable to focus any of the confused perceptions into clear perceptions.  These latter 
aspects relate to what in the 20
th
 century literature is called habituation and de-
sensitization, both of which are involved in habit.  De-sensitization refers to the fact that 
though you are exposed to a large and constant amount of stimulation, you are not 
“sensitive” to the stimulation.  Habituation is often described as “The gradual diminution 
of the response to a stimulus following the repeated presentation of the same, or a similar, 
stimulus.”641  In this way, it is possible to be in the habit of “paying attention” to aspects 
of the environment while ignoring others.  Habituating to some aspects of the 
environment does not mean you are not stimulated by them.  Rather, habituation and de-
sensitization point to the fact that memory is operable, i.e. functions, subliminally 
buffering sensation.   
Also, in New Essays on Human Understanding – Nouveaux Essaies sur 
l'Entendement Humain – written circa 1704 Leibniz speaks directly in regard to memory.  
In the form of a dialog between “Theophilus” and “Philalethes,” Leibniz, at §20, has 
Philalethes suggest, “If there are innate ideas in the mind without the mind‟s being 
actually aware of their presence, they must at least be in the memory.”642  In response, 
after invoking Plato‟s notion of anamnēsis and Locke‟s notion of tabula rasa, Theophilus 
states, “And often we have an extraordinary facility of conceiving certain things, because 
we formerly conceived them, without remembering them.”643  These statements are taken 
– for example, by the researcher credited with popularizing implicit memory in the 20th 
                                               
641 Dudai, Memory from A to Z: Keywords, Concepts, and Beyond, 112.  
642 Gottfried Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Alfred Gideon Langley, tr. 
(Chicago: Open Court, 1916), 105. 
643 Leibniz, New Essays, 106. 
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century, Daniel L. Schacter – to represent the birth of implicit memory.644  The 
distinction between implicit and explicit memory, then, is determined by awareness.  
Explicit memory is memory of which you are aware that you remember, and implicit 
memory is memory of which you are not aware that you remember.  Implicit memory 
usually refers to habits and skills, both of which involve habituation and de-sensitization.  
Lastly, of implicit memory qua implicit memory, Bergson‟s remark from Matter and 
Memory regarding memory for habits and skills is appropriate: such memory has “upon it 
no mark which betrays its origin.”645  Hence, of implicit memory which has become 
explicit, discussion of origins seems relevant, but the memories of which you are 
unaware you remember do not yield to an interrogation regarding origins.
646
 
§4 Verbal v. Nonverbal– In 1971 Allan U. Paivio published Imagery and Verbal 
Processes.
647
  This book is widely credited with the scientific distinction between verbal 
and nonverbal memory.  Paivio‟s distinction was given further clarification with his 1986 
publication of Mental Representations: A Dual Coding Approach.
648
  According to the 
latter text, Paivio distinguishes between two memory systems – verbal and nonverbal, 
and three memory processes – representational, referential, and associative.  The 
nonverbal system of coding encompasses “other sensory modalities in addition to visual, 
                                               
644 Daniel L. Schacter. “Implicit Memory: History and Current Status,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13.3 (1987), 502.  
645 Henri Bergson. Matter and Memory, Nancy Margarel Paul and W. Scott Palmer tr. (New York: Zone 
Books, 1991), 91.  
646 Cf. Stephan Lewandowsky, et al. Implicit Memory: Theoretical Issues, (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 
1989). 
647 Allan U. Paivio. Imagery and Verbal Processes, (New York: Rinehart & Winston, 1971).  
648 Allan U. Paivio. Mental Representations: A Dual Coding Approach, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986). 
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and the “language-specialized system will be referred to as the verbal system.”649  
Considering the two systems to be structurally and functionally distinct, Paivio notes,  
Structurally, they differ in the nature of representational 
units and the way the units are organized into higher order 
structures.  Functionally, they are independent in the sense 
that either system can be active without the other or both 
can be active in parallel.
650
   
Yet, at the same time, the verbal and nonverbal memory systems are “functionally 
interconnected” meaning activity in one system can invoke activity in another system.  
Moreover, as Paivio indicates, these structural and functional differences “produce 
qualitative differences,” and the qualitative differences account for the fact that the verbal 
and nonverbal systems differ in the kinds of processes in which they specialize.     
 Now, “specialize” is Paivio‟s term, and it illuminates how the term “process,” e.g. 
representational process, can be used in regard to both the verbal and the nonverbal 
memory systems despite different representational products.  Paivio explains,  
there are always two sources of information that contribute 
to performance in any memory task [my emphasis], one 
external and one internal.  The external source is the 
memory material presented to a subject.  The internal 
source consists of the long-term memory representations 
and processes that are activated by the presented material 
and the context in which it occurs. … the internal source 
“contains” (can make available) two types of 
representational information, one being information that 
cannot be attributed to a particular external episodic source 
and the other, information that can be attributed to such a 
source.
651
 
I wish to briefly indicate the Kantian structure of experience implicated herein.  On the 
one hand, construction of an image(s) during an experience is produced within the 
nonverbal memory system, and the image is produced by way of a representational 
                                               
649 Allan U. Paivio. Mental Representations: A Dual Coding Approach, (1986), 140. 
650 Paivio. Mental Representations: A Dual Coding Approach, 53-54. 
651 Paivio. Mental Representations: A Dual Coding Approach, 140. 
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process which, in Kantian terms, involves sensibility.  This Paivio claims is “external.”  
On the other hand, construction of meaning during an experience is produced within the 
verbal memory system, and the meaning is produced by way of a representational process 
which, in Kantian terms, involves understanding.  This Paivio claims is “internal,” i.e. 
verbal and nonverbal.  Hence, Paivio provides one process across two systems yielding 
qualitatively different products.   
The other processes are similarly described.  “Free verbal associating requires 
verbal representational processing and then verbal associative processing, although it 
could also involve referential processing (e.g. the word knife elicits an image of a knife, 
which evokes a fork image as well, which then elicits the verbal referential response, 
„fork‟).”652  The matrix of Paivio‟s processes may be worked out mutatis mutandis.  More 
important for my purpose here, notice the trajectory of experience is considered here as a 
trajectory of memory.  Further, this is considered a trajectory of memory despite the 
products being images and thoughts or words.  Put another way, the images and thoughts 
or words developed in the structure of experience ride on a trajectory whose motor force 
is memory.  This is tantamount to replacing intensity in Deleuze‟s structure of experience 
with memory.     
§5 Episodic v. Semantic – In the year 397, Aurelius Augustinus, the Catholic 
bishop of Hippo noted the following about memory in his Confessions,  
I come to the fields and vast palaces of memory, where … 
all the various things are kept distinct and in their right 
categories. … And in memory too I meet myself – I recall 
myself, what I have done, when and where and in what 
state of mind I was when I did it.
653
 
                                               
652 Paivio, Mental Representations: A Dual Coding Approach, 70. 
653 Augustine. Confessions, F.J. Sheed, tr. (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1993), 178-179. 
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Now it was not until over 1,500 years later that experimental psychology would reiterate 
Augustine‟s comments in a more scientific register.  A major step for experimentally and 
scientifically describing Augustine‟s insights came in the form of the distinction between 
“episodic” and “semantic” memory systems. 
In 1972 Endel Tulving published a paper titled, “Episodic and Semantic 
Memory.”654,655 This paper is widely considered the harbinger of the distinction between 
episodic and semantic memory systems.  Yet, Tulving himself credits the unpublished 
PhD dissertation of M.R. Quilliann titled Semantic Memory as a major influence.
656
  As 
Tulving notes in his influential paper, “The distinction between episodic and semantic 
memory systems should not be construed as representing the beginning of some new 
theory of memory.” (OM 384)  At the same time, Tulving‟s article makes use of a 
number of elementary distinctions which I will discuss here with the help of Tulving‟s 
article.  These distinctions include the commonplace concepts of “encoding 
(acquisition),” “storage,” and “retrieval” – often referred to as “phases” of memory – 
found in nearly all contemporary discussions of memory.  The differences between the 
episodic and semantic memory systems largely reside in differences across the 
conceptualization of these three phases.  For example, Tulving thinks of the “taxonomic 
distinction between episodic and semantic memory as two parallel and partially 
overlapping information processing systems” (OM 401) which can variously receive, 
retain, and send information from “perceptual or other cognitive systems.” (OM 385)  
                                               
654 Endel Tulving, “Episodic and Semantic Memory,” Organization of Memory, E. Tulving and W. 
Donaldson, eds. (New York: Academic Press, 1983) 381-402.  Hereafter cited as OM. 
655 Cf. Endel Tulving, Elements of Episodic Memory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). 
656 M.R. Quillian, Semantic Memory. PhD Dissertation, Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh, 1966.  
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Episodic and semantic memory processes are similar in that they are both 
considered explicit rather than implicit processes.  In contrast, Tulving notes, “The two 
systems [episodic and semantic] differ from one another in terms of (a) the nature of 
stored information, (b) autobiographical versus cognitive reference, [and] (c) conditions 
of retrieval.” (OM 385)  Furthermore, Tulving states, “Semantic memory is the memory 
necessary for the use of language.” (OM 386)  Beginning with (a), then, and quoting 
extensively from Tulving, the episodic memory process storage is tied up with a person‟s 
identity.  According to Tulving, 
A person‟s episodic memories are located in and refer to 
his own personal past.  Most, if not all, episodic memory 
claims a person makes can be translated into the form: “I 
did such and such, in such and such place, at such and such 
time.”  Thus, an integral part of the representation of a 
remembered experience in episodic memory is its reference 
to the rememberer‟s knowledge of his personal identity. 
(OM 389)   
Given the close tie to a meaningful identity, after the following Tulving comment 
distinguishing the episodic from the semantic process, I will point to an area of overlap.  
In regard to the semantic process,  
Inputs into the semantic memory system are always 
referred to an existing cognitive structure, that is they 
always have some cognitive reference, and the information 
they contain is information about the referent they signify 
rather than information about the input signal as such. … 
semantic memory information can, although it need not, be 
recorded indirectly or in a piecemeal fashion. (OM 389) 
The above quotes indicate a clear distinction between the kind of memory stored in the 
episodic system and the kind of memory stored in the semantic system.  By being 
associated with existing information stored, it is as if the semantic memory system builds 
a structure of meaning with experiences contributing to meaning both locally and 
globally in the cognitive structure.  This would be like interpreting AB in Bergson‟s 
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memory cone.  In contrast, the episodic system incorporates information associated with 
personal identity and, as such, offers an alternative way to make perception explicit.  Yet, 
the episodic and semantic processes cannot be fully distinct or without overlap, since it is 
by way of semantic content in regard to personal identity that episodic content is 
meaningfully organized.  Hence, semantic memory will play a role in both the storage 
and the retrieval of episodic memory.   
The issue of episodic and semantic overlap may be elucidated by further examing 
the process of encoding, especially in regard to episodic memory.  According to Tulving,  
A person not familiar with English is likely to organize 
HAT, CAT, and MAT into a group, but not CAT, LION, 
and TIGER.  Since acoustic coding is less dependent upon 
the semantic coding system than is semantic coding, it can 
be considered to be more direct… [Moreover] acoustic 
encoding requires less time. (OM 398) 
The above example tangibly illustrates the difference between an episodic and a semantic 
encoding strategy.  History as relying on discursivity, that is meaningful or to be 
explicitly stored as such.  For example, “We drank wine in Paris before dancing in 
Amsterdam,” relies upon the meaning of before and after, etc. in order to state a personal 
history; similarly, “I have become de-sensitized to suicidal ideation.”  So here you can 
see the pattern perceiving associative power of the empirical sense perceiving subject as 
episodic contrasted with the more semantically related apperceptive I.   
What is consistent with the above and more, Tulving reports, “The episodic 
memory system does not include the capabilities of inferential reasoning or 
generalization.” (OM 390)  However, “Inferential reasoning, generalization, application 
of rules and formulas, and use of algorithms … represent important methods of utilization 
of information stored in semantic memory.” (OM 390)  In fact, reminiscent of Plato‟s 
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anamnesis, Tulving notes, “By relying on his semantic memory, it is literally quite 
possible for a person to know something he did not learn.” (OM 390)  Lastly, recall the 
memory stage paradigm with the Atkinson-Shiffrin Model of memory (Figure 8.1)  The 
model begins with sensory memory and moves toward long-term memory.  Reading the 
results of Tulving‟s experiment across the Atkinson-Shiffrin Model, it is as if semantic 
memory favors long-term storage with its multi-associated structure, and episodic 
memory favors short-term storage with its close tie to the sensory – acoustic, visual, and 
haptic – register.  Tulving‟s results corroborate this interpretation – “forgetting appears to 
be more readily produced in the episodic than in the semantic system.” (OM 392)  
At this point, I have discussed storage and encoding across episodic and semantic 
memory.  However, the differences in regard to retrieval are perhaps most interesting.  
Two theses emerge in regard to retrieval.  First, Tulving explains, “the act of retrieval 
from either system may, and usually is, entered as an episode into episodic memory.  
Retrieval as feedback [my emphasis] into the episodic system may lead to changes in the 
contents, and the retrievability of these contents, of episodic memory.” (OM 391) 
Second, Tulving provides two lists of sentences, the first pertaining to episodic memory, 
and the second pertaining to semantic memory.  Summarizing the first (episodic) list 
Tulving says the sentences describe autobiographical events “describable in terms of their 
perceptible dimensions or attributes and in terms of their temporal-spatial relations.” (OM 
386-387)  Summarizing the second (semantic) list Tulving writes, “Although some of 
these statements refer to the speaker‟s „knowledge‟ rather than his „remembering,‟ all of 
them can be regarded as memory statements in that their content clearly depends upon 
information entered into the semantic memory [my emphasis].” (OM 387)  In other 
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words, “remember responses reflect retrieval from the episodic system and know 
responses reflect retrieval from the semantic system.”657  For ease of reference, I will 
refer to the first thesis as the “retrieval as feedback thesis” and the second thesis as the 
“all knowledge is grounded in semantic memory thesis.” 
These two theses are worth a brief second look here.  The “all knowledge is 
grounded in semantic memory” thesis suggests that to set out looking for origins first 
necessitates semantic memory for an awareness of “origins.”  Yet, said semantic 
memory, as evidenced by the “retrieval as feedback” thesis, itself stands upon a ground of 
episodic memory.  Though both episodic and semantic memory processes are considered 
explicit, rather than implicit, it turns out episodic memory is more closely associated with 
the dimension of sensory origins.  Hence, “an analysis of the power of memory,” to 
borrow Stewart‟s phrasing from above, discloses a difference in kind and a retrieval 
process – with a sort of closure upon itself –  that frustrates further examination into its 
ground.  Put another way, engaging episodic memory changes it, and, therefore, 
attempting to represent it inevitably misrepresents it.  This should remind you of 
Derrida‟s logic of supplementation, i.e. the movement of Différance – I will further 
explicate these associations below.     
§6 Procedural v. Declarative – Related to each of the previous distinctions 
discussed thus far is the distinction between procedural and declarative memory.  
Whereas both episodic and semantic were explicit memory processes, the two “major 
forms” of implicit memory are “priming” and “procedural memory.”  I discuss 
procedural memory here, and priming below.  Procedural memory is often coupled with 
                                               
657 John M. Gardiner, “On Consciousness in Relation to Memory and Learning,” The Science of 
Consciousness, Max Velmans, ed. (London: Routledge, 1996), 57. 
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and distinguished from the explicit memory process called declarative memory.  
Procedural memory “generally refers to memory for knowing how to do something.  The 
knowledge in procedural memories is not accessible to awareness, but rather is 
manifested only through performance of a task.”658  Hence, as procedural memory is 
implicit memory for knowing how, and declarative memory is explicit memory for 
knowing that and what.   
A relevant example from philosophy, the distinction between “knowing how” and 
“knowing that,” was famously discussed by Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) in his The Concept 
of Mind.  To begin with, then, perhaps Ryle is instructive in noting, “Efficient practice 
precedes the theory of it.”659  Ryle‟s colorful example,  
The cleverness of the clown may be exhibited in his 
tripping and tumbling.  He trips and tumbles just as clumsy 
people do, except that he trips and tumbles on purpose and 
after much rehearsal and at the golden moment and where 
the children can see him and so as not to hurt himself.
660
 
 Ryle is concerned to indicate a difference between “knowing how and knowing that” 
where “knowing how” is skillful and “knowing that” is factual – “learning how or 
improving in ability is not like learning that or acquiring information [Ryle‟s 
emphasis].”661  Similarly, procedural memory pertains to how a task is performed and 
declarative memory pertains to the task‟s identity.662    
Théodule Ribot, noted above, is credited with distingushing between skill 
memory or procedural memory and declarative memory in his 1881 publication Les 
Maladies de la Mémoire.  According to Ribot, “In cases belonging to this morbid group 
                                               
658 Georg Goldenberg and Bruce L. Miller, Neuropsychology and Behavioral Neurology, (St. Louis: 
Elsevier, 2008), 231. 
659 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 19. 
660 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 21. 
661 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 46. 
662 Cf. Anne Henderson, Charlane Pehoski. Hand Function in the Child: Foundations for Remediation, (St. 
Louis: Elsevier, 2005), 107. 
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neither the habits nor skill in any handicraft, such as sewing … disappears.  The 
destruction of memory in these cases affects only its highest and most instable forms, 
those personal in character…”663  Seeking a physiological explanation and in discussing 
the degeneration of memory and amnesia, Ribot – given its relevancy I quote him at 
length – remarked,  
This law, however universal it may be with regard to 
memory, is but a particular expression of a still more 
general law – a biological law.  It is a fact well known in 
biology that the structures that are latest formed are the first 
to degenerate. … Hughlings Jackson [1835-1911] was the 
first to prove in detail that the higher, complex, voluntary 
functions of the nervous system disappear first, and that the 
lower, simple, general and automatic functions disappear 
latest.  We have seen both these facts verified in the 
dissolution of the memory: what is new dies out earlier than 
what is old, what is complex earlier that what is simple.  
The law we have formulated is therefore only the 
psychological expression of a law of life.
664
  
A perhaps more familiar example, Brenda Milner, with her famous patient “H.M.”665 who 
was unable to form long-term memories also describes the distinction between procedural 
and declarative memory.
666
  Reminiscent of the clinical vignettes found in The Man Who 
Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales published by Oliver Sacks in 
1970,
667
 H.M. was able to learn skills without remembering the practice it took to require 
                                               
663 Théodule Ribot, The Diseases of Memory, J. Fitzgerald tr. (New York: Humboldt Library of Popular 
Science Literature, v. 46, 1883), 473. 
664 Ribot, The Diseases of Memory, 482. 
665 Brenda Milner. “The Memory Defect in Bilateral Hippocampal Lesions,” Psychiatric Research Report, 
11 (1959), 43-58. 
666 Suzanne Corkin. “Lasting Consequences of Bilateral Medial Temporal Lobectomy,” Seminar in 
Neurology, 4.4 (1984), 249-259. 
667 Oliver Sacks. The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales, (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1970). 
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the skill.
668
  Also, the disctinction was further popularized by John R. Anderson with his 
The Architecture of Cognition published in 1983.
669
 
 To sum: analogously, the movement from knowing how to knowing that is like 
the movement from procedural memory to declarative memory, and both involve a 
change in register.  Whereas procedural memory is implicit, declarative is explicit.  
Furthermore, just as episodic memory – the retrieval as feedback thesis – resisted full 
explication of its ground, the further requirement of register change makes procedural 
memory even more resistant to explication.  Lastly, it is worth noting, as its name should 
imply, procedural memory is tied up with performance.     
§7 Chunking – In 1956 George Armitage Miller published a now famous paper 
titled, “The Magical Number Seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for 
processing information.”670  Now, Miller‟s article seems most concerned with common 
notions of memory or memory at higher levels of elaboration, e.g. long-term memory and 
semantic memory.  However, given the historical significance of Miller‟s publication, I 
will mention two relevant notions which he discusses – recoding and chunking.  
According to Miller, “The process of memorizing may be simply the formation of 
chunks, or groups of items that go together.”671  He distinguishes between chunks and 
bits; bits compose chunks.  The distinction is important because it was in this way that he 
was able to discuss recoding.  Miller was concerned to understand how mnemonists are 
able to remember and recall items in such large numbers.  He notes, 
                                               
668 Cf. Suzanne Corkin. “What‟s new with amnesic patient H.M?” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3.2 
(2002), 153-160. 
669 John R. Anderson. The Architecture of Cognition, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1983), esp. viii & 
215. 
670 G.A. Miller. “The Magical Number Seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for 
processing information.” Psychological Review, 63.2, (1956), 81-97. 
671 Miller. “The Magical Number Seven,” Psychological Review, 95. 
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It is a little dramatic to watch a person get 40 binary digits 
in a row and then repeat them back without error.  
However, if you think of this merely as a mnemonic trick 
for extending the memory span, you will miss the more 
important point that is implicit in nearly all such mnemonic 
devices.  The point is that recoding is an extremely 
powerful weapon for increasing the amount of information 
that we can deal with.  In one form or another we use 
recoding constantly in our daily behavior [my 
emphasis].
672
 
Here, Miller is approaching what will 20 years later be known as a theory of elaboration 
– noted above.  Recoding, then, amounts to receiving bits of input – always already in the 
form of a code – and changing the code by chunking the bits.  Also, his comments on 
recoding may be seen as a nascent form of the “Generation Effect,” which suggests 
information is more easily remembered if it is generated – paraphrased/elaborated – 
rather than simply encountered – heard/read.673,674   
His paper receives its title because he suggests the optimal number of chunks is 7 
± 2.  Though recent research suggests Miller may have been overly optimistic with his 
optimal number,
675,676,677
 his publication is still considered highly influential in 
popularizing the notions of recoding and chunking and helping to usher in the Levels of 
Processing Paradigm with its focus on levels of elaboration.  More to the point, by way of 
chunking and working memory, I will appropriate Derrida‟s movement of Différance as 
shorthand reference.     
                                               
672 Miller. “The Magical Number Seven,” Psychological Review, 94-95. 
673 Cf. L.L. Jacoby.  “On Interpreting the Effects of Repetition: Solving a problem versus remembering a 
solution,” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 17.6, (1978), 649-668. 
674 Cf. John Lutz, A. Briggs, and K. Cain. “An Examination of the Value of the Generation Effect for 
Learning and New Material,” The Journal of General Psychology, 130.2, (2003), 171-188. 
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Review, 101.2, (1994), 353-356. 
676 Nelson Cowan. Working Memory Capacity, (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005), 33. 
677 Richard M. Shiffrin and Robert M. Nosofsky. “Seven Plus or Minus Two: A commentary on capacity 
limitations,” Psychological Review, 101.2 (1994), 357-361. 
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  §8 Working Memory – Though there may be dispute as to who was the first 
person in print to use the term “working” with the term “memory,” credit is given to Alan 
D. Baddeley for congealing the first model of working memory and popularizing the 
term.  Together Baddeley and Graham J.L. Hitch published “Working Memory” in 
1974.
678
  Subsequently in 2000 Baddeley added a component to his model of working 
memory.
679
  I provide illustrations below when dealing more extensively with working 
memory.  At this point, it is important to recognize the inception of the working memory 
model, and the motivation which led to its construction.  That motivation derived from 
the need to incorporate ideas of agency, attention, and autonomy – in other words, 
“control,” – into the memory models which were ever increasing in specificity.680  
According to Baddeley, he and Hitch were motivated to rethink short-term memory as 
more than just a storage system.
681
   
§9 Context Dependence – In 1932 Frederic Charles Bartlett published 
Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology.
682
  In the “Introduction” 
to the 1987 publication, professor of psychology and neuroscience Walter Kintsch notes, 
“If I had to name the three historically most influential publications in the psychological 
study of memory, I would pick Ebbinghaus‟s „On Memory,‟ in 1885, Bartlett‟s 
Remembering in 1932, and [George Armitage] Miller‟s „Magical Number Seven‟ in 
                                               
678 Alan D. Baddeley and Graham J.L. Hitch. “Working Memory,” The Psychology of Learning and 
Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory, vol. 8, G.A. Bower ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1974), 
47-89.  
679 Alan D. Baddeley. “The Episodic Buffer: A new component of working memory?” Trends in Cognitive 
Science, 4, (2000), 417-423. 
680 Alan D. Baddeley. Working Memory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 18. 
681 Baddeley. Working Memory, 33. 
682 F.C. Bartlett. Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).  
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1956.”683  Bartlett‟s studies of memory are largely considered influential given his 
concern to look into everyday uses of memory.  As such, Bartlett‟s reading of the relation 
between “interest” and memory accentuated the everydayness of memory.  According to 
Bartlett, 
[T]hough we may still talk of traces, there is no reason in 
the world for regarding these as made complete, stored up 
somewhere, and then re-excited at some much later 
moment.  The traces that our evidence allows us to speak of 
are interest-determined, interest-carried traces.  They live 
with our interests and with them they change.
684
  
In this way, Bartlett provided an understanding of memory as “contextual” – context as 
memory cue and memory as dependent upon context.
685
  This may be seen as part of the 
general trend – which I am illustrating with this section of the dissertation – to think of 
memory less in terms of its being stable than in terms of its being stabilizing.  Put another 
way, the trend has been since 1960 to think of memory less as stagnant storehouse and 
more as a lively autonomic process. 
At a higher level of abstraction, context dependence, like mood and state 
dependence below, may be thought of under the rubric of cue dependence.  In other 
words, put generally, something – some cue – sparks memory‟s retrieval bringing forth 
both implicit and explicit information in the form of senses, images, and symbols.  Put 
figuratively, it is “To see a world in a grain of sand, and heaven in a wild flower, hold 
infinity in the palm of your hand, and eternity in an hour.”686  Cue related retrieval may 
be both involuntary and voluntary, and it may be conscious or unconscious. 
                                               
683 Bartlett. Remembering, xi. 
684 Bartlett. Remembering, 211-2 
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§10 Mood and State Memory Dependency – Though closely related to memory‟s 
relation with context, it is worth noting memory‟s relation with moods and states.687  
Sometimes referred to as mood or state dependent memory, ideas regarding such memory 
have been popular at least since the work of Ivan P. Pavlov and Sigmund Freud noted 
above.
688
  To employ a trope which will break down later, I might describe the difference 
between context and mood or state dependent memory as one of degree relative to the 
objective and subjective aspects of experience.  It should be common knowledge that the 
animals whom the behaviorists studied were kept in states of deprivation, i.e. starved.
689
  
Pairing tones with the presentation of sustaining stimuli of which the subjects were 
deprived – e.g. food or water – resulted in pleasure, among other things.690  In this way, 
animals in the deprived states remembered what to do in order to reduce the 
deprivation.
691
   
Arguably, noticing that memories may persist dependent upon the episodes of 
various moods and states to which they refer led Freud to hypothesize a mechanism 
resembling an unconscious homunculus, i.e. “the Unconscious,” to control recall and 
retrieval of memories.
692
  For example, A.A. Sharp in 1938 published “An Experimental 
test of Freud‟s doctrine of the relation of hedonic tone to memory revival.”693  Sharp 
notes, “Freud assumes that unpleasant experiences are less likely to be revived than are 
                                               
687 Cf. W.A. Bousfield. “The Relationship between Mood and the Production of Affectivity Toned 
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neutral experiences and neutral experiences less likely than pleasant experiences.”694  
Sharp and his experimental results concurred with the idea that unpleasant memories may 
be more difficult to recall than pleasant memories.695  Hence, you can recognize the state 
and mood dependent aspects of memory.  
§11 Saccadic Memory – It is in understanding the physiological relation between 
the fundamental elements of sensation and persistence that memory, perhaps, first 
appears as a principle of animation.  The term which captures those two fundamental 
elements is “saccade.”  Saccades are one of the two ways humans can voluntarily move 
their eyes; the other being “smooth pursuit.”696  Smooth contrasts nicely with jerk or 
twitch, and smooth pursuit, for example, can be noticed by following the trajectory of a 
ball as it falls through the air.  Otherwise, if you intend to move your eyes in an arching 
trajectory through the air without an object to pursue, you will not be able to move them 
smoothly.
697,698
  That is, you will notice a twitching.     
Historians Nicholas Wade and Benjamin Tatler credit the origin of the word to 
Louis Émile Javal.
699
  According to Wade and Tatler, 
The word saccade derives from the old French saquer or 
sachier meaning “to pull” and at the time of Javal, 
translated as “jerk” or “twitch.”  It was first used by 
Rabelais in the 16
th
 Century to refer to certain rapid 
movements of a horse…700  
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Saccadic eye movements, then, refer to twitches and jerks of the eye.  Though sometimes 
differently termed in the literature the three types of saccade are referred to as 
“prosaccades,” “antisaccades,” and “memory-guided saccades.”701  The fact that one type 
of saccade is named memory-guided seems to imply the other saccades are somehow 
separate from memory.  However, both of the two voluntary eye movements: smooth 
pursuit and saccadic are rooted in memory, though in different ways – so too with all 
three types of saccades.
702
 
 Memory-guided saccades are referred to as such because they describe moving 
the eye back to the location where the no longer present stimuli presented.  In this way, 
memory-guided saccades are rooted in memory since memory is required for the eye to 
return to a previous location in the absence of the stimuli.  Prosaccades refer to targeting 
an object, especially when the object‟s trajectory is erratic or its velocity is too great for 
smooth pursuit tracking.  The perennial example is hitting a baseball. 
Within less than half a second the batter has to judge the 
trajectory of the ball and formulate a properly aimed and 
timed stroke.  The accuracy required is a few cm in space 
and a few ms in time.  Half a second gives time for one or 
at the most two saccades, and the speeds involved preclude 
smooth pursuit for much of the ball‟s flight.  How do 
practitioners of these sports use their eyes to get the 
information they need? … anticipation. … The saccade that 
effects this is interesting in that it is not driven by a 
“stimulus,” but by the player‟s estimate of the location of 
something that has yet to happen.
703
 
                                               
701 Wieske van Zoest, Stefan Van der Stigchel, and Jason J.S. Barton. “Distractor Effects on Saccade 
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The anticipation involved strengthens with practice because the prosaccadic movement is 
rooted in memory.
704
  With the repetition of practice the memory of where and when to 
jerk the eyes in anticipation strengthens and refines the movement.
705
  The same goes for 
the prosaccadic movement in more everyday situations like washing hands.
706
  For 
example, when you wash your hands your eyes jerk about toward the soap, water, on/off 
handle, etc. and not just before you reach for the entity in question, so while you lather 
and perform one activity your memory is accumulating information for what might 
eventually come next through prosaccadic eye movements.
707
  
Lastly, antisaccades correct for the reflexive twitching which would otherwise 
occur, this is commonly seen in activities such as reading and scene recognition.
708
  
Reading shows a complex mixture of antisaccades, prosaccades, and memory-guided 
saccades
709
 – e.g. focusing on a word or phrase,710 skimming a section,711 and returning to 
an earlier passage.
712
  Similarly, when we come to recognize a scene it is not as if we 
stare straight ahead and the picture of the scene is wholly consumed for us to remember.  
Rather, we construct the scene in our memory by combining a series of twitches – all 
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three types of saccades again – and the recipe including which combination of saccades 
to use is determined by the connection between your purpose for gazing at the scene and 
the amount of practice you have at scene recognition.
713
  That is, memory is involved in 
the task on multiple levels
714
  – higher purpose driven recall and maintenance and lower 
level twitching.  And, both of these levels go toward illustrating the manner in which 
memory controls eye function.
715
   
In fact, the constructed scene engages memory in yet another way.
716
  The 
constructed scene requires what is referred to as “transsaccadic memory.”717  Just as its 
name implies, transsaccadic memory is memory held across saccades constructing a 
scene for perception out of the recipe of eye twitches involved.
718
  Research shows that 
following the eye movements of two different people, telling one to memorize as much as 
possible in a scene for later recall, and telling the other to search for a specific object in 
the scene yields different patterns of saccades.
719
 
§12 Multiple Object Tracking – Saccadic activity has both costs and benefits for 
being alert and aware in the world.  The cost is “change blindness” and the benefit is 
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Processes in Eye Guidance, G. Underwood, ed. (2005), 213-235. 
719 Cf. John M. Henderson and Andrew Hollingsworth. “Eye Movements and Visual Memory: Detecting 
changes to saccade targets in scenes,” Perception & Psychophysics, 65.1, (2003), 58-71; Cf. Andrew 
Hollingworth. “Scene and Position Specificity in Visual Memory for Objects,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32.1, (2006), 58-69. 
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“Multiple Object Tracking (MOT).”  Though I will discuss change blindness more 
extensively below, it is valuable to note a few salient points here.  According to Alva Noë 
in Out of Our Heads: Why You are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology 
of Consciousness, “Change blindness was first discussed in print in a series of articles” 
from 1996 to 1997.
720
  The seminal article of which concluded: “Thus, just as the 
perception of a scene is mediated by a rapidly-shifting fovea of limited area, so is it also 
mediated by a rapidly-shifting attentional mechanism limited in the number of items it 
can handle at any time.”721   
There are two different types of change blindness.  On the one hand, you are blind 
to stimuli appearing between saccades.
722
  On the other hand, if throughout the process of 
saccadic scene recognition, aspects of the scene are changed faster than the eye can 
attend to the changes, then you are blind to the changes.
723
  The “flicker” phenomenon 
being exploited here is the same which allows for a sense of flowing action when 
watching a film or the sense of animation when flipping through a book which has 
different images drawn on the pages.
724
  As this section on MOT and the above section 
on saccades together should show, it is as if the speed of becoming is faster than your 
memory can process, so you see a world (instead of becoming) and you are vulnerable to 
change blindness.
725
  For a collection of excellent color graphics representing saccadic 
                                               
720Alva Noe. Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of 
Consciousness, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010), 200. 
721R.A. Rensink, J.K. O‟Regan and J.J. Clark, “To see or not to see: the need for attention to perceive 
changes in scenes,” Psychological Science, 8.5, (1997), 372. 
722 George W. McConkie. “Visual Stability across Saccades while Viewing Complex Pictures,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 22.3, (1996), 563-581. 
723 Daniel C. Dennett. Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness, (Boston: 
MIT Press, 2005), 82. 
724R.A. Rensink, J.K. O‟Regan and J.J. Clark, “To see or not to see: the need for attention to perceive 
changes in scenes,” Psychological Science, 8.5, (1997), 368. 
725 This will be clear(er) by the end of the dissertation. 
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processes and discussing change blindness see “Visual Stability Based on Remapping of 
Attention Pointers.”726 
Now, a benefit indeed of saccadic activity is Multiple Object Tracking (MOT).  
MOT has received attention in part because, easily noticeable in humans, MOT is 
evidently difficult to reproduce in artificial intelligence, i.e. in a robot.
727,728
  According 
to Susan Carey,
729
 MOT originated when in 1988 Zenon Pylyshyn and Ron W. Storm 
published “Tracking Multiple Independent Targets.”730  In their publication, Pylyshyn 
and Storm coin a key neologism.  They speak of a FINST and FINSTing, and they 
metaphorically describe a FINST as a “sticky index.”  In my opinion, the best way to 
understand MOT is to discuss FINSTs first, and an excellent account of FINSTing may 
be found in Lana M. Trick‟s “A Theory of Enumeration that Grows out of a General 
Theory of Vision: Subitizing, Counting, and FINSTs” found in The Nature and Origins 
of Mathematical Skills. 
 Trick uses Pylyshyn and Storm‟s FINST model to explain an experimental result 
which is – no doubt – commonly seen in everyday experiences.  Examining the task of 
“enumeration,” i.e. assigning a numerical value to describe the quantity of objects being 
considered, Trick points out that it takes much less time, and you have a much higher rate 
of accuracy, when enumerating a set of objects less than 5 in number.
731
  For each object 
                                               
726 Patrick Cavanagh, Amelia R. Hunt, Arash Afraz and Martin Rolfs. “Visual Stability Based on 
Remapping of Attention Pointers,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14.4, (2010), 147-153. 
727 E. Oliver Severin. Robot Companions: MentorBots and Beyond, (New York: McGraw-Hill: 2003), 40. 
728 Daniele Nardi. RoboCup 2004: Robot Soccer World Cup VIII, vol. 8, (New York: Springer, 2005), 410-
411. 
729 Susan Carey. The Origin of Concepts, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 74. 
730 Z.W. Pylyshyn and R.W. Storm. “Tracking Multiple Independent Targets: Evidence for a parallel 
tracking mechanism,” Spatial Vision, 3, (1988), 179-197. 
731 Cf. Lana M. Trick and Z.W. Pylyshyn. “What Enumeration Studies Can Show Us about Spatial 
Attention: Evidence for limited capacity preattentive processing,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception Performance, 19.2, (1993), 331-351. 
 476 
 
up to four enumerating takes between 40-120 ms increasing at a constant rate up to four.  
In other words, one object may take 40 to 120 milliseconds; two objects may take 80 to 
240 milliseconds; etc.  However, once the quantity is higher than four, the rate remains 
constant but the average time span becomes 250 to 350 milliseconds per object.
732
  
Following a 1949 study,
733
 Trick called the faster process “subitizing” and the slower 
process “counting.” (TEG 258-259)  According to Trick FINST stands for “Fingers of 
INSTantiation” which “are tokens that are used to individuate a small number of items 
before the serial, area by area processing that characterizes spatial attention [emphases 
added].” (TEG 257)   
Whereas counting involves “moving the attentional focus from location to 
location in the image,” subitizing is the enumeration that results from “moving up” the 
trajectory of experience from iconic memory construction toward a semantic level of 
processing. (TEG 257)  The “fingers” metaphor is used here to capture the idea of 
indexical “pointing,”734 the fingers are “sticky” in that the fingers seem to remember or 
“stick” with the objects – in this case being enumerated up to 4 –, and “instantiation” in 
that the fingers themselves are representative of the quantity in question. (TMI 181)  Do 
not forget what I said above about scene recognition.  Certainly, there are many things in 
your field of vision which may be enumerated, and it is in this way that FINSTs may be 
seen as aspects of memory.  Pylyshyn and Storm are careful to note the following, 
FINSTing can occur independently and in parallel at 
several places in the visual field.  In this sense it is a 
                                               
732 Lana M. Trick. “A Theory of Enumeration that Grows out of a General Theory of Vision: Subitizing, 
Counting, and FINSTs,” The Nature and Origins of Mathematical Skills, Jamie I.D. Campbell ed. 
(Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992), 257-300.  Hereafter cited as TEG. 
733 E.L. Kaufman, M.W. Lord, T.W. Reese and J. Volkmann. “The Discrimination of Visual Number,” The 
American Journal of Psychology, 62.4, (1949), 498-525. 
734 Z.W. Pylyshyn and R.W. Storm. “Tracking Multiple Independent Targets: Evidence for a parallel 
tracking mechanism,” Spatial Vision, 3, (1988), 195.  Hereafter cited as TMI. 
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preattentive operation, although the selection of some 
subset of these automatically indexed places for further 
processing or tracking may involve deliberate cognitive 
intervention.  … [Moreover, if] the hypothesis that we can 
assign a limited number of “sticky” indexes (FINSTs) to 
features in a visual display is correct, subjects should be 
able to track a subset of visually identical and randomly 
moving objects, providing the target subset is somehow 
identified at the start of the trial [my emphasis]. (TMI 181) 
In other words, memory must maintain that you are actually performing a task so that 
your visual field may be pre-attentively organized for the purpose of tracking or 
enumerating.
735
  Pre-attentively should be emphasized here because – as this chapter will 
repeatedly indicate – these processes are implicit and bypass the need to hypothesize an 
intending ego.  This is tricky because it seems like intention is required to “go into” the 
visual field and, for example, subitize.  Yet, these pre-attentive activities cannot be 
directly controlled by intention; though their efficiency can be enhanced, i.e. improved 
with practice.
736
 
I want to push this a little further before moving on.  Imagine placing on your eye 
a contact lens with a grid on it so that looking around would be like looking through 
transparent graph paper.  In so far as the contact lens would move with your eye, the 
saccadic movements would jerk the graph along with it in a kind of “frame-dragging.”  
Were you wearing glasses, however, with a grid on the lenses of the glasses, saccadic 
movements could be tracked by numbering each of the grid boxes and indicating where 
the retina – specifically the central line of sight, i.e. the fovea – passes at t1, t2, etc.  An 
interesting aspect of visual sensation may be described within this context.  The grid on 
the lenses, for example, would allow discussion of North, East, West, and South 
                                               
735 In Lockean language it is as if memory must organize primary qualities out of flux, and in a Kantian 
sense this is the beginning of object formation.  
736 C. Green and D Bavelier. “Enumeration versus multiple object tracking: The case of action video game 
players, Cognition, 101.1, (2006), 217-245. 
 478 
 
movements “within” the grid.  What is more, researchers describe an inside and outside 
of the grid.  In other words, still maintaining this thought experiment of looking through a 
grid, transsaccadic memory is capable of forming an “icon” either “inside” the grid or 
“outside” the grid.  This distinction is also referred to as retinotopic space v. non-
retinotopic space or retinotopic v. spatiotopic.
737
  Moreover, “[w]e might think of these 
two alternative ways of representing the visual world as being either world centered, with 
the map being invariant to where one fixates at any one moment, or eye centered, with 
the map representing the moment-by-moment location of the item on the retina.”738  
Visual memory – implicit due to its operation below a threshold of awareness – tracks 
object movement and organizes environmental shifting seamlessly between these “ways 
of representing the visual world” in such a way that the object‟s actual appearance 
alternates between these maps without your awareness.  Referring to the trajectory of an 
object alternating between maps Pylyshyn at times speaks of a “space-time worm.”739   
In my opinion, here is where MOT is most interesting.  MOT is capable of 
tracking objects across the distinction between retinotopic and non-retinotopic space.  
What is more, this level of sensation is more like raw memory than it is like sensation.  
What I mean by this is that the memory of what to track needs to be maintained, and it is 
not until after the tracking of multiple objects that the person, for example, tracking the 
objects is able to perform certain other tasks on the objects, such as counting the number 
of objects that were just being tracked.  Such insights have led researchers such as John 
                                               
737David Melcher and M. Concetta Morrone. “Spatiotopic Temporal Integration of Visual Motion Across 
Saccadic Eye Movements,” Nature Neuroscience, 6, (2003), 877-881. 
738Duncan E. Astle. “Going from a Retinotopic to a Spatiotopic Coordinate System for Spatial Attention,” 
Journal of Neuroscience, 29, (2009), 3971. 
739 Zenon Pylyshyn. Seeing and Visualizing: It’s not what you think, (Boston: MIT Press, 2003), 226. 
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Kevin O‟Regan to discuss “The World as an Outside Iconic Memory.”740  Hence, 
consider the following example: while I was sitting in the Jardin du Luxembourg I 
decided to attempt to see, so to speak, what these researchers are discussing.  It was 
possible for me to maintain visual contact with an area of flowers, track the flight of a 
butterfly and the crawling of another insect all the while without fixing my fovea to any 
of the moving “objects.”  I report here, of course, on just the visions I was experiencing, 
but I was also aware of the sounds, colors, smells, and feel, i.e. the breeze and the 
pleasantness of being in the Parisian garden.     
 Another interesting feature of these micro-aspects of vision, despite the saccadic 
activity across retinotopic and non-retinotopic space, movement sensed visually is not 
“smeared.”741  Researchers have discovered what they believe to be a difference in time 
signature between non-retinotopic and retinotopic space, and – most remarkably – these 
time signature differences derive from the activity of the working short-term store of 
visual memory, i.e. iconic memory.
742
  In their words, 
Although the visual system can achieve a coarse 
classification of its inputs in a relatively short time, the 
synthesis of qualia-rich and detailed percepts can take 
substantially more time.  If these prolonged computations 
were to take place in a retinotopic space, moving objects 
would generate extensive smear.  However, under normal 
viewing conditions, moving objects appear relatively sharp 
and clear, suggesting that a substantial part of visual short-
term memory takes place at a non-retinotopic locus. … 
[O]ur results indicate that the visual system can accomplish 
                                               
740 J. Kevin O‟Regan. “The World as an Outside Iconic Memory,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 
(1994), 270-271. 
741 Frank Scharnowski, Frouke Hermens, Thomas Kammer, Haluk Öğmen and Michael H. Herzog. 
“Feature Fusion Reveals Slow and Fast Visual Memories,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19.4, 
(2007), 632-641. 
742 Ken McRae, Brian E. Butler and Stephen J. Popiel. Spatiotopic and Retinotopic Components of Iconic 
Memory, Psychological Research, 49.4, (1987), 225; Bruno G. Breitmeyer, Walter Kropfl and Bela Julesz. 
“The Existence and Role of Retinotopic and Spatiotopic Forms of Visual Persistence,” Act Psychologica, 
52.3, (1982), 175. 
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temporal integration of information while avoiding smear 
by breaking off sensory memory into fast and slow 
components that are implemented in retinotopic and non-
retinotopic loci, respectively [my emphases].
743
  
Notice, the association of visual short-term memory with the non-retinotopic space 
corresponds to the space of FINSTing discussed above by Pylyshyn, Storm, and Trick.  
Here, then, beyond the fact that repetition and practice – not intention – have the capacity 
to strengthen within limits this aspect of sensation there is more evidence for the fact that 
this process is a process of memory.  It is in this way that memory is the condition for the 
possibility of being aware and alert in the world.  Despite the speed of things in the 
world, the eye is able to buffer against smear by creating an icon through a twofold 
process of – consistent with the Levels of Processing (LOP) Paradigm noted above – 
slower maintenance coupled with faster elaboration in the formation of a visual icon 
which is itself maintained by memory for the possibility of synthesis into a semantic 
judgment.  In sum, the physiology itself requires organization and direction.  Whereas, 
the latter of the two seems more difficult to recognize as a function of memory, 
organization and direction are inseparable at the level of visual apprehension because 
what is there and what is there for you to see are one and the same – a construction of 
iconic memory.  
§13 Priming – Priming is, in my opinion, one of the most fascinating aspects of 
psychology and of the mind.  Here, I will discuss different types of priming, indicate the 
different aspects of memory in which priming occurs, and provide an example of 
conceptual priming.  In regard to breadth of publication, number of memory related 
experimental discoveries, and influence, two of the most famous contemporary memory 
                                               
743 Frank Scharnowski, Frouke Hermens, Thomas Kammer, Haluk Öğmen and Michael H. Herzog. 
“Feature Fusion Reveals Slow and Fast Visual Memories,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19.4, 
(2007), 632. 
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researchers are (in alphabetical order) Daniel L. Schacter and Endel Tulving.  
Fortunately, of the five articles they have written together, two are on the topic of 
priming.  One could scarcely do better than these two articles in gaining an understanding 
of priming.  I will draw largely from their work, supplementing as needed with more 
recent research, to describe priming.  The first of these two articles was published in the 
January 1990 issue of Science.
744
   The second article is an entry on priming in the 
Encyclopedia of Neuroscience published in 1992.
745
  As noted above, priming is 
considered one of the two major types of implicit memory – with procedural memory as 
the other.  According to Schacter and Tulving, “Priming is a type of implicit memory; it 
does not involve explicit or conscious recollection of any previous experiences.” (P&M 
301)  As implicit it is best known by its effects, and may best be described 
metaphorically as an aspect of memory “flowing” beneath the threshold of awareness.  
This flowing implicit aspect of memory is influential in experience, and is sometimes 
described as the “thread” in models which speak of “threaded” or “weaved” cognition.  In 
this way discussions of priming speak toward accounting for the contingent connections 
which populate the flow of experience.
746
 
It is important to begin with a few terminological comments.  According to 
Schacter and Tulving, “The juxtaposition of its surmised ubiquity in human cognition and 
the lateness of its discovery, together with its nonconscious nature, have inspired an 
                                               
744 Endel Tulving and Daniel L. Schacter. “Priming and Human Memory Systems,” Science, 247.4940, 
(1990), 301-306.  Hereafter cited as P&M. 
745 Endel Tulving and Daniel L. Schacter. “Priming and Memory Systems,” Neuroscience Year: 
Supplement 2 to the Encyclopedia of Neuroscience, B. Smith and G. Adelman, eds. (Boston: Birkhauser, 
1992), 130-133. 
746 Cf. Csíkszentmihályi, Mihály, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery an d Invention. (New 
York: Harper Perennial, 1996). 
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intense experimental and theoretical interest in priming.”747  When discussing priming 
which occurs outside of a laboratory setting or in a laboratory setting, the language may 
slightly vary.  Priming outside a laboratory setting may be referred to as “repetition 
priming” or “automatic priming,” and priming in a laboratory setting may be referred to 
as “repetition priming” or “direct priming.”748  Generally speaking, repetition priming is 
synonymous with practice.  Now, the binary opposite of direct priming is “indirect 
priming” or “subliminal priming.”749  Whereas it is appropriate to speak of subliminal 
priming occurring outside of a laboratory, subliminal priming is not the binary opposite 
of automatic priming.
750
  In regard to repetition priming, researchers speak of positive 
and negative priming.
751
  Generally speaking, positive
752
 and negative priming
753
 are 
synonymous with activation and inhibition
 
respectively
754
 – I will clarify this further 
below.  Priming pertains to affection,
755
 sensation,
756
 perception,
757
 conation (desire or 
                                               
747 Endel Tulving and Daniel L. Schacter. “Priming and Human Memory Systems,” Science, 247.4940, 
(1990), 302. 
748 Cf. Larry R. Squire. “Ch. 9: Memory is Determined by Information Processing,” Memory and Brain, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 124-133. 
749 Cf. A.J. Marcel. “Conscious and Unconscious Perception: Experiments on visual masking and word 
recognition,” Cognitive Psychology, 15.2, (1983), 197-237. 
750 Cf. J. Cheesman and P. Merikle. “Priming with and without awareness,” Perception & Psychophysics, 
36, (1984), 387-395. 
751 Susanne Mayr and Axel Buchner.  “Negative Priming as a Memory Phenomenon: A review of 20 years 
of negative priming research,” Journal of Psychology, 215.1, (2007), 35. 
752 Susanne Mayr and Axel Buchner.  “Negative Priming as a Memory Phenomenon: A review of 20 years 
of negative priming research,” Journal of Psychology, 215.1, (2007), 43. 
753 Philip Winn. “Negative Priming,” Dictionary of Biological Psychology, (London: Routledge, 2001), 
1081. 
754 Cf. Steven P. Tipper. “The Negative Priming Effect: Inhibitory priming by ignored objects,” Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 37A, (1995) 571-590; Cf. W.T. Neill. “Inhibition and facilitation 
processes in selective attention,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 
3, (1977), 444-450. 
755 Leonard Berkowitz and Karen Heimer. “On the Construction of the Anger Experience: Aversive events 
and negative priming in the formation of feelings,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 
(1989), 1-37; Dirk Hermans, Adriaan Spruyt, Jan de Houwer, and Paul Eelen. “Affective Priming with 
Sublimminally Presented Pictures, Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 57.2, (2003), 97-114. 
756 Cf. Moshe Bar and Irving Biederman. “Subliminal Visual Priming,” Psychological Science, 9.6, (1998), 
464-469; Cf. Isabel Gauthier. “Visual Priming: The ups and downs of familiarity,” Current Biology, 10.20, 
(2000), R753-R756; Cf. Rico Fischer, Torsten Schubert, and Roman Liepelt. “Accessory Stimuli 
Modulates Effects of Nonconscious Priming,” Perception & Psychophysics, 69.1, (2007), 9-22. 
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will),
758
 conception,
759
 and semantic
760
 memory (P&M 304) – I will clarify any obscurity 
as to why conception and semantic both appear here below.  Moreover, “Priming effects 
are ubiquitous in sensation, perception, comprehension, and action.”761  In fact, priming 
can also be used to impact decision-making processes.
762
  Lastly, in a laboratory setting, 
researchers speak of “forward” and “backward” priming.  In particular, researchers speak 
of “prime” and “target” when discussing conceptual and semantic priming experiments – 
though the word “target” is used variously and loosely, especially in non-conceptual and 
non-semantic priming experiments.
763
  Hence, there are different types of priming.         
Before providing an example of semantic priming, it is useful to comment on the 
conceptual/semantic distinction.  On the one hand, conceptual refers to the distinction 
between perceptual and conceptual, and in this way can describe the difference between 
priming the perceptual shape of a word – e.g. as drawn with ink or captured in the font – 
and the conceptual meaning of the word.
764
  Furthermore, “Conceptual repetition priming 
                                                                                                                                            
757 Cf. D.L. Schacter, S.M. McGlynn, and B.A. Church. “Spared Priming Despite Impaired 
Comprehension: Implicit Memory in a Case of Word Meaning Deafness,” Neuropsychology, 7, (1993), 
107-118; Cf. Cheri L. Wigges and Alex Martin, “Properties and Mechanisms of Perceptual Priming,” 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 8.2, (1998), 227-233. 
758 Cf. James Y. Shah and Arie W. Kruglanski. “Priming Against Your Will: How accessible alternatives 
affect goal pursuit,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38.4, (2002), 368-383; Cf. Jennifer L. 
Harris, John A. Bargh, and Kelly D. Brownell. “Priming Effects of Television Food Advertising on Eating 
Behavior,” Health Psychology, 28.4, (2009), 404-413. 
759 Cf. Serge Nicolas. “Perceptual and Conceptual Priming of Individual Words in Coherent Texts,” 
Memory, 6.6, (1998), 643-663; Cf. Junko Matsukawa. “Physical and Conceptual Priming Effects on Picture 
and Word Identification,” Japanese Psychological Research, 41.3, (2002), 179-185. 
760 Cf. Kenneth I. Forster and Chris Davis. “Repetition Priming and Frequency Attenuation in Lexical 
Access,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10.4, (1984), 680-698; 
Cf. Timothy P. McNamara. Semantic Priming: Perspectives from Memory and Word Recognition, (New 
York: Psychology Press, 2005), esp. 3-9. 
761 Bernard J. Baars. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 142.  
762 L.L. Jacoby. “Perceptual Enhancement: Persistent Effects of an Experience,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9.1, (1983), 21-38. 
763 Cf. Andrea Kiesel, Wilfried Kunde, Carsten Pohl, and Joachim Hoffmann. “Priming from Novel 
Masked Stimuli Depends on Target Set Size,” Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 2.1, (2006), 37-45. 
764 Cf. I. Biederman and E.E. Cooper. “Priming Contour-deleted Images: Evidence for intermediate 
representations in visual object recognition,” Cognitive Psychology, 23.3, (1991), 393-419. 
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is largely unaffected by changes in the perceptual qualities of a stimulus between study 
and test.”765  That is, presenting stimuli in different fonts, for example, alters the 
perceptual, but not the conceptual, priming.  On the other hand, the conceptual/semantic 
distinction refers to the episodic/semantic distinction in that conceptual is the wider term 
this is reminiscent of Kant‟s use of the term concept to refer to the understanding broadly 
designated.  So, conceptual encompasses both episodic and semantic, and the semantic 
merely encompasses the semantic.
766
  To familiarize the reader with priming, I discuss an 
example here of semantic priming. 
In a semantic priming experiment two words may be related as “prime” to 
“target,” and the relation may be asymmetrical.  That is, whereas A may tend to bring to 
mind B, B may not tend to bring to mind A as often or as quickly.  “Backward priming 
refers to the situation in which the association from prime to target is weak, but the 
association from target to prime is strong.”767  This may be changed through repetition 
priming, i.e. practice.  One is reminded here of the Pascal quote with which I began Part 
II, “Habit is a second nature that destroys the first.  But what is nature? Why is habit not 
natural? I am very much afraid that nature itself is only a first habit, just as habit is a 
second nature.”768  For example, when presented with the prime “baby” English speakers 
may arrive at the target “stork.”  However, the relation is stronger for the prime “stork” to 
arrive at the target “baby.”  In an asymmetically primed relation, then, when prime to 
                                               
765 Timothy P. McNamara and Jon B. Holbrook. “Semantic Memory and Priming,” Handbook of 
Psychology: Experimental Psychology, Irving B. Weiner, Alice F. Healy, Donald K. Freeheim, and Robert 
W. Proctor, eds. (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 468. 
766 Timothy P. McNamara and Jon B. Holbrook. “Semantic Memory and Priming,” Handbook of 
Psychology: Experimental Psychology, Irving B. Weiner, Alice F. Healy, Donald K. Freeheim, and Robert 
W. Proctor, eds. (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 466. 
767 Timothy P. McNamara and Jon B. Holbrook. “Semantic Memory and Priming,” Handbook of 
Psychology: Experimental Psychology, Irving B. Weiner, Alice F. Healy, Donald K. Freeheim, and Robert 
W. Proctor, eds. (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 459. 
768 Pascal. Pensées, 32. 
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target is weaker than target to prime (e.g. baby-stork v. stork-baby), the relation is 
referred to as “backward priming,” and it is referred to as “forward priming” when prime 
to target is stronger than target to prime (e.g. stork-baby v. baby-stork).
769
   
Now, you might ask what the benefit of this distinction may be in so far as it is 
relative to whichever term you take to be prime – why not just switch words?  The 
distinction is valuable because through repetition priming, the asymmetrical relation can 
be made symmetrical, and the distinction helps in describing the change.  What is more, 
the asymmetry can even be reversed through repetition priming – turning backward 
priming into forward priming.
770
  In this way, given a specific prime-target relation, a 
subject who enters a laboratory with backward priming can be primed to leave with 
forward priming.
771
  The process might involve training the subject to associate baby to 
stork and stork to pork, for example.
772
  Hence, you can see the relation with the Pascal 
quote.  
Whereas the above example uses one whole word as prime, word fragments or 
strings of words may also be used.  For example, when you see the following word 
fragment: ele____, what word “comes to mind”?  Without controlled priming before 
being presented with the above word fragment, it is still appropriate to say that whatever 
word comes to mind you were primed to see that word.  No matter how many times you 
                                               
769 Timothy P. McNamara and Jon B. Holbrook. “Semantic Memory and Priming,” Handbook of 
Psychology: Experimental Psychology, Irving B. Weiner, et al. eds. (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 
2003), 459. 
770 A. Koriat. “Semantic Facilitation in Lexical Decision as a Function of Prime-target Association,” 
Memory and Cognition, 9.6, (1981), 587-598. 
771A. Koriat and R. Melkman. “Individual Differences in Memory Organization as Related to Word-
association, Object-sorting, and Word-matching styles,” The British Journal of Psychology, 72, (1981), 1-
18. 
772 I should, perhaps, note: this is not behaviorism.  Though an extensive discussion of why priming is not 
an example of behaviorism would be outside my current scope of discussion, it is, perhaps, sufficient to 
note there is no overt reward or conditioning involved.  Rather, priming illustrates the result of 
unadulterated exposure to stimulation with or without reward. 
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look at the word fragment, the word which comes to mind (unless of course for you “ele” 
is a word, or has specific meaning, e.g. your initials, etc.) is not actually there.  So, why 
do some readers think of the word “element” and other readers think of the word 
“elephant”?773  The answer has to do with the chain of events, perhaps both remote and 
recent, prior to the encounter with the word fragment.
774
   
A, perhaps, more explicit illustration of semantic priming then can be seen when 
the prime is a string of meaningful words.  For example, below you will find two lists of 
words both of which contain the same number of words and both of which begin and end 
with the same word.  After each list of words ask yourself what word(s) or thought(s) 
come to mind.  
List 1: Apple, Teacher, Chalkboard, Recess, Yellow: 
 
List 2: Apple, Grapes, Orange, Pear, Yellow: 
 
Notice, the lists are not complete sentences.  So, it would be artificial to speak here of 
“predication,” and it would be artificial to speak here of “grammar.”  Often after List 1, 
respondents will say “bus.”  Often after List 2, respondents will say, “banana” or 
“lemon.”  A less laboratory, or controlled situation, further illustrates the work of 
priming: Imagine you are constantly trying to finish the sentence of the person who is 
talking to you.  Of course, you are not the one uttering the sentence.  In other words, 
some would differentiate between you and the speaker of the sentence by saying the 
speaker of the sentence possesses an “intention” (to finish the sentence in some way), and 
you are not aware of that intention, at least not in the same way as the speaker.  Yet, at 
times you certainly are able to finish the sentences of others.   
                                               
773 Or, for example: “electric,” “elenchus,” or “Eleusinian Mysteries.”  
774 McNamara and Holbrook. “Semantic Memory and Priming,” Handbook of Psychology, 462. 
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The above whole word, word fragment, string of words, and everyday sentence 
completion activities are examples of positive priming, and are often accounted for by 
discussing the manner in which – through memory – the targets were variously 
“activated.”775  Sounding a bit like a “web of belief” expounded by Willard Van Orman 
Quine (1908-2000),
776
 it may be suggested that given similar backgrounds (cultural or 
otherwise), language exposure, etc. the metaphorically “underlying connections,” 
labyrinths or webs of possible target words or sentences which might come next for you 
or your interlocutor are similar enough to allow accurate predictions of the target in 
question.  It is as if a performative aspect of memory functions like a self-rearranging 
organism variously activated.  Across these webs or through these labyrinths, priming is 
described as spreading activation or a cascade of activation where what is doing the 
activating is the work of priming, and what is activated is memory.  In this way, when 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) noted, “When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his 
next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be.  Not every thought to 
every thought succeeds indifferently,”777 in his Chapter titled “Of the Consequences or 
Train of Imaginations,” of Leviathan (1651), he was already aware of priming.  However, 
he was mistaken to deem the performance of such connecting to be an aspect of 
imagination.  As mentioned above, as this work of priming cascades toward a target, the 
activation has an inhibiting effect referred to as negative priming.   
Priming can be overt or covert, i.e. accomplished with the subject‟s awareness of 
the prime or accomplished subliminally.  Also, priming effects can be momentary, “they 
                                               
775 W.T. Neill. “Inhibition and facilitation processes in selective attention,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 3, (1977), 444-450. 
776 Cf. Willard Van Orman Quine with J.S. Ullian. The Web of Belief, (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Humanities, 1978). 
777 Hobbes, Leviathan, 12. 
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can last at least as long as a conversation, and … some contexts triggered by conscious 
experience may last for years. … Even a single conscious experience may trigger a short-
term change in context [e.g.] in the case of traumatic experiences the effects can last for 
years.”778  As early as 1988 Bernard Baars had the following to say about “conscious” 
priming: 
In general, a conscious priming event: 
1[-] decreases reaction time to similar conscious events; 
2[-] lowers the threshold for related material that is near the 
perceptual threshold, or is ambiguous, vague, fleeting, 
degraded, badly understood, or isolated from its surround.  
… 
3[-] a prime increases the likelihood of similar events 
emerging in memory through free association, cued recall, 
and recognition tasks; and  
4[-] finally, a conscious prime increases the probability of 
actions and speech related to the priming stimulus
779
 
Since 1988, as noted above, researchers now know the prime need not be “conscious.”  
Subliminal presentation of a prime can still produce the target, i.e. though the subject 
remains unaware of the prime, they become aware of the target.
780
  This is shown even in 
the case of sensation where, “the presentation of an accessory stimulus facilitates 
response activation processes because of the participants enhanced level of preparation 
for stimulus processing.”781  Still more remarkable, subjects have shown priming effects 
despite introduction of the prime during “anesthetic-induced unconsciousness” and “the 
subject does not have any post-operative memory of the priming stimuli.”782 
                                               
778 Bernard J. Baars, A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 142. 
779 Baars, A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, 142. 
780 Timothy P. McNamara and Jon B. Holbrook. “Semantic Memory and Priming,” Handbook of 
Psychology: Experimental Psychology, Irving B. Weiner, Alice F. Healy, Donald K. Freeheim, and Robert 
W. Proctor, eds. (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 460. 
781 Rico Fischer, Torsten Schubert, and Roman Liepelt. “Accessory Stimuli Modulates Effects of 
Nonconscious Priming,” Perception & Psychophysics, 69.1, (2007), 9. 
782 Philip Winn. “Anaesthesia,” Dictionary of Biological Psychology, (London: Routledge, 2001), 79. 
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 Hence, priming is an aspect of memory which is not equipped with an “off 
switch.”  In other words and in sum, priming spans all of the modes of memory, and 
priming is the activity which accounts for fluency, automaticy, or flow.  Priming may be 
thought of then as a performative aspect of memory in so far as its “flowing” is also a 
“pulling along.”  Memory‟s feedback-control-loop is performed by priming across its 
modes of coding,
783
 storage,
784
 and retrieval,
785
 running through its levels of implicit and 
explicit memory – procedural, episodic, semantic, and autobiographical memory – 
spanning the trajectory of experience, e.g. affection, conation, sensation, perception, 
conception, and decision making.
786
       
§14 Automaticity – Fluency is generally taken to signify the faster or more 
efficient processing of stimuli which seems to develop from repeated processing.  
Considered a landmark study regarding memory and fluency, in 1981 Larry L. Jacoby 
and Mark Dallas published, “On the Relationship between Autobiographical Memory and 
Perceptual Learning.”787  Fluency, much like automaticity from which I will distinguish it 
below, involves nonconscious aspects of memory and is found in various performances.  
In other words, performing a piano piece, speaking a foreign language fluently, or 
chewing bubblegum while riding a bike all entail a degree of nonconscious memory, and 
                                               
783 Cf. Franklin Chang, Gary S. Dell, Kathryn Bock, and Zenzi M. Griffin. “Structural Priming as Implicit 
Learning: A comparison of models of sentence production,” Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 29.2, 
(2000), 217-230. 
784 Cf. K.A. Nielson, R.C. Radtke, R.A. Jensen. “Arousal-induced Modulation of Memory Storage 
Processes in Humans,” Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 66.2, (1996), 133-142.  
785 Cf. Endel Tulving, Daniel L. Schacter and Heather A. Stark. “Priming Effects in Word Fragment 
Completion are independent of Recognition Memory,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory and Cognition, 8.4, (1982), 336-342. 
786 See my extensive citation of articles at the beginning of the priming section above pertaining to these 
aspects of experience. 
787 L.L. Jacoby and M. Dallas. “On the Relationship between Autobiographical Memory and Perceptual 
Learning,” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 110, 3, (1981), 306-340. 
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the performances may be referred to as “automatic” or “fluent.”  Wittgenstein is perhaps 
instructional here: 
Isn‟t it like this?  First of all, people use an explanation, a 
chart, by looking it up; later they as it were look it up in the 
head and finally they work without the chart, as if it had 
never existed.  In this last case they are playing a different 
game.  For it isn‟t as if the chart is still in the background, 
to fall back on; it is excluded from our game, and if I “fall 
back on it” I am like a blinded man falling back on the 
sense of touch.
788
 
Wittgenstein‟s description is just one of the ways in which we may describe how fluency 
occurs.  Yet, Wittgenstein‟s way is appealing in that it seems to be an ordinary 
description of how people tend to think of developing a performance to the point of 
fluency.   
The development of one‟s performing ability up to and beyond the point of 
fluency can be evaluated by looking for the “effects of fluency.”  Summarizing research 
regarding the effects of fluency on sensation and perception, Jeffrey P. Toth reports 
fluency can increase the apparent fame of nonfamous 
names (Jacoby, Woloshyn et al., 1989), can lengthen the 
apparent exposure duration of a briefly flashed word 
(Witherspoon & Allan, 1985), [and] can lower the apparent 
loudness of background noise (Jacoby, Allan, Collins, & 
Larwill, 1988).
789
 
On the one hand, it seems, perhaps, odd to think of yourself or someone else as a fluent 
seer of X.  However, and keep in mind here what was said above about priming, memory 
research seems to indicate given your various fluencies and primings you will experience 
circumstances differently than someone else.  On the other hand, this idea – minus the 
technical terminology – seems to be almost commonplace.  That is, your background 
                                               
788 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Grammar, Rush Rhees, tr. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005), 85-86. 
789 Jeffrey P. Toth. “Nonconscious Forms of Human Memory,” The Oxford Handbook of Memory, Endel 
Tulving and Fergus I.M. Craik, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 254. 
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experiences, e.g. cultural or socio-economical, will influence how you respond in 
observably different ways in various situations from others who have had different 
background experiences.  Furthermore, considering tasks you perform repeatedly with 
high frequency every day, not only are you a fluent seer of X, but you are also fluent in 
performing many other tasks – tasks which it would require more effort for you to 
enumerate than to perform.  In fact the performance of these tasks may be considered 
“automatic.” 
 The difference, then, between automaticity and fluency may be thought of as a 
matter of degree ranging from performances least accessible to cognitive intervention to 
performances most accessible to cognitive intervention; automaticity tending toward 
performances with least potential intervention, and fluency tending toward performances 
with a higher degree of potential intervention.  Similar to Wittgenstein‟s description of 
fluency acquisition above,     
Automaticity is attained when a skill or procedure is 
mastered so well that it no longer requires conscious, 
effortful cognitive processing.  The burden on working 
memory is greatest in the early stages of skill 
development…  The principle of automaticity also applies 
directly to working memory functions themselves.  More 
resources are freed up as working-memory routines and 
strategies, such as subvocal rehearsal and chunking, 
become automated.  In fact, chunking may be the primary 
process that underlies automaticity.
790
 
It is important to address fluency/automaticity because the distinction – as is illustrated in 
the above quote – brings together three ideas: memory, performance, and control.  
Working memory, as its name implies, involves the performance of tasks, and as such 
indicates and illustrates a degree of agency pertaining to memory.  Specifying this degree 
                                               
790 Milton J. Dehn. Working Memory and Academic Learning: Assessment and Intervention, (New Jersey: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 122. 
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of agency pertaining to memory entails questions regarding control and questions 
regarding fluency and automaticity of performance.  Primed with the contemporary 
vernacular, it is nearly impossible to broach the topic of automaticity and free-will 
without mentioning intention and attention.  Hence, recognizing memory‟s role in 
conation and intention is tantamount to recognizing the performative standpoint.  I will 
address these issues below. 
The perhaps most primarily philosophical issue involving fluency/automaticity 
pertains to what I prefer to call the myth that automaticity entails determinism.  In order 
to address this myth, I will provide some examples to support my claim that automaticity 
and free-will are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  Hence, automaticity is not like 
teaching your buddy to ride a bike and, then, having her deliver the newspaper for you.  
Consider that just because you are fluent in English neither means your language abilities 
are limitless nor does it mean that you cannot choose freely what next to say. 
One way to characterize this issue, there seems to be a tension between limits and 
rules on the one hand, and the ability to improvise on the other hand.  I like 
Wittgenstein‟s way of characterizing this issue in On Certainty, §464. 
My difficulty can also be shown like this: I am sitting 
talking to a friend.  Suddenly I say: “I knew all along that 
you were so-and-so.”  Is that really just a superfluous, 
though true, remark?  I feel as if these words were like 
“Good morning” said to someone in the middle of a 
conversation.
791
 
It is not the case that if you attempt to say “Good morning” in the middle of a 
conversation you will find yourself restrained by some invisible force as it were.  Yet, it 
is as if saying “Good morning” in the middle of a conversation is like breaking an 
implicit rule or like taking an unusual route on a map.  Perhaps the golden mean here can 
                                               
791 Wittgenstein. On Certainty, 61e. 
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be found in Alfred Korzybski famous dictum, “The map is not the territory.”  Hence, 
your ability to control your utterances in a verbal exchange participates somewhere 
between resisting the so-called (invisible) “force of habit” and remembering you are free, 
i.e. able to make utterances independent of conventional rules. 
Michael S. Gazzaniga addresses this issue specifically in his book The Ethical 
Brain: The Science of our Moral Dilemmas, specifically in the section he titled, “My 
Brain Made Me Do It.”  According to Gazzaniga, 
The time between the onset of the readiness potential and 
the moment of conscious decision-making was about 300 
milliseconds.  If the readiness potential of the brain begins 
before we are aware of making the decision to move our 
hand, it would appear that our brains know our decisions 
before we become conscious of them.
792
    
Now, even though Gazzaniga‟s use of technology is special, the argument involved here 
is directly analogous to Wittgenstein‟s argument against William James in Zettel.  
According to Wittgenstein,  
William James: The thought is already complete at the 
beginning of the sentence.  How can one know that? … 
[Perhaps] the intention of uttering the thought may already 
exist before the first word has been said. [Wittgenstein‟s 
emphasis] … I tell someone: “I‟m going to whistle you the 
theme …”, it is my intention to whistle it, and I already 
know what I am going to whistle.  It is my intention to 
whistle the theme: have I already, in some sense, whistled it 
in thought?
793
 
Here, then, it is as if, Scalambrino : Gazzaniga :: Wittgenstein : James.  If it were the case 
that the tune had already been “whistled in thought,” then an unconscious, or perhaps 
“neuronal” determinism could ensue – “our brains know our decisions before we become 
conscious of them.”  Yet, Gazzaniga‟s term “readiness potential,” which may be 
                                               
792 Michael S. Gazzaniga. The Ethical Brain: The Science of Our Moral Dilemmas, (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2005), 92-93.  Hereafter cited as EB. 
793 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Zettel, G.E.M. Anscombe, tr. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 2e. 
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retrospectively referred to as “intention,” betrays the non-deterministic sense of the 
activation.  Practice at whistling tunes or speaking languages leaves a speaker primed for 
such activities, and readiness potential refers to the spreading activation by unconscious, 
i.e. implicit procedural and priming, memory that prepares one for moving a hand, 
whistling a tune, or uttering a phrase.   
Because the sight of a soccer ball may activate and ready your feet instead of your 
loins, a certain amount of selection and discrimination may be attributed to the 
unconscious, i.e. implicit, activity of memory.  However, readiness potential does not 
mean the fully formed or polished product of the fingers or lips is somehow “in the 
brain.”  There are two fundamental problems resulting from the type of thinking 
exemplified in the above James and Gazzaniga quotes.  First, Gazzaniga and James may 
be guilty of fallacious thinking on two counts.  They may be guilty of what in “Is 
Consciousness a Brain Process?” U.T. Place refers to as the “phenomenological fallacy,” 
i.e. “the mistaken idea that descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of 
the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment.”794  And, they may be 
guilty of the informal (linguistic) “fallacy of division.”  In other words, they reason 
mistakenly from the attributes of a totality to the attributes of the parts of the totality, and 
in doing so they level the very real difference between implicit and explicit memory.  
Second, their fallacy of division obscures the notion of agency sending us on a wild 
“ghost in the machine” chase.         
As if revealing the previously unlisted address for the homunculus family, 
Gazzaniga bolsters his neuronal determinism by introducing what he refers to as the 
                                               
794 U.T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” British Journal of Psychology, 47, (1956), 44. 
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brain‟s “left-hemisphere interpreter.”  Describing patients with a particular brain disorder, 
i.e. a particular brain damage, and narrating for “the brain,” Gazzaniga explains,  
The left-hemisphere interpreter would recognize that 
damage to nerves of the limb meant trouble for the brain 
and that the limb was paralyzed; however, in this case the 
damage occurred directly to the brain area responsible for 
signaling a problem in the perception of the limb, and it 
cannot send any information to the left-hemisphere 
interpreter.  The interpreter, must, then, create a belief to 
mediate the two know facts “I can see the limb isn‟t 
moving” and “I can‟t tell that it is damaged.”  When 
patients with this disorder are asked about their arm and 
why they can‟t move it, they will say “It‟s not mine” or “I 
just don‟t feel like moving it” – reasonable conclusions, 
given the input that the left-hemisphere interpreter is 
receiving.  The left-hemisphere is not only a master of 
belief creation, but it will stick to its belief system no 
matter what. (EB 149) 
So, on the one hand, supposedly your brain is aware of the decision being made before 
you, i.e. consciousness, the ego, intention, or whatever term generally taken to refer to 
agency and control.  On the other hand, the “brain creates belief,” according to 
Gazzaniga, which complicates matters because the brain, in essence, covers for itself.  
That is, Gazzaniga‟s model launches an attack on free-will by suggesting your brain 
automatically determines your course of action, and then your brain produces lies to 
protect itself from being blamed for the decision(s).   
The counterpoint to this thought from Gazzaniga may be found in Gordon D. 
Logan‟s Unintentional Thought.  According to Logan, 
The conclusion that automatic processing can be controlled 
does not deny the existence of automaticity … Automatic 
processing is often facilitative, providing a path of least 
resistance, well worn by habit, for us to follow.  The path 
may be difficult to resist, and it may still influence us if we 
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resist it, but we can resist it at will and minimize its 
influence.
795
 
The points I have decided to emphasize in Logan‟s quote involve his terms: “facilitative,” 
“path of least resistance” and “at will” “resistance.”  Logan‟s account, esp. his above 
three terms, is reminiscent of Aristotle‟s discussion of “vice” in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
esp. Bk. III and Bk. VII.  Both Aristotle and Logan note the importance of habit in ethical 
decision making.  In fact, Logan‟s ideas pertaining to resistance nearly echo Aristotle, 
and I would like to use Aristotle here along with Logan to counterpoint Gazzaniga and 
argue against the myth that automaticity entails determinism – emphasizing the ground of 
memory with each step.   
In Book III Chapter I of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle provides a negative 
definition of voluntary action.  “Things that happen by force or through ignorance are 
thought to be involuntary (NE 1110a).”  Yet, in Chapter V Aristotle explains, “Not 
everything that is voluntary is an object of rational choice (NE 1112a).”  Squaring the 
above two claims, Aristotle responds to a possible objection to his account of virtue and 
vice as voluntary.   
But suppose somebody argues: “Everyone aims at what 
appears good to him, but over this appearance we have no 
control; rather, how the end appears to each person depends 
on what sort of person he is.  So, if each person is in some 
way responsible for his own state, he will also be in some 
way responsible for how it appears.  If he is not, however, 
then no one will be responsible for his own wrongdoing, 
but he will do these things through ignorance of the end…” 
(NE 11141-b) 
The possible objection highlights the notion of “character.”  Whereas, Aristotle wants to 
highlight that a vicious character does not appropriate a situation in such a way as to 
provide a clear path to the virtuous action, he also wants to highlight that character 
                                               
795 Gordon D. Logan. “Automaticity and Cognitive Control,” Unintended Thought, James S. Uleman and 
John A. Bargh, eds. (New York: Guilford Press, 1989), 65. 
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formation is voluntary and itself worthy of praise or blame.  Aristotle responds to the 
possible objection noting,  
virtues are voluntary (because we are in some way partly 
responsible for our states of character, and it is by our being 
the kind of people that we are that we assume such and 
such as our end), vices also will be voluntary; they are on 
the same footing. (NE 1114b) 
Aristotle is able to maintain, then, that voluntariness of action is compatible with an 
influential locus of tendency, i.e. character, by appealing to memory, i.e. habit.  In this 
way, virtue is not compelled; it derives from rational choice; and it proceeds from a 
disposition, i.e. habit, to choose virtuously (NE 1105a) – one virtuous action does not a 
virtuous person make. 
 Whereas, Logan speaks of “path of least resistance” and “at will” “resistance,” 
Aristotle speaks of “continence” and “incontinence.”796  Yet, both acknowledge 
automaticity as an influential ground determined by memory in regard to voluntary 
actions.  Moreover, the malleability of this automaticity and the effects of training 
indicate though automaticity may range from obligatory to facilitative, it does not 
necessitate determinism.  Even the feeling of being “dragged about,” Aristotle suggests, 
comes more from ignorance than from physical mechanisms beyond our control.  It turns 
out the philosophical study of ethics has value even if no ethical theory can be “proven 
true.”  As a sort of “way of seeing” defense for ethics, seeing a situation so as to be able 
to consider a best possible ethical action requires the automaticity and priming which 
come from the study of ethics.  Hence, in experiencing a situation, automaticity provides 
a path of least resistance; recollection of knowledge regarding such situations allows for 
deliberation; and, performing – a voluntary action in relation to the situation – itself 
                                               
796 Cf. (NE Bk. VII). 
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requires the synthesis of the perceived situation with the stored knowledge, and just as 
children are not born rational deliberators, this synthesis requires practice. 
Is it the case then, that there are no strict constraints, i.e. a constraint that you 
cannot – upon encountering it – immediately overcome with will?  No, in fact, the 
constraint your will cannot immediately overcome, i.e. the, perhaps, most important 
constraint, is the constraint of your memory.  Stimuli do not speak for themselves, i.e. 
“automaticity is not driven by stimuli separately from skills.”797  If you are not trained or 
prepared to perform an action, then your will cannot overcome the limit of your memory.  
This may be thought of, for example, in terms of muscle memory and conceptual 
memory.  To hearken back to the Wittgenstein example, if you have never been exposed 
to a foreign language, then though you can say “Good morning” in the middle of a 
conversation, you cannot say, for example, “Guten Tag” or “Bon jour.”  Hence, some 
constraints can be broken, e.g. “Good morning,” others cannot, e.g. 非正 & 记忆.798 
§15 Retroactive Change – Retroactive memory change is quite simple to describe, 
and it is equally as easily overlooked as a mechanism of memory.  Suppose you have 
some experience, and if you remember it at all, you believe some account of your 
experience to be true.  You believe the account to be true because you learned it as such.  
Or, perhaps you are ignorant of its actual truth value, but it “sounds” accurate to you.  In 
either case, suppose you later learn differently, either by experiencing for yourself or 
being persuaded by a different account.  For a concrete example, perhaps you experience 
the failure of your telephone to work, and you arrive at some account of its failure to 
                                               
797 Larry L. Jacoby, Diane Ste-Marie, and Jeffrey P. Toth. “Redefining Automaticity: Unconscious 
influences, awareness, and control,” Attention, Selection, Awareness, and Control: A tribute to Donald 
Broadbent, Alan D. Baddeley and Lawrence Weiskrantz, eds. (London: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
261. 
798 This example, of course, only works if you have not learned to read Chinese. 
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work.  What is most important to note here is that, regardless of whether any of the 
accounts in question are true or can even ever be proven true, the changes described 
above occur within your memory.  Furthermore, these changes are referred to as 
“retroactive changes” because you are retroactively changing the content of your 
memory.  Whereas, more specifically it may be said you have discovered the truth or are 
learning from your mistake, more generally, it should not be overlooked that the 
retroactive changes take place in memory.  Looking at the process with a more technical 
lens uncovers the processes of “consolidation,” “retroactive inhibition” or 
“perseveration,” and “retrograde facilitation.” 
In 1900 Müller and Pilzecker, noted above, published Experimental Contributions 
to the Science of Memory introducing the notion of perseveration to account for 
“retroactive inhibition” when learning.  What is important regarding retroactive inhibition 
is what relates it to the notion of consolidation.  Müller and Pilzecker showed 
experimentally that memory continues to work beyond the intention to remember 
information.  In other words, what is referred to as a period of consolidation occurs after 
the period of exposure to the information which was intended to be remembered.  
Consolidation may be thought of, then, as the movement from short-term memory to 
long-term memory, and, as such, may be enhanced with elaborative rehearsal.
799
  
Exerting an amount of effort during the period of consolidation toward other mental tasks 
inhibits the consolidation, retroactively as it were, of the to-be-remembered information 
from short-term memory to long-term memory.
800
   
                                               
799 Cf. G.A. Miller. “The Magical Number Seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for 
processing information.” Psychological Review, 63.2, (1956), 81-97. 
800 G. Keppel. “Consolidation and Forgetting,” Memory Consolidation: Psychobiology of Cognition, H. 
Weingartner, E.S. Parker, eds. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1984), 149-150. 
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Looking back to automaticity for a moment.  Whereas, automaticity is tied up in 
the notion of obligatory memory, i.e. encoding and retrieval, storage is dependent upon 
rehearsal.  This is tantamount to saying that to which you are exposed is always already 
being taken up into short term memory, as if memory has this obligation, and has the 
further potential to be stored long-term depending upon consolidation.  Retroactive 
inhibition, then, refers to the inhibition or disruption of consolidation; by continuing your 
exposure, short-term and working memory may be overloaded and fail to consolidate 
information to long-term storage.  So, notice that memory continues to work beyond the 
encounter with the to-be-remembered information, and memory consolidation may be 
retroactively inhibited 
In 1932, then, Edward Lee Thorndike (1874-1949) published The Fundamentals 
of Learning.  Thorndike was concerned not with inhibiting memory consolidation but 
with enhancing it.  In what hearkens back to the studies noted above regarding mood and 
memory, Thorndike experimentally illustrated “retrograde facilitation” by providing 
rewards during “the critical post-encoding period.”801  These rewards – emotions and 
pleasures – helped facilitate consolidation.  In other words, grammar school repetition 
coupled with praise should lead to a further solidification of habits and long-term storage 
of information.  The rewards occur after the exposure to the to-be-remembered 
information.  Hence, the enhancing action is retroactive.  The points I hope to stress most 
of all by mentioning retroactive memory change: first, changes and corrections in beliefs 
systems are changes taking place within memory; second, memory continues to work 
beyond the intention to remember information.         
                                               
801 Edward L. Thorndike. The Fundamentals of Learning, (New York: Columbia University, 1932), 638. 
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§16 Attention/Intention as a Process of Working Memory – A new reading is 
emerging in the 21
st
 century which thinks attention and intention as grounded in and 
deriving from working memory.  The claim is that working memory is the condition for 
the possibilities of attention and intention.  Wittgenstein states the problem roughly in his 
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (§837), “But where does memory belong, and 
where attention [Wittgenstein‟s emphases]?”802  To begin with, the idea of attention as a 
spotlight into the world has been eroding for some time now.
803
  The idea first gave way 
to the idea of multiple spotlights into the world, and then to the idea of multiple spotlights 
into an image known as the world that is maintained by memory.  A number of the above 
entries (theses) have highlighted the idea of the world as an image maintained, i.e. 
constructed, by memory.
804,805
  Notice, of the image being maintained, since a 
comparatively small amount of possible contributions are retrieved, so to speak, from the 
flow of possible sensation, it is correct to call the maintenance rehearsing of memory a 
construction.  Discussing attention as a function of memory, then, I will highlight here 
two different ideas.  First, I will discuss the idea of selective attention as a mechanism 
functioning at the crossroads of working memory capacity limitations, procedural 
routines, and “higher level” recollection, i.e. contributions from episodic and semantic 
memory.  Second, I will discuss how it is that what there is to pay attention to is already a 
construct of memory.  Put generally, “awareness is a prerequisite for intentional 
                                               
802 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, G.E.M. Anscombe, tr. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 149e. 
803 Scott W. Brown and Stephanie M. Merchant. “Processing Resources in Timing and Sequencing Tasks,” 
Perception & Psychophysics, 69.3, (2007), 447-448. 
804 Cf. J. Kevin O‟Regan. “Solving the „Real‟ Mysteries of Visual Perception: The world as outside 
memory,” Canadian Journal of Psychology, 46, (1992), 461-488. 
805 Cf. J. Kevin O‟Regan. “The World as an Outside Iconic Memory,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 
(1994), 270-271. 
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control,”806 and – as should have been firmly established at this point – awareness is 
impossible without memory. 
 In The Principles of Psychology William James described attention in a way 
which was unfortunately practical for 1890.  According to James, 
Everyone knows what attention is.  It is the taking 
possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out 
of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or 
trains of thought.  Focalization [;] concentration, of 
consciousness are of its essence.  It implies withdrawal 
from some things in order to deal effectively with others, 
and is a condition which has a real opposite in the 
confused, dazed, and scatterbrained state…807 
One of the things the 21
st
 century can see, which James could not, is that this “taking 
possession by the mind” is itself a procedure.  As a procedure it may be separated from 
the object, i.e. the object‟s construction, to which it contributes.  Further, whereas James 
discusses focalization as a kind of withdrawal, he implies an obscure notion of choice.  
The tendency followed, of course, to look for the agent doing the choosing, and James 
points to the agent by perpetuating another unfortunate tendency, i.e. talking about 
“consciousness.”  Of course, there is a difference between the formation of the object, on 
the one hand, through sensation and perception and the judgment, on the other, which 
bestows an identity to the object.  Rather than either of these aspects of experience, 
attention refers more to the performance which runs through object formation, judgment, 
and the synthesis of the two.  In other words, attention pertains to the performative 
aspects of memory.  Not to consciousness.  However, James was little aware of 
unconscious attention in the form of multiple object tracking or priming.        
                                               
806 Jeffrey P. Toth. “Nonconscious Forms of Human Memory,” The Oxford Handbook of Memory, Endel 
Tulving and Fergus I.M. Craik, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 255. 
807 William James. The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1, (New York: Henry Holt, 1890), 403-404. 
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It is insufficient, then, to think of attention as performing discrimination, 
selection, or focus.  On the one hand, it is insufficient because these activities are 
sometimes performed without attention, i.e. unconsciously.  I have already discussed how 
memory is involved unconsciously in discrimination, selection, and focus in discussing 
habituation/de-sensitization, FINSTing, and priming above.  On the other hand, it is 
insufficient to think of attention as performing discrimination, selection, or focus because 
task performance is not one-dimensional.   Rather,  
When people hold several objects (such as digits or words) 
in working memory and select one for processing, 
switching to a new object takes longer than selecting the 
same object as that on the preceding processing step.  
Similarly, selecting a new task incurs task-switching 
costs.
808
 
The above quote from an article titled, “Selection of Objects and Tasks in Working 
Memory,” highlights the multi-dimensional quality of task performance.  Whereas, 
memory can account for this difference of cost incursion, attention cannot.  If task 
performance were one-dimensional –involved performing a task upon whatever is being 
attended – and attention were a spotlight peering into whatever the agent intended, 
switching to a new object upon which the same task is to be performed should incur no 
more cost than attending to the same object because the only process changing would be 
the same in each case – attention.  For example, look back at the word attention.  Now, 
look back at the word attention.  It is not the case that the mind shuts down waiting only 
to repeat the last task, e.g. it could not be sure the next task would be a repetition of the 
last.  Hence, if task performance were one-dimensional, the cost should be the same 
whether attending to the same object or a different object, so long as the task is the same.  
                                               
808 Sarah Risse and Klaus Oberauer. “Selection of Objects and Tasks in Working Memory,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, (2009), 1. 
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However, because task performance is multi-dimensional, i.e. involving the spreading 
activation of procedures applied to maintained objects in a current of priming moving 
through a sea of sensitization, the selection of objects and tasks in working memory 
incurs differing costs dependent upon the amount of memory activation required by 
working memory.
809
       
 Similar to a kind of frame-dragging, working memory is capable of dragging a 
task-to-be-performed across stimuli maintained for the sake of potentially having the task 
performed upon them.  Or, put in a vocabulary more consistent with folk psychology, I 
can pay attention to a number of things with which I can intend to do something.  
Maintaining the task to-be-performed is the repeatedly retrieving, or repeating the 
retrieval, from procedural memory of the procedure for performing the task.  On the one 
hand, priming and practice make activities more efficient even across tasks, e.g. practice 
at juggling balls and bowling pins increases your ability to catch cups and containers 
falling unexpectedly out of overstuffed cupboards as you open them.  On the other hand, 
task switching entails the performance of a procedure coded differently relative to the 
different task.  Hence, the task-switching cost noted above.  The psychological literature 
pertaining to “scripts” provides some useful insights and a useful vocabulary for 
discussing attention as a function of memory. 
When you have performed a routine enough times to have come to associate the 
routine with cues which may be noticed, for example, within a context or a mood, were 
you to transcribe the words and actions involved, you would have a “script” for the 
                                               
809 Cf. L. Hasher and R.T. Zacks. “Automatic and Effortful Processes in Memory,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 108, (1979), 356-388; Cf. M.J. Kane, L.H. Brown, J.C. McVay, P.J Silvia, et al. 
“For Whom the Mind Wanders, and When: An experience-sampling study of working memory and 
executive control in daily life,” Psychological Science, 18, (2007), 614-621. 
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routine.
810
  Psychologists use this way of talking about repetitive human activities to 
account for a number of predictable aspects regarding these activities.  For example, you 
may variously have scripts for “ordering a pizza for delivery,” “ordering food or drink at 
a restaurant,” or “asking a question in a classroom.”  The men credited with, at least, 
popularizing the notion of scripts Roger C. Schank and Robert P. Abelson refer to the 
“restaurant script.”811   
Put generally, scripts are universalized and normalized in many cases to such an 
extent that when amidst cues which may be appropriate for a range of scripts, if the script 
employed sufficiently deviates from any of the scripts considered appropriate, the 
activity, i.e. the employed script, will probably be considered deviant – thereby activating 
a different range of scripts.  Put more specifically, if you phone an establishment which 
delivers pizzas, there is a numerical range of appropriate questions to ask and there is an 
appropriate range of topics about which to ask before your interlocutor might think you 
are a prank caller – thereby hanging up on you or calling the police, depending upon the 
script they employ when, for example, they encounter the cues suggesting “prank caller.”   
Consider another aspect of scripts.  Suppose you recognize the cues you associate 
with being thirsty and encountering a coffee shop.  Though you have never been inside 
the coffee shop you have encountered nor do you know any of the individuals inside the 
coffee shop, entering the coffee shop and employing your script for ordering at a 
restaurant you will most likely be successful at receiving a beverage to quench your 
                                               
810 See Roger C. Schank and Robert P. Abelson. Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An inquiry into 
human knowledge structures, (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1977). 
811 Schank and Abelson. Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding, 40. 
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thirst.
812
  I am attempting here to accentuate something akin to the surprise of Salvador 
Dalí, “I do not understand why, when I ask for a grilled lobster in a restaurant, I am never 
served a cooked telephone…”813  In a slightly more technical register, the individuals 
involved may be described as participating in a process of anchoring upon the cues so as 
to judge the situation and identify the possible scripts appropriate to employ.  Though the 
scripts involved and the process of recognition are ultimately learned – acquired through 
practice – individuals involved may or may not be aware, i.e. conscious, of the process of 
selection upon which the identity of the coffee shop and their respective identities as 
employees or customers rest.   
Beyond the identities, then, scripts may be deferred to in order to account for the 
expectations of the individuals involved.  Reminiscent of Nietzsche‟s insight from 
Beyond Good and Evil, §138 “When we are awake we also do what we do in our dreams: 
we invent and make up the person with whom we associate – and immediately forget it.” 
(BGE 88)  Hence, scripts are like learned procedures resulting in the selection of cues 
upon which to anchor expectations and from which to further employ scripts, and within 
this framework individuals self-regulate and “pay attention” so as to perform tasks.  I 
might summarize this by saying: globally, attention may be accounted for along the lines 
of cue dependent recollection of scripts which dictate not only the identities involved but 
also the expectations involved.  Though these scripts are learned and need to be retrieved 
from memory, as is the case with procedural memory, these scripts are employed without 
                                               
812 Even if you wish to interpret this in an overly literal way and suggest our imaginary customer to just sit 
at a table – like at a restaurant – in a place where you need to order at the counter, eventually someone 
tidying up or working security – like the pizza delivery place encountering some odd number of questions – 
will seek to correct the oddities of the script by informing the customer to approach the counter – or asking 
if they are going to order a pizza. 
813 Salvador Dalí. The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí, Haakon M. Chevalier, tr. (Boston: Dover Publications, 
1993), 271. 
 507 
 
awareness – the agent lives into the script.  Locally, attention may be accounted for along 
the lines of applying a globally primed procedure in the performance of a task upon 
objects maintained within a global framework by working memory – global expectation 
means motivation regarding objects locally.   
So far, then, in order to argue for rethinking the notion of attention as a function 
of memory, I have discussed how memory is involved in the overarching framework 
which dictates attention globally.  I have discussed how memory is responsible for 
providing the material which may be attended to locally.  Further, I have discussed how 
performance, for which attention is usually taken to be a prerequisite, can occur in the 
absence of awareness – and therefore without attention.  Also, I have discussed how 
performance involves the application of a procedure selected from memory, and how 
memory may be responsible for the selection of the procedure, e.g. by way of cues.  A 
nice example of this may be found in an article by Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, 
“The Extended Mind.”  Though Clark and Chalmers are not explicitly making this point, 
they provide an example of applying, i.e. remembering, a procedure to assist in the 
performance of a task.  According to Clark and Chalmers, “These may incorporate bodily 
actions into cognitive processes, as when we use our fingers as working memory in a 
tricky calculation.”814  In sum, what was taken to be attention seems bound by memory on 
the one hand, and performed by memory on the other.  And, now I will discuss one 
further aspect of memory and attention regarding task-switching by referring to a series 
of studies – related to scripts – on expectation and expertise. 
                                               
814 Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers. “The Extended Mind,” Philosophy of Mind: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings, David J. Chalmers, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 645.  
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The majority of research on memory is concerned with recollective memory, and 
specifically memory for events is often studied in relation to expectation.
815
  As may be 
expected, this inevitably brings into the conversation the work of Robert Rosenthal and 
the “Pygmalion Effect.”816,817  The Pygmalion effect has been characterized as the self-
fulfilling prophecy embedded within or related to one‟s expectations.818  In other words, 
how do one‟s present expectations influence one‟s account of the past?819  Myriad 
experiments have been conducted for the sake of understanding “eye-witness testimony,” 
for example.820  Elizabeth F. Loftus who has published numerous articles on the topic 
interestingly had the following to say in 1978, “Almost two centuries ago, Immanuel 
Kant spoke of the human tendency to merge different experiences to form new concepts 
and ideas.  That tendency has crucial implications for one‟s ability to report his or her 
experiences accurately.”821  And, regarding accurate reporting, studies have shown that 
subject‟s expectations may be influenced by features of the experiment in multiple ways: 
the knowledge base of the observer,822 the wording, i.e. phrasing, of the questions 
posed,823 the subjectively experienced relational aspects with the experimenters,824 e.g. do 
                                               
815 Cf. K. Daniel O‟Leary, Ronald N. Kent and Jay Kanowitz. “Shaping Data Collection Congruent with 
Experimental Hypotheses,” Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 8.1, (1975), 43-51. 
816 See Robert Rosenthal. “From Unconscious Experimenter Bias to Teacher Expectancy Effects,” Teacher 
Expectancies, J.B. Dusek, ed. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1985), 37-65. 
817 See Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jackson. Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher expectation and 
pupils’ intellectual development, (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1968), 166. 
818 See Robert Rosenthal and D.B. Rubin. “Interpersonal Expectancy Effects: The first 345 studies,” The 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, (1978), 377-415. 
819 Cf. Paul Pauli and Georg W. Alpers. “Memory Bias in Patients with Hypochondriasis and Somatoform 
Pain Disorder,” Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 52.1, (2002), 45-53. 
820 See George Fisher. “The Jury‟s Rise as Lie Detector,” Yale Law Journal, 107, (1997), 575-713. 
821 Elizabeth F. Loftus, David G. Miller and Helen J. Burns. “Semantic Integration of Verbal Information 
into Visual Memory,” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 19, (1978), 19. 
822 F.C. Bartlett. Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 49; Cf. Jean M. Mandler. “A Code in the Node: The use of a story schema in 
retrieval,” Discourse Processes, 1.1, (1978), 14-35. 
823 Elizabeth F. Loftus. “Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report,” Cognitive Psychology, 7 (1975), 
550-572; Cf. Elizabeth F. Loftus, David G. Miller and Helen J. Burns. “Semantic Integration of Verbal 
Information into Visual Memory,” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 19, (1978), 19-31. 
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the subjects want to see the experimenters succeed,825 etc.  Barbara Tversky and Elizabeth 
J. Marsh examined the effects of “post[-]event reorganization of events on memory for 
the original events.”  They hold, for example, that “When people retell events, they take 
different perspectives for different audiences and purposes.”826  These factors then, among 
others, related to experimenter bias or experimenter expectancy effect have been shown 
to influence what subjects remember, i.e. recollect.  It is important to note the subjects 
need not be “lying.”  In fact, many subjects, though influenced into providing inaccurate 
accounts of what they have witnessed, believe they are providing an accurate account – 
by way of recollection, of course.   
I mention here these studies in relation to recollection to gesture by way of 
analogy into the influence of expectation regarding experiential aspects of memory.  
Recognizing the role of expectation in experience, and specifically task performance, 
further indicates the functioning of memory within the putative purview of attention.827  
For example, when you compare the two tasks of setting a cup down or tapping a cup on 
a flat surface, until the cup is either released or begins its ascent the two tasks are 
indistinguishable, i.e. the difference is undetermined.  Newtson, et al, refer to the aspects 
of a task which accomplish a differentiation from other tasks as “breakpoints.”828  Further, 
when an individual is placed in a highly novel environment and situation, asked to 
observe a task, and report the breakpoints, there is a high correlation between physical 
                                                                                                                                            
824 Robert Rosenthal. Experimenter Effects in Behavioral Research, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
1966). 
825 Ian H. Gotlib, Elena Krasnoperova and Jutta Joorman. “Attentional Biases for Negative Interpersonal 
Stimuli in Clinical Depression,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 113.1, (2004), 127-135.  
826 Barbara Tversky and Elizabeth J. Marsh. “Biased Retellings of Events Yield Biased Memories,” 
Cognitive Psychology, 40, (2000), 1-38. 
827 Cf. Christopher M Massad, Michael Hubbard and Darren Newtson. “Selective Perception of Events,” 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 15.6, (1979), 515-532.  
828 D. Newtson, G. Engquist and J. Bois. “The Objective Basis of Behavior Units,” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 35, (1977), 847. 
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change and reported breakpoints.  When an individual is placed in a highly non-novel 
environment and situation, less breakpoints are reported, and the breakpoints tend toward 
a higher level of abstraction, i.e. as opposed to tracking physical change.829  Hence, 
different participants parse action into meaningful segments differently,830 and the 
difference is related to (positively correlated with) the degree of prior instruction received 
and the ability of the participants ability to predict the action sequence.831  These results 
are taken to suggest that individuals trained regarding the task “pay less attention” to the 
task than those for whom the task is more novel.832  In other words, experts, e.g. those 
who are well practiced at a craft, pay attention differently.   
Regarding these studies, then, there is the predictable and, yet remarkable, point 
that expectations derive from – that is correct – memory.  Given the influence of memory 
by way of expectation, it is correct to speak of selective encoding, selective retrieval, and 
selective reconstruction, for example, in discussing the biases of eye-witness reports in 
recollective studies.  Similarly, in paying attention differently than novices, the same may 
be said of experts regarding the experiential (and recollective) aspects of task 
performance and observance.  Yet, the point of most relevance is the selective 
construction – not reconstruction – of experts.  In other words, pertaining to their purview 
experts do not experience a situation the same as a novice, i.e. experts do not construct 
the same experience.  Now, it may be said – the differentiating factor – experts do not 
pay attention to the same things to which novices pay attention.  However, it should now 
                                               
829 D. Newtson and R.J. Rindner. “Variation in Behavior Perception and Ability Attribution,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 37, (1979), 1874-1858. 
830 D. Newtson and G. Engquist. “The Perceptual Organization of Ongoing Behavior,” Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 12, (1976), 436-450. 
831 D. Newtson, “Attribution and the Unit of Perception of Ongoing Behavior,” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 28, (1973), 23-28.  
832 Darren Newtson, Rick J. Rindner, Robert Miller and Kathy LaCross. “Effects of Availability of Feature 
Changes on Behavior Segmentation,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14.4, (1978), 379-388. 
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be clear that what is meant here by attention is wholly a function of memory.  On the one 
hand, experts have different expectations, and derivatively, on the other hand, experts 
select different breakpoints in action sequences by reading, as it were, the action 
sequence from a higher level of abstraction, i.e. a different mapping.  Not only does the 
reduction in change tracking requirement “free up” experts to pay attention elsewhere, 
but also experts may tend toward higher refinement and efficiency regarding relevant 
scripts.      
In recognizing, then, that it is insufficient to think of attention as performing 
discrimination, selection, or focus, you can recognize attention as a privileged level of 
memory processing.  Memory differentiates experts from novices, and experts construct 
their experience differently by paying attention differently.  In fact, contemporary 
researchers who regard attention as a function of memory processing tend to point 
specifically to working memory.  Operating between the memory processes of 
maintenance and elaboration, the functions of working memory referred to as “selection 
and enhancement” otherwise describe the activity of attention.  Looking back, then, 
across the, so to speak, different layers – think the structure of experience –, as I 
mentioned above, attention names the processing of memory occurring at the crossroads 
of working memory capacity limitations, procedural routines, and “higher level” 
recollection, i.e. contributions from episodic and semantic memory.
833
  And, unconscious 
processing occurs “below” attention, e.g. at the level of sensory processing.  In order to 
discuss these different layers of experience, contemporary researchers sometimes split 
working memory and refer to the lower portions as “perceptual store” and the upper 
                                               
833 Cf. Elizabeth F. Loftus and John C. Palmer. “Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of 
the Interaction Between Language and Memory,” Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior, 13, 
(1974), 585-589. 
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portions as “executive control.”834,835  Processing that takes place below the threshold of 
attention may be taken up into the perceptual store of working memory.  However, 
strictly speaking, working memory is not involved in the, e.g. sensory, processing which 
contributes to its perceptual store.  To focus, then, on attention in itself is to recognize 
attention as a cluster of procedural routines.  In paying attention to something, you 
perform a procedure upon that image of the world selected, maintained, and enhanced by 
memory. 
Before concluding this section with a brief – non-exhaustive – tracing of my 
claim‟s textual history, I want to remind the reader by returning to the sentiment with 
which I started this section.  I suggested above that a new reading is emerging in the 21
st
 
century which thinks attention and intention as grounded in and deriving from working 
memory.  More specifically, the claim is that working memory is the condition for the 
possibilities of attention and intention.  As you will now see, such is actually a more 
conservative version in comparison with the memory researchers who equate attention 
and intention with working memory.   
In studies examining human behavior and performance, “attention has been a 
central topic since the publication of [Donald] Broadbent‟s Perception and 
Communication in 1958.”836  Whereas, “Traditionally, selective attention has been seen as 
a function of activation [emphasis by Houdé],”837 additionally in the 21st century 
                                               
834 Matthew S. Peterson, Melissa R. Beck, and Jason H. Wong. “Were You Paying Attention to Where You 
Looked? The role of executive working memory in visual search,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15.2, 
(2008), 372. 
835 Compare with my brief section on working memory above.  
836 John Duncan. “Visual Attention in Mind and Brain,” Brain, Perception, Memory: Advances in Cognitive 
Neuroscience, Johan J. Bolhuis, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 49. 
837 Olivier Houdé. Dictionary of Cognitive Science: Neuroscience, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, 
Linguistics, and Philosophy, (New York: Psychology Press, 2004), 13. 
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“Attention has been described as the selection of stimuli for higher-level processing.”838  
Beginning in 1990 and following the work with brain damaged patients regarding 
procedural memory Michael I. Posner discussed the familiar notion that “Performance 
can reveal successful storage when due to brain damage of various kinds a patient cannot 
consciously retrieve information.”839  The innovative shift came by noting the role of 
attention in performance.  Procedures were learned; tasks were performed; recollective 
memory was impaired, short-term and working memory systems were not; and, an intact 
focus of attention allowed for the consideration of alternatives.  How was this possible?  
By 1993 Clifford R. Mynatt was discussing focus of attention as working memory.840  In 
1995 Nelson Cowan began referring to the “integrated framework” of “attention and 
memory.841  In 1996 Brian Ross referred to “attention as memory”842  In 1998, Neil W. 
Mulligan was concerned to investigate, “The Role of Attention During Encoding in 
Implicit and Explicit Memory.”843 
Finally, in the year 2000, Nelson Cowan reported the following: 
Given the usual strong distinction between attention and 
memory, the suggested equivalence of the focus of attention 
and the capacity-limited portion of STM [Short-Term 
Memory] may require some getting used to by many 
readers. [my emphasis]
844
   
                                               
838 Patrick Cavanagh. “Attention Routines and the Architecture of Selection,” Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Attention, Michael I. Posner, ed. (New York: the Guilford Press, 2004), 16. 
839 Michael I. Posner and Steven E. Petersen. “The Attention System of the Human Brain,” Annual Review 
of Neuroscience, 13, (1990), 39. 
840 See Clifford R. Mynatt, Michael E. Doherty, and William Dragan. “Information Relevance, Working 
Memory, and the Consideration of Alternatives,” The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 46.4, 
(1993), 759-778. 
841 Nelson Cowan. Attention and Memory: An integrated framework, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995). 
842 Brian H. Ross, “Category Learning as Problem Solving,” The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 
35, (1996), 168. 
843 Neil W. Mulligan. “The Role of Attention During Encoding in Implicit and Explicit Memory,” Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 24, (1998), 27-47. 
844 Nelson Cowan. “The Magical Number 4 in Short-term Memory: A reconsideration of mental storage 
capacity,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24.1, (2000), 91. 
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Referring to sensory memory as the “aspects of memory representation,” i.e. the lower 
component of working memory, the perceptual store (noted above) determines “what 
chunks will be most prominent (relative to the available retrieval context)” and the 
capacity-limits of short-term memory “determine how many of the most prominent 
chunks in the representation can be attended at once.”845  In this way, when “information 
is activated it stays activated automatically for a short period of time … unless it is 
reactivated during that period of time.”846 component of working memory 
In 2003, William J. Macken sought to distinguish the automatic procedures of 
auditory sensory memory from attention by examining, “Evidence from attentional 
selectivity in short-term memory.”847  In 2004, then, Patrick Cavanagh‟s publication, 
“Attention Routines and the Architecture of Selection” pulls together the idea of attention 
as composed of routines, and as grounded in memory these routines are meant to 
encompass the work – mentioned above – of recognizing breakpoints, scripts, and 
activating procedures.  In this way, “Attention routines that begin and end with a 
reportable state divide the flow of mental activity at its boundaries where the content of 
awareness changes…”848  In 2005 Gustavo Deco can be seen referring to “A unified 
model of attention and working memory,”849 and, also in 2005, John Towse, et al, noted, 
“A family of tasks known as working memory span are thought to capture the dynamic 
between memory and ongoing mentation, in that they all require temporary maintenance 
                                               
845 Cowan, “The Magical Number 4,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 176. 
846 Cowan, “The Magical Number 4,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 92; Cf. Nelson Cowan. Working 
Memory Capacity, (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005). 
847 William J. Macken, S. Tremblay, R.J. Houghton, A.P. Nicholls and D.M. Jones. “Does Auditory 
Streaming Require Attention? Evidence from attentional selectivity in short-term memory,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 29, (2003), 43-51. 
848 Patrick Cavanagh. “Attention Routines and the Architecture of Selection,” Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Attention, Michael I. Posner, ed. (New York: the Guilford Press, 2004), 13-28. 
849 Gustavo Deco and Edmund T. Rolls. “Attention, Short-term Memory, and Action Selection: A unifying 
theory,” Progress in Neurobiology, 76, (2005), 236. 
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of information during a processing activity such as counting, reading, or arithmetic.”850  
Re-inscribing the gains from experiments on retroactive memory inhibition, Jeffrey P. 
Lozito, in 2006, confirmed the detrimental effects on attention of increased memory load 
during encoding and retrieval noting, “Consistent with this view are the numerous studies 
showing that dividing attention during memory encoding reduces later memory 
performances.”851  Finally, in 2007 Martha Ann Bell follows the trend while looking at 
the relation of memory and attention from the perspective of learning to self-regulate.852  
Hence, though this list is not exhaustive it does indicate the textual history and indicate 
the trend to think of attention and intention as functioning at the crossroads of sensory 
memory, working memory, and implicit memory.
853
 
§17 Qualia – Credit for coining “qualia” should go to C.I. (Clarence Irving) 
Lewis (1883-1964) from his 1929 publication of Mind and World Order: Outline of a 
Theory of Knowledge.  In understanding qualia, it helps to keep in mind that C.I. Lewis‟ 
work is avowedly within the Kantian structure of experience.
854
  I will have C.I. Lewis, 
then, indicate what he meant by qualia. 
There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given 
[Lewis‟ emphasis], which may be repeated in different 
                                               
850 John N. Towse, Graham J. Hitch, Zoë Hamilton, Kirsty Peacock and Una M.Z. Hutton. “Working 
Memory Period: The endurance of mental representations,” The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 58A.3, (2005), 548. 
851 Jeffrey P. Lozito and Neil W. Mulligan. “Exploring the Role of Attention During Memory Retrieval: 
Effects of semantic encoding and divided attention,” Memory & Cognition, 34.5, (2006), 986-998. 
852 Martha Ann Bell and Kirby Deater-Deckard. “Biological Systems and the Development of Self-
Regulation: Integrating Behavior, Genetics, and Psychophysiology,” Journal of Developmental & 
Behavioral Pediatrics, 28.5, (2007), 409-420. 
853 Cf. Alan D. Baddeley, V. Lewis, M. Eldridge and N. Thomson. “Attention and Retrieval from Long-
term Memory,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113, (1984), 518-540; Cf. A.D. Baddeley. 
“Working Memory,” Science, 255, (1992), 556-559; Cf. A.D. Baddeley. “Working Memory: The interface 
between memory and cognition,” Memory Systems 1994, D.L. Schacter and E. Tulving, eds. (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1994), 351-367; Cf. A. D. Baddeley. “Exploring the Central Executive,” Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 49A, (1996), 5-28. 
854 Cf. C.I. Lewis. Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge, (Boston: Dover 
Publications, 1991), 139, 151, 154, 216, and 320. 
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experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I call these 
“qualia.”  But although such qualia are universals, in the 
sense of being recognized from one to another experience, 
they must be distinguished from the properties of objects.  
Confusion of these two is characteristic of many historical 
conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories.  The 
quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of 
any possible error because it is purely subjective [my 
emphasis].  The property of an object is objective.
855
 
Lewis clarifies that by “universals” he does not mean the “„universals‟ of logic.”856 Lewis 
was also concerned to note that qualia “have no names.”857  Further, Lewis contrasts 
qualia with properties, and in particular the property of time.  So, “The qualia of sense as 
something given do not, in the nature of the case, have such temporal spread.”858  In this 
way, Lewis has indicated the Kantian domain for qualia is that of sensibility.  Lastly, the 
contemporary texts credited with maintaining the issues of qualia in the literature are 
Thomas Nagel‟s 1974, “What is it Like to Be a Bat?”859 Joseph Levine‟s 1983 
“Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap,”860 and Frank Jackson‟s 1986, “What 
Mary Didn‟t Know.”861 
 The question of qualia, then, revolves around a sort of riddle: What is a product of 
the subject, not a property of an object, and yet repeatable in experiences?  Considered 
still unsolved in 2009, this is not only a problem for the philosophy of mind; it is 
regarded as “the hard problem [my emphasis],” to be contrasted with the easy 
problems.
862
  The answer?  Well, you certainly have been primed for the correct answer: 
                                               
855 C.I. Lewis. Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge, 121. 
856 Lewis. Mind and the World Order, 61. 
857 Lewis. Mind and the World Order, 61. 
858 Lewis. Mind and the World Order, 61. 
859 Thomas Nagel. “What Is it Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review, (1974), 435-50. 
860 Joseph Levine. “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 
64, no. 4, October, 1983, 354–361. 
861 Frank Jackson. “What Mary didn't Know”, Journal of Philosophy, 83.5, (1986), 291–295. 
862 See Paul M. Churchland. “Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States,” Journal of 
Philosophy, 82, (1985), 8-28; See David J. Chalmers. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” 
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Memory(!).  Though this problem is not the target of my dissertation, here is a powerful 
example of the use of contemporary memory research – particularly, research on the 
topics of sensory memory, automaticity, and attention as a working memory process – to 
solve problems in the philosophy of mind.   
In the philosophy of mind, thinkers who refuse to accept that the mind can be 
reduced to physical brain states point to qualia as that which is untranslatable into the 
register of whatever may be found in the physical brain states.  Again, memory fits the 
bill.  No apparatus will ever be able to – in extracting across brains – account for the 
(memory of the) smell of aunt Florence‟s pepper sandwiches, even if universally the 
human brain section Z fiber P is activated when peppers are experienced.  Hence, this 
discussion of qualia is important, for example, because it need not divide neatly across 
Deleuze‟s intensity extensity distinction.  It can be seen as a more or less residual aspect 
of the constructive power of memory spanning the trajectory from sensation to ideas.  
Notice the Différance at work? 
Given the conversion power of the working memory, in Kantian language you 
could say it functions as the threefold synthesis of imagination.  Rendering the non-
discursive discursive, working memory cannibalizes itself at a span rate of 7±2.  
“Cannibalize” is a good word to use here because it captures the sense in which memory 
spans do not appear to have gaps – memory eating memory.  Through the language of 
Deleuze‟s emphasis on intensity in Kant‟s structure of experience: you remember the last 
                                                                                                                                            
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2.3, (1995), 200-219; See David J. Chalmers. “Absent Qualia, Fading 
Qualia, Dancing Qualia,” Conscious Experience, Thomas Metzinger, ed. (Kansas: Allen Press, 1995), 309-
330; Hans Flohr. “Qualia and Brain Processes,” Emergence of Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of 
Nonreductive Physicalism, Ansgar Beckerman, Hans Flohr and Jaegwon Kim, eds. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
1992), 220-240. 
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memory in such a way that the idea of flowing consecutiveness develops.  Hence, I think 
of this movement as following the logic of supplementarity, i.e. Derrida‟s Différance.   
§18 Satisficing – The idea of satisficing is intimately related with the idea of 
bounded rationality.  What I am hoping to illustrate by discussing the idea of satisficing, 
then, is the agent‟s relation with the choices she is contemplating in a satisficing 
situation.  By way of a theory of memory as play-ground cues from the environment, 
cues from your mood, cues from your habits (ethos), cues from recollection, cues from 
these aspects of the prior pulse of being and the cross-cuing involved as well – to name 
just a few of the “connections” – the ground seems full from within the fullness.  
However, there is a gap between the pulses of being to which the fullness is blind.  
Being‟s capacities are bound by being itself.  Non-being is none of the negations of 
oppositions within being; hence, we say “non-being” to refer to the gap which we cannot 
experience.      
The idea of satisficing makes an excellent point of departure, then, because it 
reminds you that your rationality is not total, i.e. boundless.  And, it reminds despite the 
seeming completeness or totality of options you can consider.  On the one hand, it can 
function analogously in regard to ontology.  On the other hand, because your capacity to 
recognize options is multiply grounded in memory, considering choices is both tied to 
your prolêptic capacity in regard to outcomes, and to your capacity to experience the 
environment in such as a way as to direct your agency at non-sensical and non-discursive 
clusters and experience them as options.  In other words, taking satisficing as a point of 
departure, you are reminded that your capacity to experience, and to relate your current 
experience with the past, is grounded in memory.  I think this ground of experience 
 519 
 
discursively barred by a logic of supplementarity, and I think the play of this ground as 
proof that the power is memory.     
Suffice to say, then, in regard to satisficing as support for my analogy: according 
to Michael Byron, 
It is testimony to the breadth of thought of Herbert Simon, 
the man who conceived the idea of „satisficing‟, that the 
concept has influenced such a wide variety of disciplines.  
To name a few: Computer science, game theory, 
economics, political science, evolutionary biology, and 
philosophy have all been enriched by reflection on the 
contrast between choosing what is satisfactory and 
choosing what is best.
863
 
Therefore, I am warranted in applying this idea outside of economics, i.e. in regard to 
ontology, epistemology, and (philosophy of psychology) memory.  Though Herbert 
Simon deserves the credit of coining such a “handy blended word [by] combing satisfy 
with suffice,”864 in regard to an idea of bounds, in deontological terms Kierkegaard was 
similarly seeking to be mindful of such a Kantian humility; “it is the duty of the human 
understanding to understand that there are things which it cannot understand.”865 
Further Byron writes, “The fecund and appealing idea of choosing what is 
satisfactory finds a place in the theory of practical reason, or thinking about what to 
do.”866  Hence, just as the older paradigm, “granted homo œconomicus an absurdly 
omniscient rationality,”867 this omniscience is analogous to the belief that individual 
being – despite the gap of ontological difference, the not-being of becoming, and the 
pulsing of the force that animates you – is boundless, total, and complete.  So, whereas 
                                               
863 Michael Byron, “Introduction,” Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1. 
864 Ken Manktelow, Reasoning and Thinking, (London: Psychology Press, 2000), 221. 
865 Kierkegaard, The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard, §633. 
866 Michael Byron, “Introduction,” Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1. 
867 Michael Byron, “Could Aristotle Satisfice?” Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical 
Reason, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 190. 
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satisficing emerges as a regulative idea of practical reason indicating practical reason‟s 
limitedness, my idea of memory emerges as a regulative idea indicating memory‟s 
incapacities as producing gaps in your being.  These gaps, then, at the sensory memory 
section of the structure of experience precisely point to non-being.  The gaps are not the 
gaps which allow for the flux upon which being floats and flows, i.e. Becoming.  The 
flowing occurs through and beneath the non-gaps, and this flowing is becoming.  Rather, 
these openings within being are the latches through which Plato‟s puzzle of the trinity is 
solved.             
§19 Parallel Distributed Processing Paradigm – With the 1980‟s, the Levels of 
Processing Paradigm (LOP) shifted into the Parallel Distributed Processing Paradigm 
(PDP) when in 1986 David Rumelhart and James L. McClelland published the collection 
of articles they edited under the title: Parallel Distributed Processing: Exploration in the 
Microstructure of Cognition.
868
  Regarding PDP, they suggest, “These models assume 
that information processing takes place through interactions of large numbers of simple 
processing elements called units, each sending excitatory and inhibitory signals to other 
units.”869  Notice in Deleuze‟s language: take the differential elements resonating, 
coupling and forcing a pulse up the structure of experience, then each unit includes the 
differential elements the forced intensity and the developed extensity.  Hence, though the 
authors refer to these units variously as “scripts,” “frames,” “schemata,” or “knowledge 
structures,” these units include the sensory elements upon which they depend if they are 
to be experiential at all.  In fact, including the experiential part of the structure does not 
                                               
868 Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. David Rumelhart and 
James L. McClelland, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986). 
869 D.E. Rumelhart, G.E. Hinton, & J.L. McClelland. “A General Framework for Parallel Distributed 
Processing,” Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. David 
Rumelhart and James L. McClelland, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 10. 
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hinder thinking the units collectively in a manner reminiscent of Pierre Bourdieu‟s (1930-
2002) notion of “habitus,”870 and John R. Searle‟s notion of “the Background.”871  
Consider the following at length quotes which distinguish between PDP and the 
older paradigms.  Toward the purpose of modeling experiential processes, PDP has the 
following to say explicitly about memory:  
What is the stored knowledge that gives rise to that pattern 
of activation?  In considering this question, we see 
immediately an important difference between PDP models 
and other models of cognitive processes.  In most models, 
knowledge is stored as a static copy of a pattern.  Retrieval 
amounts to finding the pattern in long-term memory and 
copying it into a buffer or working memory.  There is no 
real difference between the stored representation in long-
term memory and the active representation in working 
memory. In PDP models, though, this is not the case.
872
  
The distinction I hope to highlight being the PDP paradigm‟s ability to overcome the 
assumption of persistence.  The conclusion of the quote speaks directly to this. 
In these [PDP] models, the patterns themselves are not 
stored.  Rather, what is stored is the connection strengths 
between units that allow these patterns to be re-created 
[my emphasis]. … there is an instance unit assigned to each 
individual, but that unit does not contain a copy of the 
representation of that individual.  Instead, it is simply the 
case that the connections between [one unit] and the other 
units in the system are such that activation of the unit will 
                                               
870 In response to the interview question: “What was the principle behind your doubt about structuralism?” 
Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words, Matthew Adamson, tr. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1990), 9-
10. replied, “This word, strategies, evidently has to be stripped of its naively teleological connotations: 
types of behavior can be directed towards certain ends without being consciously directed to these ends, or 
determined by them.  The notion of habitus was invented, if I may say so, in order to account for this 
paradox.”   Cf. Pierre Bourdieu. Pascalian Meditations. Richard Nice, tr. (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 2000), passim. 
871 John R. Searle. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 151. 
872 D.E. Rumelhart, G.E. Hinton, & J.L. McClelland. “A General Framework for Parallel Distributed 
Processing,” Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. David 
Rumelhart and James L. McClelland, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 31. 
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cause the pattern for the individual to be reinstated on the 
property units.
873
 
These quotes directly address a primary support for the claim that experiencing being 
does not suffer interruptions.  In other words, it is possible to think that storage itself 
means persistence.  However, given the constraints on encountering and recognizing 
evidence for persistence – as the quotes above point out – PDP thinks each sphere within 
which to find the evidence as a creation.  Hence, though the patterns or structures within 
the creations – both discursive and non-discursive – are causally connected, between 
these creations are gaps.  Again, an easy way to think of this is to imagine an observer 
watching you whose power of observation moves at a faster rate than you are 
experiencing.  That is, to a being observing at a faster rate than you, what you experience 
as a full uninterrupted light by which you read, they experience as a strobe light.  See 
Figure 8.3.       
                                               
873 D.E. Rumelhart, G.E. Hinton, & J.L. McClelland. “A General Framework for Parallel Distributed 
Processing,” Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. David 
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Figure 8.3
874
 
Notice how the PDP paradigm attempts to show the experiential and the 
performative as blended.  On the one hand, this is not in violation of Kant‟s blindness 
thesis.  In fact, it actually approaches a way to articulate the excessivity of the non-
discursive.  On the other hand, the PDP paradigm thinks the entirety of the trajectory as 
discharged.  In other words, the PDP paradigm is consistent with the researching 
regarding priming, and it seeks to articulate the manner in which the excessivity of the 
primed factors surge with the burst as the structure of experience itself is discharged.  
This should remind you of an attempt to overcome the difficulties facing philosophers 
who attempt to think of memory which Dugald Stewart expressed at the beginning of this 
section.  Hence, with the PDP paradigm, the experiential is performed just as much as the 
                                               
874 Adapted from: David E. Rumelhart, P. Smolensky, James L. McClelland, and G.E. Hinton, “Schemata 
and Sequential Thought Processes in PDP Models,” Parallel Distributed Processing: Psychological and 
Biological Models, vol. 2, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1999), 10. 
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performance is experience.  It is from within the recollective standpoint that this intimacy 
gets muddled.    
Collectively, then, and from standpoints higher up in the structure of experience, 
the PDP paradigm contends these units interact with one another like a series of 
cascades
875
 spilling over into the next pulse with various tributaries participating in the 
falling flow.  A movement supposedly captured in the term “spreading activation.”  As an 
agent continually adjusts in a diverse environmental feedback loop, a large amount of the 
adjustment occurs below the discursive threshold of the structure of experience.  A 
favorite example in the literature: consider how kicking a soccer ball to advance to a 
better position in relation to the goal while navigating defenders and overcoming field 
conditions requires many adjustments which are agent specific without the agent‟s ability 
to take the time required to make discursively informed decisions regarding these 
adjustments.  Moreover, that the non-discursive adjustments can occur; that non-
discursive adjusting can change, i.e. non-discursive learning happens; and, that these 
adjustments and changes are not instantaneous together warrant the following two claims.  
On the one hand, the power traversing the sub-discursive threshold section of the 
structure of experience alternates between – being occupied and recovering – excitation 
and inhibition, i.e. in regard to its non-discursive adjustment or engagement.  On the 
other hand, this power is never raw, i.e. this power is always a power of memory – 
stabilized by memory; structured by memory; and, related across engagements and 
                                               
875 Cf. James L. McClelland. “On the Time Relations of Mental Processes: An Examination of Systems of 
Processes in Cascade,” Psychological Review, 86.4, (1979), 287-330. 
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adjustments by memory.
876
  Hence, from higher up in the structure, i.e. within the 
cascade, experience seems complete, total, or full; yet, as considering the non-discursive 
constraints reveals, experience depends upon a surging power the forced movement of 
which traverses the structure of experience as the structure of experience.      
   §20 Being Memory Bound – Individual being is grounded in, and thereby 
bounded by, memory.  On the one hand, bursts into the structure of experience determine 
the intensity and extensity along the trajectory of experience.  On the other hand, because 
memory spans – is distributed throughout – the structure of experience, individual being 
is bounded producing a situation analogous to that of bounded rationality.  Though being 
appears to persist – from within the discursive cascade –, the resonating allowed for by 
sensory memory results in the FINSTing-like forced movement, i.e. the pulsing power, of 
memory ascending the structure of experience.  Put another way, memory is that which 
structures the structure of experience.  Hence, following this description of the power of 
memory animating the structure of experience as it traverses it, the gaps between pulses 
is where to find non-being. 
Being bound, and thereby within, the discursive cascade of the higher memory 
functions, episodic, semantic, and verbal memory constitute an illusory panorama 
propped up on the filming of working memory‟s un-realing.  With the performance of 
priming wielding a logic of supplementarity through working memory permeating the 
standpoints correlative to its power and automaticity emerging as a mask of memory‟s 
play, the illusion of a “filled duration” prompts you to posit being‟s persistence.  Hence, 
if there is to be a sign of non-being, it must occur within being and be the result of the 
                                               
876 Cf. P.A. Byrne and J.D. Crawford, Cue reliability and a landmark stability heuristic determine relative 
weighting between egocentric and allocentric visual information in memory-guided reach,” Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 103.6, (2010), 3054-3069. 
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non-surge, i.e. some degree of failure to bridge the gap, between surges of being.  
Because the force animating the structure is the power of memory, the non-surge is 
revealed when memory‟s capacity to cascading-ly cover, i.e. retroactively and otherwise, 
the non-surge fails to some degree.  In other words, the “Empty Object without Concept,” 
the nihil negativum appears under the sign of “forgetting” as memory‟s surge fails to 
produce a filled duration illusion.   
Notice that forgetting moves along a trajectory of diminishing emptiness as 
memory‟s cascade fills-in for “what is forgotten” – even if this cascade is primarily just 
the automaticity or your script for coping with being forgetful.  Recall, “Even critics 
grant a role for automaticity or habit in the form of effects on performance without 
awareness of the source of those effects.”877  Yet, make no mistake, there is no “what is 
forgotten.”  “What is forgotten” is supposed to stand in for what is missing.  However, 
like the results of the logic of supplementarity, within the stacked deck surge of memory 
all expressions are positive as expressions, even when an expression expresses itself as 
not a positive expression.  Hence, there is no such thing as what is forgotten, and what is 
forgotten is not something different than what is remembered.   
Rather, what is forgotten is the attempt of what is remembered to cover over non-
being.  The experience of forgetting is an experience within being of being‟s failure to 
fully cover over with memory the gap between the pulses of being.  The gap is non-
being; altering your regulative idea, altering your script in the way which I have 
advocated for throughout this dissertation provides the necessary prolêptic for solving the 
problem of non-being.  So, the experience of forgetting is the indication of an individual 
                                               
877 James A. Debner and Larry L. Jacoby. “Unconscious Perception: Attention, Awareness, and Control,” 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20.3, (1994), 316. 
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being‟s pulsing, and the pulsing reveals non-being.  Though I will be even more explicit 
just below, at this point, I have taught you how to encounter non-being.  Hence, I have 
solved Plato‟s puzzle, i.e. the problem of non-being.    
Scalambrino‟s Structure and Trajectory of Experience 
“I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all.”  
~Immanuel Kant (CPR 1998, A 402) 
 
Of all that could be said under the heading of this section, in order to understand 
what I do say, consider that Part II of the dissertation is composed of Chapters 7, 8, and 9.  
Whereas Chapter 7 provides background for my use of memory to solve the problem of 
non-being, Chapter 8 provides the memory research with which I solve the problem, and 
Chapter 9 discusses the solution of the problem.  Since the first section of this chapter 
stated the solution by way of contemporary memory research, in this section I discuss the 
solution specifically as it relates to Kant‟s structure of experience.  Hence, this section 
should further clarify the solution to the problem by further explicating the philosophy of 
the above presented psychology. 
§21 Three interpretations of “not” as approaches to the problem of non-being – 
The three interpretations of not at work in regard to the problem of non-being are the 
following: (1) The idea of non-being via the idea of privation. (2) The idea of non-being 
via the idea of binary opposition. (3) The idea of non-being via the idea of experiential 
negation.  Whereas the first two are conceptual, the third is experiential.  Conceptual 
means either in reflection or recognition, i.e. “upward” enough in the structure of 
experience to be conceptual, and experiential refers to the (ontological) realization which 
indicates a non-conceptual ontological emergence.  I would like to note that though the 
idea of privation allows for not to be meant along degrees, and thereby correspond with a 
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spectrum of destruction – as it does in Aristotle via his matrix878 –, none of these 
destructions need refer to non-being; just because all destruction is not the same does not 
mean that one of those types of destruction solves the problem of non-being.  Hence, 
because the solution to the problem of non-being cannot be merely reflective or 
cognitive, only the third interpretation of not can provide a solution to the problem of 
non-being. 
§22 The road up is the road down – so long as you’re on it – In regard to the 
relations amongst Being, Becoming, and Non-Being and following the third 
interpretation of not noted above, from Becoming to Being indicates a process of 
ontological emergence.  However, Being to Becoming – making way for the next 
connectively originated burst of Being – produces a gap before the next emergence.  So, 
the road up the structure of experience is the road down the structure of experience as 
long as the structure of experience is maintained within a particular ontological 
emergence.   
So, we can structurally freeze frame a being.  Yet, in doing so, we engage the 
procedure of grasping and maintaining a regulative idea – the structure of experience.  
Being in this procedure, working memory can mask any gaps occurring in the 
performance of the procedure.  In fact, so long as the gaps are not too excessive, the gaps 
may also be masked to the eye of an outside observer, i.e. a being‟s audience.  Also, we 
tend to have default, i.e. habitual, scripts with which to deal with any ontological ruptures 
in our performance of a procedure.  Notice, structural freeze framing, then, is made 
possible by and re-emphasizes the value of distinctions such as those between logical and 
                                               
878 Again, just because Aristotle has degrees or a matrix of opposition, and thereby negation, does not mean 
his distinctions encompass, for example, Kant‟s experiential negation.  In other words, non-discursive 
opposition eludes Aristotle.  
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real negation and discursivity and non-discursivity.  However, it itself – we must 
remember – is the fruit of a procedure riding on an organization maintained by memory.  
 
§23 Memory’s jurisdiction – If all at once I had a finger in Pittsburgh, a finger in 
Paris, a finger in Chicago, and a finger in New Philadelphia, I would sense temperature 
differently than I currently do with my hand.  However, memory would, of course, be 
required to maintain the different senses and allow for cognitive elaboration of the senses 
in order to have said different sense of temperature.  On a more subtle level, this is 
precisely how you process a sense of “your” temperature currently.  In other words, you 
require memory.  Hence, memory‟s jurisdiction includes the entirety of the structure of 
experience from sense to ideas – even though you can cognitively isolate any aspect of 
the structure and reflect upon it in a way such that memory seems to not be a part of your 
concept of sensation. 
Indeed, Kant was well aware of the difficulty here, i.e. discerning memory‟s 
jurisdiction; it is the difficulty of thinking space without time.  Connecting, i.e. 
coordinating, space(s) means remembering one space with another space, proximal or 
not.  And though you might say that a “receptor” is required in physical space, such a 
determination is retrospective.  You did not strategically, i.e. cognitively or reflectively, 
place your fingers on your body such that they are wherever they happen to be.  Yet, 
retrospectively you give credit to your fingers for growing strategically in such a place to 
sense as they do.  The problem with thinking of sensation in such a way is that it 
overlooks the primordial connective power of memory, i.e. it reduces memory‟s 
jurisdiction. 
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   §24 Why call it “pulsing”? – As I discussed in both the Kant, the Derrida, and 
the Deleuze chapters, in Kant‟s structure of experience space is prior to time such that 
space contains infinities unthinkable because non-continual.  Within the continuity of 
time we can think of infinity.  Also in Kant‟s structure of mind – I discussed this in the 
Kant chapter when honoring Fichte for highlighting this – imagination is responsible for 
the time dimension when ascending the structure, i.e. traversing the trajectory of the 
structure.  So, it is the sensory manifold that is responsible for space.  Hence, the question 
becomes: How should we think about a power of the mind that is located in space without 
time. 
The way to think of this power is to think of it as connective – recall Kant calls it 
“coordinating” (B 112).  Retrospectively we tend to speak of one space, and we tend not 
to use Kant‟s language of space‟s infinities which are too excessive to think as such.  
However, sticking with Kant – and I might add that this argumentative move I am 
making, it seems to me, is a defining feature of post-structuralism – the ability to connect 
either entails a constant grip on all of the infinities or it entails a disconnecting for the 
sake of re-connecting differently.  Despite the former being reminiscent of various 
mystical doctrines which could be interpreted as involving memory, I do not follow it.  
Rather, I follow the latter.  Hence, at the structural level of space – in the structure of 
experience – there is a connecting and disconnecting which allows for the coordinating, 
and as the trajectory moves “up” such that an experience (in space and time) emerges out 
of this connecting and disconnecting, the trajectory of the structure takes on the character 
of a pulsing.  The pulse in experience, then, is an experience in one space, and the next 
pulse in experience is an experience in a different – ly connected – other one space.  
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Moreover, since space as the “bottom” of the structure of experience means the first 
indication of ontological emergence, the ontological emergence pulses, i.e. being emerges 
pulsing-ly. 
    §25 Why memory and not time – Keeping in mind what was just said about the 
ontological binding which occurs in the performance of a task, when applied to the 
performative aspect of the power of memory, each ontological burst has its own past, so 
the idea of persistence or connectedness across these ontological bursts which emerge is 
just that, an idea or a change in the weighting of a cue; both of these reveal – as you 
should be able by now to see without me pointing it out – their roots in memory, though 
in different ways.  First, through storage, i.e. recollective or sensory.  Second, through an 
altered capacity for performance. 
The connecting power of memory is not limited to linearity, as is the case with the 
connective power of time.  These connections at the structural level of space may be 
thought of as excessively related to the structural level of time – remaining faithful to the 
multiple-infinities aspect of space in Kant‟s structure of experience.  It is difficult to think 
of this level apart from memory, specifically memory‟s connective functions such as 
“instantiating” and “priming.” 
Instantiating refers to “connection weight” across spatial-level combinations.  In 
other words, increasing the frequency of the connection, say A-follows-B, increases the 
weight of that connection while reducing the weight of others, viz. non-A-followed-by-B 
connections.  Priming‟s method is automatic and multi-layered.  What is more, priming 
can shuffle multiple types of input through instantiation, e.g. images, scents, textures, 
tastes and ideas simultaneously.  Notice this simultaneity refers to the unity of what 
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emerges to the structural level of  time.  Depending, then, on the strength, i.e. weight, of 
the cues involved in a particular connecting of space, various objects, moods, and 
interpretations emerge to identify space – forgetting it is limited both physically and 
psychically.  
 Consider the example of shaking dice.  The power governing, i.e. binding, the 
procedure of shaking dice is memory.  On the one hand, if controlling the shake of the 
dice helps influence the correctness of predicting the outcome of a dice throw, then notice 
how memory must be involved to match each shaking of the dice across a number of 
tosses.  On the other hand, notice how shaking dice is itself a procedure.  So, here too, 
memory is intimately involved at every carnal movement to keep the shaking hand from 
performing a different procedure such as throwing the dice, punching the table, squeezing 
too tightly, etc. 
In sum, it is as if each cue at the structural level of experience contains its own 
past by way of being dragged along a network of cues and weighting its path.  Whereas 
memory in space is able to capture this amount of complexity, time cannot.  The 
trajectory‟s momentum from space to time is reflected in temporal infinity as a limit – an 
already delimited expression of an emergent being.  It is as if time were the structure‟s 
awareness of its trajectory‟s delimiting momentum.  This is why time does not solve the 
problem of non-being. 
Temporal negation seems as though it should apply to experience.  Time seems to 
overlay the conceptual and experiential levels of Kant‟s structure transparently.  
However, notice that the negation involved is a type of not-being; it negates within the 
ontological structure, it does not negate the structure.  Only when thinking in time, do I 
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reason that time goes on infinitely – even without me to think it.  And to say this is 
essentially to repeat that space contains infinities too complicated to be reproduced in 
time, since production itself requires selection amongst the infinities.  Hence, temporal 
negation is necessary but not sufficient for ontological negation.   
Only a negating of the power that is allowing for and binding emergent being will 
negate the emergent being.  So, this is why negating memory solves the problem of non-
being and negating time does not, i.e. the negation must include the structural level of 
space.  Whereas memory functions as a principle of organization, time is an aspect of the 
experience being instantiated and primed by memory. 
Lastly, Kant himself indicated in a footnote to the second Preface of the Critique 
of Pure Reason (B xl),  
Therefore this consciousness of my existence in time [my 
emphases] is linked, by way of identity, with the 
consciousness of a relation to something outside me; and 
hence what inseparably connects what is outside [my 
emphasis] me with my inner sense [i.e. time] is experience 
rather than invention, sense rather than my power of 
imagination [my emphasis]. (CPR 1996, B xl)  
Whereas Derrida presses the “by way of identity” piece of this quote to suggest time is 
discursive (cf. Ch. 4), I want to press “what inseparably connects what is outside me with 
my inner sense,” and that – as the above Kant quote points out – is at the level of “sense” 
in, i.e. at the bottom of, Kant‟s structure of experience.  Of course, this level of the 
structure of experience is supposed to be non-discursive, so there are two questions which 
arise: Why call it “sense”? and What is Kant doing talking about the “outside”?  I will 
answer both of these questions in the next section.  Hence, the next section is a 
continuation of this discussion: Why memory and not time? 
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§26 The cosmological concern of the “outside” – Having already assumed objects 
must conform to our knowledge, i.e. the structure by which we come to know an object, 
Kant refers to any concern for what is “outside” the structure by which we come to know 
an object as a “cosmological” concern.  Now, to be fair, solving the problem of non-being 
does not require that I discuss the “outside.”  However, discussing the outside is a faster 
way of communicating the ramifications of the solution to the problem of non-being, and 
it is also consistent with Kant‟s work.  Hence, though I follow Kant in using the 
problematic term of the “outside” for the sake of efficiency, solving the problem of non-
being does not depend on explaining “the outside.”     
 In fact, discussing the outside is yet another way to highlight the illicit nature of 
the reduction of Becoming, Being, and Non-Being to Becoming and Being.  In the case 
of the latter, the outside is forced to refer to Becoming.  In the wake of my solution to the 
problem of non-being, “outside” can be meant in at least two, if not multiple, ways.  In 
order to get a grip on this term “outside” it is perhaps best to return to the Critique of 
Pure Reason.  Kant repeatedly uses the term “outside” when discussing the mind 
independent features of – what he contextualizes as – cosmology (Cf. A 672/B 700).   
In the second Preface, Kant suggests the following clarification to the first edition 
of his work: 
[T]his persisting element cannot be an intuition in me.  For 
all the determining grounds of my existence that can be 
encountered in me are representations, and as such they 
themselves need something persisting distinct from them, 
in relation to which their change, and thus my existence in 
the time in which they change, can be determined. (CPR 
1998, B xxxix)   
Kant then supposes a counter response to his clarification:  One “will perhaps say: I am 
immediately conscious to myself only of what is in me, i.e. of my representation of 
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external things [my emphasis]; consequently it still remains undecided [my emphasis; cf. 
Derrida] whether there is something outside me corresponding to it [i.e. my 
representation] or not.”  (CPR 1998, B xxxix)  Notice, this counter response which Kant 
supposes is a critique of the “outside.”  On the one hand, though I will merely refer 
readers back to the Introduction, Chapter Three, and Chapter Five here to find support for 
this claim, the problematic of the outside is itself tied up with the question of outside the 
forms and outside the dialectic.  On the other hand, Kant‟s subsequent clarification to his 
supposed counter response accomplishes three goals: (1) it explains why the solution to 
the problem of non-being – because it involves the ground of the structure of experience 
– involves outer sense and not inner sense, i.e. space and not time; (2) it explains how 
Kant thinks of the outside, outer sense, and inner sense as a chain of conditions, e.g. outer 
sense as a condition for inner sense or space as condition for time; and (3) it legitimates 
the use of the term “outside” in regard to cosmology, i.e. the relations amongst 
Becoming, Being, and Non-Being. 
 Here, then, is Kant‟s subsequent clarification to his supposed counter response: 
This consciousness of my existence is thus bound up 
identically with the consciousness of a relation to some-
thing outside me, and so it is experience and not fiction, 
sense and not imagination, that inseparably joins the outer 
with my inner sense; for outer sense is already in itself a 
relation of intuition to something actual outside me [my 
emphasis]; and its reality, as distinct from imagination, 
rests only on the fact that it is inseparably bound up with 
inner experience itself, as the condition of its possibility. 
(CPR 1998, B xl) 
First, then,  notice, despite the faculties lining the structure of experience in Kant‟s first 
edition Transcendental Deduction, “sense and not imagination … joins the outer with my 
inner sense.”  Second, the area of overlap between outside and inside is space, i.e. outer 
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sense.  Kant claims, “outer sense is already in itself a relation of intuition to something 
actual outside,” and the reality of outer sense is the condition for the possibility of “inner 
experience.”  This, of course, invokes three terms: the outside, outer sense, i.e. the 
intuition of space, and inner sense, i.e. the intuition of time.  Third, and lastly, these three 
terms encompass an ontological emergence from Becoming to Being (Cf. A 478/B 506).  
Hence, Kant will later say, “I am just as certainly conscious that there are things outside 
me to which my sensibility relates, as I am conscious that I myself exist determined in 
time.” (CPR 1998, B xli) 
§27 Emergence with (retrospectively identified) contingency not correspondence 
– The following two Kant quotes precisely show the trajectory along the structure of 
experience for our being‟s ontological emergence.  After sharing these two quotes with 
you, I will discuss them.  First, according to Kant,  
The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, 
insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation.  That intuition 
which is related to the object through sensation is called 
empirical.  The undetermined object of an empirical 
intuition is called appearance [Kant‟s emphases]. (CPR 
1998, A 20/B 34) 
Second, “All our cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding, 
and ends with reason, beyond which there is nothing higher to be found in us to work on 
the matter of intution.” (CPR 1998, A 298/B 355)  Hence, it is in this way that reason 
“never applies directly to experience or to any object but instead applies to the 
understanding.” (CPR 1998, A 302/B 359) 
 That reason does not apply directly to experience ensures that the identity of an 
ontological emergence must relate contingently – and not correspond directly – to the 
Becoming out of which it emerged.  In my opinion, this is already contained in Kant‟s 
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innovative discursive/non-discursive distinction; however, above is Kant deducing 
contingency from the structure of experience itself.  Notice it is not accurate to make the 
logical quip here that – as Trendelenburg attempted with Kant (Cf. Ch. 2) – it may be 
possible for Becoming and Being to “line up” so as to correspond to one another; this can 
never be the case because the structure of experience, i.e. the ontological emergence is 
already a delimiting.  Hence, Becoming exceeds Being.  So, Being‟s relation to 
Becoming must be a contingent relation. 
 Now, it is possible to alter Kant‟s structure of experience by correcting his 
misunderstanding of “affinity.”  Following contemporary memory research, notice the 
anticipations of procedurally organized activity are, necessarily, organized and 
maintained by memory.  Put another way, a being‟s dependence on memory can already 
be seen by analyzing the notion of procedure.  Further, even passively, sensory 
identification can be controlled by way of practice to the point of inapprehension.  
Beyond the point of inapprehension, of course, there is nothing to discuss.  For example, 
these observations do not deny skin‟s ability to transfer temperature, by Being in, i.e. 
emergent out of, Becoming, you are immersed in temperature; rather these observations 
suggest the organization of that in which you are immersed so as to allow for sensing 
temperature depends on memory.           
§28 That it is v. What it is – It might add clarification to invoke two perennial 
philosophical sets of distinctions.  The first distinction is between “that it is” and “what it 
is,” and the second is the distinction between “subject” and “object.”  Being in the wake 
of Kant‟s Copernican revolution means the ground of the structure of experience is the 
ground of the subject.  Objects conform to mind.  So, if the power at the ground of 
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experience, i.e. at the ground of the subject, is non-discursive, then the question guiding 
this clarification: Why call it memory – recall Kant calls it sense?   
In order for us to say that an entity is for a subject, the subject must process an 
experience of the entity in question.  This does not deny that there are objects in the 
world.  There may be a chair in the kitchen; however, we are talking about experience, 
and that the chair is for a subject means the subject is experiencing the chair.  Hence, that 
an object is for a subject requires the subject to process an experience of the object. 
In order to say what an entity is for a subject, the subject must further elaborate 
the experience of that the entity is for the subject.  Notice this means maintaining that it is 
in order to elaborate that into what.  I emphasize these two terms because they are the 
terms that contemporary memory researcher – discussed above – employ to discuss the 
process of memory in experience.  If you do not maintain that an entity is in experience, 
it would be as if you would forget why you were trying to think of the word “chair.”  
That is something I just bumped into.  What is it?  It is a chair. 
So, there are objects in the world to be encountered that we refer to as “chairs.”  
This does not mean that you are constantly experiencing a chair.  In fact, even if you are 
always sitting, it does not mean that you are constantly experiencing a chair.  Hence, the 
subject processes different objects through experience. 
The object of experience, then, can be divided into that it is and what it is.  The 
object of experience can be divided as such because we are talking about experience, and 
“experience” means an experiencing subject.  We are not talking about the number of 
chairs in the world at any given point in history.  Rather, we are talking about the process 
of experiencing what we conceptualize as a “chair.”  The shorthand I have been using 
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throughout the dissertation to discuss this is to say: encountering the – that it is – chair 
engages the lower part of the structure of experience, and conceptualizing what it is, i.e. a 
“chair,” engages a higher part of the structure of experience.  I have Kant to thank for the 
ability to talk about the process of experience in this way. 
Keeping with the above discussion of the structure of experience as a “vertical” 
process, e.g. “lower” or “higher” in the structure, there are, then, two major kinds of 
change to discuss in regard to the subject of experience.  First, there is the change which 
moves from that it is to what it is or what it is to that it is regarding the same object – for 
ease of reference call this “vertical change in regard to the subject of experience.”   
Second, there is the change from either a that to a different that or a different what or the 
change from a what to a different what or different that – for ease of reference call this 
“horizontal change in regard to the subject of experience.”  These then, in regard to the 
experiencing subject, are the major kinds of change.  Notice, I say “major” because the 
difference between touching a chair and seeing the same chair belong to the that it is part 
of the structure of experience.   
Now that the distinctions are in place, we can use them to talk about the relations 
amongst Becoming, Being, and Non-Being.  When we say that it is, notice we are making 
a type of ontological claim.  We are saying that some entity is.  Yet, whenever we invoke 
change, it is essentially unanimous that we are invoking Becoming.  So, does this mean 
that discussing horizontal change in regard to the subject of experience is a discussion of 
Becoming?  And, if so, then what does this say about Being – recall horizontal change is 
across different entities, i.e. beings?  To answer both questions at once: Yes, Becoming is 
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tied up with Being in regard to horizontal change.  So, what about vertical change in 
regard to the subject? 
Because we are subjects, it is by way of vertical change that we can discuss 
Becoming as not tied up with Being.  In order to discuss Becoming as not tied up with 
Being we must look to the that it is part of the structure of experience while keeping in 
mind that the trajectory of experience, i.e. the upward direction in the structure, is a 
narrowing trajectory.  What I mean by “narrowing” is exactly what Kant meant.  In other 
words, that it is exceeds what it is because that it is can be multiple whats.  For example, 
a chair can also be a stepping stool, a family heirloom, kindling for a fire, a lion taming 
device, a radio stand, etc.  Hence, moving further upward, i.e. away, from the ground of 
experience and deeper into conceptuality is a narrowing, and moving further downward, 
i.e. toward the ground of experience is a broadening. 
At the ground of the structure of experience, then, there is a large amount of 
potential thats within sensible proximity to the subject.  To think any cluster of this 
potentiality is to zip it up the structure of experience and into the realm of whats.  Hence, 
were we able to think this ground of sensible proximity to the subject, we would be able 
to think of Becoming that is not tied up with Being.  Most philosophers, it seems to me, 
forget to think about this ground of sensible proximity to the subject. 
To conclude:  In order for us to have an experience of that it is, aspects of this 
Becoming, i.e. aspects of the ground of sensible proximity to the subject, must be 
connected to one other.  After all, you differentiate between the smell of the pie and the 
feel of the chair, though they both occur in the kitchen.  Further, once connected, these 
aspects must be maintained in order to be elaborated from that it is to what it is.  You 
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might recall: Contemporary memory research suggests both that sensory memory is 
instantiating by being connective and that the process of maintenance and elaboration 
depend on memory.  Moreover, this is how memory binds the being of the subject.   
So: Why call it memory – recall Kant calls it sense; moreover it is a non-
discursive power?  The answer: Memory accounts for, i.e. memory allows for, both the 
processing at each level of the structure of experience and the continuity “up” the 
structure of experience.  The problem of Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction is precisely 
the problem of the continuity of the structure of experience, i.e. how to account for the 
structure‟s trajectory.  Maintenance and elaboration – terms I borrow wholesale from 
contemporary memory research – account for the structure‟s trajectory.  Imagination does 
not combine sensibility and understanding – imagination does not combine that it is with 
what it is.  Rather, memory‟s maintenance allows for the elaboration of that which is 
maintained into what is maintained.  This is why the power at the ground of the subject 
should be thought of as memory. 
Now, since memory allows for a movement from, i.e. a stabilization of, 
Becoming, i.e. the ground of sensible proximity to the subject, into Being, we can focus 
specifically on the connective aspect of the ground of experience.  Notice, this precisely 
overlaps with the discussion above regarding the coordinating – Kant‟s language – of 
space‟s multiple infinities.  Because the power (of memory) at the ground must be 
connective, it must also be dis-connective.  In other words, in order to connect some 
aspects of the ground, i.e. unify some aspects into a that it is, it must disconnect other 
aspects.  Since, we tend to think in time, let me state it in temporal language for ease of 
understanding: Connecting some aspects of the ground means disconnecting the 
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previously connected aspects.  The connecting and disconnecting constitute – voilà – the 
beginning of an ontological burst for, i.e. of, the subject.  Your being is not persisting; it 
is pulsing.     
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“In order to comprise all the preceding in one notion, it is first of all necessary to remind the reader that the 
discussion here is not about the genesis of experience, but about that which lies in experience.  The former 
belongs to empirical psychology…”879 
~Immanuel Kant 
 
“When I awoke … not knowing where I was, I could not even be sure at first who I was … but then 
memory – not yet of the place in which I was … would come like a rope let down from above to draw me 
up out of the abyss of non-being…”880  
~Marcel Proust 
 
“All is ephemeral, the one remembering and the one remembered.”881 
~Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations, Bk IV, §35 
 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion – A Critique of Pure Difference  
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 9 Sections and Objectives 
There are only two sections to Chapter 9.  As promised at the beginning of this 
dissertation, after presenting my solution I planned to discuss the different vista of being 
the solution provides.  I also suggested the perhaps largest impact of the solution might 
pertain to ethics.  Keeping in mind the material in this chapter is supplementary to the 
work of solving the problem of non-being, then, there are two words I would use to 
describe this chapter: figurative and indicative.  Yet, this chapter should further 
familiarize you with the solution to the problem since I will explicitly show you how my 
solution meets Plato‟s criteria for solving the problem, i.e. how I overcome the two 
impasses of the problem.  Hence, in the first section of this chapter I provide a figurative 
statement of the solution to the problem of non-being with explicit reference to meeting 
Plato‟s criteria for solving the problem, and in the second section of this chapter I initiate 
a discussion of what may be the value of solving the problem of non-being.   
                                               
879 Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, §21a, 55. 
880 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, Vol. 1: Swann’s Way, C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin, tr., D.J. Enright, rev., (New York: The Modern Library, 2003) 4-5.  Translation modified. 
881 Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations, G.M.A. Grube, tr. (New York: Hackett, 1983), 33. 
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Non-Being ex Priority of Being: Scalambrino‟s Solution to the Problem of Non-Being 
“We are ourselves the beings to be analyzed.”882 
~Martin Heidegger 
 
Think through this with me: On the one hand, memory is, of course, self-evident.  
On the other hand, memory is a mask.  Let me begin with “self-evident.”  You should 
know when you grasp an object that your practice at grasping objects and the technique 
with which you grasp objects, including the floating identity of the object you grasp, 
depend upon memory.  I use the word “grasp” here to speak both parts of its double 
entendre simultaneously, i.e. conceptual and experiential grasping.  I use the word 
“floating” here to remind you of the relational play-ground of the object‟s identity.  In 
other words, there are aspects of the object grasped which depend upon the dexterity with 
which you grasp objects, and the other prerequisites for grasping an object can also be 
ordered along the descending trajectory of experience.  As such, these prerequisites 
cluster around the respective memory standpoints of the structure of experience.  Hence, 
memory is intimately involved in all aspects of experience, and, as such, should be self-
evident. 
Yet, memory is also a mask because it operates according to the logic of 
supplementarity.  You simply cannot experience an object without engaging memory.  
And, this is the correct context in which to regress an object to the thing-in-itself.  The 
regression “down” the trajectory of experience, in this context, then means regressing 
down the memory standpoints.  Recall Chapter two‟s quotes from Leibniz and 
Malebranche and the failure of Kant‟s 18th century eyes to read “affinity” as a function of 
memory.  On the way down the trajectory of experience Derrida‟s Différance is 
                                               
882 Martin Heidegger, Being & Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, tr., (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2001), 67. 
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encountered at the level of the working memory – a performative aspect located just 
beneath the recollective/conceptual standpoint.  Derrida provides an accurate account of 
what happens when you try to lift the discursive mask riding memory‟s performance.  
Recall, “Most of the cognitive and linguistic patterning and structuring of experience is 
taken for granted rather than actively registered or interpreted.  Our understanding and 
our application of concepts, for example, are processes that generally occur „on 
automatic.‟”883  In fact, Nietzsche‟s celebrated quote is appropriate here:  
Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted 
thoughts!  It was not long ago that you were still so 
colorful, young, and malicious, full of thorns and secret 
spices – you made me sneeze and laugh – and now?  You 
have already taken off your novelty, and some of you are 
ready, I fear, to become truths … What things do we copy, 
writing and painting, we mandarins with Chinese brushes, 
we immortalizers of things that can be written – what are 
the only things we are able to paint? … always only birds 
that grew weary of flying and flew astray and now can be 
caught by hand … And it is only your afternoon, you, my 
written and painted thoughts, for which alone I have colors, 
many colors perhaps … but nobody will guess from that 
how you looked in your morning, you sudden sparks and 
wonders of my solitude, you my old beloved … thoughts! 
(BGE 236-237, §296) 
Taking “afternoon” to refer to the mid-point of the structure of experience – 
constellations of Ideas occurring in ἐλαληίνλ‟s starry night – and “can” indicating 
discursivity as the adjustment of waking from ἕηεξνλ‟s morning, Nietzsche‟s quote 
colorfully echoes Kant‟s excessivity of non-discursivity as an epitaph for any 
correspondence theories regarding experience.  Hence, memory is also a mask; and, 
beneath the mask? Another mask – this is why I stated numerous times above that 
Derrida‟s innovation of Différance is valuable, but not in the way he intended it. 
                                               
883 R.D.V. Glasgow, Madness, Masks, and Laughter: An Essay on Comedy, (Madison: Teaneck, 1995), 33. 
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Beyond memory‟s self-evidence and memory‟s logic of supplementarity, the 
ground of experience is memory at play – memory as the play-ground of experience.  
Without artificially confining the performance of memory, e.g. in laboratory settings, 
memory‟s performance is too complexly primed to predict its bloom, e.g. think 
retroactively effective memory and Multiple Object Tracking.  Moreover, the priming is 
intertwined with the other major aspect of implicit performative memory involved, i.e. 
procedural memory.   
What I mean is that, once activated, the performance of various procedures 
influence further activations; recall my example of tapping a cup on the table – various 
procedures activate other procedures with differing “break points.”884  Complicating 
matters to the point of seeming paradoxical, given the influence of context, mood, and the 
agent‟s tendencies in regard to chunking, experience can seem as boundless as you wish 
it to be.  Yet, this seeming infinity is, of course, an aspect of finding another mask 
beneath every mask.  Hence, memory‟s self-evidence and putative boundlessness require 
the play of memory from “beneath”885 in order to be activated.  Think of my rendition of 
Deleuze‟s Baroque House graphic (Figure 5.6) and the PDP graphic above (Figure 8.3).  
There are two aspects of what I am currently discussing which I will further flesh out 
below: first, the extent to which what I am describing in regard to contemporary memory 
research is a re-description of the work shown above by Kant, Derrida, and Deleuze, and, 
second, the consequences of incorporating the play-ground of memory into a regulative 
idea regarding memory‟s self-evidence.      
                                               
884 Cf. Larry L. Jacoby and Colleen M. Kelley. “Unconscious Influences of Memory for a Prior Event,” 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13.3 (1987), 314-336.  
885 In regard, of course, to the structure of experience. 
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The factors which function in the play of memory, then, make non-discursive 
memory too excessive to be regressively identified.  This is the same problem that Kant, 
Derrida, and Deleuze acknowledge, and it is also the perplexity associated with the 
second impasse of the problem of non-being.  On the one hand, how can you accurately 
depict excessive non-discursive functioning occurring beneath the threshold of 
discursivity?  On the other hand, if such non-discursive functioning cannot be depicted, 
then how can you indicate the (real) negation of the functioning so as to solve the 
problem of non-being?  Hence, Gorgias‟ strategy enhanced by Kant, Derrida, and 
Deleuze can advance only this far – as exemplified by the above two questions.      
Deleuze‟s innovation was to think of the ground – the play of memory from 
beneath, in this case – as expressing a power which could – depending upon its intensity 
– traverse the structure of experience.  I do not take issue with this aspect of Deleuze‟s 
innovation.  Rather, I take issue with Deleuze‟s assumption of persistence.  So, by 
thinking memory as the power traversing the structure of experience, and the higher 
aspects of the power as expressly connected with the lower – I, of course, mean higher 
and lower here in regard to the structure of experience –, then, each expression, each 
burst can be thought of as a solidified expression of being memory bound.  Further, 
notice that this speaks directly to the importance of changing the regulative idea, i.e. the 
memory script, involved when encountering memory‟s self-evidence – recognizing that 
your recognizing depends on memory is not yet sufficient.  Rather, a distinction must be 
made between what is not the agent and what is the agent, in order to see experience as 
bound by memory and experience as memory “all the way down.”  Hence, Deleuze‟s 
innovation accounts for a power spanning the trajectory of experience, and Deleuze‟s 
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extensity intensity distinction can be coupled with a distinction between the physicality of 
the environment
886
 and the physicality of the agent to conclude the list of necessary 
distinctions.   
Contemporary memory research teaches that memory systems function differently 
than physical systems.  The idea you have of how an object interacts with another object 
in physical space does not provide an accurate account of the interactions between 
“memories.”  First and foremost, the physical account cannot accurately account for the 
activity of memory because it is merely convention (a language game) to speak of 
“memories” as such.  In other words, there are no isolated “memories” which can be 
placed in storage and retrieved intact later.  The easy justification here would be the 
verifiability, or lack thereof, factor; however, the justification that the memory in 
question is not a physical object should be just as clear.  These two justifications pertain 
to the conceptual standpoint.  Moreover, in regard to the apperceptive standpoint, the 
“you” who “looks back” is either looking at images and ideas predicated upon 
experiential factors or is in a mode of reflection.  Hence, the conceptual and apperceptive 
standpoints may be seen depending upon memory‟s complicated cuing, i.e. not like a 
physical system of correspondences.     
Yet, the sliding from solidified sphere of experience to solidified sphere of 
experience is certainly constrained, e.g. image to image, thought to thought perception to 
perception, etc.  What is more, the constraints cannot be reduced to the physical.  The 
most relevant difference here, then, between the two types of accounts: you cannot look 
to the content of the memory system in order to discover its constraints.  The constraints 
of the memory system derive from the play which, though producing the “memory,” 
                                               
886 Cf. Yvaral, “Marilyn Numerisée #420,” 1990. 
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eludes the content of the memory.  Recall, memory is the power stabilizing the physical 
factors involved regarding the agent‟s experiential standpoint, e.g. saccadic sensory 
memory.    Hence, the constraints pertain to the power producing the content of 
experience.   
Finally, then, combine the constraints piece with the solidified sphere piece.  I use 
the term “solidified sphere” of experience in order to refer to the bound content whatever 
that content happens to be.  Recall that from within the bound content, the sliding from 
content to content – burst to burst – appears seamless.  Contemporary memory research 
refers to the appearance of seamlessness as “the filled duration illusion.”887  Moreover, 
recognition takes place within the bound content.  However, since the constraints do not 
appear as such within the content, the constraints pertain to the non-discursive power of 
memory – from experiential standpoint “up” – binding the content.  Recall, according to 
contemporary memory research, the traversing of the structure was referred to as the 
“maintenance” of the power, and the upward movement referred to as the power‟s further 
“elaboration.”  Lastly, as countless examples illustrate,888 even in regard to the non-
discursive automaticity and fluency, the power of memory is not perpetual.  Yet, the gaps 
between memory’s discharge and recovery are concealed by the bound content.  Hence, 
each (non-discursive) gap (non-discursively) constitutes the (non-discursive) absence of 
being.         
                                               
887 Cf. Lorraine G. Allan, “The internal clock revisited,” Time, Action, and Cognition: Toward Bridging the 
Gap, Françoise Macar, et al. ed., (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), 191-202; Cf. R.C. Ihle 
and W.E. Wilsoncroft, “The filled-duration illusion: Limits of duration of interval and auditory fillers,” 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 56.2, (1983), 655-660; Cf. John H. Weardon, et al. “Internal Clock Processes 
and the Filled-Duration Illusion,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 33.3, (2007), 716-729; Cf. B.H. Repp and M. Bruttomesso, “A filled duration illusion in 
music: Effects of metrical subdivision on the perception and production of beat tempo,” Advances in 
Cognitive Psychology, 13.5, (2010), 114-134. 
888 Think of the celebrated “kicking a soccer ball” example. 
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Thus I have been describing the regulative idea with which to recognize non-
being, i.e. providing you with a prolêptic.  The solution to the problem of non-being is 
found in the gaps between memory‟s bindings.  Yet, these gaps cannot be a part of 
experience.  So, as I explained in Chapter 8 above, you must look for a sign within a 
bound memory experience indicating the failure of memory to fully recover from the gap 
of non-being.  By “fully” here I mean sufficiently such that you do not notice the 
seemingly seamless sliding has been interrupted.  Since the power involved here is 
memory, the indication of the gap comes with the adjustment within a memory bound 
experience to forgetting.  Forgetting – as such and in regard to shifting and cycling of 
procedures – functions as an indication of memory‟s failure to fully recover from the gap.  
Not the idea of forgetting as non-being, and not the idea of non-being as non-being; 
rather, it is the regulative idea which recognizes forgetting as being‟s coping with a glitch 
in its coping with non-being that allows for the proper relation, i.e. anticipation, to 
encounter non-being (with/while being).  I will show you, then, in regard to Plato‟s 
puzzle of the Sophist, that I have solved the problem of non-being.   
In the Introduction I summarized that a successful strategy for solving the 
problem of non-being would: involve looking for non-being in experience, and would 
involve an awareness of the (experiential) structure which allows for being.  This is 
precisely what I have done by critiquing Derrida and Deleuze in regard to pure 
difference.  I have incorporated their innovations in regard to the experiential standpoint, 
i.e. experience, and I have critiqued their thoughts regarding the aspect of experience 
which they supposed to indicate non-being.  Ultimately the downfall of their attempts can 
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be traced to Kant, and his excusable mistake of not recognizing affinity as an indication 
of the power of memory. 
Also in the Introduction I indicated that following Gorgias the inapprehension 
occurring within experience which indicates non-being would need to be described so as 
to make it clear what this inapprehension might look like in experience.  I have succeeded 
in making this inapprehension clear without falling victim to the other impasse.  In other 
words, notice my solution to the problem of non-being does not violate Plato‟s criteria: 
 [W]e maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute 
being to non-being? … Do you see, then, that not-being in 
itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it 
is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable?
889
 
(Soph 1895, 238c)   
[Σπλλνεῖο νὖλ ὡο νὔηε θζέμαζζαη δπλαηὸλ ὀξζῶο νὔη‟ 
εἰπεῖλ νὔηε δηαλνεζῆλαη ηὸ κὴ ὄλ αὐηὸ θαζ‟αὑηό, ἀιι‟ 
ἔζηηλ ἀδηαλόεηόλ ηε θαὶ ἄξξεηνλ θαὶ ἄθζεγθηνλ θαὶ 
ἄινγνλ;]890 
I too maintain being cannot be attributed to the gap between memory‟s bursts which bind 
being.  Also, I maintain that the gaps of which I speak are non-discursive, i.e. unutterable, 
unspeakable, and indescribable.  Notice, I am not describing the gaps directly.  This is 
why I used the language of “indirectly” in the Introduction.  I am describing the way the 
regulative idea needs to be constructed in order to accurately depict the power allowing 
for and traversing the structure of experience.  Making the further distinction between the 
physicality of the environment, at the command of your being, and the non-physical 
power of memory, I was able to describe the power – not the gap – as pulsing.  After you 
incorporate this thinking into your regulative idea, you can then notice a difference within 
your being indicating the lingering of the inapprehension.  Once this is a part of your 
memory script, then, from within being you can recognize “your” non-being.  The 
                                               
889 Taking non-being for κὴ ὄλ. 
890 Plato, Theaetetus and Sophist, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 342. 
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recognition is not non-being; the recognition is of the inapprehension in experience from 
the gap in memory, i.e. non-being.  In this way I have solved the problem of non-being. 
Non-Being & Memory: Your being is not persisting; it is pulsing 
“in the scent of chrysanthemums, 
climbing through the dark 
at festival time”891 
~Bashō, Hokku, §713  
 
“Thence we came forth once more to see the stars.”892 
~Dante Alighieri, Inferno, Canto XXXIV 
 
 So what might the value of solving the problem of non-being be?  I believe the 
consequences of solving the problem of non-being are wide reaching.  On the one hand, 
in regard to the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology, I hope to have shown 
the value of discussing memory, not mind.  I am reminded of Ed Casey‟s comment here: 
the rooting of the word “memory” in memor- (mindful) – 
and ultimately of “remembering,” “reminding,” and 
“reminiscing” in mens (mind) – bespeaks the same 
ingrediency, as does the striking fact that gemynd in Old 
English means equally “memory” or “mind.893 
Elsewhere I pursue these insights more fully.  On the other hand, I believe the solution to 
the problem of non-being should be employed toward rethinking a number of our 
ontological and epistemological commitments – these may be explored by further 
examining the way my solution critiques the solutions put forward by Aristotle, Kant, 
Hegel, Derrida, and Deleuze.  However, the commitments I am interested in discussing 
here are the ethical ones.   
                                               
891 Matsuo Bashō, Bashō’s Haiku: Selected Poems, David Landis Barnhill, tr. (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2004), 152. 
892 Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy: The Inferno, Purgatory, and Paradise, Frederick Pollock, tr. 
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1854), 191.   
893 Ed Casey, Remembering: A Phenomenological Study, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 
258. 
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In the attempt to announce my approach to discussing the ethical consequences, I 
might suggest the consequences generally pertain to death and the connection between 
being and history.  If my solution to the problem of non-being is correct – and given 
Plato‟s criteria, it is correct –, then your being is not persisting; it is pulsing.  What this 
means is that an incorrect valuation has become attached to the physical vessel for your 
being.  A number of thinkers attempt to confront this overvaluation by attacking the issue 
of identity.  However, the issue of identity does not sufficiently address the heart of what 
is at stake, i.e. being.  The solution to the problem of non-being shows your being 
entering and leaving, so to speak, its physical vessel
894
 repeatedly throughout what 
appears to be a continuous, i.e. seamless, life.   
In regard to death, the solution to the problem of non-being seems, at least, to 
suggest that physical death will not be the first time you cease to be.  I am reminded of 
Epicurus: “Death is nothing to us.”895  The extent to which you think this speaks to the 
immortality of your being may be the extent to which you think of your being as a non-
personal force of change in the physical world.  However, to ask the question of “where” 
in regard to this pulsing should seem like a misplacement of discursivity.
896
  Recall, a 
significant amount of maintenance and elaboration must occur in order to traverse from 
the play-ground of memory to the recollective standpoint and the emergence of personal 
identity.  Hence, perhaps history need not be tied to individual being in such a literal, or 
even physical, way.  
                                               
894 It, of course, doesn‟t really make sense to speak of “physical vessel,” if you understand what I‟ve been 
saying.  But I‟m trying to quickly communicate the value of the solution in regard to the formation of an 
ethics.  
895 Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” The Epicurus Reader, Lloyd P. Gerson, tr. (New York: Hackett, 
1994), 7. 
896 This is also the problem with using the term “physical.” 
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If I think that my life is my history from birth to death, then goals such as 
extending my life and enhancing the narrative of that history may seem reasonable.  If I 
think of my life as the pulsing of a power into a physical realm, then goals such as better 
preparing this realm for the return of being(s) may seem satisfactory and sufficient.  The 
link between being and the narrative regarding the course of physical change may be 
more tenuous than we would like to admit.  Since, per my view, memory goes “all the 
way down” the rupture called “forgetting” is truly an opening “all the way down.”897  
Experientially, the loss in forgetting is total.   
If you never remember “again,” then from the perspective of others, “you are 
gone.”  It is as if without the sufficient escape velocity (from non-being “back” into 
being), you do not even get the chance to say “good bye.”  Yet, what I take to be one of 
the best aspects about this view is that it is impossible to be Romantic about the loss.  
What I mean is that despite my descriptive use of metaphors, in light of the solution to 
the problem of non-being, solidarity revolves around being itself.  Other individual 
beings should not look upon your non-return to being as something to fill them with 
anxiety because it too will someday happen to them – à la existentialism.  Rather, they 
should recognize it is already happening to them.   
Arguably Plato and Kant both attempted to think ethics as inseparable from 
ontology.  A recurrent obstacle to thinking ethics and ontology together seems to be the 
question of how to account for difference across agents.  In other words, if an ethics is to 
hold universally across beings in virtue of their being, then how do we account for the 
seemingly vast difference across agents in regard to their ethical comportment?   
                                               
897 Cf. The Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) paradigm from Chapter 8 above. 
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Following physical difference, some ontological accounts – sometimes called 
“naturalistic” – embrace difference and find it impossible to then arrive at universality.  
Indeed, it is perhaps not unlike a shell game.  Aristotle‟s virtue ethics seemed to have 
negotiated a compromise between biological diversity and universality by invoking the 
process of disposition predicated upon training, i.e. the learning of ethical principles early 
in life.  Notice Aristotle‟s implicit reliance there upon memory.898  Yet, the problem, of 
course, remained in that being vicious is still an ethics, so such an account of difference 
across agents deems the virtues relative – not universal.  My diagnosis: Aristotle did not 
fully realize the value and the role of memory in regard to ontology.  
In the wake of my solution to the problem of non-being, perhaps it is possible to 
both have a universal ethics grounded in being and account for the lack of necessity that 
agents recognize the universality.  Even if the so called naturalists remain committed to 
attributing mindlessness to the physical by seeking a physical account of mind as 
“information processing,” the information processing – per my vista – becomes an aspect 
of being – accounted for by memory – not an aspect of, what per my vista would be the 
idea of, the physical.  Hence, the solution to the problem of non-being may, in fact, have 
an impact on ethics, e.g. regarding agency.               
The solution to the problem of non-being does not suddenly make pleasure non-
pleasure.  Yet, it should make you aware that forgotten pleasure is no pleasure at all.  
And, forgotten power is no power at all.  The time frames involved regarding these 
statements are precisely the time frames involved regarding the experience of pleasure 
and power.  Extending your life does not expand the cycling frame of opportunity for 
                                               
898 It is as if Aristotle thinks the subject‟s being as a concept, and not noticing its ground in memory, he 
literalizes the plant metaphor, i.e. downplays entelechy‟s dependence on memory. 
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being to indulge its individual physicality.  And outside the – already limited because 
cycling – frame of experience sends one further removed into the recollective standpoint.  
Hence, perhaps Plato thought the solution to the problem of non-being could work toward 
removing the impediments to justice and goodness.     
Your being is suspended in non-being by the power of your memory.  That is all.  
It is not that you die if you forget – Alzheimer‟s patients continue to wander hallways; 
but your being vanishes with the diminishing power of your memory.  (Your) Memory is 
the ground of (your) being.  There is not a group of people looking over your shoulder 
with whom you confer to determine the meaning of this sentence, and it is impossible to 
separate memory out from the process of indication – sensual, perceptual, linguistic, or 
otherwise.  Yet, adjustments being made due to the inability to perpetually maintain an 
experience reveal the pulsing character of being despite the illusion of (filled-duration) 
persistence.  When we consider the consequences of this realization, then that which “is 
there – like our life”899 looks different.  Due to the waxing and waning of the power of 
memory, being pulses within becoming.  Hence, non-being is not the not-being of 
becoming; rather non-being, as the ontological, i.e. what Kant calls “real,” negation of 
being, is neither being nor becoming.
900
 
Lastly, here is yet another way to put the solution to the problem of non-being.  I 
would like to state it one more time in visual terms for those who feel as though 
Heidegger‟s Being and Time helped them gain an appreciation of individual being, i.e. 
Being-in-the-world.  The working memory (of Dasein) is like a film projector running on 
the logic of supplementarity.  At the limit of the subject‟s being is non-discursive sensory 
                                               
899 My emphasis. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §559, 73. 
900 Thus Plato‟s trinity is completed.  Aristotle‟s paradigm shift has been overcome; you no longer must 
consider just being and becoming. 
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memory.  So, rather than call this aspect of the subject a “receptor” which would commit 
us to re-positing a thing-in-itself, the memory research supports calling this an abysmal 
ground governed by play, i.e. the limit of the subject as memory maintaining the play-
ground such that a (non-physical) swelling overflows as a groundless fountain.  And, 
“play” is the correct word to use here because, whatever the logic according to which the 
fountain is running, the source of the fountain is discursively inaccessible.  Further, it is 
inaccessible – the fountain seems groundless – because accessing it would be tantamount 
to applying all the apparatuses for accessing it merely within an enclosed vision.
901
   
What this means is that whatever you can imagine or think is, on the one hand, 
dependent upon the power which provided (1) the images or thoughts and (2) the context 
with which they are correlated.
902
  On the other hand, the power providing both these 
aspects of experience is the power of memory which – continuing with the language of 
this figurative statement – composes the fountain itself, i.e. the fountain is a fountain of 
memory.  So, when the source of the fountain pulses, the fountain itself pulses – like 
shutting it off and then turning it back on again –, and a new self enclosed vision arises.  
In this way, then, to think in one enclosed vision of its relation to another “enclosed 
vision” is to merely engage the relationality within rationality.  Despite using the 
relationality of rationality, it would be amphibolous – taking place merely within 
reflection – to relationally think the “outside” of an enclosed vision.  In other words, 
doing so would be measuring within a vision correlative to the context constructed and 
propped up – along with and within a particular enclosed vision – by the power of 
                                               
901 This idea can then be used to think ethics as inseparable from ontology because ontology no longer need 
be grounded an idea of the physical.  Yes, it‟s still an idea, but it is the correct idea because it solves the 
problem of non-being, which is what the “physical” is supposed to refer to anyway. 
902 Cf. Larry L. Jacoby. “On interpreting the effects of repetition: Solving a problem versus remembering a 
solution,” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 17 (1978), 649-667. 
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memory.  Hence, the way to notice the pulse, or (as I sometimes refer to it) the flicker, is 
to notice how the power of memory itself pulses or flickers, i.e. the flicker of the power 
providing the vision. 
 In other words, noticing the flickering Grundkraft of memory derives neither from 
the conceptual standpoint nor from reason.  Rather, the flickering derives from – think of 
Gorgias‟ strategy here – the negation of the power which conditions sense perception, i.e. 
memory.  It is as if awareness of the flicker comes when you “wake up,” so to speak, in a 
vision having the experience of forgetting what usually leaps over from the previous 
pulse – the “previous” flicker of the power of memory.  Think about how you react to not 
being able to think of “what you were going to say.”  Your reaction is itself a procedure, 
i.e. an automatic engagement of procedural memory covering over the “gap.”  The power 
is attempting to recover from a lapse, and since discursivity is secondary to the power, 
i.e. higher up in the structure of experience, the terms used to describe a lapse of the more 
primary power of memory necessarily always fail to function as an appropriate 
signification.   
Yet, you do not spontaneously engage in the procedure of reacting to forgetting 
unless you enter into a mode of recovery.  Hence, ask yourself: From what are you 
recovering?  You are recovering from the forgetting, i.e. the gap in the power of memory, 
and with memory as the ground of the structure of experience, the experiential 
inapprehension referred to here as a “gap” is the solution to the problem of non-being.  
Plato‟s criteria are met.  Though you still cannot say non-being, i.e. your enunciation of 
non-being is a part of memory‟s recovering, and this recovering derives from default 
procedural memory engaging your habitual scripts, i.e. eclipsing memory‟s “gap” of non-
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being with discursivity, the solution to the problem of non-being – think Plato‟s 
dependency of reckoning thesis here – provides a different vista of being.   
Put another way, this is how you feel the break of the connection – sensory 
memory as a psychic circuit breaker – and recognize the gap between being in the pulses.  
Previous and gap – just like “what you were going to say” – must be in quotes above, but 
you need not runaway with Derrida and “refuse to accept the terms.”  For example, 
consider what is referred to as being blindsided, i.e. struck from behind by a large 
speeding object.  On the one hand, if you are never able to identify the object which 
struck you, you still engage in a struggle to identify whatever happened precisely because 
you were in fact struck.  Identifying the object is a separate issue, and it cannot have 
primacy over being blindsided.  That is, not being able to identify the object which struck 
you does not mean that you therefore were not struck.  On the other hand, though post-
blindsided deliberation will use terminology relative to what may be terminologically 
undecidable, the motor force of the deliberation itself does not involve a decision.  
Decisions take place within the automatic response which you notice because – and that 
means after – it has already been engaged.  So, of course, decisions regarding origin are 
thrice removed taking place within memory‟s cascading recovery from non-being.   
Therefore, I avoid the Derridean fate of having the terms involved deconstructed because 
the meaning of these terms is generated – thank you Deleuze – not relative to the stacked 
deck of discursivity but relative to the non-discursivity necessitating the occurrence of the 
discursive construction.   
Yes discursivity falls short of signifying the “gap,” but discursivity is directed as 
such, i.e. toward the gap, because of the “gap” or whatever term we language users agree 
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to use in responding to memory‟s failure.  I am not concerned with the fool‟s errand of 
naming it.  Rather, what I am concerned to show you is that this is the solution to the 
problem of non-being.  And, since the duration of being or, in more Heideggerian 
terminology, a “vision” depends upon the power maintaining it, the duration – across 
gaps, as it were, – is not filled.  The power waxes and wanes even when the gap is 
unnoticeable.  Hence, your being is not persisting; it is pulsing. 
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Appendix II: Transcription of Dissertation Defense  
The following is a transcription of the Dissertation Defense which took place on April 
15
th
 2011 in the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center of Duquesne University‟s 
Gumberg Library beginning at 1:30pm. 
The transcript is divided into the following four sections: §1 Introductory 
Comments; §2 Twenty-Minute Presentation of Dissertation; §3 Questions from the 
Committee; §4 Questions from the Audience. 
§1 Introductory Comments – 
Dr. Selcer: Welcome to Frank Scalambrino‟s dissertation defense.  Frank has written an 
extremely ambitious project that sets out to do not just what his title indicates: critiquing 
the idea of pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze through attention to the problem of 
non-being and the structure and function of memory, but also to, I would say: (a) solve 
what he takes to be the most important problem of all of ontology; (b) develop an entirely 
new philosophical psychology; (c) justify all this historically with respect essentially to 
the entire history of philosophy, specifically Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, 
Hegel, Heidegger, Bergson, Hyppolite, Derrida, Deleuze, and a slew of cognitive 
psychologists and scientists; and (d) develop what is essentially an entirely new 
philosophical account of memory.  All in one dissertation – so, it‟s a really ambitious 
project that deals very rigorously with a really wide range of figures and texts and 
philosophical problems. 
The way we usually proceed is with around a 20 minute presentation of the person 
defending the dissertation, then questions from the committee, and then questions from 
everyone else.  So, take it away Frank. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you.  Thank you all for being here.  Also, I would like to say, I 
feel as though Dr. Wurzer is here with us in spirit, and I am thankful for that as well.  
§2 Twenty-Minute Presentation of Dissertation –  
Mr. Scalambrino: I picked the problem of non-being to work on; and, the problem of 
non-being is a very difficult problem, a very perplexing problem, in so far as there are a 
large number of philosophers who suggest it is not even a real problem. 
So, the way in which I thought I would begin would be to quickly contextualize 
the problem both historically and, then by contextualizing it, logically; I will have 
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already begun dealing with the problem.  There are a good number of philosophers that I 
either touch on or devote a chapter to, and that‟s primarily because of the perplexing 
nature of the problem.  I wanted to further legitimize the fact that this is a real problem.  
And looking at Plato, and a number of these other philosophers as well, it seems as 
though it is important in regard to ontology, in so far as until you solve the problem of 
non-being, you do not fully understand being. 
After solving the problem of non-being, then, I put forward an attempt to 
paraphrase the solution.  I do this to suggest how we might think differently about being 
in the wake of having solved this problem. 
So, historically, there are a large number of respected Ancient scholars who have 
commented on and discussed the problem of non-being.  For example, and this is just to 
name a few, G.E.L. Owen, Francis Cornford, Stanley Rosen, G.E.M. Anscombe, Martha 
Nussbaum, Ronald Polansky, and John McDowell.  These individuals have all 
commented on this problem. 
Also, some philosophers who avowedly attempt to solve this problem are Plato; 
Aristotle, you might recall the numerous comments about this in the Metaphysics, i.e. 
Aristotle‟s Metaphysics; Kant, for example, one of the things I found very interesting 
about the Critique of Pure Reason that tends to be overlooked is that Kant devotes a 
section and a graphic to what he calls, “The Table of Nothing” – the Table of Nothing: 
What‟s Kant doing talking about the Table of Nothing in the Critique of Pure Reason?  In 
addition, then, to Kant we have: Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Derrida, Deleuze, 
Lacan, and Badiou.  Just to name a few. 
Also, I, of course, took Dr. Evan‟s Difference & Repetition class, and the paper I 
wrote for that class was on Deleuze and Badiou on non-being.  And, when I took Dr. 
Polansky‟s Metaphysics class, I wrote some of the shorter papers on non-being in there as 
well.  I can say my reading of non-being in Aristotle has changed drastically since the 
days of taking Metaphysics with Dr. Polansky. 
Okay, so then in order to contextualize the problem logically, then, what I put 
together here [pointing to Dissertation Defense Handout] – because the dissertation is a 
large document; as I moved through this problem, I continued to step back in order to get 
a better look at the problem.  It increased the number of philosophers I was looking at; I 
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did not want to spend so much time with Aristotle, and then I just felt that if I did not 
spend enough time with Aristotle, I wouldn‟t do this problem justice – so what I‟ve done 
[pointing again to the dissertation handout] is put together a very fast moving, a very 
quick, flowchart of what Kant might refer to as the regulative idea I‟ve constructed for 
you, in order to solve the problem of non-being.  So, if I could pass this out to you 
[dissertation handout]…  There‟s really only – if you count the starting point as a step – 
there are really only 8 steps to this, and I think it actually moves pretty fast.  And, that 
should help you get a handle on it, as opposed to getting through so many pages [in the 
dissertation]. 
 Alright, so we start off here with the problem of non-being, and I‟ve already told 
you that what I take to be at stake, what I take to be the value of solving the problem of 
non-being, is, according to Plato in the Sophist, to get a better understanding of being 
itself.  So, if we just have these three steps here [within the first step of the flowchart], the 
first being the question:  
What is non-being?  And when you attempt to answer that question you move to 
what I refer to as the first aporia or the “complicated nature” of the problem of non-being.  
For example, when you move over here to beta from alpha we have: Non-being cannot be 
thought, experienced, or described.  So, some people are content with that, and the way I 
read this is that if they are content to take that as an answer to the problem of non-being, 
then they really haven‟t overcome that aporia – they haven‟t overcome the first aporia.   
When we follow through the Sophist, for example, the Eleatic visitor is talking to 
Theaetetus and between the two of them they seem to offer up this as a response to the 
problem of non-being: well, non-being cannot be thought, experienced, or described.  If 
you‟re actually reading the dissertation I take a look at this in the Parmenides, as well, 
and provide a logical rendition of it too. 
So, after Theaetetus seems to agree to this, to assent to this, then the Eleatic 
visitor complicates matters even further by moving to the next aporia.  And, showing 
Theaetetus the next aporia, which is: If it is the case that non-being cannot be thought, 
experienced, or described, then: what is it that we are asking about?  Then, what are we 
even asking about?  Isn‟t it the case that we have thought of something or that we are 
describing something when we were providing this answer?  I refer to this second aporia 
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as the “paradoxical nature” of the problem of non-being.  So, that‟s the start.  This is the 
start. 
We move to step one then.  If you follow Plato and Kant, it seems as though their 
attempt to resolve this problem is to move by way of the structure of experience and to 
distinguish between two types of opposition.  Okay.  This means distinguishing between 
participation in the form of difference.  And, here is where we start talking about 
difference now.  So, we have participation in the form of difference, enantion, and 
difference in itself or heteron.  Okay.  So we have this distinction, and then what I have 
here is this conceptual v. experiential [distinction], if you‟re following along here 
[pointing to the flowchart] you can see it moves along with the Critique of Pure Reason: 
Ideas and Concepts in the Understanding broadly designated and Perception and 
Sensation pertaining to experience.   
Step two, then, would be [pointing to flowchart] one of the ways to keep this 
straight and make it move faster.  Hence, we could say not-being with a “t” and non-
being with an “n” respectively.  So, not-being pertains to logical negation, and non-being 
pertains to experiential negation.  It seems as though, then, if we are going to solve the 
problem of non-being, then it has to be something other than the use of just logic or ideas.  
So, this is helping us figure out where we are going to look.  Somehow we have to look 
in experience to solve this problem. 
Moving to the third step, then, I analyze this problem in the dissertation both 
logically and historically by looking at the way in which a number of philosophers have 
attempted to solve this problem.  And, so, here are six different positions in relation to 
this problem [pointing to flowchart]. 
Let‟s move to step four.  In step four, what are the solutions from step three?  So, 
as quickly as possible as I tried to state what I take each one of these thinkers to be 
putting forward as a solution to the problem of non-being.  So, we have this notion of 
hypokeimenal destruction or death, and this is where I believe that non-being gets 
incorrectly equated with death.  If it‟s the case that non-being is incorrectly equated with 
death in Aristotle, then, it makes this solution all the more interesting, in my opinion.  
With Kant, Kant posits a non-entity, the Undinge, the nihil negativum of the thing-in-
itself, and here in a moment you‟ll see what he means by nihil negativum.  Hegel, of 
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course, talks about non-being as an internal moment in a dialectical movement.  Now 
both Derrida and Deleuze talk about pure difference, and it is by way of talking about 
pure difference that you can extract their solutions to the problem of non-being.  For 
Derrida, we have pure difference and the logic of supplementarity, and ultimately we end 
up with Différance.  And, with Deleuze, difference as Being becoming active versus “?-
being.”  Deleuze explicitly puts forth question mark being as his solution to the problem 
of non-being.  My solution: as you‟ll see this won‟t make full sense until I reach the last 
step [in the flowchart], there are gaps between the memory that is at the ground of 
experience.  So, I‟m following Plato and Kant in making this distinction between two 
types of opposition, looking into experience, and suggesting that it is possible to 
recognize these gaps, after the fact, in experience; and, that these gaps constitute the 
solution to the problem of non-being.  Okay. 
The fifth step, then, in order to deal with this massive amount of information is to 
group these solutions.  So, I‟ve grouped these solutions into two groups.  In the first 
group I put Kant, Deleuze, and my attempt to solve this problem.  In the second group I 
put Aristotle, Hegel, and Derrida.  My suggestion here is that – and again I tried to 
thoroughly support these claims in the dissertation – Aristotle, Hegel, and Derrida are 
unable to overcome the first aporia.  This is because they don‟t follow this broadly 
distinguishing between two types of opposition.  Those in the first group overcome the 
first aporia. 
Second to the last step, then, the sixth step, says this is a further fleshing out of the 
solutions, [i.e.] the attempts to solve the problem of non-being.  I‟m grouping together 
Aristotle‟s hypokeimenal logic, what I refer to as Hegel‟s “metaphysical shell game,” and 
Derrida‟s Différance.  And if you notice, this is again for group two, there is a 
dependence of identifying the first step here [pointing to the flowchart] “L” on the next 
step whether it be “M” or “N.”  So, Aristotle takes the destruction of this underlying 
hypokeimenon or “L” – there‟s a significant amount of references that I make in the 
dissertation to all of these responses, so, if you‟d like I can flip it open (I have the page 
numbers written down) and we can look at the text if you like – this is where I‟m 
suggesting that Aristotle takes non-being to be death.  You especially find this when you 
look at his difference kinds of change.  Again, Hegel takes non-being to be a moment 
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within this dialectical movement of identification. And, Derrida takes the being or non-
being of the hypokeimenon as pure difference to be undecidable – ultimately [pointing at 
the flowchart].  So, ultimately he takes it to be undecidable, and this, of course, is due to 
the logic of supplementarity.  So, by saying that something is “not,” you‟re merely just 
adding – you‟re supplementing – that being.  You‟re supplementing its being to begin 
with.  Hence, there is a sense in which you could say that whatever the underlying 
undifferentiated first moment in the dialect might be that for all of these thinkers it is 
always already being, i.e. always already a being.  In that sense, I read them as not 
overcoming the first aporia of the problem.  Okay. 
So, now we move to the bottom of this page.  So, the group one thinkers … We 
can see this with Kant‟s Table of Nothing – I‟ve reproduced Kant‟s Table of Nothing for 
you.  You can see it comes from A 292 in the Critique of Pure Reason.  You can notice 
that when you look at Kant‟s Table the Table follows the division of the structure of 
experience that I noted in steps one and two on the first page [of the flowchart].  What I 
mean by that is: the conceptual negation moves from – in this Table of Nothing – from 
numeral I to numeral II; experiential negation moves from III to IV.  In this way, now we 
have a way to use this other type of opposition, this other type of negation, and notice we 
are zeroing in on non-being [(Cf. A 575/B 603)].  Okay. 
If you flip over, then, to the last page, i.e. the last step of this movement.  With 
this step, then, what I want to do is to differentiate my attempt to solve this problem from 
their attempts to solve this problem, and when I say “their attempts to solve this 
problem,” I mean Kant and Deleuze.  Okay, so, from the Critique of Pure Reason – again 
– Kant emphasizes a passive, i.e. apprehension of synopsis, relation to the ground as 
abyss.  And, just as the second of Kant‟s justifications for positing the thing-in-itself 
depends on imagination, so he derives nihil negativum through an experiential negation 
involving imagination.  Now, even when you look at the Table of Nothing, you already 
see this.  You can already see this just by looking at the Table of Nothing. 
Despite suggesting that nihil negativum is arrived at by an experiential negation 
which involves imagination, Kant claims that the ground of being involves sense, and it is 
governed by what he calls “affinity.”  Okay.  So, now… In the twenty-first century, when 
we look at this contemporary memory research, it seems pretty clear and straight forward 
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that they now think of affinity as pertaining to memory.  So, affinity is an aspect of 
memory.  You‟ll see this as we get a little further down, how this makes sense. 
Now, concerning Deleuze, Deleuze emphasizes the ground as active, as intensive 
expressive abyss; this is as opposed to Kant.  And, following a model of ontogenesis or 
ontological emergence from Becoming, I read Deleuze … Deleuze considers difference 
as Being, i.e. as Becoming‟s being active, and question mark being as non-being, i.e. 
Becoming‟s being reactive.  This is largely coming out of Nietzsche & Philosophy and 
Difference & Repetition – where he is talking about this being active and being reactive.  
In this way, Deleuze follows Bergson, and he considers the problem of non-being to be a 
pseudo problem.  So, here I suggest that Deleuze reconvenes with group two, and that he 
ultimately reduces Being, Becoming, and Non-Being to Becoming and Being.  Hence, he 
misses non-being, and he considers it ?-being; and, by considering it ?-being, you can 
already see he thinks of non-being as a type of being.  This is why I say he reconvenes 
with group two. 
So, all throughout the dissertation, I continue to return to this comment that I like 
to make that it seems to me Kant was the person who advanced the furthest on the 
problem of non-being.  So, then, my hope was to … I had always – as some of this past 
stuff shows you – been interested in the problem of non-being, and I thought that I was 
leaving it behind; and I was going to do some work on memory instead, and as I‟m 
looking at all these memory articles, suddenly it just hit me.  I was like, “Oh, this is the 
way to solve the problem of non-being.” 
So, then, looking again at the ground of being by way of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, I am emphasizing that the abyss or the ground of being is actually a play-ground; 
it is governed by play.  It is the play-ground of memory, i.e. memory as being‟s play-
ground.  So, following Deleuze in a sense, I have ontological emergence from an active 
ground, and this is accounted for in the contemporary memory research by sensory and 
procedural memory.  Then, following and aspect of Différance from Derrida, there are 
projective and retrojective gap masking effects, and this is one of the reasons … this non-
being – as Plato indicated initially – is unable to be at all.  Let‟s see.  And, if you‟d care 
for me to elaborate on priming, for example, I‟d be happy to do so. 
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So, then, rounding this off… No longer being at all; the gaps between the pulses 
of ontological emergence, they constitute my solution to the problem of non-being.  To 
round this off: I‟m following contemporary memory research regarding the experiential 
ground of being, and that means the second of the two oppositions, that the experiential 
ground of being is governed by memory.  It is a ground of memory.  Sense is, then, 
grounded in sensory memory.  Productive imagination … I‟m following along with the 
Critique of Pure Reason, by the way, right now.  Sense is grounded in sensory memory; 
productive imagination is grounded in working memory; reproductive imagination is 
grounded in short term and long term memory; and, then, this is a point of contention I 
thought I would just make explicit, contemporary memory research does not deny an 
outside world, rather it suggests that the flowing change of Becoming is too fast and 
excessive to effect being directly.  In other words, memory is a buffer – we could say.  
Memory is the buffer because of which there is an ontological emergence, and then 
connective and instantiating – these are buzz words in the memory research – memory 
allows for ontological emergence.  I‟m using a couple quotes here [cited in flowchart and 
dissertation]: “Stimuli do not speak for themselves.” “Automaticity is not driven by 
stimuli separately from skills.” “These patterns themselves are not stored.  What is stored 
is the connection strengths,” this is another buzz word, “connection strengths between 
these units that allow for the patterns to be recreated.”  And, notice my emphasis that it is 
a continual re-creation.   
Though of all the people I do deal with, I do not deal with Nietzsche [in the 
dissertation].  But, for those of you versed in Nietzsche, you can‟t help but hear Nietzsche 
in the background here.  Lastly, then, the trajectory of experience is grounded in an 
engagement of procedural memory, and the gaps between memory‟s cycling and shifting 
engagements of procedural memory are covered over by priming and habitual scripts.  
So, then, these … It is my suggestion that these gaps solve the problem of non-being.  So, 
one of the ways I would paraphrase this to you in order to suggest what is the value of 
this … I turn this phrase: Your being is not persisting; it is pulsing. 
Lastly, if you just want to look at this last page.  I tried to give you a graphic 
representation [chuckle chuckle].  On the left hand side, it follows along with the Critique 
of Pure Reason really, and I borrowed this [portion of the] graphic from contemporary 
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memory research.  You have the Necker cube.  The Necker cube emerging within being, 
we could say.  The Necker cube emerging within being.  I like the use of the Necker cube 
because you can see it in different ways.  Then, underneath we have Becoming, and 
between the flickering, we might say, the flickering of being, you have these gaps.  So, 
you can see I have the null symbol there in order to indicate where one would locate non-
being.  So … 
So, that‟s the flowchart of the regulative idea that I constructed in order to try to 
solve the problem of non-being.    
  [Pause for applause.] 
§3 Questions from the Committee –  
Dr. Selcer: So Frank, I‟m going to start.  I have some general questions, and then I have 
Kant on the brain these days, so I‟m going to proceed that way.   
My first and most general question about your dissertation is one I‟ve been asking 
you since you first came to me with a version of a proposal for this.  So, let me ask it in a 
longer way than I initially asked it.  You make in the dissertation a distinction between 
not-being as logical negation, as I understand it, and non-being as an ontological 
negativity that you explain in terms of this problem of the ground of experience.   
And, I think that was very clear in your dissertation and, in fact, you managed to 
successfully translate that out of the Platonic Aristotelian context into the rest of the 
history of philosophy very well.  
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you. 
Dr. Selcer: But what you mean, I still think, by non-being remains a bit of a mystery to 
me.  So, as far as I can tell, the closest you come in the dissertation to actually stating 
what you take the problem of non-being to be, which is a problem your dissertation 
presents as having fundamentally structured the entirety of the history of metaphysics and 
philosophical psychology from Plato to Deleuze and Derrida is when you claim that even 
asking what the problem is invokes a kind of paradox.  Right?  At some point you say, 
since when you answer the question what is non-being, an answer is being given, the 
answer cannot refer to non-being – as you went through today also in your chart. 
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You said in the dissertation several times, and you said earlier today, we shouldn‟t 
make the mistake of thinking that this renders the problem of non-being a pseudo 
problem, and I guess my question is: Why not? 
Why isn‟t it a terminological conundrum with which maybe Plato‟s Sophist and 
then your project falls because you want to insist that we do in fact have to ask what your 
dissertation seems to actually argue is an unanswerable question.  Right?  That is to say, a 
question that could only be framed in terms of logical negation, but that wasn‟t supposed 
to be about logical negation at all.  Instead it was supposed to be this experiential 
negativity. 
So, let me put this a different way.  It‟s one thing…  And I think you provide a 
good argument that we ought to resist giving a direct answer to the question: What is 
non-being?  You have to give an indirect answer that takes a series of detours through 
memory and so on and so forth.  So, it‟s one thing to resist that by arguing the nature of 
the question makes a direct answer impossible and requires instead this indirect detour 
through the problem of memory.  But it seems like it‟s another thing in the wake of that 
response to claim that the problem of non-being is one you can‟t explain.  And, that the 
whole of the history of philosophy has grappled with it.  Right?  So, I‟m not asking you 
to provide an answer to the question: What is non-being.  But, I do want you to answer 
the question: What is the problem of non-being? 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  So, it seems to me, and again, I would follow along through the 
dialog between the Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus to get a solid feel for this.  It seems to 
me that if it‟s the case that we understand what being is.  And, I would go so far as to 
suggest that this engages Heidegger [also].  So, even if we want to take some sort of 
analogous to a ready-to-hand engagement such that being is non-discursive, or something 
like that, still there is a sense in which we then think we understand being.  And, so, it 
seems to me, again this is the value of – and, I‟m answering your question – the value of 
non-being is that if we think we understand being, we don‟t really understand being until 
we understand non-being.  And, so, then this gives birth to the problem of non-being, and 
the problem of non-being is just: What is non-being?  What is non-being, then, because 
we think we understand being, and we set out to understand being; but, until we 
understand non-being we don‟t really understand being. 
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 Dr. Selcer: And, we can‟t understand non-being directly.  That‟s the problem? 
Mr. Scalambrino: No, I‟m saying that the problem is: What is non-being?  And that in 
order to understand being we must understand non-being.  So, I‟m saying that‟s the 
problem.  So, the perplexity, we would say, of the problem is that when you actually step 
in and try to solve the problem of non-being that‟s when you find yourself sort of running 
in circles.    
Dr. Selcer: Okay.  So, then, why … To use an example that you actually pointed to 
earlier today: What‟s wrong with the reductive solutions?  What‟s wrong with the 
solutions that essentially neutralize – right – the problematic of trying to give a direct 
account of non-being by reducing it – as you argue Deleuze does – to Being and 
Becoming?  Why is that not a solution to what you identified as the problem of non-
being?  If that is a path to actually being able to think Being as Becoming, or to think 
Being as pure difference, for Deleuze, what‟s wrong, then?   
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  So, there are two parts to this.  What I think is really wrong 
with that is that it follows Aristotle too much.  This is why I stepped back, and I had to 
write so much about Aristotle.  I didn‟t really want to do that, but I just thought that this 
is coming out of Aristotle‟s reading of non-being.  So, in reducing Being to Becoming, 
and this is why start off with [in the dissertation] this [section titled]: What is the 
relationship between Being, Becoming, and Non-Being?  We would say something like 
both Becoming and Non-Being are non-discursive.  However, the difference between the 
two might be that you can have an idea of Becoming that is not directly in 
contradistinction to becoming as non-being is [to any idea of Non-Being]. 
 So, it seems to me, the problem is that when you reduce the relationship between 
Being, Becoming, and Non-Being to just Being and Becoming, suddenly it does seem as 
though the assumption of persistence is carried in, and you become committed to 
persistence.  This is why, for example, even in the philosophy of mind, it seems to me 
that there is a sort of naïve reading of Physicalism.  A naïve reading of Physicalism in so 
far as my being becomes equated with – what would have to be the idea of – my physical 
being, and so then non-being ends up being death.    
Dr. Selcer: But I have to ask, this may be just too big a question for a project this big, but 
what is the ground and what is the consequent here?  It seems like sometimes you‟re 
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arguing that the thesis of the persistence of being is false, therefore my solution to the 
problem of non-being is true.  And, other times, you‟re arguing my solution to the 
problem of non-being is true, therefore the thesis of the persistence of being is false.  
Which is it?  Do you begin by asserting the punctual pulsating nature of being, and then 
develop your solution to the problem of non-being on that ground?  Or is it the other way 
around? 
Mr. Scalambrino: I gotta tell ya.  Sincerely, I think that‟s a fabulous question.  And, I 
asked myself that question over and over again because I was sincerely asking the 
question: Am I begging the question?  So, am I begging the question? 
 But really, the way I approached this problem was sort of: Hey, what‟s Plato 
doing talking about this?  That‟s how I came to this.  So, I had always been told, the 
Parmenides and the Sophist are really difficult dialogs.  So, then, I was like: I want to go 
read those dialogs and see what‟s being said in there.  Then, you come to those dialogs, 
and…  Why are they talking about non-being?  And, so it seemed to me that… So, here‟s 
this problem, this problem of non-being, and what happens if we were to meet the criteria 
for solving that problem.  And, it seems to me that when you meet the criteria for solving 
the problem, it really highlights the sense in which persistence is merely an assumption. 
 So, that‟s how I came to it.  Because I asked myself several times… over and 
over… but I really don‟t think that I am because… Plato‟s putting forward this problem, 
and I‟m trying to meet the criteria for solving it; but, not just fantasizing a solution.  
Rather, for example, all these contemporary memory research articles that I‟m looking 
at… They‟re talking about the ground of being in such a way that, for example… So, 
there are several different ways that we could talk about this. 
 It‟s a naïve version of Physicalism to think that your eyes are open, and then 
you‟re just taking in the physical world as it is.  That‟s a naïve version of Physicalism.  
It‟s rather the case – I like to talk about this with a poetical reference to Dionysian – that 
your eyes are “shooting” around.  Your eyes are “shooting” around.  What they refer to as 
“scene recognition” in the contemporary memory research, it‟s not the case that your eyes 
are open and you‟re just taking in the room.  Rather, your eyes are shooting all over the 
place, and you‟re constructing the scene.  But in order for you to be able to construct the 
scene, you have to hold it in memory.  So, what I‟m saying is that there is sort of all this 
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change occurring.  What I try to fall back into this Ancient stuff as talking about this 
flowing flux of Becoming, all this change.  And, there is this jutting around going on, if 
we‟re just talking about vision, and out of that emerges the scene.  And, that‟s just one 
way to do it.   
They also talk about the difference between spatiotopic and retinotopic in order to 
track multiple objects and in order to stabilize – if you will – to stabilize all this change 
and to sort of “hold it” in being.  So, yeah …       
Dr. Selcer: This is just sort of speculative on my part, it isn‟t something I‟ve prepared, 
but would it be right to say that you‟ve essentially proposed a strangely Kantian 
Copernican revolution with respect to a Bergsonian account of perception.  I mean: 
Bergson‟s got a pretty well established critique of the kind of cinematographic account of 
perception, in so far as it implies a set of ontological premises about the nature of the 
external world.  And, it‟s as if you‟ve taken that Bergsonian critique but moved it away 
from the question of objects, and you‟ve moved it to the interior of the subject such that a 
cinematographic form of perception constructs continuous flux or continuous flow in a 
external world; but, that perceptual construction gives rise to exactly what you want to 
talk about in your dissertation as being.  Does that make sense? 
Mr. Scalambrino: I think it does.  I guess what I would add to it is that: Ultimately, this is 
Kantian, as I follow through it here [pointing to flowchart].  And then, what I‟m asking is 
that  Kant seems to have the ground of being, the ground of the structure of experience, 
for example, is sensory, so the question is really… What I‟m trying to show is that 
contemporary memory research is talking about this as suggesting that really… When 
they talk about FINSTing and the difference between subitizing and counting… So, 
just…quickly … If there are a number of objects that you are trying to count and it‟s 
under five, then you‟re able to count much quicker, just by looking at it, and they are 
suggesting that it is in this way that memory is instantiating.  So, I can‟t follow that, it 
would take me too far afield. 
 So, what I‟m doing, is just taking that as evidence for my claim that the ground of 
the structure of experience is memory.  It‟s not sensation, or that would lead us into a 
naïve Physicalism. 
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Dr. Selcer: Alright, let me ask you a couple questions about Kant, and then I‟m going to 
turn it over to the other folks on the committee.  So, the first one might be not a serious 
question.  Because it may just be a question of how you‟re using a certain bit of 
terminology.  Or, it may be central to your argument.  I‟m not sure. 
 Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  
Dr. Selcer: So, already today, and throughout the dissertation, one of the major sets of 
terminological distinctions on which your argument is built is the distinction between the 
discursive and the non-discursive.  This is particularly the case when you‟re discussing 
Kant.  But it‟s not clear to me whether you‟re using discursivity in the sense that Kant is 
using discursivity, or if you‟re taking a post-Kantian notion of discursivity and using it to 
interpret the Kantian project. 
 Kant‟s really explicit about his distinction between concepts as discursive 
cognitions or mediate representations in distinction from intuitions as non-discursive, 
immediate representations.  But, when you talk about the non-discursive, you seem to 
want it to refer to everything that is not constructed as a concept through the application 
of the categories to what‟s given intuitively through the pure forms of space and time.  
So, for Kant, the non-discursive is not the thing-in-itself, it‟s the Gegenstand, it‟s the 
object of experience formed by spatiality and temporality as the a priori structures of 
intuition – but not yet cognized, because not yet constructed as conceptual.   
 In Kant‟s distinction, intuitions are non-discursive and conceptuality is discursive.  
For you it seems like, anything that is an object, either of intuition or conceptuality is 
discursive, and the non-discursive is whatever got apprehended.  Whatever was given to 
sensibility and understanding in the first place.  My question is: Are you deriving your 
sense of discursivity and non-discursivity from Kant?  And, if so, can you talk a little bit 
more about how it maps on to Kant‟s distinction between concepts and intuitions.  Or, are 
you deriving it from somewhere else and using it, if you like, as an interpretive lens 
through which to read the Kantian account of the relationship between sensibility and 
understanding – in your very nice readings of the A and B Deductions? 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  Thank you. 
 So, if I could start by saying that, again, I believe that Kant got closest – we could 
talk about whether or not I take Plato to have provided a solution at all, or to have solved 
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this problem – and the reason I think Kant got closest is because he was able to suppose 
this non-entity, the thing-in-itself.  So, really what I‟m most interested in doing is just 
stressing the value of this distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive. 
 By stressing the value of the distinction between the discursive and non-
discursive this is one of the ways in which we can keep in mind the, what I would refer to 
as the, “excessive nature” of both intuition but also the sense in which Becoming exceeds 
Being.  So, there is a sense in which the ontological emergence is already a delimiting or 
a limiting. 
 So, let‟s see… Yeah… So, this would be one of the way in which we could also 
account for things like [quoting Leibniz] there‟s something always “still sleeping in the 
abyss.”  Right?  So, really I wanted to stress the distinction between discursivity and non-
discursivity is one of the ways in which I engage the perplexity of the problem of non-
being in order to try to stress this sense in which I think Kant is right to make the 
conceptual experiential distinction.  
Dr. Selcer: I‟m still not clear whether you take the non-discursive to be what‟s given to 
intuition or intuitive representations themselves.  So, for Kant, intuitive representations 
are non-discursive.  The non-discursive doesn‟t refer to, the way I understand it anyway, 
the non-discursive does not refer to the noumenal and does not refer to what is given, 
what appears in appearance.  Immediate intuitive representations are non-discursive; 
mediate conceptual cognizable representations are discursive.  But, you seem to want to 
broaden the sphere of non-discursivity to include both the operations of the faculties of 
sensibility, and the objects… 
 Let me put it a different way, because there is another question I wanted to ask 
you, and it was bound up in the kind of answer you gave here.  Not just in the chapter 
which is explicitly on Kant, but throughout the dissertation when you refer back to the 
Kantian project – and I will say that I really appreciate your hyper-Kantian reading of … 
especially Deleuze, which I think is right…  
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you. 
Dr. Selcer: But, what exactly do you mean in the dissertation when you repeatedly claim 
that Kant posits the thing-in-itself? 
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 So, as you rightly point out, he‟s careful not to endow ding-an-sich with 
existence, and he‟s certainly not a philosopher who would endow something we‟re forced 
to think about with truth value.  Otherwise, the Transcendental Dialectic would be a 
logical truth and not a logical illusion.  So, on your reading, if Kant‟s thing-in-itself 
neither exists nor is the object of a true judgment, then what do you mean when you say 
he “posits” it. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  Thank you. 
 Your second phrasing of the question helped me get a grip on it.  When we are 
talking about the structure of experience, it depends if we are talking about the object of 
experience and regressing backward or talking about the structure of experience on the 
way up from Becoming.  So, we could say, on the way up from Becoming, the sensory 
manifold is non-discursive, certainly.  But, then, on the way down, what I want to say is: 
what is non-discursive is even more than the sensory manifold because Becoming must 
be non-discursive as well.  So, perhaps, it depends upon which angle you‟re approaching 
non-discursivity from (Cf. A 685/B 713).  And, let‟s see… Forgive me… The last bit of 
your second question… 
Dr. Selcer: Positing…  
Mr. Scalambrino: Yes, positing.  That‟s right.  Thank you…   
 Okay.  I feel as though is paying the debt for the Copernican revolution, in a 
sense, with this sort of “positing” of the thing-in-itself.  So, what we end up with is this 
idea that since in the beginning, we have assumed: Objects don‟t conform to mind; mind 
conforms to objects… The Copernican revolution…  
Dr. Selcer: It‟s the other way around.  
Mr. Scalambrino: Oh, yeah… Right, help me out here...  Yeah.  You‟re right; it‟s the 
other way around.  For Kant, the mind doesn‟t conform to objects, objects conform to 
mind.  So, if it‟s the case that objects conform to the mind, then there is a sense in which 
we can‟t know these things, of course, things.  But at the same time, we‟re going to have 
to talk about them –right? – because we made this move.  So, we have to pay that debt. 
 So, in order to pay that debt, there are two ways to pay it.  We can pay it from the 
conceptual aspect of the structure of experience, or we can pay it from the experiential 
part of the structure of experience.  When you pay it from the conceptual, this is when 
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you posit the distinction between phenomena and noumena, but this is a logical situation.  
However, from the experiential we have to pay that debt.  In order to pay that debt from 
the experiential, Kant can’t say what it is, but at the same time he still has to somehow be 
able to pay that debt. 
 So, in order to do this, we are really pressing the A Deduction of the Critique of 
Pure Reason.  And, what we have then, if you just follow through the list of faculties that 
are lining the structure of experience, when we start to get a representation we have the 
threefold synthesis of imagination.  This is the apprehension of the synopsis.  So, because 
the threefold synthesis is a synthesis of imagination – and, again, I think this is the one 
place where, well, if Kant could have seen it the way these twenty-first century memory 
researchers can see it, Kant wouldn‟t have said these things – because the ground of the 
representation is the threefold synthesis of imagination, somehow we need to negate 
imagination in order to pay the debt for the Copernican revolution.  Kant explicitly says, 
it must be an image of something.  It has to be an image of something.  So, that‟s why I 
say he posits the thing, because there has to be an image of something.  Now, of course, 
it‟s excessive; it‟s non-discursive; it‟s the sensory manifold; etc.        
Dr. Selcer: But… This will be my last question… 
Mr. Scalambrino: Oh, that‟s okay.  These are great questions.  Thank you. 
Dr. Selcer: There‟s a sense in which what really does the work of connecting the way you 
seem to be framing the realm of discursivity and the realm of non-discursivity in Kant is 
not, if you like, the result of the threefold synthesis but instead the schematism where 
Kant explicitly says schemata are not images but rather rules – rules for the production of 
images of concepts.  So, it‟s really that schematization of the categories with respect to an 
attempt to conceptualize the pure forms of intuition from sensibility that would get you 
the non-discursive in the way… Getting you the non-discursive is the Kantian version of 
solving the problem of non-being, right?  So, why is that not right?  
 You really want to emphasize the role of… the tight connection between images 
and imagination partly because it allows you to argue on the basis later of contemporary 
memory research and what Derrida and Deleuze have done to Kant that it should have 
been memory here and not imagination.  Right? 
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Mr. Scalambrino: Right.  However, what is actually going on here is that it should have 
been memory at the level of the sensory…  
Dr. Selcer: Ah. 
Mr. Scalambrino: At the level of the sensory manifold.  So, this is why in step seven [of 
the flowchart] I say, Kant emphasizes a passive apprehension of synopsis relation to the 
ground [of experience] as abyss.  So here we have the ground as abyss, and then the 
passive relation is the “bottom of,” I‟ll use “bottom” so as to not confuse the terminology, 
the bottom of the threefold synthesis of imagination.  And, so, in so far as it is the bottom 
of the threefold synthesis of imagination, Kant thinks that in order to pay the debt for the 
Copernican revolution he has to negate imagination. 
 What I would suggest is that Deleuze actually has this right.  Deleuze suggests we 
need to go right from the ground.  And, he‟s right, in my opinion.  And, also, the ground 
is active; it‟s an active abyss.  This again… So, Nietzsche, “When you stare into the 
abyss, the abyss stares into you.”  There is a sense in which Kant is suggesting that we 
are abysmal beings … that when we try to see into our very ground, we are looking into 
an abyss. 
 So, then, my question is: What governs the activity of that abyss?  And, if it‟s the 
case, as it seems as though contemporary memory research actually suggests, if it‟s the 
case that the activity of the abyss at the ground of being is governed by memory, then 
there might be a way in which – though, again, it‟s not the idea of it – there might be a 
way in which we can notice the movement of this ground such that we can actually 
provide a solution to the problem of non-being. 
Dr. Selcer: Okay.  Thank you.  
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you. 
Dr. Evans: Some of my stuff will follow up on Dan‟s.  Although actually I wanted to 
start with a question on Plato, first I wanted to say in terms of the pros and cons in a 
general way of the dissertation: In terms of the pros, it‟s an incredible amount of 
scholarship that you put into this Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Derrida, Deleuze, and also the 
empirical memory research.  I think it really shows a strong knowledge of the history of 
philosophy and of psychology; there were some lovely graphs; and, there were some nice 
turns of phrase throughout; and, clarity, on pretty much everything that you were 
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articulating in there, you did it in a very clear way; then, second of all, your originality.  
You use all of this to come up with your own theory.  And, I think that‟s very good and 
remarkable thing to do, as well.  Seconding pretty much what Dan said here. 
 In terms of problems: in the most general sense, now, I‟m thinking of when you 
want to turn this into something you want to publish.  And, of course, the immediate 
thing that comes to mind is that it‟s very very long.  And most publishers, unless you 
already have a big name, they‟ll have problems with that.  More important, it isn‟t so 
much the length.  I thought at times there was almost too much complexity.  It wasn‟t 
whether all of it fit one way or the other, but there was so much of it that some of it 
seemed unnecessary for the major points were going to make.  And, therefore, it meant 
the reader has to battle through that to get to those major points.  I thought of it as kind of 
underbrush.  It‟s a very good underbrush, but nonetheless underbrush in the sense that it 
blocked the person from getting to the points as quickly as they might have. 
 This shows up in a particular way, there are a huge number of recalls.  You‟re 
asking your reader almost every other page to recall what was said a little earlier, a little 
earlier.  When you do revise it to cut it down to get it into something you can publish, one 
little test you can do is to ask how many of those recalls can I get rid of and have it still 
seamlessly flow to the points that I‟m making.  …  So, that, just in terms of… but, it‟s a 
really excellent work. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you. 
Dr. Evans: What I wanted to start out with… You‟ve already summarized very well the 
question of non-being and why you‟re at it.  In Plato, you use his form of Difference, and 
you want to say his form of Difference points to non-being, right?  And, it is as if it itself 
– Difference – is beyond Being, right?  The form of Difference in itself is non-being?  
Mr. Scalambrino: I suggested the form of Difference in itself is one of the ways we could 
point beyond the forms.  So, for example, unless we want to say that the form of Being is 
being itself, then there must be a way in which we can somehow point outside of the 
forms.  And, so what I am trying to do here is to explicate why Plato is saying we need to 
solve this problem anyway, and it seems as though it‟s because when you are just 
considering the form of Being itself, then there is a sense in which it [being] is sort of 
eclipsed, right.  So, you can‟t see outside of the forms that way. 
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 So, when you‟re considering Difference in itself, there is a sense in which 
Difference in itself is different from itself, and we get what I refer to in Deleuze as this 
recursive fractal version.  Following this recursive fractal out gets you outside the forms.  
But, I ultimately suggest I don‟t think the answer is difference because I think Derrida 
and Deleuze are attacking heteron and trying to rewrite heteron in order to say that well, 
difference is the answer, but you must understand difference in this way.  But I don‟t 
think that is actually the right way to approach it.  I think that Kant actually had the right 
way to approach it, and we just needed to clear up how he thought of the ground. 
Dr. Evans: Well, for this question, I‟m going to follow up a bit on it, and the next one 
will be on Deleuze.  But, I‟m mainly just trying to get clarified on this idea of the 
problem of non-being and the possible solutions to it.  And, my last questions will be on 
your answer to it; and, those will be, perhaps, a little more critical. 
 What I was wondering is that Plato also says the Good is not being but something 
yet beyond and superior to it in rank and power.  You were using the form of Difference 
to point to what might be non-being or indicate in the direction. In a sense Plato is also 
saying, the Good is beyond Being too.  So, how would that enter into the problematic that 
we‟re setting up here about non-being?    
 Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  In the Republic, and I had tried to make reference to the 
Republic; but I didn‟t want to make this thing any bigger than it was already, but I do 
think you can make reference to the Cave Allegory here.  During this discussion in the 
Republic, non-being is this extremely dark place but being is too bright, so just like our 
eyes must adjust on the way up and back down… What I found interesting was… 
Forgive me; I keep jumping to Deleuze with you… What I found interesting was Deleuze 
tried to turn this upside down, so that it was a sense in which by going deeper into the 
cave we are going into greater and greater being as opposed to going out of the cave.  So, 
if I‟m understanding your question correctly… 
Dr. Evans: Plato says that the Good is beyond Being.  Is that the same as saying it‟s non-
being? 
Mr. Scalambrino: That‟s an excellent question. 
Dr. Evans: Let me add one more thing to it.  If we want to talk about whether you can 
describe the Good, Plato says, well, you have to go through the child of the Good, you 
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have to do it through the analogy of the Sun.  So, would that be indirect enough, then that 
you‟d be describing the Sun, but you‟d be using that indirectly – like those pulses you‟re 
going to talk about – to point to something that‟s related to them; but, you‟re not saying 
what it is directly, the Good in this case.  You‟re just talking about the Sun Analogy the 
same way you‟re talking about pulses that indirectly point to, in an inapprehensible way, 
the gaps. 
 Mr. Scalambrino: That‟s very interesting.  If I could paraphrase this, is it the case that 
solving the problem of non-being, in so far as it helps us get an understanding of being, 
does it also help us get an understanding of the Good?  That‟s a really interesting 
question.  Now, in so far as I didn‟t pursue that in order to solve the problem of non-
being, I don‟t know that I addressed it in there.  But, it‟s an excellent question.  
Dr. Evans: It‟s an offering for the book.    
Mr. Scalambrino: Yeah, right.  That‟s great.  I‟m definitely going to think some more 
about that.  That‟s an excellent question. 
Dr. Evans: A similar thing comes up with respect to Deleuze in a way.  What I sort of 
understood in the end is that the particular way that Deleuze himself talks about non-
being, where he converts it into question mark being or non in parentheses being, in that 
case you criticism as well is that you‟re really not giving us non-being, you‟re giving us 
becoming.  With Plato we have Being, Becoming, and Non-Being, and that‟s really the 
basic criticism you have against his own offering.       
Mr. Scalambrino: Yes. 
Dr. Evans: What I want to do is to say, maybe there‟s another way – just like we did with 
Plato there –  that with Deleuze we can get another avenue into non-being that fits the 
criteria you‟ve set up for what has to constitute a good proper answer, a solution to non-
being question. 
 Deleuze also makes the distinction between Cosmos, Chaos, and Chaosmos.  
Cosmos consists of series that are ordered by the Same.  For instance, say the unmoved 
mover in Aristotle, Plato‟s form…  So, Cosmos is basically order.  Then there is Chaos, 
and the way he puts it here is Chaos is absolute divergence in the sense that any series of 
elements that we might be talking about completely exclude one another – hence, 
diverge; but also, they in no sense communicate with one another and in no way compose 
 640 
 
a unity.  And, if we could think of Cosmos as Being, and we could think, perhaps here, of 
Chaos as non-being.  Now we go to Chaosmos which is going to be Becoming. 
 And here Deleuze says we have the divergent series again, but they do 
communicate with one another.  Now the problem is that when we say they do 
communicate doesn‟t that mean you need some sort of Sameness that makes them 
communicate?  His answer is no.  The communication is always the production of 
difference – always another difference.  So, we‟ve got these three.  Couldn‟t we say, then, 
that non-being, Chaos, and because we live in Chaosmos – that‟s what‟s around us, that‟s 
what we experience – that it indicates Chaos; and Chaos is ineffable in the sense that 
when we do give this description that there are these series that absolutely diverge from 
one another and in no way communicate, we‟ve given something that really doesn‟t make 
much sense.  It‟s indicated; it‟s a bit like those gaps again.  So, would this be a way that 
we could have Deleuze using his notion of difference give us a solution to the problem of 
non-being? 
Mr. Scalambrino: I like that.   
You know, when Dr. Polansky and I were talking about this project, I said, my 
suggestion to people would be [echoing Dr. Polansky‟s suggestion from years prior], 
because I think it‟s a good suggestion, that they should write a commentary for their 
dissertation.  And, he asked me: Well, what book would you write a commentary on?  
And without even taking a breath, I said, “Difference & Repetition.”  You know, when I 
took your Difference & Repetition class it was the first time I ever really engaged 
Deleuze, and I just went wild for Deleuze.  I think Deleuze is great.  I‟d like to see us 
right up there with the University of Edinburgh.   
But, in either case, yes.  I think that‟s excellent.  So, I guess I would say 
something like: If it‟s the case that being emerges from becoming, perhaps there‟s some 
way that by paying attention to these things we are sub-merging back into the chaotic 
nature of the self, or something like that.  And, that by sub-merging back into the chaotic 
nature of the self we are able to start recognizing these gaps.  Yeah… Yeah.  That‟s 
neat… That‟s neat.     
Dr. Evans: By the way, in reading this it really caused me to do a lot of thinking, so I 
have a lot of thank you for it too. 
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Mr. Scalambrino: Well, thank you…  Thank you. 
Dr. Evans: Going to the last part now – memory itself…  Well, I‟ll tell you where I want 
to go to.  I want to suggest memory isn‟t as foundational as you say, but time actually is 
more foundational. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. 
Dr. Evans: And time always involves the future, and that‟s the thing.  But, let me build 
up to it a little bit.  Although I think actually what I was going to do, you already did for 
me [pointing to the flowchart] when you summarized your view.  I was going to go 
through it step by step with you to make sure I understood it correctly, but I think what I 
have here pretty much paralleled what you were saying, so maybe I can cut a lot of that 
out because you‟ve already done it for us.   
We‟ve already talked about the gaps and the pulses and the way the gaps are the 
solution to the problem of non-being in your theory.  And, you want to say that these 
pulses are really memory, and you can describe them; but that‟s describing the power of 
memory, and it‟s not describing the gaps.  You only get the gaps because… In a sense 
actually built into the notion of pulse there‟s going to be a gap because the pulse is 
[snapping fingers], so it‟s just built into it you‟ve already got gaps.  So, there is a sense in 
which… Or you want to claim you‟re not apprehending the gaps, that they are 
inapprehensible.  I‟m not so sure about that, but let that one dangle for the moment. 
Now, what I want to claim following both Derrida and Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty 
and a lot of other thinkers.  I want to say, isn‟t time more basic than memory?  Time 
always involves both the future and the past because the present, as the present, 
disappears at the same time that it opens itself to the future.  It has already always 
happened and is not yet.  It is becoming, rather than being.  In a sense time is becoming.  
And, everything which embodies time, which is pretty much everything – maybe 
everything in life –, then is going to be becoming. 
Deleuze fits into this nicely where he talks about the three stages of time.  You 
went through those nicely in your dissertation.  He basically wants to claim that the 
Eternal Return which is the third synthesis of time – of the three syntheses of time.  He 
claims the Eternal Return makes a condition out of the past, a past that never was present.  
In other words, this is what he calls memory.  And, it makes an agent out of the present or 
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an imminent future.  He says this empty form of time, the Eternal Return, effaces the 
latter two determinations – the memory and the present, the past and the present – in its 
and the event‟s becoming.  So, only a new becoming, or difference, returns.   
So, it‟s clear in Deleuze that with the Eternal Return that this time which involves 
the future is more basic than memory itself because after all it effaces them and makes a 
condition out of them.  So, they serve, you might say, at its orders.  And, this is exactly 
what being itself does as a becoming.  Being as becoming is the production of difference, 
as a continuous division of itself, a differentiating of itself.  So, either the pulses and 
memory are future oriented, in which case memory is subordinate to time, or they are not, 
in which case they are not time; and, hence, can‟t qualify as memory, so long as the latter 
– memory – has any temporal meaning at all.  That‟s sort of the argument, and I wanted 
to have you respond to that. 
That‟s a lot.  We can break this down…    
Mr. Scalambrino: No, that‟s good stuff.  That‟s good stuff. 
 When I was leaning on Derrida a little bit in the Derrida chapter, I was trying to – 
and this brings up the distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive – to press 
this idea of time as discursive.  So, in so far as time is discursive, we could ask ourselves, 
are we talking about the concept or the notion of time, or are we talking about time as a 
force.  And so, for me, what I‟m trying to get at is more this idea that it‟s memory that is 
accounting for a pulse out of becoming, or we could say from becoming, rather than 
memory as merely storage. 
 I don‟t know if that gets right at the heart of what it is you‟re saying there.  
Dr. Evans: It depends on the character of that pulse.  Does it have past, present, and 
future?  Is it a pulse that is like the Eternal Return?  
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  Interesting.  Yeah.  Alright.  Forgive me, this is bringing up so 
much.  I wanted to say something like…  I wanted to keep Nietzsche out of this.  I‟m 
trying to keep Nietzsche out of this for now.  In so far as we have being that lacks 
identity.  So, that we are being, and then we don‟t gain an identity until we are higher up 
in the structure of experience.  But, still we might want to say my being is participating in 
this entire pulse – or sometimes I refer to it as a fountain out of becoming – then there is a 
sense in which prior to arriving at an identity, or prior to the content of the identity I 
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arrive at, then there is a sense in which it is just the repetition of being.  And, so if we ask 
this question of Sameness in regard to the structure of experience it seems as though we 
could say that it is the repetition of being so that once we add identity to it, then we might 
slide into questions of things like reincarnation.  I don‟t know if that‟s where you‟re 
headed with this. 
Dr. Evans: No.  
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  But, we‟re asking, is the being the Same?  Is the being the same 
within each pulse? 
Dr. Evans: For me, more it‟s, is this pulse temporal?  
Mr. Scalambrino: Is this pulse temporal? 
Dr. Evans: Is it time?  And if it‟s time does that mean that you have the future, the 
present, and the past?  
Mr. Scalambrino: If I press the structure of experience, and in so far as time comes after 
space, and space is coming out of the bottom of the pulse, then I would say it …  
This is going to get us… I hear the paradox coming: Does the pulse take time to 
get to the intuition of time, but I what I would say about that is that we are doing this 
within conceptuality.  So, we have to think about this conceptually.  I want to say that it‟s 
not… How about, I would say that perhaps the best way to get at it is not through time. 
Whether or not the pulse itself is occurring within time, it seems as though you 
must be within the pulse and, perhaps, even higher up within the pulse in order to be able 
to make a claim like that. 
Dr. Evans: But wouldn‟t that then also apply to all the claims your making about memory 
and the pulses too – that you‟re doing it conceptually, if I‟m doing it conceptually?  
Mr. Scalambrino: No, that‟s true.  Yes, that would be true as well.  So, for example, I 
would fall back on this memory research.  They certainly use time.  They say things like, 
if it‟s the case that the eye is “shooting around,” i.e. the difference between the 
antisaccades and the prosaccades, they say, you only have so much time to hit a baseball.  
So the baseball‟s coming in, you see the baseball, and you need to be able to project your 
eyes out in front of it to be able to hit the baseball, etc.  And, they certainly use time 
because they are using time in order to measure movements of the eyes and the objects 
that are moving as well.  However, it seems as though they are talking about time as an 
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after the fact because memory is required in order to provide the organization.  So, if I 
were to fall into some Aristotelian language, I would say memory functions as the 
principle of organization.       
Dr. Evans: Memory?  And, then, would it be memory more, or would it just be, in fact, a 
structure that we don‟t call memory or anything else, it‟s just a structure?  Because if its 
memory doesn‟t it have to involve time in some way to even call it memory?  And if it 
does involve time, then, we have the future coming back in, again.  
Mr. Scalambrino: Oh, okay; I see what you‟re saying.  So, this power at the ground of 
experience, should we really even call it “memory”?  That‟s an excellent question.  It 
seems like we‟re committed to saying something like, it‟s non-discursive.  It‟s got to be a 
non-discursive power.  If it‟s the power that is the – I don‟t want to say – “the condition 
for the possibility of,” but if it is the power that is allowing for the emergence of being, 
then certainly we‟d have to say in so far as it‟s a condition… I won‟t go there it would 
take too much time, but there is an excellent quote in the Critique of Pure Reason, where 
Kant says, “I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to 
cognize an object at all.” (A 402)  So, then, if that‟s the case, then why call it “memory”? 
Dr. Evans: Yeah. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. 
Dr. Evans: One other thing.  If we‟re going to look at memory research, there‟s a bigger 
question that comes up.  Think of all the philosophy of science that‟s been done around 
scientific experiments.  In other words, when the scientist does their work, when they set 
up their problematic, their problematic is a particular way of viewing the world from the 
get go.  For one thing, you‟re doing experimental stuff, you have to be able to divide up 
your terrain into independent and dependent variables, or else you won‟t be able to 
conduct an experiment and use that as a way of proving one hypothesis over another.   
So, already from the beginning there is a way of conceptualizing the field.  I call it 
“analytic discourse” as opposed to “organic discourse” that we get in phenomenology and 
other ways.  So, already there is a prior question as to the value of all that research.  If it‟s 
working within a particular framework, there is a prior question of whether that 
framework should be the framework or not.  And, that was one thing I thought, too, you 
might have to deal with when you justify… I mean you can use the scientific research 
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that you did to say this is suggestive, but I‟m actually making my point on philosophical 
grounds not empirical grounds.  I‟m not using it to prove my hypothesis; I‟m using it, 
rather, to illustrate it, and it‟s suggestive.  And, it does make some interesting 
differentiations that I can pull out of it and include in my philosophical articulations.         
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  So, forgive me.  Let me see if I can paraphrase this: What I hear 
is… Well, I‟ll just go right to it.  The language that you use in Psychology & Nihilism 
against the equating of the mental with the computer model, I feel as though there is a bit 
of that in the background.  And, I‟m actually on board with that.  In fact, what I‟m 
suggesting is something like: let‟s take their research, right?  Let‟s take their research, 
and let‟s show them that their research actually provides a result that, therefore, they‟re 
not going to be able to get where they want to go with their research. 
 There is a level of automaticity.  They love talking about fluency and 
automaticimy, automaticity.  It seems as though… And, I‟m only moving this fast 
because of time, so forgive me.  Yeah, because of time, right?  
Dr. Evans: You hope. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Yeah, right. 
 So, because there is this level of automaticity and priming at the level of 
automaticity such that, [to the crowd] if you don‟t know what “priming” is, you should 
definitely look it up.  Priming is an amazing idea.  It‟s an amazing concept, in my 
opinion.  But, in either case, what we find is that there is a sense in which it‟s automatic, 
so to speak, the power at the ground is automatic, and it‟s at play.  So, it seems to me, 
that – and I‟m speculating here, right – if they want to make a computer model of the 
mind, then they‟re going to have to make a computer that just has a whole bunch of 
thoughts that only some of them, then, it grabs hold of.   
One way we could argue: are they creating a sense of desire?  Because, I might be 
sitting here – I‟m not sitting here – but, I might be standing here and having all sorts of 
thoughts about the pizza I might have later or how well I slept last night, and all these 
things are just “shooting around” inside my head, but I don‟t organize them or grab hold 
of them.  So, I would suggest we take their research and actually head them off at the 
pass.       
Dr. Evans: And, I agree with that. 
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Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. 
Dr. Evans: Thanks. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you.  Yeah.  Yeah. 
Dr. Polansky: So, I‟ll just ask some picky sort of things.  You say: Aristotle equates non-
being with death.  Why‟d you do that? 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay [looking up a passage in the dissertation]. 
Dr. Polansky: One would assume only living things can die. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Right.  I specifically wrote this down – there it is.  I specifically wrote 
this down in case we‟d have to go there.  On pages 53 & 54 of the dissertation, yeah.  
What I suggest is that, looking at a couple different Aristotle texts here… Forgive for 
quickly paraphrasing, and sort of reading this to you: 
Whereas at Categories §14 Aristotle distinguished between “six kinds of change” 
(15a14-15) – those being: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and 
change of place –, in On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle distinguishes between 
“unqualified” and “qualified” “coming-to-be and passing-away” (318b13-318b17).  The 
first two of the six kinds of change, then, from Categories §14 pertain to unqualified 
coming-to-be and passing-away, and the last four kinds of change pertain to qualified 
coming-to-be and passing-away.  And, in Physics Book I §7 (190a33) since he is 
discussing “becoming,” Aristotle brackets destruction and separates the other kinds of 
change into “absolute becoming” which is generation or “coming into existence,” and the 
other kinds of change as “coming to be this or that.”   
 So, there‟s a sense in which, if it‟s coming to be this or that, then it already is.  So, 
we have to fall back into this other grouping of generation and destruction, in order to get 
at this unqualified not-being.  And so, in that way, it‟s not generation, so it would be 
destruction. 
Dr. Polansky: So, all destruction is death? 
Mr. Scalambrino: Oh.  Okay.  No.  I‟m not trying to suggest that all destruction is death.   
Dr. Polansky: In the discussion of Being, Becoming, and Non-Being – are you familiar 
with the Timaeus at all? 
Mr. Scalambrino: A little bit.  Not as well as you. 
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Dr. Polansky: Yeah, but Plato, when you do Being, Becoming, and then the third thing 
would seem to be necessity or receptacle.  Or… 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  Khôra? 
Dr. Polansky: Khôra.  So, is that non-being?  Or non-being?  Sorry. 
Mr. Scalambrino: I take this to be a question similar to the question that Dr. Evans asked.  
How do we want to interpret the gap?  So, I can‟t make an argument with you right now 
about the Timaeus.  I could take a look at the Timaeus again later, and try to make that 
argument with you about the Timaeus.  However, in the Derrida chapter I talk about 
Khôra.  The question is: To what extent can we equate Différance with Khôra?  And, it 
seems to me that… How to interpret these gaps… My mission here was just to indicate 
that there are gaps. 
 I‟d have to re-read the Timaeus to see if I would want to go so far as to say that 
Plato is talking about these [gaps] when he‟s talking about Khôra.  [Waving to Mr. 
Cimakasky who had just arrived]  Maybe we can ask Joe.       
 May I ask you a… Do you think that Plato already had… Do you think that Khôra 
is Plato‟s solution to the problem of non-being? 
Dr. Polansky: It‟s possible. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  Alright. 
Dr. Polansky: Well, in the Sophist that you‟re talking about, non-being seems not to be 
absolute non-being but otherness or difference, as you called it.  And the Khôra just 
seems to be difference at the level of sensible things … that Becoming is in.  
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. So, if I could go to this graphic [pointing to graphic from 
flowchart].  If we would say that this is [point to inverted cone part of the flowchart 
graphic] the receptacle, and that the receptacle is Becoming where being is emerging out 
of, then I would have to say that non-being is not the Khôra because non-being is outside 
the receptacle. 
Dr. Polansky: Okay.  Yeah, so then, my next question is about all your talk about the 
“outside.”  That‟s strange talk.  Outside the forms; outside the dialectic; you have outside 
all over the place.  What‟s that mean? 
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Mr. Scalambrino: Yeah.  Right.  This is the problem with… We could push this into the 
philosophy of mind and the mind/body problem; this is going on in Hegel, and this 
“There is no outside the text,” is going on with Derrida as well.  Yeah.  
 In so far as non-being can‟t be thought, then I wouldn‟t say that I‟m saying that 
non-being is the “outside.”  Because, to go back to something I had said earlier, that 
would be to handle it in a conceptual way with the assumption that that exhausts it, and I 
don‟t think that that exhausts it.  So, if we take it as the caveat that is non-being outside 
of being?  I mean, I would assent to something like that, but the real work needs to be 
how do you interpret the use of “outside”? 
 Just like we would want to say: It is actually true, for example, at the very 
beginning here [pointing to first step of the flowchart] when we say non-being cannot be 
thought experienced or described, we would want to assent to that actually.  But, that 
doesn‟t solve the problem.  We can overcome that aporia, but we must go to the next 
aporia also and ask:  Well then, what are we talking about? 
 So, if I want to say it‟s “outside,” well then, how could it be outside because 
aren‟t I inside, right now?  Yeah, right.  That‟s problematic. 
Dr. Polansky: Okay.  So on this [pointing to flow chart] and in here [pointing to the 
dissertation] you do ἐλαληίνλ.  That seems to be contrary, but you seem to treat it fairly 
peculiarly.  On this chart you have ἐλαληίνλ is difference, and then difference in itself is 
ἕηεξνλ.  That seems strange.  What do you understand contrariety to be?  Because you 
say somewhere that: “contrariety is the greatest opposition”…  
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  That‟s a direct quote out of Aristotle (Metaphysics X §4, 
1055a5).  So, if we‟re doing Aristotle here, I was trying to look at the different types of 
opposition that Aristotle talks about, and then to actually look [further] to see what he 
was doing with enantion and what he was doing with heteron in the actual text. 
 But I would say, first and foremost, this enantion/heteron business I‟m borrowing 
from Heidegger.  So, Heidegger‟s commentary on the Sophist… I‟m borrowing 
Heidegger‟s reading of the Sophist in order to make this move a little faster, but it does 
seem as though, for example, in the Aristotle quotes that I provided [in the original 
Greek], it does seem as though it pertains in so far as Aristotle seems interested more in 
conceptual contrariety.  Which is why immediately with Aristotle, if we‟re talking about 
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non-being, then suddenly we‟re talking about the principle of non-contradiction.  But see, 
this is why I didn‟t want to do Aristotle because I don‟t … I wouldn‟t follow him there.  I 
don‟t think that necessarily I‟m trying to refute the principle of non-contradiction or the 
law of non-contradiction. 
Dr. Polansky: Okay.  Let‟s let the audience ask questions. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  Thank you. 
§4 Questions from the Audience –  
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  So, [to the audience] what questions do you have? 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  Jim. 
Mr. Bahoh: Well, I haven‟t read your dissertation, so I don‟t understand the details of it.  
But, several years ago we had many conversations about memory and your interest in the 
topic of memory.  And, I want to ask you or provide a prompt for you to expand on that a 
little bit.  I‟m curious about the role that concept of memory is playing in your overall 
project.  I‟m interested in what your concept of memory is but especially in what its role 
is.   
Particularly in so far as you mentioned that Nietzsche is in the background.  And 
you also mentioned that you don‟t want to engage Nietzsche at this point.  So, I want to 
ask you to engage with Nietzsche, and you don‟t have to, you can tell me my question … 
Mr. Scalambrino: No.  No.  I appreciate it. 
Dr. Selcer: Before you start to answer that, because I‟m going to have to go catch a plane 
fairly soon, we‟re just going to go deliberate in the other room.  While you continue to 
take questions and answer them. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  Thank you. 
Mr. Bahoh: So, this is my question.  You‟re saying in the outline you gave us all that you 
use this concept of the abyss being the play-ground of being.  And, I like this image.  I 
like this way of phrasing it.  And, the image immediately invokes childhood. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  Yes, and the Nietzschean Child. 
Mr. Bahoh: Right. So, Nietzsche brings Zarathustra with the Three Metamorphoses, and 
the third metamorphosis is the child.  And, the child is specifically the one who can 
forget. 
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Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  Interesting, yeah, I think this was Fritz‟s initial reading as well 
[from Dr. Wurzer‟s Graduate Seminar on Nietzsche]. 
Mr. Bahoh: So, I‟m curious as to what the role of memory is in your project, particularly 
with respect to this idea of play-ground of being, memory being the play-ground of being 
or the abyss – because in the Nietzschean context, the ability to really play or the ability 
to do the Gay Science is contingent upon the ability to forget. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  Right.  Excellent question.  Okay.  Let me share this with you 
because this is an example of “priming.”  I‟m answering your question. 
 So, priming, it‟s essentially unanimous, go look this stuff up on your own, I truly 
encourage you: the suggestion is that priming permeates memory.  So, there are all 
different types of priming.  There‟s conceptual priming; there‟s semantic priming; and 
there‟s even perceptual and sensory priming.  Okay, so let me give you an example of 
conceptual priming, so that analogously you can recognize what else is going on. 
 I‟m going to give you five words.  I‟m just going to say five words to you, and 
watch what is at play here.  There are two different sets of five words.  The first set goes 
like this: 
   Apple, Teacher, Chalkboard, Recess, Yellow 
And, when people are asked: What is it that you‟re thinking of?  Usually it‟s pretty close 
to being a school bus.  Right?  Apple, Teacher, Chalkboard, Recess, Yellow; usually 
people respond with “School Bus.”  Now let me give you the second list: 
   Apple, Grapes, Orange, Pear, Yellow 
Most people say “Lemon” or “Banana.”  Now, what‟s interesting about these two lists: 
They both start with “Apple,” and they both end with “Yellow.”  There‟s only three in 
between that are different, and what this means is that we are “primed” to arrive at a 
certain target.   
Well, if you do this analogously, to suggest on a sensory level: Well, if I‟m 
sensing this; I‟m sensing that; then, I‟m primed in my sensory pursuit of what it is I‟m 
going to gain out of the environment next.  I‟m primed for that.  And, we could say on a 
Nietzschean level: [I‟m primed as to] how I‟m going to interpret that [what comes next]. 
So, that‟s a conceptual example, but when you look at it on the level of 
perceptual, it seems to me that it‟s an example of how it is a play-ground.  It‟s an 
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example of how it is a play-ground because it‟s moving on its own.  And I should have 
used this when he [Dr. Evans] was talking with me.  It’s moving on its own, and it must 
be memory because it’s being altered as it moves.  So, just like both lists start off with 
“Apple,” then once they go to either “Teacher” or “Grapes,” it‟s starting to move.  Now, 
it‟s playing on its own, but it is remembering the ground that it is covering.  So, it‟s in 
that way that I would say the ground is governed by play. 
Now, when you read the Critique of Pure Reason there is really only a page on 
what Kant calls “affinity.”  So, there is a sense in which he just blows right by this, and 
doesn‟t spend much time on it.  But he suggests, somehow at the level of the sensory 
manifold – the synopsis of the sensory manifold – somehow the connection between 
the…  What is unfolded in the sensory manifold, somehow these things are connected to 
one another.  And, he claims that it‟s governed by “affinity.”  This is all in the 
Dissertation Abstract.  He says it‟s governed by affinity, but he thinks that affinity is 
ultimately an aspect of sense, of just pure sensation.  But see, that leaves too much up to 
chance in the sense that we just don‟t understand how it works.  But, when you ground it 
in memory governed by priming, then, suddenly you‟re able to understand how it plays.    
 Any other questions?  Okay, Chris. 
Mr. Mountenay: I keep thinking of, and it‟s either in the end of the first or the beginning 
of the second book of The World as Will and Representation by Schopenhauer, where he 
brings up the problem that… He‟s separated the world into will and representation, and I 
think he‟s one of the first philosophers who exists at a time when science is saying, you 
know on the grand scale of things, human existence hasn‟t been that long.  We‟ve been 
around for just a fraction of geologic time, and so he asks the question, is there 
representation before there is something to be represented to?  
I think he says, it was probably some primal creature, 500 million years back or 
so… So, I guess my question – a truncated version: Is there such a thing as pre-Cambrian 
non-being?  I mean, before there are creatures who have enough going on to have 
memory, cause let‟s say memory goes back to vertebrates – let‟s say vertebrates were 
able to have memory – is there non-being before that, or is that even a non-question? 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. So, this is invoking one of the Skeptical Tropes or the Skeptical 
Modes. 
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Mr. Mountenay: It‟s the first one. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Right.  And, I was expecting Dr. Polansky to throw this at me as well.  
So, the way I would respond to this via Schopenhauer is that Schopenhauer is a good 
example of an attempt to solve this problem post-Kant.  What Schopenhauer is 
suggesting that the ground is actually “Will.”  He comes right out and says it, and he even 
points back to the Sophist; he says the solution to the problem of non-being is the denial 
of the will. 
 So, you see how this works.  The people who are trying to solve this problem say, 
there is the structure of experience, and whatever it is that is governing the ground of 
experience, we must deny [i.e. negate] that.  Then we get a solution.  He says, it‟s will, 
and I say, it‟s memory. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Good question.  Patrick.   
Mr. Reider: I actually wanted to return to the question that Dr. Evans posed earlier.  I was 
curious about this question of time.  Are we talking about an ontological question? Or, 
are we talking about what is logically prior?  It seems to me that if we are going to 
address this problem from what is logically prior, in the sense that we are dealing with 
this question of how we can arrive at a resolution of it, we need to start with what factors 
are available to us, and that‟s not going to immediately be the ontological question. It‟s 
going to be memory, which seems to me to allow for the experience of time.  And, so, in 
that sense, could say that memory is primary, rather than time – as being logically prior 
but not ontologically prior? 
Mr. Scalambrino: Yeah, so, again, I take this to be a heavy heavy paradoxical response.  
This idea, for example, I think this hearkens back to: Does God create in time?  Did it 
take God time to create the world, etc? Is God in time or outside of time?  That sort of 
stuff…  That‟s heavy.  That‟s very heavy. 
 I, again, I tried to follow the path that these other philosophers were following, in 
order to solve this problem.  So, for example, as Chris brings up, Schopenhauer is another 
good example because he‟s post-Kant.  And, so, [the path seems to be] let‟s look at the 
structure of experience – this is why the flowchart is set up as it is – what‟s at the ground 
of the structure of experience?  How would we negate that?  What would it look like if 
we were to negate it? 
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 So, when I follow that path, and I arrive at the ground as memory, then the 
negation is providing us with this gap.  And, it meets the criteria. 
 I would have to go back and look to see, if we worked with this idea of time, does 
it meet the criteria?  And, to what extent would it be different from Heidegger‟s Being & 
Time?  Or, to what extent is there an overlap between my project and Heidegger‟s.   
Dr. Evans: If we‟re talking ontologically, then we‟re saying ontologically time exists, 
time is the unfolding of everything, and memory is just part of it.  And, if memory is 
taken apart from that, then do we still call it “memory” anymore?  If we are talking about 
experiential time, then “memory” is a bit misleading; it‟s reifying because really re-
membering is what‟s going on, and remembering does involves time.  
Mr. Scalambrino: So, briefly, one of the ways we could do this is to say: Within the 
pulse, it is as if within the pulse you are remembering from inside the other pulse, but 
really it‟s the case that the pulse contains memory.  So, that you‟re really remembering 
within the pulse, but it seems like you‟re remembering within the “prior” pulse.  Then, 
once we try to start talking about it, you have to use time, because I have to start saying 
the “prior,” the “next,” etc. 
 It‟s a good question.  Again, though, I still think following the path of these other 
philosophers, really the last key was: What is the ground?  And, then, looking at the 
empirical memory research in order to enunciate the ground, if in fact it is memory this 
would be the outcome.  Does that outcome meet the criteria?  I think it does.  
Dr. Selcer: Frank, I‟m going to have to go. 
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.  Cheers. 
Dr. Selcer: I just wanted to say: Congratulations, we signed off on the paper. 
[Pause for applause] 
Dr. Scalambrino: Thank you.  Thank you very much. 
Dr. Selcer: So, there‟s no reason the conversation can‟t continue, but unfortunately I 
won‟t be here for it. 
 Dr. Scalambrino: Thank you.  Thank you everyone for being here. 
 
